Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed Bedrossian: Hello, everyone. We have with us Arthur G. Martirosyan, an expert on international conflict management and negotiations. We have a lot of topics on our minds, like the incoming government’s five-year plan, things like their attacks on the church, enclave giveaways, the TRIPP project, and then we want to talk about Pashinyan’s revenge-based governance, when a lot of the opposition leaders are And does the opposition have a strategy to deal with this?
As always, don’t forget to support us, podcasts.groong.org. And let’s get on with the program. Arthur, welcome back to the Groong Podcast. We love to have you.
Arthur Martirosyan: Thank you for having me. Good to see you. Thank you, Arthur.
Hovik Manucharyan: Voghjuyn Arthur, glad to have you back.
Arthur Martirosyan: Thank you very much.
Asbed Bedrossian: So Pashinyan got re-elected and revenge politics are in full swing again in Yerevan. All the opposition leaders, Arthur, are now under arrest. Gagik Tsarukyan is under arrest after seizing his cement factory and putting him in jail. And the regime is now threatening to revoke his properties and his homes, as a matter of fact.
Samvel Karapetyan has been under house arrest or detention for over a year now. And over the last few days, Robert Kocharyan was arrested. He was immediately given two months of pretrial detention. His son, Sedrak Kocharyan, was arrested.
Levon Kocharyan’s house was searched. Nine others have been charged. Even Sirusho’s businesses have been searched. That’s how extensive these people are.
And there are, of course, reports that many of the businesses associated with Kocharyan are closed and criminal charges are being filed against directors of his companies, a little bit like the same pattern that happened a month ago with Tsarukyan’s businesses. Why did Pashinyan decide to go on this offensive?
Arthur Martirosyan: Well, because he needs to demonstrate that he’s in full control. Actions of an authoritarian leader who is masking as a quasi-democratic, but since he has a full go-ahead from European partners, it’s possible for him to do almost anything, anything he wants, anything from the menu of Aliyev, because I don’t think that dealing with Kocharyan is just a revenge. It’s something that would very much please Aliyev , because Aliyev has been speaking about bringing to trial, to courts, all leaders of Armenia who one way or the other have been involved with Artsakh. Two presidents of Artsakh are in prison in Baku.
One is in Yerevan. As to Karapetyan, he was on the wanted list in Baku. He’s in prison in Yerevan. So this is not just about This is also about pleasing his main partner, Aliyev, in whatever he’s doing.
Also, it’s obvious that the remaining five years that he’s going to be in power, he has to make some tectonic changes related to the Armenian identity, as promised to both Azerbaijan and Turkey, because without that, they’re not going to give him anything that he wants. Essentially, we’ll get to this later, I guess, his program. If you read this program, between the lines, you understand that it is not a program that any Western government would have approved in the parliament, but it’s something that still is very much dependent on the goodwill and mercy of Turkey and Azerbaijan.
All of the things that they are promising us to be delivered by 2031 depend on whether Turkey and Azerbaijan would allow them to do that. Almost everything in the program. But we’ll get to that later. So if you have that kind of dependence, if your relations with Moscow, as sour as it can get, I guess, and the promises to get even worse, then you have to essentially make sure that no opposition politically can Even take an opportunity at mobilizing now the social or economic discontent.
So that’s his fear. That’s why it’s the time for him to tighten the screws and make sure that the opposition is controlled. Finally, there are the games in the parliament, because although his party didn’t manage to get the majority of Armenian votes. It’s even shorter than half of the eligible voters who came to the polls.
He didn’t even get 50 percent, but he has a majority in the parliament. But that majority is not what he wanted. He wanted to have constitutional majority so that he can change the constitution without a referendum. He didn’t get that.
So now the game is going to be in the parliament. So you arrest some of these people and you start putting pressure on the ones who are in the parliament, hoping to get some of them to switch sides or turn to his camp so that he can get the desired number for constitutional changes. As to I think if he thinks that he can turn these things into bargaining chips with Moscow, it’s a miscalculation. I don’t think Moscow is going to step in with some concessions on its policy just because Putin ’s friend Kocharyan is behind the bars.
Asbed Bedrossian: Right. In addition to what you said about why he’s on this offensive against Kocharyan and Sargsyan, let me just add, I think that is primarily what his identity is based on, that he’s not one of the formers. If he doesn’t do this to distinguish himself, he’s basically a nobody. He’s basically a failed nobody, as far as I’m concerned.
Asbed Bedrossian: Now, as far as the opposition leaders go, have they not foreseen this? What is their strategy to counter this? Was there ever a plan B?
Arthur Martirosyan: Well, I cannot speak for the opposition, these are different players, but it was, I think, fairly predictable. The moment they agreed to take the mandates and to be in the parliament, Pashinyan secured an important thing, which is Because we know he doesn’t have one, but for the external world, if there is a functioning parliament with the opposition, and the opposition participates in the parliament where the The votes were stolen, essentially. One party didn’t make it because Pashinyan decided to have their mandates, essentially. So if they agreed, it must have been some kind of calculation behind it.
And I’m speculating now. I’m kind of trying to think together with you what it might have been. On the moral grounds, it’s a total disaster, because on moral grounds, it’s wrong. You do not go into parliament where you are calling your I mean, there’s nothing to sit and discuss with traitors, right?
But politics is the art of possible, and let’s assume that they decided to get this mandate so that they can have at least some say on the issues. They can play the same game as the previous Parliament saying that we want to keep the population informed, or at least some opposition voices would be heard by the people. Another argument was, and I don’t know how valid that is, had they refused to take their mandates, Pashinyan would have found some other political parties as opposition, pocket opposition, to take this, and then still will be—would have been the same game, essentially. And finally, at least they get some leverage, right?
I mean, they can—even though the leaders are under arrest, they have some leverage, some way to reaching out and doing more from the parliament than if they had not been there. So these are the arguments, and I don’t know if any of this is gonna have any influence on where these things go. Pashinyan makes a claim that it was his promise that he’d have all of them behind the bars, and for eight years he didn’t do anything, just because now he has to blame someone, right? Because his electorate, apart from the admin resource, he has some electorate, and that electorate really was anti-Kocharyan and Sargsyan and whatnot.
So yes, they wanted them behind the bars, and now who’s he blaming? And the judiciary, they promised when they came to power in 2018 that they would go through reforms. They were talking about vetting the judges. They were talking about all sorts of things.
Nothing was done. And in fact, he managed to appoint some of the judges of his liking. But even that hasn’t been working to please his constituency, his electorate. Why?
Because they don’t have real cases. They bring cases that have no legs to stand on.
Asbed Bedrossian: Essentially, he wants to tweet somebody into prison and he hasn’t been able to.
Arthur Martirosyan: I mean, for him, the game is I’ll keep them as long as I want in prison. The trial can be long. But we all understand that once these verdicts, once they’re made against, for instance, Samvel Karapetyan or I don’t know what’s going to be with Kocharyan this time, but I don’t think it really has a leg to stand on. Going back to March 1, making a new claim that now since the European Court has decided that the Armenian state was somehow guilty in what happened.
But even that decision doesn’t say that it was the president who was. I mean, because the state is a very—it’s a very amorphous way of saying who was guilty for what happened or who was responsible for what happened. But the minute these cases go out to the same European courts, they’re going to find these people, I’m more than sure, are not guilty. But it’s the political process that is important.
How long is Samvel Karapetyan essentially under arrest? And it can go on, they can drag, they can make this. Politically, it works for him. He thinks that’s the game he can play, even if eventually they’re going to get the He needs now to get everybody scared.
If you cannot love me, you will have to fear me. I’m paraphrasing now Machiavelli, but that’s what he’s after. If these people do not love me and they don’t, they will have to fear me. And he has, as I said, a carte blanche from European countries to do anything because he’s doing the main thing that is in their interest.
And he’s wrapping that, packaging that, as if it’s in our national interest. But that’s essentially what they want to see.
Hovik Manucharyan: Arthur, it’s one thing to decide to go into the parliament, but we witnessed something very interesting, which is Strong Armenia essentially, at least the leadership of Strong Armenia, said that we’re going to try to maintain a civil tone, we’re going to try to sort of function as parliamentarians and keep the parliament going. Of course, with the Edgar Ghazaryan incidents, that policy quickly showed its cracks because all of Civil Contract attacked him and did so for a week continuously. They refused to vote in any of these Strong Armenia nominations, which by the D’Hondt formula, was the opposition’s, Strong Armenia’s, choice.
And then when Pashinyan finally made it into the Parliament to discuss his program, everything went out of the window. Again, we’re back to the old name-calling. He gloated that he was able to bring the three-headed beast to its knees, referring to the opposition parties. He labeled the Catholicos of All Armenians as unholy.
Look who’s saying that. And that was the most tame part of the Parliament sessions. So I know you can’t speak for the opposition, but in retrospect, Is this strategy going to… At least one of the scenarios is that the opposition is trying to keep the populace, keep the social discontent warm so that eventually they can go to street protests.
Is this strategy working for that goal because will a lot of people see the opposition as being weak and unable to galvanize any resistance to Pashinyan because of all of these things?
Arthur Martirosyan: Well, I think Pashinyan has figured out for some time now that Parliament, from the French word parler, speaking, you can speak, yes, some of the speeches can be fiery, can get him nervous, can get him react in not parliamentary ways and whatnot, but in the end he controls the game. You came and you made this parliament a legitimate body, and we can claim that the opposition is allowed to be there. Yes, he can pressure them, he can use the language. It’s a language that even in the streets not every Armenian uses.
But it’s, after all, a calculation politically what’s possible. And that is possible for him. There are no consequences, because he controls the judiciary, much as he complains about it. He controls all three branches.
So what’s going to happen? I mean, he has the power of the Law enforcement. And he can do anything he wants. There is no recourse.
There’s nothing that can be done in the country to stop him from doing that. And he’s saying this is even a soft authoritarianism, right? And he needs this quasi-democratic thing because he needs to show to Europe that the country is democratic. Although I don’t think Europeans need that anymore.
I mean, if they look at all the criteria, you can qualify and be ready for European Union, but as the Georgian case showed us, if you are not anti-Russian enough, it doesn’t matter.
Asbed Bedrossian: You’re not ready.
Arthur Martirosyan: It all collapses. I mean, you’re not ready. And on the contrary, if you show enough anti-Russian stance, And if you are behaving as an authoritarian, they’d be condoning that. We live in a very different environment, I mean, in terms of international relations right now.
And some people still think that, oh, Europeans, their values, democracy and human rights and whatnot. None of that matters anymore. All of that has been changed since—well, even before we could see these cracks, before 22, but since the Russia-Ukraine war, all of this has changed. I mean, look even at the Ukrainian case, right?
We’re getting almost daily stories about corruption in the entourage of Zelensky. What is Europe saying? Don’t touch. He’s untouchable.
He’s untouchable. So I think Pashinyan is taking some cues from all of that and says, yes, I can do that. Who’s going to stop me? The majority in Armenia, the population, the majority that never voted for him, by the way, is still passive enough not to take any part in any of this.
And what else? What else is going to stop him? What’s going to stop him from doing whatever he wants to do? And if the judges cannot find reasons to put behind the bars anyone he fingers, in the evening he says this guy needs to be arrested, the next day the guy’s arrested.
And everybody understands that. Is the population happy about it? And our problem is that the majority of the population doesn’t care. And the ones who care and understand and can speak, I sometimes watch Aram Abrahamyan from Aravot, his reels.
I mean, he’s doing reels. He says things that are, I mean, he puts his finger right where the problem is, right? But it doesn’t change anything. So back to Parliament, you can talk whatever you want.
I’m deciding, I can tell who’s going to be in prison tomorrow, I’m saying what we’re going to do, and I’m going to be, and all of this is going to be used again to coerce some of the parliamentarians in the hope to gain them on his side, or at least to neutralize them so that he can get people he wants in the parliament and then the constitutional majority. Because without that constitutional change, he cannot get the peace agreement signed. And there are probably many other things that we do not know yet about. What else?
Some of the things have become obvious, right? Enclaves, I mean, yes, that issue is now, again, much discussed here in Yerevan, but it was obvious that he was going to go back. Look, answering the question of one of the journalists the other day, and she was saying, how come you have agreed on those particular maps, given that Azerbaijan in its constitution does not recognize the Soviet period, or rather recognizes it as an occupied country, as many other former Soviets, like Georgia, the Baltic states. So how come you have agreed?
And she said, no, no, we never negotiated the maps. In Prague, when we agreed that we’re going to have the mutual recognition of each other, we agreed on the Almaty Declaration, and if we agreed on the Almaty Declaration, then it follows that the last maps of the Soviet Union, legal maps, it says, should be respected by both sides. But it’s a contradiction in terms, in logical. I mean, I do not expect that he’s a reader of Aristotelian logic, but he’s not answering the question, and it’s not the first time.
He can say anything because he knows part of the population that understands that he’s manipulating, understands that his statements are illogical, is essentially impotent to change anything. They can’t do anything. And the majority doesn’t care whatever he says. Yes, give Kyarki now.
He says Kyarki is a done deal. He’s going to give it to Azerbaijan. And is there going to be protests? People going to come into the streets?
To make sure that that never happens, he’s going to tighten the screws. And I’m sure they’re going to go not only after these people, but many others, to make sure that they feel the pressure. If they cannot arrest people, there will be house searches. If they cannot do house searches, they will be invited to police or whatever.
I mean, they will find so many different ways to put pressure on people. The game is obvious. Is the opposition playing that game? Yes, he has made them play that game.
If they think they can outsmart him in playing that game, I personally do not see how they’re going to be able to do that. The only thing, again, That they are going to have as a card, being a parliament member, they can go and see in prison some of the political prisoners , they can voice some of the issues related to the conditions of the imprisonment and whatnot. Other than that, I cannot see what else they’re going to do. Are they going to make some statements in Europe to invite Europeans to intervene or say, no, no, no, you can’t do that, Pashinyan?
No way. Pashinyan knows it’s not going to happen. So that’s my reading of what’s going on.
Hovik Manucharyan: Speaking to the fact about the enclaves, or the so-called enclaves in Tigranashen, Pashinyan’s agenda essentially of delimitation and demarcation apparently includes recognizing that Tigranashen, which is the Armenian name, And it’s a key town that sits on one of the main transportation arteries of Armenia, is not Armenian after all.
Pashinyan said so himself, saying that Armenia’s border, I mean, just so that there is no confusion, because people, various people tried to think of clever ways of ambiguating this, but Pashinyan himself said that Armenia’s borders comprise 29,743 square kilometers and Tigranashen, or what Pashinyan and the Turks, called Kyarki, is not part of that. I mean, the writing is on the wall. He wants to give it away, but can you tell us, I mean, when you ask them, they say, oh, we’ll construct a detour, we’ll manage it. History of Tigranashen.
Is it really Azerbaijani? And what is the significance of Tigranashen for Armenia strategically, for those who don’t know?
Arthur Martirosyan: Well, essentially, you said that. I mean, and I remember that in 1988, when the movement began, and then in 1989 in particular, Azerbaijanis who lived there, they managed to block the road. And essentially, Armenia was cut in half. The southern part was separated from the north, and that was the reason why there was fierce fighting, and that territory was regained by fight.
It was not just Azerbaijanis were evicted and whatnot. No, there was serious fighting that Armenians had to. They were forced to conduct to gain connection between south and north of the country. So that enclave has a strategic importance.
And when Pashinyan manipulates, he says, oh, there is an enclave that is in Azerbaijan, Artsvashen. We’ll be getting Artsvashen. First of all, even if we get Artsvashen, and even if we are able to populate Artsvashen, its importance and significance in terms of geopolitics is not going to be the same as Tigranashen. That’s obvious to anyone who has studied the conflict, who knows how that developed.
These enclaves are another kind of… One more thing before
Asbed Bedrossian: you move on, Arthur. What kind of access is there to arts fashion? It’s inside Azerbaijan. How do you get there even if it’s Armenian territory?
Arthur Martirosyan: Presumably, he says, they’re going to negotiate and make sure that the enclave is going to be connected to Armenia, just as Tigranashen is going to be connected to Nakhichevan, that is, Azerbaijan. Now, that’s him telling us that he hopes, as a negotiator, to get that done. Will it be done that way? I have no idea.
I don’t think Azerbaijan is going to give him anything right now. Nothing. Because they have all the leverage. He has given them everything.
And when we get to talk a little bit about the program, just as in the previous one, you know, when you are saying something like my development, My development depends on how I’m going to have the communication open with Turkey and Azerbaijan. I’m not saying it’s a bad thing to have that communication open, by the way. I’m saying when you pin your entire development on them, they sit back and they say, hey, let’s see what else we can get from this guy, because everything he wants depends on us.
Asbed Bedrossian: One more thing, Arthur. I know we’ve been talking about this Tigranashen versus Artsvashen kind of thing, but I think one of the latest things he added, he was saying that if we don’t give Tigranashen back, then say goodbye to Jermuk. So it’s absolutely Armenian territory, which has been occupied currently, or nearly occupied, that he says in order to get a pullback by their armies, I’m going to give part of the country away.
Arthur Martirosyan: Well, I mean, again, there is no logic in what he’s saying, but he never cared about perfect syllogisms in his statements. It just doesn’t make much sense, right? I mean, if Azerbaijan has occupied your sovereign territory by the very maps that you are talking about, then they have to move back unconditionally. That’s right.
And you are saying, no, no, they’re going to sit there until we give them Tigranashen. What does it mean, then? It means that Azerbaijan understands Tigranashen’s importance. It’s so important to them that they have now gotten another bargaining chip in dealing with him.
But, I mean, this is beyond, you know, forget about fairness, forget about This is just kind of Eastern Bazaar, you know, where I take something from you and I say, well, you will get that if you give me that other thing. I mean, this is exactly that.
Asbed Bedrossian: It is.
Arthur Martirosyan: It really is. And he’s playing that game. And if you ask him why you are doing this, he’d say, what else? What else can we do?
We cannot do anything. My answer to that is if you cannot do anything, then get out of the kitchen.
Asbed Bedrossian: You said my words exactly. Resign and let somebody who can deal with the problem deal with the problem.
Arthur Martirosyan: I mean, this is the tragedy, you know, because they say, oh, we failed. We couldn’t do this. Things changed. We changed our mind and whatnot.
And they’re getting away with that, you know. In any democratic government state, I mean, even Eastern Europe, forget about Western European, I mean, this kind of thing is impossible to imagine. The government would be out the next minute. I mean, but in Armenia, it’s okay, because that’s what I’m saying.
People are making mistakes. They think that we are quasi-democratic, or democratic, quasi-democratic. Nothing can be closer to a sultanistic regime. And when I’m saying sultanistic, it’s not a pejorative term.
It’s my teacher Juan Linz at Yale, one of the best minds in transition to democracy, was calling some of the regimes. So, yes, Aliyev’s is sultanistic, and so is Pashinyan’s. Although he continues to play these elections, we have democracy, the bastion of democracy. There cannot be any democracy if you do not have a republic.
We do not have a republic. If one party controls all three branches of power, it controls everything. And given the way the democratic procedures and processes are structured in this country, we can see that you can have half of the half vote for you, half comes to the polls, half of that half votes for you, and that gives you a majority in the parliament. And this is representative democracy.
Asbed Bedrossian: Like you said, he did not get half the popular
Arthur Martirosyan: votes. When John Stuart Mill was talking about the tyranny of the majority, that’s exactly what he meant. But in Armenian case, it’s not even the majority. It’s not even the majority.
He doesn’t have the majority. But he controls the law enforcement, he controls the power, he controls the army, and therefore, and he says, oh, you don’t like this? Start a revolution against me. Who’s going to start a revolution against
Hovik Manucharyan: me? Knowing full well that anyone who thinks about that will be in jail before even they have a, you know… No,
Arthur Martirosyan: even if you say we’re going to have it done our way, it’s already enough for you to
Hovik Manucharyan: be… Yeah. It’s sedition. It’s already like an overthrow of state.
Asbed Bedrossian: I think it’s important to know that he did not get 50% of the votes. He stole a bunch of the votes to keep certain parties out so that he could get three-fifths majority so that he could do certain things without approval from the opposition.
Asbed Bedrossian: So one of the results of that is that they have proposed a five-year plan. As you said, it’s not really so much of a five-year program. It’s more of a list of buzzwords and wish lists on the part of Pashinyan for the next five years. And of course, Civil Contract unanimously voted for that.
The opposition boycotted that vote. There are many areas, over a dozen areas to this We’ll put them in the show notes. We’ll take a redux of this and put it in the show notes. You can check them out.
Asbed Bedrossian: There are several major themes I want to outline. One of them is the ideological replacement of the Third Republic with this thing he calls the Real Armenia. And he’s already shopping this Fourth Republic idea. I’ll go to the others a little more in a moment, but I’ll give you a chance to talk to us.
Why does Pashinyan need to kill the Third Republic?
Arthur Martirosyan: Well, I think he’s trying, at least conceptually, to follow the French way of moving from one to another, from one republic to the Fifth Republic. So he thinks that he is starting from scratch. He’s starting from scratch. We know the First and the Second Republic, the Soviet and the Democratic First Republic, but then the Republic that existed from 1991 to date, it’s a failed Republic, according to him, although he’s part of that Republic still.
It’s a failed Republic because it was based on a false notion. On a false notion that we need Karabakh, that we have claims of genocide and it should be part of our foreign policy, all of that needs to be removed so that we can create a republic that can live happily ever after with Turks and all our neighbors and Georgians. He often adds that too. The problem is that I wouldn’t call the third one a republic in a clean sense of the term republic.
And the Soviet one certainly was not a republic. Let’s get clear on terminology, right, what the republic means. Res publica. So it’s about things public.
But who says that in the Soviet Union Armenia or any other of the 14 other republics had the separation of powers or they really were what republic is meant in the Western parlance. Of course, it was not a republic and it’s not a republic now. I mean, if tomorrow comes in and he says, well, the judiciary is failing to the promise that we’ve made to the people after the revolution, that we will be doing this and this, we’ll be putting all these people behind the bars, we’ll be taking the property, we’ll be giving it back to the people, all that stuff, eight years, he controlled all of it. He controlled all of it.
He now simply wants to use that again as an opportunity to bring that old discourse, right? Because he has no other way to make this sound appealing to anyone in the country. He has to do it as if this is still that old fight against the corrupt presidents and But in fact, he is surrounded by oligarchs himself. And more importantly, I mean, there is no love lost for me when it comes to Tsarukyan.
But you have to follow the rules. Otherwise, you are saying, there are no rules, I can do whatever I want. And that way, you are just another authoritarian. So he says that’s the dilemma for him.
He has to act as an authoritarian to fulfill the promise. But if you are acting as an authoritarian to fulfill the promise, then there is no republic and there is no democracy. So which do you choose? And he says, I’m choosing right now authoritarian.
And essentially, he wants to look like the founding father. He’s like probably—I mean, he’s never said that openly. Maybe he has said this to his Turkish counterparts. He admires Atatürk.
He wants to be an Atatürk figure who not only changes the rules of the game, but he also changes the identity. Well, I don’t think Atatürk was entirely successful in changing the identity, but he certainly tried. So that same thing is on Pashinyan’s agenda, and that’s why he is after the church, and that’s why he wants to rewrite the history textbooks, and he’s already doing that, and that’s why he wants to get rid of any mention of Artsakh. And part of the reason Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan are under attack because he wants to remove them from the political landscape of Armenia entirely.
He’d prefer to keep them behind the bars, but at least remove them so that they are not seen, that Aliyev is not saying, oh, these guys are probably going to come to power tomorrow. That has to be removed from the political agenda entirely. They should not exist as a political force. That’s what he’s doing.
Hovik Manucharyan: Another part of the program is, I mean, it’s predictable, but again, you know, very interesting and I don’t know how wise. In the section on geopolitical diversification and EU integration, there is a sharp contrast between the 2021 plan. Russia is no longer referred to as a strategic partner. Of course, we know Everything that’s going on between Armenia and the Eurasian Economic Union, CSTO and so forth.
So it’s not surprising, but what do you think Russia’s options are here?
Arthur Martirosyan: Well, Russians are going to continue to do what they were doing. I mean, he is now kind of saying, look, I don’t want to get out of the CSTO. You’d better kick me out of the CSTO.
Hovik Manucharyan: Do me a favor and kick us out so that we don’t have to think hard about it.
Asbed Bedrossian: He literally said
Arthur Martirosyan: that. What were they comparing it to? I think they were saying it’s almost like a schoolboy who wants to be kicked out of the class and is doing everything to be kicked out of the class. For whatever reason, the teacher keeps them in.
So why is Russia keeping them in? They say, you want to get out? You say that you want to get out. We’re not going to do that.
But I think if he really had the alternatives, he would have done that. But he’s bluffing on the alternatives. Alternative number one, I get out of CSTO, but I have my security dilemma somehow manageable. We don’t have that.
And he knows that. Nobody’s going to come to help us, save us in this situation. So it’s very scary. There are some scary scenarios related to that, the minute he gets out.
The same goes with the Eurasian Union. His ministers and he himself were going out of their way to tell us that Armenia is going to get its produce sold down European markets. It’s going to be in Europe instead of Russia. Of course, nothing of the kind is happening.
It’s not that easy to get alternatives done. It’s very hard work. And they failed that. They had eight years to work on these alternatives.
By and large, they failed their 2021 program.
Hovik Manucharyan: If they fail their 2021 program,
Arthur Martirosyan: who says that they’re going to achieve anything in their 2026–2031 program? And there is no consequence for them politically. They take no responsibility for not having done what they promised in 21. I mean, in 21, they were even promising things regarding Karabakh.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, that’s right. I mean, in many ways, Arthur, it doesn’t make any sense, right? In 2018, they came. And then they lost catastrophic wars.
They lost Artsakh. They proposed things in 2021, which they have not kept, and they’re still getting elected. The logic does not add up. It just doesn’t make any sense.
Arthur Martirosyan: Well, it doesn’t make any sense, except that in politics, again, I mean, it’s the art of possible. And unfortunately, what he’s doing is still possible, right? He’s getting away with all that stuff. I think the most serious call from Russia is going to be around December 2.
He doesn’t want to run a referendum. He says, oh, we’re first going to apply to the European Union, and when they say that they want us in, then we’ll run a referendum to see what the population thinks. That’s his answer to Moscow. But I don’t think it’s going to satisfy Moscow.
They’re saying, if you’re not running a referendum, you’re going to come and stand here in Moscow, wherever that meeting is going to be, and you’re going to say I’m not, I don’t have any intention to go to EU to stay with the Eurasian Union. Is he going to do that? No, of course he wants to avoid any of that. It’s a kind of dodging kind of I think much of this diplomacy, if you call it diplomacy, is coming from the Libaridian playbook, and kind of dodging, not saying anything.
Or if you don’t want us in Eurasian Union, it’s very bad for you, because your union is going to collapse without you. Look, Armenia is—the turnover with Armenia for them is only less than 1 percent. What’s the problem for them? 1%. What’s the turnover for Armenia? 30 to 50%.
Are you going to feel it? Yes, you’re going to feel it. And the incompetence of them. At least they could have tried during the session in the parliament to make some changes.
For instance, On the very day they had hearings, Scott Bessent in the United States was talking about new sanctions on countries that deal with Iran. So now, I mean, is Armenia dealing with Iran? Yes. What does the program say?
That we’re going to enhance dialogue with Iran, we’re going to increase our trade with Iran. Are you going to be able to do that? It’s very risky and uncertain. And if it’s uncertain, why are you putting that in the program?
So then you’d say, oh, we couldn’t do it because so many things changed. And that’s about almost anything. Nothing is very specific. Even corporations would not allow planning like that.
Do you have a log frame? Do you have targets? Do you have specific numbers? None of that exists there.
None of that.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah. Arthur, I wanted to get your ideas about another wish list item that we have on this program, and that has to do with the AI, energy infrastructure, other infrastructure that have just been put in there. Apparently, they would like to decide within a year what kind of a nuclear power plant they want to have. They want to keep their chances open of extending the current power plant, Metsamor, to beyond 2036, and explore all these other geothermal, hydrogen, blah, blah, blah, you know.
But the thing is that there are some plans also to have this AI factory in Hrazdan, which is currently at about 15 megawatts, and they plan to explode it to about 300 megawatts. Of course, if they’re going to shut down Metsamor and then they’re going to put up a small modular reactor, which is capable of 300 to 350, We’re suddenly going to lose power rather than add power in the country. So all of the power of the new power plant is going to go to basically this AI factory. And then what’s going to happen to the country?
And apparently they’re proposing electric lines so that we can buy power from Azerbaijan. What are your thoughts about this math?
Arthur Martirosyan: Well, again, I think they will be building all sorts of new dependencies on Azerbaijan and Turkey. That’s obvious. If they’re going to get out of Eurasian Union, I mean, there’s not going to be any alternative left. If relations with Iran are going to be, if the U.S. is going to strongly mandate that there’s not going to be even this Electricity for gas kind of deal.
It’s going to hit the Armenian interests and damage in very significant ways. The problem is, you know, it takes real experts to say, and there are so many unknowns about what are we gaining from this plant in Hrazdan. So how much water are you going to need for cooling? Would that affect Sevan?
There are so many unknowns and uncertainties about it. Obviously, I mean, on paper, it looks good to have something like that, but the devil is in the details and the details we will know once it becomes operational. Do you even have enough commissions to that? I mean, are there enough startups who really need to use to that extent, to that scale that you’re going to have it in Armenia?
Other countries are going to need that. Are we getting any requests from them? Do you have a pipeline? Do you see what’s going to happen?
I don’t know much about that. So I don’t want to speculate about things that are not my But I can see that there are many unknowns and uncertainties about that project, but Pashinyan presents it as if it’s The best thing since sliced bread for Armenia. And it’s our hope, it’s our future. And in fact, talking about the kind of relationship he wants with the diaspora, he says, Firebird is what kind of diasporas we want here.
We don’t want this second-hand shop stuff.
Asbed Bedrossian: These ANCs and the ARFs and the AGBUs and the Assemblies.
Arthur Martirosyan: All these people, it’s nonsense. Real business. And is this real business? Only time will show.
I mean, of course, you can talk and play on the major expectations from AI. But I think, again, it’s very humble and not professional. There’s a national take on this. Even globally, there are many issues on where are we going with this stuff.
So, again, he’s a great manipulator. I mean, I was surprised that he didn’t start using that whole thing even before his elections, right? Because I thought that he’d be rolling it out before elections. But maybe there were issues related with the investors, with the money and whatnot.
So that’s why, or maybe even the US, that’s why it was postponed. So now they’re going to continue to sell to ordinary, average Armenians this issue about the great future and billions that are going to be made through that enterprise. I have my own very conservative, I’d say, and cautious Take on where it’s going to go in the next several years.
Hovik Manucharyan: Arthur, we want to quickly also talk about the Armenian Church. Apparently, in the Fourth Republic concept, there is no room for the church or at least the Catholicos that is currently heading the church. And another important and absurd initiative of that program was basically to reform the Armenian church. It’s right there in the Armenian government program.
And we know that the Catholicos is being dragged through the courts right now on flimsy charges on being accused of defrocking his own priests, which has full authority to do. But for the first time, I heard
Arthur Martirosyan: something. Trade unions are supporting the priests. The Armenian trade unions are in full support of the priests.
Hovik Manucharyan: But interestingly, for the first time, I finally heard something that I think may be a clue. Pashinyan revealed that, basically, he said that Armenian priests, allegedly under the direction of the Vehapar, continue praying that God preserve Artsakh, which he described as an incitement to war. And, if we remember, Pashinyan’s attacks against Armenian Church intensified when the Catholicos, or the Vehapar, went to Bern, I believe, and spoke about the rights of the people of Artsakh, including Armenian cultural heritage left behind. So, at least for the Catholicos, he was talking about rights of people.
And then we know that strong criticism followed from the Azerbaijani And then Pashinyan and his wife joined in. Did Pashinyan reveal the true reason why he’s intensifying the attacks against the church, in your opinion?
Arthur Martirosyan: I think no, but it’s very plausible, very plausible that this whole thing also falls into the Turkish and Azerbaijani agenda and the whole concept of Real Armenia and the Fourth Republic is that diaspora have as little influence on things Armenian as possible. And because church is kind of one organization that has connections with diaspora, it’s really an all-Armenian organization in some ways. So for Turks and Azeris, it has been a thorn in their side for a long time. Republic, the Fourth Republic, according to Pashinyan, should be kind of isolated from those influences.
I mean, you are there in diaspora, only those who carry the blue Armenian passport are our citizens. Unless you are a Firebird that brings 500 million here, it’s okay, but everything else, especially the church out. And that’s exactly what Azeris and Turks would want to see. They would want to see Armenia as a neighbor that doesn’t have all the support in different capitals of the world.
And that way, Armenia is going to be weak. And as we discussed, we discussed only one area, energy and stuff, but as dependent on Turks and others as possible so that they can either integrate it in the bigger kind of Turan, their vision of creating Turan, where Armenia is this midget state that has no influence on regional politics or whatever, and it can have some if it has the diaspora, right? So it can knock on various doors in capitals of major powers, but without the diaspora it cannot. So for them it makes a lot of sense.
And if I say that Pashinyan is doing exactly what they want, that would be true. But Pashinyan would say that he has all other reasons. And the reason that he’s bringing makes no sense for anyone who does not necessarily need to be a religious person, but even understands a little bit about how the state and religion in the European civilization that we’re aspiring to be part of, right, has been formulated in the last couple of centuries, and in France in particular. So separation of church and state is important.
And what he’s doing is he’s saying, no, no, no, I want a church. This is more like Henry VIII of England, right? I want a church that I can control.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah.
Arthur Martirosyan: I don’t want them to be independent or influenced by Armenians who live in other parts. And it can be Russia, it can be United States, it can be France, it doesn’t matter. Or he could say our interests of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and of Pashinyan coincide here. Maybe coincide, or maybe he’s just doing what they put on paper.
What do they want? What are their expectations from the Fourth Republic? We will let you live on this territory if you give us whatever we want, according to all other stuff, enclaves, and you allow Azeris to resettle in Armenia. They’re denying all of that, but I’m sure that that’s the program of Azerbaijan and Turkey.
They do not necessarily need to talk about that right now. If they could, they could say, give Kocharyan out to Azerbaijan right now. He cannot do it right now. But the least he can do is put him behind bars so that in Baku they can say, yes, mashallah, and praise Pashinyan again for what he’s doing.
I’m trying to think of what states or countries have behaved like that. And the only country that comes to my mind is Japan. Capitulation of Japan. Not even Germany, but Japan.
Because Japan, even today, when they talk about Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and nukes, they are shy of saying who did that. So it’s a capitulation that Pashinyan sells to us as the only way to preserve, to save at least whatever there is left of Armenia. And that’s why it’s so I think, pernicious. That’s why I think it’s so dangerous for our identity.
Because once that program, the Great Turan program, starts rolling over Armenia, and it already has made its—I mean, he says Jermuk, for instance. Once it begins, I don’t think Pashinyan or whoever replaces him is going to be able to stop that from happening.
Asbed Bedrossian: Arthur, speaking of the Great Turan project, we’ve talked about the TRIPP project extensively on this, but over the last couple of days we read in Kyrgyz media that Armenia has offered 5% of TRIPP to Kyrgyzstan and 5% to Kazakhstan. Of course, you know that Armenia has 24% or 26% of the project and then 74% goes to America. Of those 26%, 5% they’re trying to sell to Kyrgyzstan and 5% to Kazakhstan. At the same time, Pashinyan is, of course, negotiating and pleading with Russia to sell the railroad concessions to Armenia or to a third party.
Now, on the surface, it might look like Armenia, which is leaving the Eurasian Economic Union and going to Europe. It’s selling its shares of TRIPP to prominent members of the Eurasian Economic Union and, of course, Turkic countries, members of the Organization of Turkic States. So I want to ask you, In the world of negotiations, are the words matching the actions? How should we read all this stuff?
Arthur Martirosyan: Well, I think for European Union, getting access to Central Asia is important. They have interests to have access to Central Asia because that’s the closest you can get to China. And so in some ways, if Pashinyan is making any calculations about this, he must have figured it out that the European Union supports all of that. As long as Russians are out and Turks and Azeris obviously are going to be major players dominating in the region in that case, then so be it.
So Pashinyan can play with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and it doesn’t really matter that much for them. I mean, who else they could have invited? France to have their shares here? Why France would care one way or the other?
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, you said it, I mean, and I think they’re going to have, and Kyrgyzstan is expecting a couple of days major events related to the nomad people. Most of Turkey would fall under that umbrella too. So yes, in their vision, it’s better to have this Turan and Turkic peoples united and to some degree under control by Brussels or having their influence on them. Than to have it under Russia or China.
So Pashinyan is trying anything. For him, it doesn’t really matter. If we could talk to Pakistan about this, he’d talk to Pakistan about this. I think he’s omnivorous when it comes to solving a problem that he has on his hands.
When it comes to giving
Hovik Manucharyan: away territory,
Arthur Martirosyan: When it comes to staying in power, let’s put it in very simple terms. For him, staying in power means that enemies are fine. He’ll do that. And talking to Kazakhstan, and by the way, Tokayev, I think, is going to be in Yerevan this fall on a state visit.
So through Turkey, Azerbaijan, who also have good relations with Kazakhstan, they will try to, through Tokayev, also talk to Moscow and try to get Russians out, as if Kazakhstan really wants it. But I don’t know if Russians are ready to play that game right now. They have other fish to fry right now.
Hovik Manucharyan: Speaking of Russia, this is really interesting because when Armenia made noises about joining EU, all these pro-Western positions, Russia is publicly complaining about them. But we have two other major countries, the Central Asian states, or the Central Asian Five, essentially, they’re also making a similar play. And I see this project, the Middle Corridor, as part of that, and this Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan stake as part of that. Am I sensing that Russia is…
I mean, to me, those are bigger threats to Russia than Armenia is. What do you think explains Russia’s silence in terms of Kazakhstan’s place and Kyrgyzstan’s place? And what do you think will happen in terms of what is the strategic threat to Russia from European encroachment into Central Asia?
Arthur Martirosyan: Well, I think it’s a matter of sequencing. The Central Asian game is, for me, the longer-term game. Right now, they need to address the issue of a proxy war of Europe, a proxy war through Ukraine with them. Once they address that, then they may turn and pay more attention to other things.
They are on the back burner right now. It doesn’t mean that they’re not paying attention to that, but Russia is not going to go and do something, especially given that these Turkic states are also playing very kind of cautious game. They’re not antagonizing their relations with Russia in any way, and I’m sure that when they’re going to have this SCO, ShOS in Russian. I think there is a great meeting again in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
So these countries are going to get to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and you’ll see how they’re going to be greeting Putin when he gets there. So they’re playing it, no escalation. If there are some issues that are questions or whatever, they try to resolve them without escalating anything. And the same goes with Kazakhstan.
Look at how Tokayev has been building his relations with Moscow. They think that it’s for a longer haul. That whole thing is for a longer haul. Both, by the way, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz and Moscow.
So Moscow has other things to take care of. Therefore, they’re not really that much involved in stating something against the Turan or whatever. They just keep it quiet. And also they have their interest in Turkey.
Let’s not forget that either. So it’s about short-term interest versus medium- to long-term interest and kind of balancing all that. And apart from short-term interest, I think they have urgent ones. And the urgent ones are Ukraine and Europe.
So once they are done with the kind of architecture they’re going to build with Europeans, if that’s in the making, will allow them to Look southwards, although the whole issue of the underbelly, the southern underbelly, has been a challenge for Russia even before the Soviets, even for Tsarist Russia. Starting with geopolitical thinkers about threats. So, yes, Russia will have to make choices. That country has huge challenges going forward.
Related to the demography and not only. We’ll see. I mean, it’s going to be a game where you probably would see some elements of the 19th century, but also some completely new stuff, because in the 19th century, China was not a big player. Now it’s in a different…
Asbed Bedrossian: It’s a big player. Well, if you ask me, this is keep Turkey in, Russia out, and Armenia down, the way they started NATO.
Arthur Martirosyan: Yes, I think, unfortunately, lots of stuff is done at the expense of our interests. I mean, our interests are not taken into consideration. There are words, there are promises. Oh, European markets are open for your apricots.
I even made some apricot jam myself. But, I mean, are you serious? Is this sustainable? Can you really do that?
Asbed Bedrossian: Arthur, thank you for coming on the show today. We really appreciate your time and insights. Hope to talk to you soon.
Arthur Martirosyan: I hope I’m on an optimistic note someday. Thanks, guys. Take care. Good night.
Asbed Bedrossian: That’s our show recorded on August 28, 2026. Arthur G. Martirosyan is a senior consultant with CMPartners. In 1994, after graduating from Yale University, he joined the Conflict Management Group and Harvard Negotiation Project and has since worked on conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, the Balkans, Africa, and Latin America.
For more information, you know where to go, podcasts.groong.org slash episode number. Click on the bios, get more information.
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Asbed Bedrossian: One of our listeners actually hyped us. Did you see that?
Hovik Manucharyan: We got one hype, yay. I got so excited when I learned about the hype feature. I learned that you need 100,000 points in hype points to be able to appear on the map anywhere. But don’t let that discourage you.
We’ll settle for five hypes. The goal for this episode is five people hyping us and commenting about it. No, no, no, five, five. Let’s set high standards, you know.
Five people comment, five people hype us and comment that you hyped us and let us know how we did. Thank you. That’s right.
Asbed Bedrossian: I’m Asbed Bedrossian.
Hovik Manucharyan: And as always, I’m Hovik Manucharyan. Have a great day.
Asbed Bedrossian: Talk to you soon.
Hovik Manucharyan: Bye-bye. Bye-bye.