Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed Bedrossian: Hello, everyone, and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode.
Asbed Bedrossian: We are joined by Mr. Eldar Mamedov, a former Latvian diplomat and a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute, also a member of the Pugwash Council on Science and World Affairs. He is here to discuss the politics and dynamics of the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Israel relationship, how it affects Iran’s northern border and the South Caucasus. Mr.
Mamedov, welcome back to our podcast.
Eldar Mamedov: Pleasure to be with you, as always.
Hovik Manucharyan: Welcome, Mr.
Hovik Manucharyan: Mamedov. Let’s begin our discussion by talking about this so-called hijab dispute in Azerbaijan.
Eldar Mamedov: Thank you.
Hovik Manucharyan: For most of the media, and I think for us as well, it started unexpectedly in September when the Aliyev regime, their cabinet, passed a resolution, number 309 in Azerbaijan, that restricted clothing that’s inconsistent with secular education. without explicitly naming the hijab. But then what followed was media reports of students being excluded over headscarves and this crackdown on the hijab, which to me came from almost nowhere, drew criticism both from Iran and Turkey. But especially some Turkish Islamists were very vocal about it. and this escalated into a public war of words between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
The Azerbaijani parliamentary working group, for instance, condemned the criticism from AKP and specifically condemned Saral and accusing him of interference. Oktay Saral, for those who don’t know, was Erdogan’s advisor. And things escalated quite dramatically for a period. Azerbaijan declared 31 Turkish politicians as persona non grata, even including Fatih Erbakan.
For those who don’t know, Necmettin Erbakan, his father, who was a famous Islamist. And eventually things appeared to settle with Erdogan sacking his advisor things started to cool down, and eventually Erdogan went to Shushi, occupied Shushi, and declared that they’re reaffirming their alliance with Azerbaijan. So it seemed like everything was trying to be ironed out and mended. me, this ended as unexpectedly as it came.
So, Eldar, help us understand what explains the timing and the intensity of this dispute, and how it suddenly also was extinguished. and is this a struggle over religious freedom or assertion of autonomy or what else could it be
Eldar Mamedov: Well, I would point out several factors at play here. So, first of all, the restrictions, they came out pretty much out of nowhere. But that’s not the first time. There were such campaigns in Azerbaijan before, and there were also protests, and some activists were arrested and promptly accused of being Iranian agents.
Indeed, Turkey has been more vocal in protesting on this issue rather than Iran, which of course puts the Aliyev government in a rather delicate situation because unlike Iran, Turkey is a very close ally. And you, of course, know this slogan, one people, two states. So it seems that the crisis was used in Baku to emphasize the two states element of the equation. Baku clearly is very anxious to demonstrate to the whole world that it’s an independent power, that it’s quite assertive and quite capable of asserting its own autonomy.
Of course, after the military success in 2020 and 2023 in Karabakh, the Aliyev regime has grown progressively more hubristic. And let’s not forget that before this headscarf crisis, there was also a speech by Aliyev in which he said that no one helped Azerbaijan to recover Nagorno-Karabakh . a very clear message to countries like Turkey, but not also Pakistan as well, who were, in fact, very supportive of Azerbaijan at that juncture. So, of course, all of that created this negative environment between Baku and Ankara. And you are right to point out that some Islamically-minded in Turkey.
They staged protest against Azerbaijan allegations in Turkish city. And in Baku, it was seen as an evidence that the Turkish state is somehow plotting against Azerbaijan and undermining this relationship with Baku. Why have they made this assessment? Because Because in Azerbaijan there are no spontaneous protests because there is no political freedom.
And even though Turkey is also moving under President Erdogan increasingly in the authoritarian direction, it’s still not completely the case in Turkey that any kind of civic or dissident activity is repressed. So here we see that some activists from some Islamically, let’s say, sensitive NGOs, they staged those protests, which they did totally spontaneously. There’s no evidence that anyone orchestrated that.
And in fact, it would be absurd even to suggest such a thing, given how sensitive the headscarf issue has been for decades in Turkey. and the ruling party itself, Erdogan’s party, has grown to power to a great extent by defending the religious freedoms under the formerly very strict Kemalist regime in Turkey. So they did not need any, let’s say, orchestration from above to go out and protest. But of course, since in Baku, no protests can happen legally if they are not greenlighted
Hovik Manucharyan: Sanctioned, yeah.
Eldar Mamedov: by the government. So it was seen as a kind of attack on Baku and on Ankara-Baku relationship. So hence, we’ve seen some pretty wild accusations, even of Hakan Fidan, the foreign minister, plotting a coup in Baku, which is obviously an observer position, which has been taken off the website, one of the websites that spread it, but of course it’s a pro-government website. So yeah, I would say that for Baku, the crisis was instrumentalized to show that the equation in Ankara-Baku relationship has changed.
The equation that assumed that Ankara was somehow the elder brother, the senior partner, disallines, that that no longer is the case. Baku sees itself as an equal, and the whole crisis was instrumentalized to assert this newfound self -perception of Azerbaijani government.
Hovik Manucharyan: There was some interesting support from media associated with Israel in support
Hovik Manucharyan: of Azerbaijan. I mean, is Israel a factor in all of this, do you think, in this dispute specifically?
Eldar Mamedov: Definitely. Definitely Israel is a factor. Let’s not forget that Israel has very close strategic relationship with Azerbaijan and at the same time Israel frames Turkey as a kind of new Iran. And this is not just rhetorical, it’s something that has been actually said by very, let’s say, renowned Israeli politicians such as Naftali Bennett, and that was also amplified in think tank materials and so.
So in this case, I should point out to, when we talk about Israeli kind of trace, I would point to Joseph Epstein, who is director of so-called Turan Research Center at the Yorktown University. But he also happens to be a fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs Research Center or whatever it’s called, think tank in Israel. And he is the one who published just a few days after the ban came into effect in Azerbaijan. He published a piece which actually advocated, defended the decision, the hijab ban in Azerbaijan, on the grounds of national sovereignty as opposed to religious freedom.
So for them, the actors that are close to the Israeli line, they frame this issue and the secularism in countries like Azerbaijan as a matter of national security and sovereignty, not as a religious freedom. Why is that? Why is this sovereign secularity so important here? Very simple, because the headscarf issue is something very potent, very powerful symbolically in uniting Muslims across the borders.
So the more, the stronger there is transnational Muslim identity across different countries, the stronger there is concern for Palestinian cause. and in Israel’s interest it is to sever as much as possible this resonance Central Asia such as Kazakhstan especially they are particularly targeted for this sort of strategy those countries they all have Soviet heritage they have secular elites and they are being and used to build this so-called Turkic arc, which would not only contain Iran, but also Turkey.
And obviously, since Israel now frames Turkey as its new enemy, it is interested in building up countries that would play the role of containing Turkey and not just Iran. And obviously, Azerbaijan, with its current regime, is the primary and willing accomplice for that strategy. But I would say that to an increasing degree, the same could be said about Kazakhstan as well.
Asbed Bedrossian: Mr. Mamedov, it seems like this whole hijab issue, let’s call it, has done some damage to Erdogan’s administration. And so he was, in a way to say, very diplomatic about the whole affair, even though he fired a couple of people and that didn’t seem like it made a lot of
Eldar Mamedov: Thank you.
Asbed Bedrossian: difference for Aliyev. He did not escalate. So on November 8, he was in Shushi, as we noted. And but the display was quite effusive, the brotherly love and the togetherness and everything.
What was the reason why Turkey was so or Erdogan was so came back so hard to try and make up for the issue?
Eldar Mamedov: Well, I think there are a lot of issues that still unite Azerbaijan and Turkey very closely. The energy cooperation, defense cooperation. And Turkey still sees Azerbaijan as a key partner to expand its geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus, but also as a gateway to Central Asia. you are quite right to say that this excessive deference that Erdogan showed to Aliyev that it has provoked some discontent in Turkey especially among the circles that take religious freedom seriously given the background of their own struggles but I think it also also shows, confronts Turkey with its own predicament.
Turkey, on the one hand, is playing up the pan-Turkic card, especially because there is a far-right nationalist party that is in coalition with Erdogan, the Devlet Bahceli Party, nationalistic, whatever it’s called, movement party. So they are very committed to this idea of greater Turan of Turkic people. So that pulls Erdogan to the east. At the same time, the Islamist element of his coalition pulls him to the south, to the Arab world, to make a pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
So it’s kind of, you know, situation, kind of balancing act that he must play to reconcile the pan-Turkic and pan-Islamist aspirations, because those are not only not necessarily complementary, they can also be in conflict, as we can see.
Asbed Bedrossian: Right.
Eldar Mamedov: The pan-Turkic dimension of Turkish foreign policy is in fact in conflict with the pan-Islamist one, as we’ve seen concretely in the case of this latest flare-up with Azerbaijan. But let me also tell you that this contradiction is not easily reconcilable. And the structural drivers of these divergences, which has to do with Israel, which has to do with relations with the Muslim world, and the different ways that Turkey and Azerbaijan both approach those relationships, these are structural drivers of the conflict.
And they’re not going to go away simply because Erdogan went to see Aliyev and they both displayed this brotherly fraternal warmth and friendship. This is not going to go away.
Asbed Bedrossian: That’s a really good point you make because I was going to ask you if the issue has been fixed or has it just been shoved back under the covers. A quick question to you, and I haven’t followed up on this, I’m sorry. Has this issue resonated in Pakistan and how?
Eldar Mamedov: Well, yes. I mean, it resonated in Pakistan in the sense that it’s obviously a profoundly Islamic country.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah.
Eldar Mamedov: It has been created as a homeland for Muslims by its founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, although it was never conceived as a theocratic country, as an Islamist country. But Muslim identity is, of course, very important for the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis. And two things really ruffled the feathers the wrong way in Pakistan. One was this Aliyev’s rather boastful statement that no country has helped Azerbaijan during the Karabakh war.
And the second, of course, was the issue of the headscarves. In fact, one pretty well-known Pakistani academic, he told me privately that if a government in Pakistan were to move in that direction, banning headscarves. It would have been immediately toppled.
Asbed Bedrossian: Heh heh heh.
Eldar Mamedov: But obviously that’s not the case in Azerbaijan. But to your point, indeed it was perceived rather negatively, I would say.
Asbed Bedrossian: Okay. Well, so turning our attention to some of these bilateral relationships, as we noted, the Baku-Tel-Aviv relationship is very strong right now. In fact, Israeli president Herzog was in Baku in October. and Turkey-Israel relationships are pretty acrimonious, and I think that’s on behalf of the Israel-Iran conflict that is going on, the Gaza genocide that’s going on. And on November 11, just a few days ago, Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a pretty harsh rebuke of the Israeli Foreign Ministry.
What does Baku obtain from its relationship with Israel that Ankara cannot provide? Israel obtained from Baku that it can readily replace
Eldar Mamedov: Well, for Baku, as I noted earlier, the whole issue of diversifying its relationships is to assert its independence from any big powers. That is true in equal measure to Russia, but also as we have seen for Turkey. So, Azerbaijani leadership, especially security apparatus, they don’t want to be seen as anyone’s junior partner, and that includes Turkey as well. So what can Israel offer to Azerbaijan?
It’s obviously the modern cutting-edge weaponry. In fact, it was detailed in a very way by such newspapers as Haaretz, the leading newspaper in Israel. they actually did a very good job in tracing down Israel’s help for ethnic cleansing that Azerbaijan conducted in Karabakh there’s a well known article called Israel’s fingerprints fingertips all over ethnic cleansing in Karabakh so in 2023 I would suggest everyone who wants to learn more about Israel-Azerbaijani relationship acquainted with that article.
So apart from that very important element is also Israeli lobby in Washington which is very friendly to Azerbaijan and pushes Azerbaijani narratives and interests such as Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Hudson Institute, so all these are some other outfits, Jewish Institute for National Security, JINSA it’s called, that are promoting from time to time, quite consistently actually, Azerbaijani narratives. Concretely, positioning Azerbaijan as a kind of Western American foothold squeezed between Russia and Iran. But of course, It’s Iran that is mostly of interest to them.
And, of course, what Israel obtains is a foothold very much on the northern borders of Iran in the shape of Republic of Azerbaijan. But there is also this consistent thread of thought in Israeli, some of Israeli strategic thinking that Azerbaijani minority in Iran could somehow be induced to revolt against the government in Tehran and that Baku can be helpful in that endeavor. Of course, this is also being promoted very aggressively by structures like FDD, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and also Hudson Institute. But of course, it’s delusional.
Everybody who has a minimal notion of Iran and of the Azerbaijani community in Iran knows that it’s a thoroughly patriotic, very well-integrated community, which does not share at all Baku views on geopolitics, on relations with Armenia and general positioning. in the region. So this idea has been discredited so many times at every juncture, but they’re still pushing for it.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah. Mr. Mamedov, we will find that article that you mentioned about Israel’s fingerprints all over the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Eldar Mamedov: I can say it.
Asbed Bedrossian: We’ll put it in our show notes at podcasts.groong.org slash episode number.
Eldar Mamedov: Hmm.
Hovik Manucharyan: think when we talked, was it earlier this year, March, I believe.
Eldar Mamedov: Yeah.
Hovik Manucharyan: When we talked in March, it was, of course, right after and during the U.S.-Israeli attack against Iran. And, you know, at that time, I think was publicly trying to distance from Israel. And you, I think, yourself mentioned that Aliyev is in trouble because, you know, he has for years, you know, derived a lot of benefit from the relationship with Tel Aviv. implication, I think, is that Aliyev still has a lot of debt to repay to Israel for its help in the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh.
Now, specifically in the context of the Turkey-Israel and Azerbaijan triangle, implication, I think, is that Aliyev still has a lot of debt to repay to Israel for its help in the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh. because we see that increasing as well. And what concrete developments would force a change in the situation or a choice or between, you know, a choice in direction for the regime in Baku, which so far seems to be doubling down on its relationship with Tel Aviv.
Eldar Mamedov: Well, I think that, as I said, Baku clearly sees an upside in its relations with Israel. Military cooperation is one thing. Diplomatic support in Washington is another thing. When it comes specifically to Iran, since you mentioned it, I think Turkey has played a role in sort of discouraging Aliyev from supporting Israel too much in March.
And that is because of Turkey’s own concerns. The destabilized Iran would mean the risk of emergence of a Kurdish entity on the territory of Iran, which obviously Turkey sees as a primary national security threat to itself. On the other hand, Iran itself has acted. If you recall, there were a couple of drones sent, four drones sent from Iranian territory, which hit airports in Nakhijevan . and Aliyev made a very strong, threatening statement, threatening with iron fist and promising retaliation.
Yet in reality, none of that happened. What happened was that he sent instead some cargoes with humanitarian help for Nowruz, Persian New Year, in both Iran and Azerbaijan. So all that bravado has been exposed as a bluff. Obviously, Aliyev is very careful not to provoke direct confrontation with Iran because he knows very well that Iran no longer has any red lines in terms of retaliation against countries that it suspects of helping its enemies.
Foreign Minister said it very clearly, Abbas Araghchi. And Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure is actually quite vulnerable to Iranian strikes. So I think that Aliyev has every incentive to tread carefully in this one.
Hovik Manucharyan: Well, the elections are behind us.
Hovik Manucharyan: It was, by any measure, a landslide victory for Democrats. And on November 12, Duckworth, Bennet, Sanders, and Van Hollen called for restrictions on Israel war funding, which many were predicting already. At the same time, Al Jazeera reports that CENTCOM has essentially dismissed the claim that Washington had told Israel to prepare for renewed confrontation. So we wanted to get your thoughts.
What have the midterm election results changed in the probability of major offensive against Iran? And what has it left unchanged? What do you see as the likelihood of a new offensive against Iran?
Eldar Mamedov: Well, certainly, what the result of the election has changed is that it is no longer a rule in American politics that to get elected to an office, like in the Senate, you have to be an unconditional supporter of Israel. So that’s a tremendous change with the situation only five, six years ago. In fact, we’ve seen that specifically in the case of Michigan, the new senator, Abdul El-Sayed, he explicitly distanced himself from Israel and was critical of Israeli politics. And his opponent was an old school, neoconservative Republican who was very devoted to Israel and emphasized that.
And AIPAC obviously has helped his campaign. And still he lost. So I think we are witnessing the sea change in attitudes of American electorate. Democrats, is also about the Republican Party, especially if you look at the younger voices, if you look at voices like the magazine The American Conservative, which is run by young American Republicans, and which has been very critical of the Iran war, and generally speaking, of Israel’s role in American politics.
So I think this is one long-term trend that is worth it comes to likelihood of another round of war here I’m very cautious and I would even say pessimistic why it’s true that on the one hand Trump said that Iran war is no longer a priority and he even directed his vice president to focus on internal is unsettled. And he said yesterday, in fact, that when he was asked whether leaving the current government in place in Tehran, whether that would count as a failure, he said absolutely. That would be a failure and a defeat.
Then also, don’t forget that the Mossad chief is these days in Washington, at least he was there yesterday, and the prime minister the outgoing Prime Minister of Israel, Netanyahu, is said to be calling Trump every day, urging him to restart the war with Iran. And I think here an important element is also Trump’s psychology. I’m not a fan of, normally I’m not a fan of psychological explanations for the ways the leaders act. But I think in this case, it’s important to remember that Trump is essentially a narcissist.
So whoever tells him that he was wrong on Iran, he was wrong to launch that war, and the evidence is in the results of midterm elections, he doesn’t like that. He doesn’t like people who tell him that he’s wrong. whereas people who come to him and tell him that he was right and he simply has to double down that message that kind of message is much more receptive to hearing and what we see is a completely insane explanation of the midterm defeat we hear it from pro -Israel and neoconservative circles insistently that the problem was not the war. The problem was not that he started the war. The problem was that he did not finish it.
So what these circles, evangelicals, pro-Israel, Israel firsters, I would call them neoconservatives, what they are pushing him to is to restart the bombing campaign and to somehow finish the job, whatever that means. so we are still in a very volatile situation but it’s also not only about Trump it’s also about Iran since there is no deal the blockade is still effective and it’s even being expanded to Iran’s land borders there is a new task force created by CENTCOM called Iron Gate which is geared to block Iran’s land trade, not just maritime and obviously Iran doesn’t like it.
So Iran could at some point take an action to break that blockade and that would provoke then a new round of hostilities. So I would say that maybe the immediate risk of a war receded somewhat, but we are very very far yet from a stable situation and let alone a move to peaceful settlement.
Hovik Manucharyan: Do you think there’s some kind of a deadline in all of this, in terms of the likelihood of a hot war starting, for instance, when Democrats fully take power, when this term ends? at the same time what evidence would change your assessment in terms of any of this whether war would be more likely or it would be less likely
Eldar Mamedov: It’s difficult to mention any specific deadlines or milestones. I think we should just observe the situation on the ground and see whether Iranians are taking any action to break the blockade. I think they’re not going to wait indefinitely. And certainly they’re not looking for ways to make Trump’s life easier.
Of course, we have to see whether and at what point Trump decides to resume the attack. I think another variable is also Israel, as always, and the room of opportunity, the window of opportunity for Netanyahu is closing, especially if Eisenkot manages to form a coalition. then Netanyahu’s room for would be reduced dramatically. But then again, this being Israel, we really don’t know where this is all heading, because the last I’ve seen was that Eisenkot actually offered Netanyahu and his Likud party some role in the so-called National Unity Party, and to Netanyahu himself, some sort of diplomatic role.
So this doesn’t look to me like a rupture with the Netanyahu’s coalition at all. So I can only say that we are still in a very volatile, very unsettled situation.
Hovik Manucharyan: we have a lot to talk about, but I actually want to also quickly cover the war in Ukraine. I think you had an article on November 12th that argued that Trump’s weakness now could create room for European diplomacy in the context of the Ukrainian war. we’re now seeing evidence that Europe is assembling a team of, I guess, negotiators, even though Russia publicly refuses to sit across the table and negotiate with them. can you tell us more about your thesis and how it’s working out so far? you think there is any chance for the conflict in Ukraine to be settled anytime soon?
Eldar Mamedov: I’m very pessimistic about that.
Hovik Manucharyan: Hmm?
Eldar Mamedov: And part of the answer is that Europeans, they still can’t figure out who is going to negotiate the mandate and what exactly are they prepared to negotiate. Because frankly, the five countries plus EU institutions, the Council and Commission that has been agreed, it’s just too many. It’s just the team is too crowded. And those countries, they don’t all have their positions completely aligned.
So it’s going to be very difficult, I think, for them to negotiate as a common team, except maybe some very basic common denominator. but that is not a very effective way of negotiating. We will remember that when JCPOA was negotiated with Iran, there were only three European countries, Britain, France, and Germany. And even then, even among the three of them, they had some difficulties with France being, for example, more hawkish than the other two. So here you also bring in Italy and Poland, and of course Poland has its own position and its own concerns.
Plus you bring the President of the Council, Costa, and the President of the European Commission, von der Leyen. So how all of these players are going to, how is this going to play out? That’s anybody’s guess, but it certainly doesn’t convey an impression that Europe is very serious or very settled in its negotiating position. Now, when it comes to negotiations, there were reports in New York Times about the Russian demands, which go far beyond Ukraine, and those demands, they are not directed only to Ukrainians, or they do not concern only the situation in Ukraine, but also the broader matters of European security architecture.
So if these reports are to be believed, there are demands such as for Finland, for example, to abandon NATO, to roll back its presence in Poland and the Baltic states, which frankly, from the point of view of NATO countries, are all non-starters. So the question is why Russia is putting on the table questions that it probably knows well, a non-starter for Western powers. There could be two explanations. One is that it’s a typical bargaining tactics.
So you start with unrealistic demands and then you gradually go down to what is more agreeable and then you sell that climb down as concessions. Or it’s indeed what Moscow wants. And in that case, given that it’s unacceptable for Europeans, I would see no other way but just doubling down, both sides doubling down on the current status quo and essentially the war going on
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah.
Eldar Mamedov: for far longer.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah.
Asbed Bedrossian: There are enough developments around the Ukraine front that we could probably have
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah. I think, yeah. Yeah.
Asbed Bedrossian: an entire show dedicated to it.
Eldar Mamedov: Thank you.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah. I apologize for taking us on this digression, but I think it was worthwhile. Thank you, Dr.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, definitely.
Eldar Mamedov: Without problems.
Hovik Manucharyan: Mamedov. Asbed, bring us back to Iran and Azerbaijan.
Asbed Bedrossian: But I’ll bring us back.
Eldar Mamedov: Yeah.
Asbed Bedrossian: That’s right. I’ll bring us back to the Iran-Azerbaijan.
Eldar Mamedov: Yeah.
Asbed Bedrossian: There’s been enough coverage of how Azerbaijan territory has already been used against Iran in various U .S.-Israeli attacks. let’s distinguish what’s publicly established about Azerbaijan from the various scenarios that we need to test what’s publicly verifiable Mr. Mamedov as evidence if any that Azerbaijani territory has been used for operations against Iran and what remains allegations that is good enough for you to make an assessment on to base an analysis on you
Eldar Mamedov: I think we should be indeed very careful distinguishing hypotheses, allegations and evidence. You will recall that earlier this year there was a big reportage by CNN with some security officials, probably from the United States, possibly from Israel too, leaking information about Israel’s de facto territorial bases in the region, which were used to attack Iran. And among those, the United Arab Emirates was mentioned, but also Azerbaijan. And of course, Baku reacted very angrily.
They demanded that CNN removes that content. They threatened to sue them.
So that shows that, in general, every time there is some suggestion that Azerbaijani territory is being used by Israel in any way for hostile activities against Iran, the reaction is always very, very angry. and that alone already gives you some food for thought but I think there is also good case to be made that at least for intelligence activities given the presence of Israeli intelligence in alleged presence of Israeli intelligence in Azerbaijan at least for intelligence operations operations the territory of Azerbaijan very well may have been used by Israel I think it’s credible
Asbed Bedrossian: Hmm.
Asbed Bedrossian: Now, we all know about the Shushi Declaration for between Turkey and Azerbaijan. If Iran and Azerbaijan suddenly end up in some kind of a confrontation, how would Ankara weigh its alliance obligations against the causes of that confrontation?
Eldar Mamedov: I would be very surprised.
Asbed Bedrossian: Does that mean immediately Turkey would be engaged, or is this much more nuanced?
Eldar Mamedov: No. No. No. No.
I would rule out immediate Turkish engagement on the Turkish relations with Iran long precede the emergence of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1918. It’s a longstanding relationship, a complex one. strong element on rivalry there but also let’s not forget that since the times of the Ottomans and the Safavids they can run whenever at war so their relations may be at times they may be better at other times they may be more conflictual but they always somehow manage not to let their disagreements and their rivalries to spill to open hostility. We saw that in Syria, for example, where they supported opposing sides in the civil war.
So no, I don’t think that Turkey would immediately rush to help Azerbaijan. What Ankara would likely do is first to deter Iran from attacking Azerbaijan, if it comes to it, but that’s not the same as fighting on Azerbaijan’s behalf. And then they would definitely use their diplomatic connections with both Tehran and Baku to try to calm their situation down, to try to settle it.
Asbed Bedrossian: In a situation like this, if there is a flare-up between Iran and Azerbaijan, how should Armenia proceed to protect its sovereignty, its access to Iran, its trade with Iran under such a situation?
Eldar Mamedov: Well, I mean, it’s not up to me
Asbed Bedrossian: Or can it?
Eldar Mamedov: to advise Armenian government, but if you ask me, I would say that Armenia’s relations with Iran has extraordinary importance for Armenian nation and state. and certainly there is no need to repeat that. But I think especially in the current situation when Azerbaijan does not show any political will actually to come to peace agreement with Armenia, we constantly see all sorts of excuses to postpone the peace.
On the other hand, we see that Ankara, even though on its own, it would be ready to open a border with Armenia, but it’s not doing so because its Armenia policy is effectively held hostage by Baku. and there are a lot of Turkish diplomats and experts who are criticizing this kind of dependency, but we see that on an official level nothing is changing. So in this situation, probably it’s not even needed to emphasize how important, how vital and how existential for Armenia is this border with Iran, essentially the only friendly neighbour Armenia has in its geopolitical predicament.
So I would say whatever the regional crisis, this should be a priority for any Armenian government. I’m talking again the way I see it. Of course, the Armenian people in the Armenian government, they will choose the course of action that they will find the most suitable for the country.
Asbed Bedrossian: Right, right.
Hovik Manucharyan: you write a lot of interesting articles, so I want to actually talk about one of the other ones that we had a chance to read. It’s titled, A Bold Proposal, Iran Should Join the Mecca Alliance.
Eldar Mamedov: Hmm.
Hovik Manucharyan: I’ve seen other proposals that Israel should also join the Mecca Alliance, but let’s just focus on Iran. the August 31 alliance statement by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan cooperation it talks about collective deterrence many for instance thought that that was an alliance to deter Iran you actually proposed that in the Mecca Alliance actually a more, you know, a formula for peace. in detail that
Eldar Mamedov: I think that any regional architecture that is geared towards stability and collective security necessarily must involve the countries that are not allies and maybe not even friends. So, otherwise establishing an alliance or a pact among friends, that’s not a big deal since they already are friends. that Turkey and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, all three of them, they have enjoyed close relationships since a very long time, especially Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on that track. In 2025, they signed the bilateral defense pact, which also has concrete commitments to defense of each other.
And the Mecca pact is a kind of expansion to that bilateral deal to Turkey. So, but all of these countries, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, Pakistan, they always had very close and friendly relationship. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, not always. Remember, there was the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, which created tensions between the two countries, but they overcome it.
Asbed Bedrossian: But there’s also been permanent competition between the two states for the
Eldar Mamedov: Thank you. Yes.
Asbed Bedrossian: leadership of the Islamic world, the caliphate, for example, etc.
Eldar Mamedov: Yes. Yes. But I think there is also realization that ultimately they are all in the same boat in the sense that what is the real threat to all of them is Israeli exceptionalism and Israeli hegemonic ambition. And on the other hand, the perception that the United States is an unreliable ally.
So these two factors, the American unreliability and the Israeli hegemonic ambition, is what pushed those countries to establish that pact to a much greater degree than any lingering concerns about Iran. And I’m not saying that there are no concerns. Of course, there are, especially in the case of the Saudis. But on the scale of threats and challenges, it has been clearly decided in those three capitals that the United States’ unreliability and Israel ambition, there are far bigger threats than whatever challenge Iran could pose to those countries.
So why bringing Iran in would make sense precisely because that would create a kind of regional, inclusive regional structure whereby they no longer have to worry too much about the threat that Iran could pose to any of these countries. and we’re talking about Iran’s support for the Ansarullah movement for example in Yemen, the Houthis so if Iran is brought into this sort of broader umbrella, security umbrella then Iran would be incentivized also to use its leverage on the Houthis to scale down their attacks on Saudi Arabia but at the same time it would also encourage Saudi Arabia to make a deal with the Houthis and stop bombing them so in the end if that kind of structure can work out then everybody wins the Saudi and the Houthis they stop their war and Iran becomes part of the broader arrangement and the only party that loses out in that equation is Israel precisely the reason why it makes sense for these countries to come together.
When it comes to Israel, well, in the future, if Israel changes its policies, if it comes to terms with the Palestinians, if it stops its hegemonic drive, then one way or another, Israel could also become part of the regional constellation. the existence of Israel is a reality. It’s going to be there. So it would only make sense to somehow anchor it in a broader regional understanding, but we all understand that as things stand now, there’s a very, very long way to go. And Israeli leadership and even the opposition, they certainly don’t show much appetite to change their ways when it comes to Palestinians in the broader region.
Asbed Bedrossian: I find your proposal fascinating. So before we propose that Armenia should join the Mecca agreement,
Eldar Mamedov: Thanks, Andrea.
Asbed Bedrossian: let’s bring that scenario that you gave closer to home to something that’s actually happened where Israel attacks Iran and then Tehran accuses Azerbaijan of possibly helping and threatening retaliation against Baku. How would your scenario work to de-escalate such a situation and make, at least from our perspective, the South Caucasus a little more stable?
Eldar Mamedov: Well, I think that all South Caucasus nations should make it very clear that they’re not going to play any role in any potential Israeli attack on Iran. And even in the case of Azerbaijan, we’ve established that there was, at the very least, there was a degree of tacit cooperation on intelligence level and on using Azerbaijani territory. strong allegations about that. And we know what are the drivers of that. But in the case of Armenia, I would say there’s absolutely no reason why Armenia would want to be complicit in any way.
I know that some Armenian experts, more on the liberal side, more supporting the current Prime Minister Pashinyan , that they were entertaining some notions that Armenia must make itself more interesting to Israel. I’m talking specifically about Sheila Paylan, who wrote an article in that direction for the Atlantic Council. Frankly, I find this line of thinking delusional,
Asbed Bedrossian: Dangerous, yeah.
Eldar Mamedov: because why would Israel, dangerous and delusional, why would Israel choose Armenia over Azerbaijan if it already has decades of this strategic alliance with Azerbaijan, what kind of assets Armenia could offer to displace Azerbaijan as Israel’s main ally in the South Caucasus? And most importantly, what will Armenia get in exchange and what are going to be the costs of such alignment? So it would seem to me that following that advice would not accrue any geopolitical benefits to Armenia, but it would definitely destroy Armenia’s relationship with Iran, which, as I mentioned, is of vital importance.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, we are also wondering exactly on that issue. We are always afraid that the Trump route, for example, could suddenly become an implicit base for operations against Iran. And as you said earlier, there are no more red lines that Iran has for any country that is harboring overt or covert operations against it. Mr.
Mamedov, thank you so much for joining us today. This has been a very interesting conversation. up with you again sometime soon.
Eldar Mamedov: My pleasure. Thank you so much.
Hovik Manucharyan: Thank you.
Asbed Bedrossian: Okay, well, that’s our show today.
Asbed Bedrossian: This episode was recorded on November 15, 2026, and we’ve been talking with Mr. Eldar Mamedov. He is a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute and a member of the Pugwash Council on Science and World Affairs. Mr.
Mamedov is a diplomat who has worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia and in Latvian embassies in Washington, D.C. and Madrid. He has served as a political advisor for the Social Democrats in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. and he was in charge of the EP delegation for inter-parliamentary relations with Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. There’s more. You can look it up on our show notes, podcasts.groong.org slash episode number.
Click on the links for the bios.
Hovik Manucharyan: Thank you, everyone.
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