Ukraine's Pragmatic Reset with Georgia: Abandoning Regime Change
Vladimir Zelensky sanctioned the Prime Minister of Georgia, called him a pro-Russian agent, and at some point they decided to unilaterally initiate dialogue in Yerevan. What changed?
Archil Sikharulidze provides a sharp geopolitical analysis of a dramatic reversal in Ukraine’s approach to Georgia, showing how hard power and resource constraints force great powers to abandon ideological consistency. Initially, Zelensky sanctioned Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, branded him pro-Russian, and avoided engagement with the Georgian government. European and Western officials supported this position, treating Georgian Dream as an adversary because it refused to join the campaign to isolate Russia. However, by 2026, Zelensky met directly with the very figure he had sanctioned, signaling a complete reset in Kyiv-Tbilisi relations. Sikharulidze argues this reversal reflects a fundamental strategic realization: Ukraine cannot afford to have enemies in the South Caucasus when it is fighting for survival. Georgia remains crucial for humanitarian aid, refugee support, and regional stability. More broadly, Ukraine discovered that its attempt to extend its geopolitical standards to the region-demanding that all states treat Russia as an existential enemy-was failing. India, China, and many other nations either stayed neutral or openly prioritized pragmatism over ideological alignment with Kyiv. Faced with limited allies and mounting pressure, Zelensky chose pragmatism: restore the relationship that should never have been damaged. Sikharulidze argues this reversal is itself pragmatic, not naive. Ukraine needs Georgia far more than it can afford to isolate it. The reset also signals to other South Caucasus states that ideological pressure from Kyiv has limits and that nations pursuing their own interests will not face indefinite punishment. This shift has implications for EU policy as well, suggesting that even Western institutions are beginning to recognize that pragmatism may trump ideology in a multipolar world.
Transcript
Hovik Manucharyan: If we have time, Hovik Manucharyan: I might ask some more questions about the internal politics in Georgia Hovik Manucharyan: because I think it's all related. Hovik Manucharyan: But since we're on the topic of Georgian and European relations, Hovik Manucharyan: your recent article, “Why Does Ukraine Suddenly Need Georgia?” Hovik Manucharyan: In that article, Hovik Manucharyan: you argue that Kyiv has softened its approach towards Georgian Dream Hovik Manucharyan: after earlier attempts to isolate the government. Hovik Manucharyan: Now, why does Ukraine Hovik Manucharyan: What other signs are there for this warming of relations? Hovik Manucharyan: And has Kyiv accepted that the Georgian Dream is likely to remain in power in the coming years? Hovik Manucharyan: This is an excellent question. Archil Sikharulidze: I think there are two standpoints, mine and the opposite one. Archil Sikharulidze: The opposite view, usually held by strong supporters of Ukraine, Archil Sikharulidze: say that, well, Archil Sikharulidze: big brother, Archil Sikharulidze: we had previously one big brother, Russia, Archil Sikharulidze: now we have another big brother, Archil Sikharulidze: Ukraine, Archil Sikharulidze: decided that Georgia is poor and helpless, Archil Sikharulidze: that our country is being destroyed by Georgian Dream, Archil Sikharulidze: so they decided to still communicate with Prime Minister of Georgia and Archil Sikharulidze: to somehow help Georgia come out of this political crisis. Archil Sikharulidze: I think this narrative is extremely naive, even though I would say it's stupid.