Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Hovik Manucharyan: Suren, it has been a long time. Thanks for making the time to join us on Groong.
Asbed Bedrossian: Welcome.
Suren Sargsyan: Pleasure. Pleasure to be back.
Asbed Bedrossian: Okay, well, following a month-long lull,
Asbed Bedrossian: direct military conflict escalated this week as U.S. forces struck Iranian positions around the Strait of Hormuz, allegedly to counter threats to regional shipping, triggering a wave of Iranian retaliatory strikes across the Gulf. Despite the intensifying exchanges, Washington’s broader strategic objectives remain ambiguous. us. Now, Trump has declared Iran militarily defeated and ruled out nuclear strikes, yet simultaneously he threatened expanded attacks and raised the prospect of regime change as Iranian strikes continued unabated.
Suren, given the situation, what is the actual U.S. objective in Iran and why did Washington choose to escalate at this moment in time, barely two months before the midterm elections in the U.S. and elections in Israel.
Suren Sargsyan: Well, thank you, first of all. It’s good to be back here with you guys. As for Iran, I think they don’t have a, I think Washington, D.C., they don’t have exit strategy here. One issue is to start a war, another issue is how to get out.
But as I can see, there is no exit strategy, and it’s a big problem for the Trump administration, because they don’t know what to do, because whatever they do is creating more problems, deeper problems. And that is why I suppose that they do not have any exit strategy. anything successful. That is why closer to mid-term elections is going to be even tougher for Trump administration and Republicans, especially in the House. Senate is somehow, I suppose, will still be Republican, but House of Representatives might probably go to Democrats, which is making additional problems for Trump administration and Trump himself, personally.
This is the picture that I see right now. Many things can change. We still have a couple of months, but still whatever we see is quite challenging for Trump in regards to the House of Representatives. As for the war itself, it’s really very hard to say what’s going to happen because, you know, there is no predictability.
There is zero predictability because Trump is tweeting something. Then he’s changing his mind and tweeting something else. First, he’s talking about military action. Then he’s talking about diplomacy.
Then he’s talking about military action. Then he’s bombing. So it’s changing all the time. So that is why it’s very hard to understand what is the strategy.
I don’t think there is a strategy. absence of strategy like okay let’s see what’s going to happen and try to solve the problems as as they arrive i think this is a strategy which is not a good strategy because it’s leading to nowhere but i don’t believe that Iranian-American relations uh you know they have a lot of problems they have a lot of uh a lot of problems coming from uh from the last century so i don’t believe that the problems will be solved even if they decide not to shoot, it doesn’t mean that the problems will be solved because they have a lot of problems.
They have a lot of differences, different views concerning Middle East, concerning all other regions around security architecture in Middle East, of course, Israel, et cetera. So that is why even if the war stops tomorrow, it doesn’t necessarily mean that they will be able to solve their problems, even if they stop the war with negotiations.
Asbed Bedrossian: One thing that we can really notice is that Trump says, for example, that Iran is completely militarily defeated, the Strait of Hormuz has been opened, has been demined, yet Iran is certainly able to retaliate and cause a lot of problems and use its deterrence as a way of stopping these attacks. How come Trump’s reality is so far from reality?
Suren Sargsyan: I think that’s the strategy of Iran, to change the situation as fast as possible, as rapidly as possible, because they understand that it’s really very hard for the Trump administration to respond on all the possible changes, whatever they do. The prices for the gas are getting very high in the United States, and the people are not very happy about it, and definitely these kind of things are going to affect their decision on the term of elections. Probably Iran is considering that fact too and trying to, you know, sort of help Trump challengers to be more successful during the midterm elections.
Asbed Bedrossian: Mm-hmm.
Suren Sargsyan: That’s my opinion, that if Democrats are able to gain majority in the House and the Senate, definitely they will start the process of impeachment of Trump. Definitely.
Asbed Bedrossian: Mm-hmm.
Suren Sargsyan: I’m 100 percent sure. If they see the possibility, they will definitely start as soon as possible, like they’ve done before. You know, it’s not something new. So that is why I think Iran is also considering that fact and thinking that why not?
If Trump is having problems during the midterm elections, it’s good for Iran.
Asbed Bedrossian: What does victory really look like under all these conditions at this point?
Suren Sargsyan: It’s a good question.
Asbed Bedrossian: How does the U.S. say, we’re done, we’ve achieved our objectives and we’re done?
Suren Sargsyan: But they’re talking about it all the time. Trump is always saying that achievements are already there. We achieved whatever we wanted to achieve. And then all of a sudden, in a couple of weeks, he’s hitting Iranian military or non-military objects again, which means that they don’t have a strategy.
I mean, the change of the regime, as they called it, it was not an official target for the Trump administration during the beginning of the war. I mean, they were talking about it’s not officially the think tanks like pro-Trump team members, etc. But on the highest level, they never said that this is the main target because simply they knew that it’s not going to happen. It’s really very hard to change the government in Iran.
And we saw that despite all the bombings, despite all the killings of high-level officials, including Supreme Leader of Iran, nothing has changed. So the government is not falling apart. Nothing has changed in Iran. So this target is not achievable at this moment, as I see.
And I think Washington understands that it’s not achievable at this moment.
Hovik Manucharyan: So then let’s turn to Armenia because this week was essentially predominated by news
Hovik Manucharyan: about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit. And for Armenia, one of the most striking exchanges around the summit came after, actually, the Pashinyan and Putin meeting, during Putin’s press conference. Putin said that if Armenia no longer wants the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri, then Russia can leave tomorrow. If Armenia wants it to stay, then Russia is prepared to stay.
Pashinyan then gave almost the same answer in reverse. He said that the military base is no longer a vital interest for Armenia and if Russia wants to leave, Armenia will not object. And if Armenia can work with Russia. Now, it’s just surreal because for decades we’ve been treating this base as a major strategic asset for both countries.
But now it sounds like very messy divorce and the military base seems like this pet dog. You know, it may be a large, aging, expensive Caucasian Shepherd named Boris, or as he was lovingly called, Boriska, you know, in the better days, caught in the middle of it all. And neither side wants to sort of admit it wants custody of this dog. And there is a broader contradiction.
For the last five years, Pashinyan has been saying that whatever he’s doing, all of his policies are framed from the perspective of Armenia’s sovereignty and defending it. Even as all of his actions have coincided with one concession after another to Turkey and Azerbaijan, but when it comes to the Russian military base which clearly is a sovereign and strategic decision regardless of whether Armenia wants to keep it or close it, Pashinyan suddenly seems to have no position: Russia can stay or Russia can leave. And we saw something similar to this with the CSTO.
Rather than formally withdrawing, Yerevan is effectively asking the CSTO to decide Armenia’s status for it, sparing Pashinyan from having to make and defend the difficult decision himself. Now, what is really hidden behind this apparent high-stakes poker game, Suren? Why are both sides, Pashinyan and Putin, avoiding saying plainly whether they want the base to stay or go? Thank you.
Suren Sargsyan: Well, at least I can see that Armenia is talking a lot about Armenian-Russian relations, talking a lot, there is a lot of anti-Russian rhetorics in Armenian politics, including in the governmental circles, including in the Civil Contract political party, but Armenia is not doing any concrete steps against any Russian vital interests, like just talks, no actions. This, this we can say about it’s this for the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Okay. If you don’t want to stay, just leave.
What does it mean? Freezing membership because such a status doesn’t exist under the agreement, like freezing membership. It doesn’t exist. And nobody can kick you out, you know, according to this, to the structure of this, of this treaty, nobody can kick you out.
You can just leave or you can stay. Eurasian Economic Union. A lot of talk that Armenia has to leave and go to the European Union, etc. But in fact, nobody’s going to do that.
Nobody’s even saying that, you know, let’s leave Eurasian Union and see what’s going to happen. No. Armenia is still a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. And Putin was saying, you know, if you want to leave, you can leave right now.
Pashinyan is saying, no, I don’t want to leave. I want to stay. The same with the military base. Like, if you don’t, what is the position of Putin and what is the position of Pashinyan?
They don’t want to take responsibility about this military base. Pashinyan is saying, if you want it, you can take it. Putin is saying if you don’t need it I will take it but Putin is not saying I know you don’t need it I’m taking it out and Pashinyan is not saying just take it out and get out of here I mean this kind of statements are not there so which means that Armenia doesn’t want to do any concrete steps against Russian interests in the South Caucasus. I mean, a lot of talks, zero actions.
Zero. What I’m saying, zero, because we’re still at the Collective Security Treaty Organization, we’re still at the Eurasian Economic Union, and we’re still having Russian military base, Russian border patrol units in Armenia, and we see that nothing is changing in that regard. So if you are really willing to take Russians out from the Armenian territory, you can just do that. You can just say that I don’t want you guys to stay.
Just get out of here.
Hovik Manucharyan: Suren, I would imagine Pashinyan’s, let me say, supporters, or the collective leadership of the European Union must be elated with this opportunity. now if Pashinyan is trying to half-ass his way out of this and not make a commitment I would imagine now there will be a lot of pressure from the Eurocrats to push Armenia towards closing the base and so far we’ve seen that Armenia now is more reliant on EU donations and EU policy to survive given the cold relationship with Russia. Do you think that Pashinyan can keep up this, you know, neither here nor there policy amidst all of this, all of these forces acting on Armenia?
And also at the same time, why did Putin bring it up? Because maybe it was discussed at the private meeting between Pashinyan and Putin, but it was not discussed and it wasn’t there.
Suren Sargsyan: Publicly, it was out there, yeah, yeah.
Hovik Manucharyan: And then Putin all of a sudden during his press conference said you know what we can take out the base is who needs that base more is it strategic for either Armenia or Russia today
Suren Sargsyan: I think it’s strategic, first of all, for Russia, because at the end of the day, you see that this military base is not only about Russian military presence in Armenia, it is about Russian military presence at the border of NATO. So we’re talking about Turkey, of course. This military base is, I suppose, it’s beneficial for Russia more than probably beneficial for Armenia right now. But at the same time, we have to understand that the relations between the West, collective West and Russia, has never been so uneasy.
At least if we can use that word. I mean, there is a little room for maneuver right now than ever before. Because during the presidency of Armenia’s first president, Ter-Petrosyan, Kocharyan, and of course there were some tensions between Russia and the West. But now it’s not a tension.
They’re enemies. they’re fighting against each other in Ukraine. And the West is supporting Ukraine as much as possible against Russia. They’re enemies. And it’s really very hard to maneuver, you know, without having troubles coming from both sides.
Of course, there will be pressure from the European Union. Like, you know, Pashinyan, you have to make a decision. Are you with us or are you with our enemy? And the same with Russia.
Are you with us or are you with my enemy? And it’s really a very tough decision to make right now. I think he will try not to make that decision as long as possible to see what is happening in Ukraine, to see what is happening in U.S.-Russia relations, because collective West today is really very hard to say that the U.S. is part of the collective West today as it used to be, because of the U.S.-EU relations, because of the relations of the United States and Trump administration with other European Union partners. This is a completely different situation.
So most probably uh Pashinyan is saying okay let me wait not to make any concrete steps not to take any concrete steps wait to see what is happening with you let’s see what’s happening with Iran and United States and try to figure out what can be done uh without you know going here or without going there
Asbed Bedrossian: Suren, with both sides, the European West and Russia, all saying that you are with us or you’re against us, actually the main message that we’ve heard from people that we’ve talked to, for example, Ambassador Matlock and Jeffrey Sachs , is that do not participate,
Suren Sargsyan: Yup.
Asbed Bedrossian: do not take sides, do not engage in these global rivalries, you’ll only get hurt. So is it correct for Pashinyan to be basically in an undefined position, shall we say, about this whole thing? Or should he actually say, I’m with this or I’m with that situation? I’m specifically talking about membership in the CSTO and membership, or rather the presence of the 102nd military base in Armenia.
Suren Sargsyan: I think he will try not to take any side. I think he will try to do that. Of course, the worst thing that you can do for such a small country as Armenia is to take sides when global players are fighting and you’re just a little piece of land, little country. And if you take sides, it’s going to be a catastrophe for your economy, for your security, etc.
So that is, I suppose, Pashinyan will wait as much as possible to see what is happening. And to see where the threats are coming towards Armenia and threats are coming towards his own power. Because this is a very important issue, too. We have to understand this.
He’s not only thinking about Armenia, but he’s also thinking about how to keep his power as strong as possible. long as possible. So that is why I suppose he will try to wait not to take any sides, despite the pressure coming from different places, he will do some concessions, it will give something to Russians, something to Europeans, something to Turkey, something to Azerbaijan, but we’ll try to, you know, keep as much as possible this current status not to pick any of these sides.
Hovik Manucharyan: Now, both Pashinyan and Putin said that there will be a follow-up meeting. In fact, I don’t know why there even needed to be like a 30-minute meeting, just like at the tail end of the SCO summit and who requested it. But they said that they will have a more thorough meeting in Russia sometime soon. I don’t think the timeline was given where everything will be put on the table. every aspect of the Armenian and Russian relationship.
What do you think are the major topics of this negotiation or this meeting? Is it, for instance, building a new Russian nuclear plant in Armenia, which we heard Rosatom say that this was part of the discussions in Bishkek. Like what about small modular reactors that Armenia is pushing, you know, that are built by the U.S.? Could some other surprise elements be like, I mean, I’m still treating this as a potential for negotiation and not, you know, going towards a full break between Russian and Armenian relations.
But we’ve also heard Russian officials say that TRIPP is a threat to them and saying that Russia should have a role in the TRIPP corridor. So is that going to be part of the negotiations as well? What do you think are going to be the big topics for Armenia and for Russia in these upcoming negotiations?
Suren Sargsyan: I think this topic of referendum is quite a realistic topic that they are having all the time. I mean, Russian President or the Prime Minister. Because Putin is seeing, he sees that Armenia is ready to do a referendum because Azerbaijan wants Armenia to do a referendum and Turkey definitely. And he’s like, okay, if they want you to do a referendum, do one more referendum to me and let your people decide whatever you want to do.
And Pashinyan doesn’t want to do that because he will have a lot of troubles if he combines two referendums and two issues together. It’s going to be a huge problem. And beside that, whatever people decide, he cannot undo it. It’s a problem for him.
It’s a problem for his government. It’s a problem for him to keep the power and to be as powerful as he is now. He understands that. Beside that, you know, Putin is like, you know, you’re going to do a referendum. issue too.
Why don’t you do that? If you don’t do that, we will understand a lot of things. I think this is a real issue that they’re discussing. The referendum and the position of Armenian people.
Do they want to leave or they want to stay? Because I suppose Putin is thinking that the interests of Armenian people somehow different from the interests of Pashinyan and his team. And in some extent, he’s right. He’s right that there are a lot of differences between what Armenian people want and what Pashinyan is providing Armenian people.
Armenia, Armenian sovereignty, security, foreign policy, defense policy, etc. So that is why he’s probably pushing on that issue to tell him, you know, your people is deciding this way, like Brexit, you know, you Brexit yourself, decide whatever you want to do. If you want to go, just go. If you want to stay, just stop talking like this and just start being more active in our organizations like Collective Security Treaty Organization, Eurasian Union, etc.
I think this is a real topic that they decide. Another issue that you mentioned is the nuclear power station that we have in Armenia. There are two different discussions. One for the small, modular American stations.
Asbed Bedrossian: The reactors.
Suren Sargsyan: Yeah. And the other one is the Russian one that we already have. Turkey and Azerbaijan are saying that you have to just close the one that you have because it’s against our national interests, and Armenia has nothing to do about it. I mean, if he’s giving it to Russians, he will say, dear Russians, dear Turks, just talk to each other, just decide whatever you want to do.
It’s Russian asset, it’s Russian station, go and talk to Russians. And for this modular station, this is a very interesting question because we did research on that topic and we talked with a lot of professionals, American professionals, physicists, nuclear physicists, and they’re saying that, you know, it’s still not ready. We have to do a lot of things. We have to do a lot of research.
We’re not sure if it’s more healthy, if it’s more secure, if it doesn’t have bad impact on nature, et cetera. So there are a lot of issues that they still have to address before coming to a conclusion that the small modular nuclear stations are safe to have. So this is a problem that we have here. Another problem, as Hovik mentioned, is the TRIPP itself as a project.
Because something is happening and we don’t see it probably. We don’t have enough information about it, but we see that the smallest part of this Middle Corridor, the 42-kilometer corridor part in Armenia is not under construction yet. Though Azerbaijan is already prepared on the infrastructure, roads, communications, et cetera. But nothing is happening in Armenia, and this construction, they even haven’t started the construction, which means that they are having some problems.
And I suppose the biggest problem here is the factor of Iran, because a TRIPP is going to be the closest ever within like a couple of hundred meters in some places. Presence, American presence, American strategic presence near the Iranian border is very close to Iran. Nothing ever happened like that. And they are scared and they are unhappy about it. and they think it’s a threat.
And probably they are saying, you know, if you try to start to do construction, we’re going to hit that site because, you know, we don’t know what you’re doing. We don’t trust you. We don’t trust Americans. We don’t know what’s going to happen.
So don’t be mad with us that we’re going to hit you because, you know, we don’t know what is happening. This is issue number one. That is why I suppose nothing is started yet. And second issue is the issue of railroads, Russian railroads, which is an important thing to think about and to discuss.
Because you know that the important part of TRIPP is the railway. With this railway connection from Central Asia, then to Caspian Sea, and from Caspian Sea, the railroad should bring all the goods, transfer it from Azerbaijan to Armenia, Turkey, and then to Europe. This is the essential part of it. It’s very important to have this railway system used.
Armenian railroad system is under Russian concession, which means that Russians are operating the Armenian railroads. Now, two options. They have to give it back to Armenia somehow. I don’t know why.
Armenia has to take it back from Russia. Again, I don’t know how. But what was the most interesting thing that a couple of months ago, maybe months ago, Russian, the president of Russia’s railroad company, the chairman, whatever you call him, He said that we did about $400 million investment there and, okay, pay us back and then we will leave. So he gave amount of money, which is significant.
Why? If you’re talking about money, if you’re talking about you’re giving exact money, that means, okay, give us $400 million and we will leave. Or we want to be part of that project. We want to be part of a TRIPP.
And this $400 million can be our investment in that project. But again, if we go with that logic, if we continue that logic, the decision will not be near them. Russia and Washington will decide whether Russia will be part of this TRIPP or part of this Middle Corridor somehow or not. So this is up to Washington and Moscow to decide, not up to Yerevan or Baku.
Yerevan or Baku had nothing to do here. So this is more decision for global players. This is a very interesting moment in this whole process.
Hovik Manucharyan: this whole story, this divorce story between Armenia and Russia, so far is missing a large and powerful neighbor in the neighborhood who has interests of his own. Of course, I’m talking about Iran. In early 2025, Russia signed a strategic comprehensive partnership with Iran.
And many analysts are putting a lot of emphasis on that as the cornerstone of Russian and Iranian relations, I know you said that the Russian base is strategic for the base in Gyumri is strategic for Russia but if it is true that for Russia having dominance in the South Caucasus is no longer like the top priority in its list of strategic objectives some analysts I’ve heard speculate that Russia could essentially outsource in the region to Iran, its partner. Now, of course, that flies in the face of everything that’s going on right now with all the EU, U.S., Turkey, Azerbaijani activity and control in Armenia.
But do you think that there is a credence to this story that maybe Russia is saying, OK, I don’t have time or resources to deal with Armenia right now, but I’m going to allow Iran to dictate and be the dominant player in the South Caucasus. What do you think about that?
Suren Sargsyan: Well, this is a realistic scenario, but at the same time, we have to understand that Iran is not the player that can be very successful in the South Caucasus without Russia’s support, because Iran itself is in a very difficult situation. It has to balance Turkey not only in the South Caucasus, but around the whole Central Asian region, the whole Middle Eastern region. It’s very hard for Iran to deal with all these problems because it’s half of the world. They’re dealing with half of the world, with the toughest half of the world, with the most dangerous half of the world.
And there are a lot of challengers, a lot of challengers like Turkey, like Azerbaijan. challenger too and China is challenger in central asia uh and China is somehow trying to be involved in in the Middle East so uh Russia is not able to go ahead and protect own interests in the territory of the south that is true somehow because it’s busy with Ukraine it’s like fourth fifth year almost five years uh busy with what is happening in Ukraine but uh to give the positions to Iran come back. Yeah, that’s a scenario, but it’s a very difficult scenario. If Iran is powerful in the South Caucasus, why should it get out?
If Russia is coming back, okay, thank you for keeping my seat. Now get out of here and give me my seat back. It doesn’t work that way. It doesn’t work that way.
Russia will try to, I think it’s trying to avoid additional problems in the South Caucasus, additional fronts to be opened against Russia in the South Caucasus.
Somehow, Russia is trying his best to have less troubles coming from not only from these from from the south forces including from the Central Asia if you see the relations of Russia and Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is very interesting partner for Russia too with a lot of problems actually you know we’re thinking that they’re brotherly countries they are actually but they have a lot of troubles on on the highest level like in Armenia like the Kazakh president and the Russian president always, you know, heated conversations, et cetera.
And there are a lot of information in Russian or Kazakh media about the relations of two countries, including in the Eurasian Union.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah.
Suren Sargsyan: So that is why I think Russia is not as powerful as it used to be, but it will try its best to keep, you know, whatever they have here, there, you know, to play, sometimes to say, okay, we’re not going to disturb you here, Pashinyan, do whatever you want to do. Okay, Kazakhstan, do whatever you want to do there. will try to keep his positions even weak but it’s better to keep your own weak positions and give your positions to someone that’s how the geopolitics work especially in this part
Asbed Bedrossian: Suren, as you said, the TRIPP is about 42, 43 kilometers. It’s only a small, a tiny little part of the Greater East-West Middle Corridor. So in light of the Shanghai Cooperation Summit, let’s take a step back and look at Central Asia, which is part of the Greater East-West Corridor. For more than a century, strategists have viewed Central Asia as a critical geopolitical chessboard.
Halford Mackinder famously described the Eurasian interior as the pivot of world politics, arguing that control of the heart of Eurasia could shape the balance of power across the continent. Now, Central Asia remains a prime arena for major power rivalries. Russia views the region as part of the Greater Eurasia concept that it has. China relies on it as a land bridge for trade energy and regional security.
Europe seeks critical minerals out of Central Asia and trade routes to bypass Moscow through Central Asia. And the U.S. wants control of everything to limit China and Russia and their dominance in this region. What’s the U.S. strategy towards Central Asia today? And how does it compare with Europe’s?
Are they separate, competing, cooperating or what?
Suren Sargsyan: Again, we will come to the beginning of our conversation that the U.S. and the European Union, they’re somehow, they’re not the same anymore as they used to be. They don’t have the same goal, they don’t have the same objectives, they don’t have the same priorities as they used to have. Maybe the next administration, when someone comes the White House, the situation will change. But at this point, we can definitely say that there is a big gap between what Europe wants and what the United States wants.
As for Central Asia, it’s a very important part of the world. Why? First, it’s geography, because Central Asia is a huge territory with five quite successful countries, especially Kazakhstan, especially Uzbekistan. Strategically, it’s a very important place between Russia, China, and the United States is trying to be there, too.
But at the same time, we have to understand that for Central Asia, there is another fight, fought by Turkey. Turkey is trying to you know be more active in Central Asia as active as possible because of the Organization of Turkic States, OTS. He’s quite successful and he’s you know he’s uh he’s doing a very successful uh job in that regard
Asbed Bedrossian: Would you consider Turkey as a proxy of the West in this geopolitics?
Suren Sargsyan: Again, Turkey is playing its own game and quite successfully. Turkey is a part of, whenever it needs to be part of Collective West, it is a part of Collective West. When he doesn’t need that, he’s not. I mean, he’s a quite powerful player and their president is a quite powerful person and they do good thinking of whatever they want to do.
So basically we have a situation when Turkey is on its own, whenever it needs to be on its own, and he’s a part of the team whenever he needs to be a part of a team. If he’s trying to challenge Moscow, he’s part of the team. He’s a member of the NATO. If not, he’s just playing by himself. the strategy of the U.S. is to be as much involved as possible in Central Asia because it’s a very rich region with oil, with gas, with a lot of minerals.
And Washington, we know that is now trying to gain as much control over these resources as it is possible, simply because China is very active in that regard. And China is also trying to have as much access to all these minerals as possible. And when we come back to what Trump was saying about Greenland, it’s not about the land. It’s about the minerals.
It’s about resources that Greenland has. And China is getting quite successful in Greenland. They’re trying to be involved. They’re trying to do some investments.
And they’re very successful. The U.S. doesn’t. They don’t like it simply because it’s a new challenger. Let a new challenger come and do something not far from your own territory.
So that is why this process is going to go on between Russia, the United States, and China in Central Asia for their resources. And finally, if we take a look at it, what is happening? The Chinese investments in Central Asia are huge. And they are mostly buying all these resources and gas and oil, et cetera. are trying to buy all these possible resources in Central Asia doing investments.
But at the same time, when it comes to how to take these resources, how to export these resources to the European Union, U.S. is saying, you know, this corridor that we have, including TRIPP, you can use that one. I mean, okay, I cannot compete with you and buy these resources in Central Asia, but you cannot compete with me so you have to use our you have to use my routes in order to take all these goods and resources from Central Asia to European markets so basically this is another type of challenging process that we see between China and the United States
Hovik Manucharyan: That’s interesting. And this is, I think, where Armenia, with the TRIPP, figures greatly in the Central Asian power dynamics now. The TRIPP agreement, so we’re going to come back to TRIPP. I know we talk a lot about on this podcast about the TRIPP.
It’s also called the Zangezur Corridor by Turkey and Azerbaijan. it is crazy because there are so many intersecting competing powers all laser focused on this small area of land and it’s a very dangerous uh position to be in. It’s a route through southern Armenia and what’s interesting is that it was visibly spearheaded by the United States through this 100 year deal that was signed in June. But it is also becoming, like you said, a vital link as part of Europe’s Middle Corridor, especially as relations between EU and Georgia have strained recently.
It seems like EU is going all in on Armenia. now why is this interesting because even though EU and U.S. representatives were not invited to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit there were two people closely tied with TRIPP who were present in Bishkek Senator Steve Daines and also Konstantin Sokolov who essentially now holds the purse strings for any major TRIPP project. So Pashinyan met with them shortly before his meeting with Putin. Now, the timeline is intriguing because Senator Daines is not a well-known figure in Armenia, but there are claims that he played an important role in shaping the TRIPP proposal.
If you remember, Pashinyan said sometime I think ago that the idea for whatever became the TRIPP was initially floated in May of 2025. It was signed months later, but by May already the U.S. had a proposal to Armenia on this. And who else visited Armenia in the region at the time? It was Senator Daines.
He visited Armenia in May and also Azerbaijan. And then in July, he came back and went to Azerbaijan, but not Armenia. What do we know about how this TRIPP project was developed and Senator Daines’ role in this? Is it fair to call him something of a godfather in this TRIPP deal?
Suren Sargsyan: I wouldn’t call him a godfather. I wouldn’t call him even a founding father. I’ll tell you why. Because the idea of a corridor or a road connecting Nakhijevan to Azerbaijan is coming from early 90s.
And the same Goble Plan was something like that. You know, it was about this. And within the 30 years, the United States were trying to, you know, sort of implement this project somehow. It was part of the negotiation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan during Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations.
It was part of Key West when President Bush had a meeting with Aliyev father and President Kocharyan. So it was always there. So calling somebody a godfather, I don’t think he’s a godfather. Maybe he did some implementation on that.
He did some practical steps and he decided, you know, let’s do this, that. But I think one of the founding fathers or godfathers was Witkoff definitely and his team, because they did a really, really, really big job on that regard, on TRIPP. And they were traveling to Moscow, they were traveling to Azerbaijan, talking to them, different separate representatives of Witkoff team came to Armenia, etc. etc. And finally, the Sokolov figure is very interesting because, well, Sokolov. is a person who has business interest in Armenia.
So he knows very well the Armenian realities on the ground. He’s a businessman. He owns a bank. He owns a mining company.
Asbed Bedrossian: Mine, yeah.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah, the mine.
Suren Sargsyan: He has Viva Cell-MTS. I think he’s not 100% owner, but he’s one of the owners.
Hovik Manucharyan: He’s a controlling shareholder, yep.
Suren Sargsyan: Yeah, so he has a lot of assets in Armenia, which makes him a person who knows Armenia very well, with challenges, with problems, etc. At the same time, he’s very close to Trump team. He’s very close to Trump administration because he’s a MAGA supporter and donor, quite a big one, which makes him a person who has very, you know, he can just call, let’s say, pick a phone and call, let’s say, to Rubio and say, you know, we have a problem here.
The appointment of this person is very important because they’re saying like okay we need to do it as fast as possible so we don’t need this routine embassy reporting phone calls I don’t know cables etc as fast as possible and this is a person who can be very effective he knows what is happening in Armenia he knows how Washington works and he knows the people he knows the phone numbers he can call whoever he wants to call to make everything as fast as possible so there are so-called founding fathers or godfathers for this process. And I suppose Rubio knows the region very well. He could be part of it somehow.
I don’t know how, but he could be part of it because he knows the region very well. He was a senator. He was a quite active Armenian senator. He knew the Armenian genocide issue, Nagorno-Karabakh issue, and he was in touch with Armenian lobby, et cetera.
So a lot of people were involved in this TRIPP, I suppose, and a lot of people with a big knowledge, a knowledge of history too.
Suren Sargsyan: Thank you.
Hovik Manucharyan: What does TRIPP give the United States? Does it give Washington a new form of strategic leverage, essentially, over the East-West trade? you know, like you said, you know, the Washington is saying, you know, if Europe wants to communicate with Asia, then it can use this small corridor that now is its own. But what can that control over this corridor really give the United States? Aren’t we overstating the importance of TRIPP in that regard.
Suren Sargsyan: You know, this is the first time within the American history that America is receiving a strategic presence in the South Caucasus. They tried a lot, starting from Bush. They tried a lot. They tried to be here.
They tried to do huge projects here, like massive projects here, but they failed. All the administrations failed, including the first administration of Trump. They failed. They didn’t have any possibility to be involved in the South Caucasus strategically.
Now, if this process, this is a business presence, but it can become a strategic presence. And it is becoming a strategic presence if implemented fully 100% the way that Washington, D.C. wants it to be implemented. So that is why I suppose this presence, strategic presence in the South Caucasus and in the Middle Corridor is very important for the United States. And I’m pretty sure that they will try their best to be as much involved in this region as possible.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah. Now, what’s also interesting is that Europe now appears to be all in on TRIPP, but initially it was the U.S. who was doing all the sort of leading and talking about it. Who wants TRIPP more, Washington or Brussels?
Suren Sargsyan: Of course, Washington. Of course, Washington.
Hovik Manucharyan: Really?
Suren Sargsyan: Of course, of course. I mean, Washington, the main locomotive of this project, of this process, yeah, there are some benefits for the European Union, too. There are some benefits for Brussels, too, including the concept that this is bypassing Russia.
This project is bypassing Russia, and Europe will have independence in getting gas from Kazakhstan, let’s say, via Russia or Turkey which is a partner for the European Union as we just talked a couple of minutes ago so that is why this is very important for the European Union too and they will support the process definitely but as for the TRIPP itself of course number one beneficiaries the United States because they are finally having course number one beneficiaries the United States because they are finally having
Asbed Bedrossian: Suren, I have a question to flip the previous question on its head a little bit.
Suren Sargsyan: Go there.
Asbed Bedrossian: You know, we know all the people who stand to benefit, and we always say that Turkey and Azerbaijan stand to benefit the most. There is almost no benefit for Armenia. Now we’re talking about the U.S. and Europe benefiting from this. Who stands to lose the most if this project is not realized?
Suren Sargsyan: This is a very good question. I’ll tell you, Asbed, because there’s no alternative. Like, what is happening if TRIPP is failed?
Asbed Bedrossian: Mm-hmm.
Suren Sargsyan: No TRIPP.
Asbed Bedrossian: Mm-hmm.
Suren Sargsyan: Okay, what is happening next? The next, Azerbaijan is coming saying, you know, we don’t care about TRIPP. It’s not working. They couldn’t do that.
Give us our corridor. And this corridor will be called not TRIPP, And I’m pretty sure that our new government will be happy to give it to them. I mean, they will give the corridor at the end of the day. So this is scenario number one.
Second scenario is Russians are coming and saying, you know, Americans failed, Washington failed, Trump failed. Now it’s our time to intervene. Why? Because on November 9th, we have signed an agreement.
In that agreement, we agreed that Russian special forces will be operating in this supporting free transfer of goods from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan or from, or vice versa, or whatever. So Russians will come and say, you know, we have agreement. Okay, let’s let our special forces be there and control the territory. So there is no alternative to this TRIPP.
I mean, there is alternative, there are alternatives, but these are the alternatives that I’m talking about. Maybe there are some alternatives to maybe Iran will say, you know, that if you’re not able to, if you’re not able to keep your Syunik region secured, you have to give it to Azeris or Turks, just give it to us. Why would you have it if you cannot manage it? I mean, there are a lot of different alternatives.
But realistically, a real alternative, I don’t see any alternative. What is going to happen if TRIPP is not there? Okay. This is a question to you too, by the way.
What do you think? What’s going to happen?
Asbed Bedrossian: So am I hearing that you’re saying that the failure of this situation, I don’t even know if I should call the TRIPP project, Armenia stands to lose the most from this.
Suren Sargsyan: This is one of the scenarios that Armenia, and the fault of Armenian authorities is that they don’t have a plan B.
Asbed Bedrossian: Mm-hmm.
Suren Sargsyan: Just zero plan B, nothing is planned. Not with the European Union, nothing with, I don’t know, Russians or Iranians, nobody. Let’s say Trump is impeached tomorrow and everything is, Washington is a mess. Nothing is going to happen.
I don’t know. It’s really hard to say because there’s no plan B.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, it’s not necessarily going to happen in the next year in the United States, but after Trump is gone, we don’t know who’s going to come to power, and I don’t know exactly what the level of interest or engagement is going to be on the part of greater Washington, let’s say. Because we’ve talked to Christine A. Arakelian, who knows Washington a little bit, and she said that there hasn’t been the kind of buy-in about TRIPP from Congress, for example, to be a completely institutionalized project.
Suren Sargsyan: She’s right. She’s right. I do agree with her.
Asbed Bedrossian: So we know the next two years for TRIPP, but we don’t know beyond that.
Suren Sargsyan: Yeah, she’s right. But besides that, Asbed, I’ll tell you something else.
Asbed Bedrossian: And we have to…
Suren Sargsyan: As I mentioned before, all the administration were trying to do something like that. So it’s not a Trump interest. It’s an American interest to be involved in this region and to have some significant presence in the South Caucasus region. And this is one of the most successful things they’ve ever done before.
Even after the revolution in Georgia, they were not very successful in being involved there. foreign assistance, Bush administration, troops, financial assistance, a lot of assistance to Georgia. But what happened in Georgia was sold, so it was a failure too. But this one is something else. This is something that is happening on the ground, and that is why I’m thinking about the alternatives.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah.
Suren Sargsyan: And when I think about it, I don’t think any alternative beneficial for Armenia. I’m not saying this is super beneficial for Armenia. Yes, this is beneficial, at least somehow. Some flow of the money, not a huge amount of money will be here because of the transfer of the goods.
But at the same time, again, the problem is not because we don’t have benefits, but the alternative is unknown, which is more dangerous. Because when you’re dealing with something unknown, it usually can be more dangerous than something known.
Asbed Bedrossian: So when you said that the government has no plan B, what kind of alternatives are you envisioning that the government should have at least in place for scenario?
Suren Sargsyan: I don’t know, maybe something with the European Union. Maybe they could have something, some plan B with the European Union. Maybe they could bring the European Union in as much involved as possible. I don’t know. because you know we’re always looking on things from from this angle and we’re not inside we don’t have enough information about a lot of things we can do analysis based on what we know but there are a lot of unknowns I suppose that if we knew we could be better in this regard we could do better
Asbed Bedrossian: And I’m concerned about this because even if we do something with Europe,
Asbed Bedrossian: we are still antagonizing our next door neighbor, Iran. And so they feel always excluded. Is there a scenario where Iran benefits from any kind of a project that is east-west
Suren Sargsyan: Of course.
Asbed Bedrossian: and a project that doesn’t hurt the north-south aspect of this corridor business?
Suren Sargsyan: Yeah, another problem for Iran is that Iran used to be exclusive connection between Azerbaijan and Nakhijevan and it is now losing its exclusiveness. This is another important thing that we have to take into consideration, not because it’s on the border of Iran, but because Iran is not having that benefit anymore, which is significant for Iran in order to keep Azerbaijan somehow under control. This is an important aspect. But as for Iran, a lot of things depends on what’s going to happen with the U.S.-Iran War.
If tensions are not that high or if they come to an agreement, it will be beneficiary for everyone, including Armenia, because you will have this TRIPP without any problems operating. You will probably have, why not, Iran joining somehow to that project if the problems between Iran and the U.S. are solved somehow. So a lot of alternatives, a lot of opportunities may arise. But right now I see no visible alternatives for this TRIPP.
If it’s not going to happen, I don’t know what’s going to happen.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah. Very interesting discussion. Mr. Suren Sargsyan, thank you for joining
Suren Sargsyan: Thank you.
Hovik Manucharyan: us. We have to close today, but we hope to have you back soon.
Suren Sargsyan: Thank you.
Hovik Manucharyan: This was a truly interesting discussion.
Asbed Bedrossian: Thank you, Suren.
Suren Sargsyan: Thank you very much. Thank you, Asbed. Thank you, Hovik.
Asbed Bedrossian: That’s our show today. This episode was recorded on September 4, 2026. We’ve been talking with Suren Sargsyan. He is the founder and president of the Armenian Center for American Studies, a research center based in Yerevan.
For more information, of course, you can go to podcasts.groong.org slash episode number and check out the links.
Hovik Manucharyan: Folks, tell us how we’re doing. We’re doing good, right? So tell us. And let us know what we need to change.
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I’m Hovik Manucharyan
Asbed Bedrossian: And I’m Asbed Bedrossian, and we will talk to you soon.
Hovik Manucharyan: Bye-bye.
Asbed Bedrossian: Bye-bye.