If Russia Wins Ukraine But Loses Armenia: Is That a Strategic Victory?

Dr. Suslov presents a strategic paradox that haunts contemporary Russian foreign policy: the possibility that Moscow could achieve its military objectives in Ukraine while simultaneously losing diplomatic and geopolitical influence across the post-Soviet space. If Russia prevails on the battlefield in Ukraine but sees Armenia pivot toward Europe, Moldova slip further from its orbit, and Turkish-American influence expand across the South Caucasus, would that constitute a strategic victory for Russia? The question cuts to the heart of whether military triumph translates into long-term geopolitical advantage.

Suslov’s answer is nuanced. He argues that nothing in international relations is truly irreversible, citing the Russian-Georgian relationship as a prime example. After the August 2008 war, many observers predicted a permanent rupture between Moscow and Tbilisi. Yet today, paradoxically, Russian-Georgian relations are described as among the most stable in the South Caucasus, despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties. This is because geography, geopolitical necessity, and economic interdependence inexorably pull Georgia back toward Russia, even when political elites in Tbilisi pursue Western alignment. The same logic, Suslov suggests, could eventually apply to Armenia and Moldova: Western promises of market access and integration may eventually disappoint, and the gravitational pull of geography and strategic necessity will reassert itself.

However, Suslov’s optimism comes with a caveat: the path back to Russian influence need not be as fraught and costly as it was with Georgia. Ideally, Armenia would avoid a military conflict with Russia (as Georgia experienced) and would negotiate a new modus vivendi through peaceful adjustment of expectations and interests. The underlying argument is that Russia’s long-term influence in the South Caucasus cannot be permanently destroyed by short-term Western initiatives, but it can be significantly degraded if Moscow allows the window of opportunity to close. The question for Russian policymakers is whether winning in Ukraine while losing Armenia represents strategic success or a Pyrrhic victory that undermines Russia’s broader civilizational and regional role.