Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed Bedrossian: Hello, everyone, and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode.
Asbed Bedrossian: We are continuing to discuss how the Iran war is developing because it has great significance for Armenia right to the north of Iran’s border. Today we are joined by Dr. Trita Parsi, who is the Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute, a leading voice for diplomatic U.S. foreign policy and an expert on Iran and Middle East affairs. Dr.
Trita Parsi, welcome back to the Groong podcast.
Trita Parsi: Thank you so much for having me.
Asbed Bedrossian: Thank you.
Hovik Manucharyan: Thank you for joining, Dr. Parsi.
Trita Parsi: Yeah.
Hovik Manucharyan: Dr. Parsi, let’s just begin with understanding what happened over the last few weeks. And also, it’s very curious for us because depending on the time, point in time when you actually read the news or watch Trump’s statements, you get a very different idea of what he wants to do with regard to Iran. with the elections behind us, actually saying that the likelihood of renewed strikes is less now. Do you see a genuine attempt find an exit by Trump or perhaps he’s trying to achieve by coercion what eight months of war failed to do?
Trita Parsi: I don’t think we can quite yet say that the risk of war has gone down. I think there’s been moments in which it almost restarted and he chose not to, and that has given people greater confidence that he’s not going to go in that direction. But that is not, in my view, sufficient to say that the risk of war actually has reduced. It tells us that he hesitates, which we already knew.
For there to be a real shift, I think we need to see a bit more. Now, what does he want? When it comes to specific variables, we know. We know that he wants the 60% enriched uranium.
He wants that in order to be able to declare victory. I think in general, he likes the idea of a deal if the deal enables him to declare victory. But other than that, it’s very difficult because he seems to be changing his mind a lot. And he’s constantly pendulating between wanting more war, actually going for a deal, or even going for just a status quo, which is a decision he made on Friday in which he rejected certain military options and then decided instead to continue the economic warfare.
But the economic warfare is the current situation. It’s unstable. It will constantly be at risk of escalating into a war. So I cannot see him continuing the current situation for particularly long.
Hovik Manucharyan: Right.
Hovik Manucharyan: And similarly, do you think that members of his administration, that includes Vance, Rubio, the Pentagon, and all these other agencies, are they unified with Trump on strategy, or are they pulling him different ways? And who has the greatest influence, in your opinion, on Trump currently, today?
Trita Parsi: No, I think it is very, very clear that this is a highly, highly divided administration in which you have people like Pete Hegseth and Brad Cooper, who is the head of the CENTCOM, pushing for military action. You have people like JD Vance and a few others favoring diplomacy. You have people like Ratcliffe, Bessent, Rubio favoring the status quo, which is more economic warfare, perhaps miscalculating or perhaps knowing that this status quo eventually will lead to war. So I do think that we oftentimes hear about how there’s divisions inside of Iran, and I’m sure there’s some.
But when it comes to strategic divisions, I find it to be far graver on the American side than there currently is on the Iranian side.
Asbed Bedrossian: Dr.
Asbed Bedrossian: Parsi, you mentioned the 60% enriched uranium as kind of a demand on the part of satisfying Trump. On the other side, Tehran is demanding an end to the blockade , sanctions, compensation, etc. Where do you see that there is a realistic deal between the two sides to accept a compromise so that the war and the collapse of trust are not just the stopper at this point, it becomes a very realistic deal between the two countries?
Trita Parsi: Look, at the end of the day, what was in the MOU, I think largely is going to end up being some of the key variables for a deal. Regional ceasefire, lifting of the blockade, opening of the strait. But then when it comes to the nuclear issue, that’s where you’re going to get some real points of tension. What happens to the 60%?
The Iranians want to just dilute it. The American side, as I understand it, will not accept that. They want it to be shipped out. If it is to be shipped out, would all of it be shipped out?
Would a portion of it be shipped out? Where would it be shipped out? Would there be a mechanism in which the Iranians could get back the 60% if the U.S. once again violates the deal as it did with the JCPOA? What happens with ongoing enrichment in Iran?
Will Iran be able to build a stockpile again? There’s plenty of questions and some of them are quite technical. and the current American team does not appear to have that same level of technical expertise as Obama’s team did to be able to handle some of these questions. So there’s still a lot of challenges when it comes to an actual deal that could make it work. We have to remember the MOU at the end of the day was just an interim agreement and even that fell apart.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yes, indeed. And I read some articles yesterday from Iran that said basically shipping the nuclear fuel is not on the table. So who is under greater pressure at present to compromise? Is it Washington or Tehran as it stands today?
And where’s that pressure coming from?
Trita Parsi: You know, now when the midterms are over, one could make the argument that Trump actually is not under the same pressure to make a deal as he was before. He’s already paid the political price for this. He will not pay another political price unless he escalates. If he just keeps things as they are and slowly but surely the risk premium comes down and oil prices go down, yes, it’s not a great situation. a lot of people would be angry at him, but there’s no moment, no point on the political calendar anytime soon in which that price will be extracted of him again.
So in some ways, the pressure to actually go for a deal may be receding, whereas the pressure in the short term to escalate will increase because the window for escalating is short. Once Congress is in democratic hands, or perhaps even by December 10th, Congress can stop the funding for the war. imposing significant limitations on Trump. You also have this situation in Israel that is changing, with Netanyahu perhaps only having another two or so weeks left as a caretaker government.
So those who want to have an escalation want to have it as quickly as possible, whereas the pressure for a negotiated deal is not necessarily naturally going to be as strong as it was before the midterms. Now, on the Iranian side, they are feeling in a rather comfortable situation. They believe that their deterrence against the United States is the key reason why he hasn’t attacked yet. They are suffering from the blockade, but they’re also finding ways around it.
And they’re making money off of the traffic in the strait right now because of a lot of ships de facto paying the Iranians fees to be able to transit. So they’re not in a desperate situation so that they would have to change the parameters in order to be feeling more comfortable. But at the same time, in the long run, the Iranians cannot continue to be in this no state of war, no state of peace . They need one of the two.
And even the Supreme Leader has now said that and said, contrary to his father, who preferred neither peace nor war, the son now has said there could either be peace or war, but nothing in between.
Asbed Bedrossian: Do you see the possibility of a step-by-step solution towards a final agreement, or do you think the whole thing has to be a package? For example, could a limited ceasefire take place at this point, kind of a stable environment, before a nuclear agreement? Could that be left for a future deadline?
Trita Parsi: So, what has been done is that the MOU was supposed to be 60 days to resolve a set of issues, such as regional ceasefire, opening up the strait, after which there will be nuclear negotiations. Now that has been compressed in a proposal the Iranians put on the table in September, in which instead of 60 days, it will be seven days. Then it shrunk to five days, and the latest proposal is that that entire period will be no longer than two days. Trump wants to get to nuclear talks as quickly as possible.
But that also means that within two days, you need to lift the blockade, you need to open up the strait, you need to have a regional ceasefire. That’s going to be very difficult. Now, perhaps they will make an exception and give the regional ceasefire slightly more time. But bottom line is, there’s an effort to compress this as much as possible.
Because the step by step process, particularly if it’s long, is very much opposed by the American side. Trump does not like to have the reward deferred. He wants to have the reward up front. And to be frank, perhaps 60 days was a realistic time frame in terms of the things that needed to be done.
But he also gave a tremendously long period of time for things to go wrong.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah.
Trita Parsi: And to make it shorter is actually perhaps smarter, perhaps not as short as two days, but nevertheless, not as long as 60 days.
Hovik Manucharyan: Dr. Parsi, you quickly mentioned Israel, and we know that things are in flux in Israeli politics as well. We don’t know, for instance, who will be the next government. But regardless of, or maybe given different potential scenarios, do you think that Israel or any specific Israeli leader in the coming months will be able to, derail any potential deal with Iran between the US and Iran.
Trita Parsi: I think Netanyahu has the ability, the capacity and the incentives to do so. He may face a lot of resistance from inside the security establishment of Israel. However, there is a realization that Israel is losing the American public, that both people on the left and the right are now increasingly negative towards Israel.
Hovik Manucharyan: Hmm.
Trita Parsi: Even Trump himself said that in an interview. And as a result, this may be a more complicated issue. I’m not so sure that a new Israeli prime minister with very limited political experience, such as someone like Edelstein, not to say that he’s inexperienced, but nevertheless, as a role of a prime minister, he has no experience. Handling a coalition that will be very unstable to start off his premiership by undermining the US and moving things in a overwhelmingly voted against.
That would be a rather risky move, one that I think Netanyahu would accept because he’s been proven to accept these type of risks over this issue because of his obsession with Iran. But it’s not necessarily one that I am equally confident that someone like Edelstein would take.
Asbed Bedrossian: What would be Netanyahu’s incentive here
Hovik Manucharyan: All right.
Asbed Bedrossian: try and derail the talks?
Trita Parsi: Well, first of all, we have seen him do everything he can for the last couple of decades to get the U.S. and Iran into a war. And he wants that war to conclude in such a manner that there is no nuclear program in Iran, there is no Islamic Republic, and that the Iranian state has been so profoundly weakened that it will not be able to pose a challenge or a deterrence against Israel for decades to come.
He has not yet achieved that, but he’s closer to it than he’s ever been before, because finally the United States, from his standpoint, did attack Iran. if he manages to if the option he has is to sabotage a US peace effort in order to move in this direction and force Trump’s hand into a war, it will obviously be very costly but I think from Netanyahu’s standpoint, he thinks that this is what will seal his legacy and his legacy is more important in terms of what he manages to do to Iran or get the US to do to Iran rather than the US-Israel relationship itself.
He has already shown a willingness to challenge and risk the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Remember, in 2015, when he came to the U.S. Congress in an unprecedented move and spoke against the President of the United States, already back then, a lot of supporters of Israel in the United States were upset because they felt that Israel, under his leadership, was now willing to risk the Israeli-American relationship. And indeed, a lot of people in Israel criticized him for that as well.
So this is nothing new. Now, is he willing to do that against Trump? That might be a different question. But if he’s not going to be prime minister for long anyways, then perhaps his calculation will be that it’s worth it.
Asbed Bedrossian: Right, right.
Asbed Bedrossian: So you’ve said that Iran managed to turn American military superiority into an American political defeat. Now, after these Republican losses in Congress, where, as you mentioned, Trump has already paid the political price, and with the December 11 funding deadline approaching, has Tehran actually gained a new leverage, or is it at risk of overplaying its hand?
Trita Parsi: I think that leverage is already in place now. At this point, there is a risk of miscalculation on the Iranian side. I’m a little bit careful not to use the term overplay its hands because that would mean that they are under the wrong impression of what their power is and they’re pushing for something that they cannot achieve. So far, it’s the U.S. that has overplayed its hand.
The U.S. that thought that they could get rid of the Islamic Republic in four days. The U.S. who thought that the Iranians would capitulate. All of these different things, none of them that have been turned out to be true. The Iranians have been rather effective in what they’ve done, but they are definitely prone to miscalculation, as anyone else is.
And I think there is a risk that they will miss the window, that there is a psychology to Trump that they also have to take into account. That even if the deal is one that perhaps he should accept, that is attractive to him, that he has an ego that also needs some sort of a soothing in order for him to say yes.
And so far, what we’ve seen from the Iranians is that they’re actually more willing to give concessions on substance than to give concessions on symbolic issues, such as, for instance, having a phone call between Pezeshkian and Trump, which I think actually could do quite a lot in getting Trump to be more open to the current proposal and perhaps even accept it. But this is not a step that the Iranians at this point are even willing to consider seriously, it seems like.
Hovik Manucharyan: Dr. Parsi, we have a few questions for you about Armenia. But before we go there, I think this applies to Armenia as well. We sometimes hear messaging the presidential camp in Iran, and also, I guess, the conservatives or hardliners, I don’t know what is a better word for it, or the Ayatollah camp in Iran.
And it is bewildering sometimes to hear the same, you know, almost contradictory messaging throughout this whole period. So how do you explain that? And who do you think right now has the upper hand or the mandate essentially to dictate or to manage foreign policy and especially manage how this war is negotiated?
Trita Parsi: Look, the Iranian political process, the internal process has always been somewhat opaque and it’s been difficult to know exactly where the power lies. But it’s even more opaque now because there’s been significant changes in personnel and in procedures and we don’t have clear insights into it. On the surface, it does appear as if Mohsen Rezaei is in a significantly important position, and he probably is. But I think there’s a lot of other things happening in the background that we’re not privy to that also are very, very important.
Hovik Manucharyan: Mm-hmm.
Trita Parsi: So I think, to be frank with you, we cannot give an honest answer of where exactly the center of power is. We cannot give an exact answer of who is really running the show. What we can say, however, is that someone is running the show. We’re not talking about a chaotic system.
We’re not talking about a system in which one side of the government is acting in contradiction government.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah.
Trita Parsi: I see that more on the American side right now than I do on the Iranian side. So I think there’s a significant amount of discipline. I’m sure there’s tactical differences. I’m not seeing any clear strategic differences within various camps.
And I think most importantly, they’re running the show. Someway, somehow the show is being run without us being able to completely pin down who is doing it or where the center of the power is.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah, perhaps that’s the strategy.
Hovik Manucharyan: Now, coming to Armenia, in 2025, I believe the U.S. was able to essentially be the ground where Armenia and Azerbaijan signed this deal called TRIPP , Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity that would allow Azerbaijan to communicate with its Nakhijevan exclave through Armenia, through the south of Armenia, very close to the Iranian border. For Iran, this has been a very strong red line. I mean, they have reiterated it once, you know, multiple times, not just once, but that red line has been expressed by the, I guess, the supporters of Ayatollah, the advisors of Ayatollah.
And meanwhile, we also know that Israel, for instance, has very strong relations with Azerbaijan as well. And many would say that TRIPP is actually very much supported by Israel as well. But we know that CNN, for instance, reported that Israeli commandos and intelligence operatives have already used Azerbaijani territory for operations against Iran. So as Armenians, we’re very worried about the northern front of this Iran war and what it means and, you know, what risks it entails for the region.
Do you see, you know, escalations in Armenia and Azerbaijan as part of this Iran war in the coming months? Or, you know, how do you think that will happen? Do you think it will be piecemeal if things escalate or are there specific regions like Armenia and Azerbaijan which might be more prone to escalation?
Trita Parsi: So, let me first start off by saying that my expertise on the situation in the Caucasus and with Azerbaijan and Armenia is unfortunately very, very limited. So, I will not in any way, shape or form pretend to be an expert on this area. But I can say two things on this. First of all, I would take very seriously when the Iranians say that in the next war, if there is a next war, there will be no geographic limits.
They successfully fought the U.S. side by escalating horizontally last time. The U.S. side did not expect that the Iranians would strike all of the GCC countries right away. The Iranians quickly managed to put themselves in a position in which they were determining the geography of the war. That does not mean that in the next round they necessarily will escalate vis-a-vis Azerbaijan.
I think there was also a strategy on the Iranian side to keep that part of the border passive rather than necessarily allowing the war to go there. If I were to guess, I would say that there’s a higher likelihood, and this may sound strange, but there’s a higher likelihood that the Iranians would shoot at bases in Europe and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean than necessarily target Azerbaijan, unless there’s some very, very clear evidence that emerges that they are actively participating in the war.
Trita Parsi: The second point, though is that in regards to TRIPP I would suspect I mean that arrangement happened at a moment when Iran was seen and probably felt very weak and it was an agreement that from the Iranian side is highly, highly problematic. I would not be surprised that if this war ends and if it war if it ends with the similar balance that exists now in which Iran has emerged much stronger that the Iranians in short order would want to revisit TRIPP. I don’t know exactly how they would be able to challenge it, etc. But I don’t think that they will sit passively by, given the fact that this is a very sensitive issue for them.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah, in fact, we mentioned different camps. So the most recent threat, Iranian threat against TRIPP came from Ali Akbar Velayati, who used very colorful language such as breaking Trump’s legs if the U.S. ever tries to do anything in the region. He even went to the point of criticizing heavily Nikol Pashinyan , Armenia’s current leader. What would you say in terms of how, you know, the strength of his words and is it, you know, is it similar to Rezaei?
Like you said, is he part of that same camp?
Trita Parsi: He is part of the same camp by and large, I would say, but he is obviously a very important figure. I don’t think he would say anything without some buy-in from within the system. I think that was a warning that they deliberately wanted to come from Velayati. But it has not escalated to the point in which, for instance, the same threat would come from Qalibaf, from Araghchi, or from Rezaei himself.
So it’s still one step below, given the current structure. But as I said earlier, this is a very important issue. And I have a hard time seeing that the Iranians, if they find themselves to be in a position of strength, an improved position regionally after this war, that they would allow, that they would not look for opportunities to pose a challenge to the TRIPP arrangement.
Asbed Bedrossian: All right, Dr. Parsi, we know that your time is very limited today, so thank you for your time and insight. We really appreciate that you could join us today.
Trita Parsi: Thank you so much for having me. Really appreciate it. Thank you.
Asbed Bedrossian: We will talk to you soon.
Hovik Manucharyan: The pleasure is all ours. Thank you.
Trita Parsi: Excellent. Thank you. Have a great one. Talk to you soon.
Asbed Bedrossian: You too. Bye-bye.
Asbed Bedrossian: That’s our show today. This episode was recorded on November 10, 2026. Thank you for listening. It’s always very interesting to listen to Dr.
Parsi. You can find him on his Substack also. He is the Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute, a leading voice for diplomatic U.S. foreign policy, an expert on Iran and Middle East affairs, and his insights appear regularly in The Washington Post, The New York Times. He’s frequently on CNN, BBC, NPR, Al Jazeera, and we’re lucky to have him.
Dr. Parsi has been named one of the Washingtonian magazine’s 25 most influential foreign policy figures annually since 2021. Thank you for listening.
Asbed Bedrossian: As I said, we would appreciate your support. Share, like, and hype. Hovik, what else can they do to our shows to increase our outreach?
Hovik Manucharyan: Well, drop a comment. Make sure you’re subscribed, actually, especially since we, if you found this interview through searching for Dr. Parsi, you likely, actually, most of our viewers statistically are not subscribed. So please make sure you’re subscribed.
And why you should subscribe is because we are two independent voices, two Armenians, of course, but we are not funded by any foreign entity,
Asbed Bedrossian: No governments, no NGOs.
Hovik Manucharyan: any state department, Department of Government. And we specifically started this podcast to counteract the malign influence, I would say, of foreign-funded entities operating in Armenia, especially in English language media. So that is our cause. And if you support it, then also consider supporting us financially.
You can go to podcasts.groong.org slash donate. And the links will all be in the description but you can subscribe and provide a regular contribution or you can do a one-time contribution. Either is, of course, we’d be very grateful for, but we would strongly prefer if you can do a regular contribution to help keep us going and to help our budget be more stable.
Asbed Bedrossian: That’s right.
Hovik Manucharyan: Thank you very much. And with that, I’m Hovik Manucharyan.
Asbed Bedrossian: And I’m Asbed Bedrossian, and we will talk to you soon.
Hovik Manucharyan: Until next time.