The Opposition's Limited Options: How Parliament Can Block Pashinyan Without Votes to Remove Him
The opposition did not gain enough votes to change the government. But they have enough votes not to allow this government to pass decisions that require a referendum or two-thirds majority.
The June 2026 Armenian parliamentary elections delivered a fragmented result. Pashinyan’s Civil Contract won a majority of seats, but the opposition-Strong Armenia, Hayastan Dashinq, and others-holds enough seats to deny the two-thirds supermajority required for major decisions. These include ratifying international agreements, amending the constitution, and calling referendums. This mathematical reality constrains Pashinyan’s power far more than a simple majority might suggest.
Aghajanian explains the opposition’s strategy as working in two phases. Currently, parties like Strong Armenia attempt to signal willingness to cooperate on matters of national interest, hoping to demonstrate to the government (and the West) that constructive governance is possible if Pashinyan adopts policies serving Armenian interests rather than foreign ones. This creates space for potential Civil Contract defectors-MPs who might break ranks if convinced that opposing certain measures serves their political future better than loyalty to Pashinyan.
The real test comes when TRIPP ratification and the new constitution reach parliament. Ambassador predicts that these two issues will shatter any veneer of cooperation. TRIPP ratification requires a two-thirds vote; the opposition can block it. Constitutional changes similarly require supermajority support. If Pashinyan attempts to bypass the opposition through back channels or coercion, the parliamentary coalition will fracture visibly, revealing whether any Civil Contract MPs are willing to risk defection.
Aghajanian is skeptical this will happen soon, noting that Civil Contract candidate selection was designed to ensure loyalty through leverage and dependency. However, she suggests the opposition’s primary mandate is not to remove Pashinyan immediately but to delay implementation of policies that compromise Armenian sovereignty until public opinion shifts or external circumstances change. This buying-time strategy acknowledges that opposition parties lack votes to rule but possess enough power to obstruct.
Transcript
Dziunik Aghajanian: Well, let's face the situation that the opposition did not gain enough votes to change the government, to get into the ruling positions. But they have enough votes not to allow this government to pass decisions that require a referendum. Or there are several decisions that the National Assembly cannot pass without the two-thirds vote. So what I think the parties are doing is trying to create a situation when it is ripe, they will gain additional votes from the other side. So the opposition is trying to work in a way that would probably at the right moment get some Civil Contract members join their endeavor in saying goodbye to Pashinyan. I think in the coming months it's not going to happen. And knowing how the Civil Contract selection was made, I don't believe any of these people that are currently in