The opposition's only remaining path: Constitutional Court and local elections
Opposition should take mandates. If opposition takes a radical stance and creates a shadow government, Pashinyan would crack down forcefully and jail all the members. There is a major local election round in September and October this year.
Faced with a rigged election and an emboldened authoritarian government, Armenia’s opposition confronts a narrow and difficult choice. Political scientist Hrant Mikaelian argues against the most radical option: rejecting parliamentary mandates and declaring non-recognition of the new government. While emotionally satisfying to some opposition supporters, this stance would produce one of two disastrous outcomes. First, opposition parties that refuse to enter parliament would gradually lose relevance and dissolve due to reduced participation and visibility, a pattern observed repeatedly in other democracies. Second, if the opposition created a rival government or shadow parliament, Pashinyan would have the pretext and justification to jail opposition leaders en masse.
Instead, Mikaelian recommends that opposition parties accept their parliamentary mandates and use the legislature as a platform. Even with a minority, opposition deputies can expose government abuses, propose alternative legislation, and maintain their organizational capacity. The Constitutional Court path remains open: if the court invalidates the cancellation of results in the three precincts where Prosperous Armenia was eliminated, that party would re-enter parliament, forcing Pashinyan to seek consensus on major issues rather than governing as a near-absolute majority.
Crucially, three to four months after the June election, Armenia will hold local elections in September and October. These races will determine mayors and local councils in Vanadzor, Gyumri, and many other towns across the country. If the opposition organizes effectively, Mikaelian argues, it can win most of these races, demonstrating continued public support and rebuilding institutional presence at the grassroots. This strategy is unglamorous-it requires patience, legal struggle, and careful coalition-building-but it offers the only realistic path to eventual political recovery in an environment of severe repression.