Pashinyan Is Preparing for New Elections and Constitutional Crisis
He's trying to prepare the political system and environment for the looming crises which are going to come unavoidably and inevitably.
Dr. Grigoryan analyzes a pattern in Pashinyan’s post-election moves that suggests preparation for renewed confrontation. The cancellation of results in three precincts-specifically designed to exclude Prosperous Armenia while securing a three-fifths majority-revealed a strategic calculation. But the deeper preparation is underway through proposed legislation to ban political parties found guilty of bribery and to disenfranchise Armenians who spend more than six months abroad.
These moves appear contradictory on their surface. Pashinyan claims 65 percent of diaspora Armenians support him, yet proposes restricting their voting rights. Grigoryan argues this inconsistency reveals Pashinyan’s own assessment: he does not believe his stated numbers and is preparing for scenarios where he cannot rely on diaspora support. The bribery legislation-despite his accusation that 70 percent of opposition voters received bribes-lacks any actual prosecutions or court judgments. The law appears designed as a preventive tool for potential future elections.
What is Pashinyan preparing for? Grigoryan identifies inevitable crises stemming from contradictions in his strategic position. Russia has explicitly stated Armenia cannot sit on two chairs indefinitely and must choose strategic orientation. Pashinyan cannot simultaneously pursue TRIPP, integrate with Europe, and maintain CSTO membership. Constitutional changes-promised to Azerbaijan-may trigger another domestic crisis. The opposition, if it learns from mistakes, could mount a stronger challenge in subsequent elections.
By pre-positioning legislative tools to ban opposition parties and restrict diaspora voting, Pashinyan is building an institutional foundation for managing these crises without risking genuine electoral competition. Grigoryan notes this reflects the typical trajectory of revolutionary regimes: initial democratic legitimacy gives way to institutional consolidation of power as messianically-minded leaders prioritize their “salvation project” over democratic norms. Pashinyan, like revolutionary leaders before him, may believe no cost is too high for implementing his strategic vision.
The opposition’s path forward depends on whether new election would favor them or the ruling party. Without clear answers-and without fundamental opposition reform-even changed circumstances may not dislodge an entrenched incumbent using institutional tools to short-circuit democratic competition.
Transcript
Arman: I think there is some kind of a poison pill in these elections, especially in the Arman: in the cancellation of the results in these three districts and quite blatantly Arman: leaving Prosperous Armenia out of it so that he could get three-fifths majority. Arman: I think most people are, Arman: as you pointed out, Arman: even some of his supporters are not closing their eyes on these actions and are Arman: openly criticizing it. Arman: So he may have certain concerns and I think the crisis is not over around Armenia. Arman: At a certain point he will have to make certain decisions, right? Arman: with regard to the constitutional changes, with regard to the peace treaty with Azerbaijan. Arman: He's going to have to make decisions with regard to the country's strategic orientation. Arman: Russians have already quite unequivocally stated that you're not going to be Arman: allowed to sit on two chairs at the same time and you have to make certain tough Arman: decisions. Arman: Is he going to get out of the Arman: The CSTO or the Eurasian Economic Union is he really going to start a process of Arman: full integration with the European Union although nobody from the European Union