Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed Bedrossian: Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Armenian News Network Groong Week in Review for August 16, 2026. Before we dive into all of our topics, let me just remind that you can do more than moral support for us. Go to podcasts.groong.org slash donate and become a sustaining member. Help us out.
Hovik, what do we have? What are we talking about today?
Hovik Manucharyan: The potential for our region to go into flames, but I feel like sort of we’ve been talking about that for the last eight years.
Asbed Bedrossian: That’s right.
Hovik Manucharyan: And yeah, it’s sort of it’s a new normal, right? I think we should briefly talk about the Iran war.
Hovik Manucharyan: Let’s start there. Yeah. This week marks the 60 day period for the memorandum of understanding the MOU between Iran and the US. And as it has expired or is expiring, I don’t know the exact date, but essentially Trump said that he’s not interested in extending it and indicated that the US might annex the Strait of Hormuz.
Asbed Bedrossian: You mean the Strait of Hormuz will become the 51st state?
Hovik Manucharyan: I think he said the Strait of America, he called it. But it is worrying because there is other accompanying news. Last week we already talked about the potential deal between Iran and Oman on the Strait of Hormuz with a lot of speculation and implied understanding that Oman was Essentially representing the U.S. as well in these negotiations . And that fell through.
Then, you know, Trump, amazingly, he said he would bomb Oman if it gets its way, somehow indicating that what Oman was doing for Trump was not enough. We talked about Mojtaba Khamenei reshuffling his cabinet, apparently installing more hardline members. Trump endorsed formally the Pakistan-Turkey and Saudi military alliance. Also, U.S., again, through the words of Bessent, the Secretary of Commerce, threatened severe economic sanctions against Iran, as if they have not been under any kind of sanctions so far.
Now, if you watch alt media, we’re not going to try to rehash all of those because you’ll be well aware of all the coverage and analysis on this. But I’d like to understand one simple question. U.S. has tried once, it has tried twice to crack Iran. So what hasn’t the U.S. done so far that it thinks it will succeed in this third round if fighting begins?
I mean, what are your thoughts, Asbed?
Asbed Bedrossian: Hovik, I think that maybe they’re just trying to gain time. Because like we discussed last week, there’s a severe shortage of ammunition for U.S. weaponry, Israeli weaponry. Even though they claim that they are fully reloaded and ready to go, I don’t think that they are. And I think that we have barely two months to the elections in Israel and the United States, and they’re just fighting for time right now.
Hovik Manucharyan: I think it’s clear that the US stockpile of weaponry is nowhere near the pre-war stockpile, but assuming that the US did buy this time and Eventually rebuilt its stockpile. I’m just wondering what else they could do to Iran that they haven’t done before. To me, it’s still puzzling what the goals of the U.S. are. I really don’t think that there’s a whole lot they’re going to be
Asbed Bedrossian: able to do. They can inflict a lot more damage. They’re going to destroy more civilian infrastructure. But I don’t think that they’re going to be able to do anything to force Iran to capitulate.
I just don’t see it happening. It’s a huge country. Just look at the map and we’ve discussed how large it is. It’s pretty much as large as Central Europe.
All of the major countries put together are barely as large as Iran and 90 million people. It’s just not going to capitulate. There’s not even enough weaponry in the world to carpet bomb Iran.
Hovik Manucharyan: For those of you who might not be aware, John Mearsheimer actually He started his own YouTube channel and his latest video episode was exactly on this issue. What is the US going to do the third time that it was not able to do the first and second times? And what is the US objective? What is the grand design of the US?
And I think according to him, it’s basically the US has no strategic goal right now. Meanwhile, Iran has all the options.
Asbed Bedrossian: There’s a lack of strategy. There’s a lack of exit strategy. There’s a lack of I mean, what are they trying to achieve? Over the last couple of days, Trump basically, when we were talking about bombing Oman, he was also saying that he’s still committed to Iran not getting nuclear weapons.
That was the first time we’ve heard this in almost a month or more, almost two months. It had basically gone out the door because we had completely forgotten why this war, by we, I mean the United States, had completely Lost sight of why they even got into this war. So I just don’t see them really getting back on the horse. I think that if the Democrats take the House and or the Senate, there is a very good chance that the United States will pay more attention to Ukraine again and start funneling money in that direction.
And Iran will probably go a little more on the wayside. That’s my best guess.
Hovik Manucharyan: The real issue is, of course, the Strait of Hormuz is mostly closed. There’s reports of some ships being able to pass through, but definitely not at any significant level.
Asbed Bedrossian: Let’s not miss mentioning, Hovik, that, of course, even though it’s closed, it is completely under US control, right? That’s also something that Trump said.
Hovik Manucharyan: Well, yeah, if I can’t have it, then no one can. But what I’m trying to get at is how long can the global economy last because you’re trying to And I think that your argument has a right to exist where, okay, this is going to be a protracted conflict, but I think that a lot of nations around the world are feeling the stress in terms of the decline of energy resources. This can’t last indefinitely, right? If the US goal is opening the Strait of Hormuz, then it should be done I’m not an expert, but how long can the global economy last?
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, that’s one concern. Hovik, we should also be concerned about what’s going to happen on the northern front. Maybe in our next conversation with Ambassador Aghajanian soon, I think tomorrow, we’ll talk a little bit about this issue because it seems like Iran is definitely not on the same page with Armenia about the TRIPP, the Trump route project. And I remain deeply concerned that as this conflict lingers on, if not escalates, the Northern Front will become an issue.
I mean, just recently, Levon Zurabian, who is an opposition leader, was in Tehran. And some security officials told him that if the TRIPP becomes a problem for them, they will deal with it the same way that they dealt with American bases in the Middle East and the Gulf states. So I fear that Armenia is going to become a target.
Hovik Manucharyan: Exactly, and I think Levon Zurabian didn’t mention his sources, right? But just a few days ago, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, he is a senior advisor to the commander-in-chief of Iran’s armed forces, basically said that, why should we give Armenia any differential treatment. We will treat Armenia and the South Caucasus the same way as we have dealt with the Strait of Hormuz and the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf. So this is serious, folks.
I think Armenians, depending on your political orientation, live in alternate realities. But those realities are going to collide one day and pop one of those realities. And the reality that Armenia is playing with fire right now, I think, is the true reality. So we should be paying attention to this.
And I think what we’ll also talk about with Dziunik is the Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan alliance, which last week we talked about it and we mentioned it as essentially evidence that Turkey is becoming more powerful in the Middle East as another sort of force against Israel and becoming more independent. That may or may not be the full extent of it because with Trump endorsing it, it seems like Trump is very happy for this to happen, so we’d like to know, okay, is there more to this? Is the next round of the Iran war going to also include these three countries?
Now, we know that Pakistan has generally tried to maintain warm relations with Iran, and so has Turkey on the surface. But if there’s a military alliance with Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian bases get targeted. What’s going to happen? So those are very interesting questions that we’d like to explore with Dziunik later this week.
Asbed Bedrossian: Hovik, I’m going to turn our attention a little bit to Russian-Armenian relations,
Asbed Bedrossian: if you don’t mind.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yes.
Asbed Bedrossian: If you recall, Pashinyan was at the Eurasian Economic Union meeting at Cholpon-Ata, and following his refusal to hold a referendum for Armenians to choose to leave the Eurasian Economic Union and instead join the EU, now Russia has basically given Armenia an ultimatum to hold a referendum by December 2026. Or the Eurasian Economic Union leaders are going to take joint action including legal suspension or termination of agreements with Armenia.
Additionally, I read that the CSTO is going to consider measures on November 11, 2026 to restrict Armenia’s voting rights and quota appointments due to Yerevan’s refusal to pay its membership fees ever since May 2024. So do you think that Armenia cares if it is frozen out of the CSTO? I mean, should it care? It’s basically the relationship is at zero right now.
What do you make of these, I’ll call them, threats?
Hovik Manucharyan: Armenia, under a wise leadership, should care about its membership in the CSTO, as despite not being another NATO, let me just put it this way. The CSTO essentially is a club for purchasing Russian weapons at cost. And if only for that, I think Armenia should care. But we should remember that what happened, how did this thing with the CSTO start?
I think when the CSTO envoy was in Armenia to investigate Armenia’s application in September 2022, when the attack against Jermuk happened, the leader, so-called leader, the de facto leader of Armenia, Pashinyan, was in Europe meeting the head of NATO. And then Armenia claims that CSTO did not come to Armenia’s aid. Sure, there are a lot of political reasons why individual members of CSTO might not be fully willing to go to war with Azerbaijan, but that was never the question. And it should be understood that the CSTO should be taken for what it is, which was a club for purchasing military equipment from Russia.
And do you remember what Armenia said at the time? Armenia said, essentially, we’re not leaving the CSTO. It’s a question of who’s leaving us. And eerily, the same argument is now being used against the Eurasian Economic Union.
It’s not Armenia leaving the EAEU, it’s the EAEU leaving Armenia. So Armenia should care both about EAEU and CSTO, but you know, a puppet regime, a puppet actually to many different world powers, but primarily Azerbaijan and Turkey and the European Union doesn’t. And in fact, I think they will be relieved if they somehow are provided an opportunity to leave the EU peacefully. But you do not play games in geopolitics unless you are able to pay for it.
And Armenia, how is Armenia going to pay for it?
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, I personally don’t think a whole lot about the CSTO, but I think that it has deterrence value. And when you are flanked by Turkey and Azerbaijan, flat out enemies of Armenia, how quickly do you think that the UK will come to our aid if Azerbaijan decides to take Syunik tomorrow, or France, or the United States. I don’t think anybody is going to come.
Hovik Manucharyan: And we get it, right? Belarus is a member of the CSTO. It has very good relations with Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan is.
There are serious problems with the CSTO. It is not black and white. But on the net, the CSTO did offer Armenia military aid, both in terms of logistics, both actually in terms of military equipment in response to Armenia’s application. Armenia rejected that.
It vetoed that decision in 2022. And now Armenia is blaming the CSTO for not coming to its aid and saying that because the CSTO, I think, or some CSTO countries said, you know, we don’t, we don’t know what the actual borders of Armenia are. Now, the same question could be posed to Pashinyan . Does Pashinyan know where Armenia’s borders are?
Because he seems to be more in doubt than others.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, I’m trying hard not to litigate the entire history of that damaged relationship. But in general, I think the CSTO does have deterrence value. And like you said, it used to be a club for cheap weaponry. So that’s where I stand.
But let’s also ask the same kind of question. Should Armenia be concerned about leaving the Eurasian Economic Union? Because this one is actually a much easier question to ask. I mean, we have a huge number of issues such as, let’s say, Armenia gets sanctioned by the Eurasian Economic Union and suddenly the trade tariffs, which are at zero right now, suddenly become a thing.
Gas prices, which are supremely preferential for Armenia. I mean, Armenia is getting currently 165, 177 dollars per cubic, per thousand cubic meter, I think, of gas, while Europe is consuming it at about 600 something dollars. That goes away. There could be grain embargoes, and most importantly, something that we’ve been talking about for the last couple of weeks, migrant laborers from Armenia to Russia and the remittances that they sent.
I was looking that up again just to make sure that I have the numbers right. We’re talking about almost $4 billion a year of remittances by laborers, migrant laborers, who are sending their families the money back to Armenia. And if we were to, you know, just for various issues, it could go down to about 3.2. Personally, 3.2 billion, 3.8 billion dollars.
That’s a huge amount of money and Russia could stop that overnight by some banking rules. That could sink the drum, that could sink the Armenian economy just like that before Macron could make a call to Pashinyan.
Hovik Manucharyan: A wise leader of Armenia would actually care about its relationship with the Eurasian Economic Union, despite wanting to also establish better relations with everyone, including the European Union. No one is saying that, okay, we should take sides. And I think that is the level of… We’re essentially the gutter in terms of politics, where you either are pro-Russian or pro-European, and there is no middle ground.
What’s happening right now is Armenia is being pressured to push the gas pedal and it’s going to have disastrous consequences for Armenia. Perhaps he’s being made to believe that they will come to his aid by short-term bailouts and some kind of loans, which will put the burden on Armenian citizens in the future. But it’s clear that if you look at the discussions around the TRIPP and wiring energy different ways, Europe would prefer to cut out Russia completely, perhaps bring in Central Asian and Azerbaijani energy through Armenia to Turkey and also feed Armenia using that.
And as part of that, make Armenia completely subservient to Azerbaijan, especially at the mercy of Azerbaijan. This is not in Armenia’s national interest, folks. I don’t know how else to say it. You talked about Azerbaijan.
Asbed Bedrossian: Talk a little bit about Aliyev visiting Nakhichevan.
Hovik Manucharyan: Aliyev was in Nakhichevan last week. Nakhichevan is currently probably the most militarized territory in the South Caucasus and perhaps even in the region in terms of it has Turkish forces there. It has a huge accumulation of military hardware. And he essentially held a sort of victorious tour of Nakhichevan and discussed his plans to increase militarization of the Azerbaijani exclave.
And he said some interesting things about TRIPP or the Zangezur Corridor . For instance, he said that Armenia had capitulated and agreed to his corridor, and Armenians should not be afraid of the word capitulation. We should just accept it. And the culmination of that capitulation was the signing of the White House Memorandum in August of 2025.
And his tone is generally militaristic all the time, but it was even more militaristic now. So I felt that it made harder for his proxies in Armenia through the Civil Contract regime to sell the narrative of peace to Armenia. So, amidst the bluster that Aliyev was spewing left and right, he revealed that Azerbaijani technical teams had actually been in Syunik and had scoped out the locations of various transmission lines and the locations through which electric poles would be installed to carry electricity from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan.
But also this could be sold to Armenia with one minor sort of proviso and that was that Armenia would have to at one point stop relying on nuclear energy, and when it does, Azerbaijan can displace that energy through those power lines. Of course, we’re not just talking about Azerbaijani power. We’re talking about there are plans for building undersea cables through the Caspian Sea and having Central Asian energy also piped through there. So this is part of the European project of which Azerbaijan is partnering.
It’s interesting that Pashinyan has two modes of reacting to Aliyev. One is eventual confirmation, because this news about the Azerbaijani experts visiting Armenia was never disclosed in the past, right? He said, yeah, sure, they came to Armenia, but that’s old news. We mentioned it in the past.
Yeah, apparently it happened many months ago. They hadn’t, but yeah, I mean, not specifically about this issue. And then about the nuclear power, he said he denied that Armenia is going to stop using nuclear energy, and he said Armenia’s goal is 100% energy independence. So in both cases, if Pashinyan is confirming something Aliyev said, then that means it’s true.
And if Pashinyan is denying something that Aliyev said, then it also means it’s true. And there’s no other mode for Pashinyan. What are your thoughts about all this?
Asbed Bedrossian: Well, I actually laughed pretty hard when I read that. He thinks that Armenia is going to be achieving 100% independence in energy. While antagonizing Iran and Russia. China hasn’t achieved that.
The United States hasn’t achieved that. Turkey hasn’t achieved that. I mean, how is Armenia going to achieve 100% energy independence? It’s just basically Pashinyan flatulating at the Armenian population, simply because the Armenian population is allowing him to do that.
That’s what I think, Hovik.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah. I mean, it’s one thing to say we’re going to increase our energy independence, but what we’re seeing is actually Armenia’s energy independence is vaporizing because if you antagonize Russia and increase your energy bill by fourfold, then what kind of independence is that?
Asbed Bedrossian: Why would Aliyev suddenly talk about the Armenian nuclear power plant? What’s his business talking about it?
Hovik Manucharyan: Well, it’s not sudden. Actually, Azerbaijan and Turkey have, for 30 years, been aggressively talking about nuclear power. The nuclear power plant is what provides Armenia. It is the only part of energy in Armenia that is more or less independent, minus the nuclear fuel that Russia provides.
Now that is on the chopping block. And my question is, how long until the Armenian nuclear power plant issue becomes not just a veiled threat or a silent precondition, but an outright overt one by Aliyev? I think that that time is very close.
Asbed Bedrossian: Okay, so at this point in time, in this discussion, I didn’t see that Aliyev was making a threat. You think that it’s actually a veiled threat or a precondition to signing peace because you think that eventually this is going to become a flat-out precondition, correct?
Hovik Manucharyan: Yes, yes, because Azerbaijan has all the cards and we see, you know, every time, you know, newer preconditions being put forth. So there is this backlog of preconditions that Azerbaijan occasionally pulls something out of and puts in front of Armenia. And I think this is going to be one of those.
Asbed Bedrossian: Interesting. Well, we’ll see how that comes to pass. But I was actually thinking about if there is peace, And even Hajiyev, I think, has said that there is de facto peace right now between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Well, if there is peace, why can’t there be some kind of a trade agreement today between Azerbaijan and Armenia so that Azerbaijan provides, let’s say, gas to Armenia and Armenia provides electricity straight out to Nakhichevan, a little bit like the Iran swap that’s going on.
Iran provides gas to Armenia and Armenia provides electricity back to Iran. Why can’t they do that? Why do they have to put all these wires, all these cables coming from Azerbaijan all the way to Nakhichevan, over Syunik, et cetera, et cetera? That infrastructure actually exists.
All they have to do is they have to agree to a swap of, let’s say, gas for electricity.
Hovik Manucharyan: And I think that the goal of Azerbaijan is complete control over Armenian energy, of course. Now, with Russia being pushed out, I think that this is an opportune moment for Azerbaijan. And I think that is a plan by Pashinyan’s handlers, is to convince Pashinyan that, hey, Azerbaijan will sell you the energy. It’ll come at a cost, and sorry, we can’t do anything about it if they put up more demands, but yes, you will have another source of gas and another source of electricity.
Azerbaijan has about 10 gigawatts itself, I think, of electric potential right now. Armenia has only, I think, a few gigawatts, but I’m not sure the exact amount, but yeah, so if Aliyev is allowed to …increases leverage over Armenia, of course he would. You know, I think he has enough leverage right now. So yeah, I mean, count me out of voting for buying Azerbaijan gas.
But again, that’s what the current regime is doing.
Hovik Manucharyan: Now, another interesting point we just glossed over is the It’s Nakhichevan, essentially. You know, the significance of Nakhichevan, the significance of his visit, the fact that Nakhichevan is one of the most militarized points in the South Caucasus right now. And who do you think is the target of that? I mean, I think Aliyev thinks he’s probably done with Armenia, right, for 50 years or 30 years or whatever.
So why is he increasing the militarization of the region, bringing more troops, bringing more equipment Is Armenia the target or is some other country involved or potentially targeted here?
Asbed Bedrossian: The answer is yes and yes, I think. I mean, there was a little-heard story about how the Russians from the 102nd military base were the ones who actually stopped Azerbaijan from taking over Jermuk. And nobody really hears that story. And what they were going to do is they were basically going to attack through Yeraskh and they were going to attack through Jermuk and basically squeeze and cut off the south of Armenia from the north of Armenia.
That hasn’t happened yet. And I don’t think that they’ve given up on that project. So I really believe that the militarization of Nakhichevan is a state of readiness for the next opportune moment to basically cut Armenia in two. And there won’t be a cutting of Armenia into it.
It’ll be basically assimilating the south of Armenia into… That’s right. That’s what’s going to happen. Armenia is going to become Greater Yerevan and it’ll be a city-state essentially.
Also importantly, just like you asked, all of this militarization is far too much just to take over Armenia, which is rolled over like a poodle and showing its soft underbelly. There’s nothing to resist any kind of army that is backed by Turkey, as a matter of fact. No, this is aimed at Iran, and Iran knows this very well. That’s why they have their armies also piled up in a huge state of readiness.
I’m quite worried about it because Nakhichevan is basically the same part of Syunik, just somebody who cut off a chunk of Armenia and gave it to Azerbaijan, to be honest. And the fates are interconnected.
Hovik Manucharyan: Nakhichevan, for those who don’t know, used to be significantly Armenian, if not majority Armenian. At the turn of the last century, I think it was 50% Armenian. And Azerbaijan, as part of the Soviet Union, gradually degraded the Armenian population there.
Asbed Bedrossian: Hovik, let’s mention also, in 2006, Azerbaijan went on a spree of destroying thousands of Armenian khachkars in the cemeteries in Julfa. So they’ve done everything possible to destroy everything Armenian and Armenian heritage in Nakhichevan.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah.
Asbed Bedrossian: And they don’t even know why it’s called Nakhichevan.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah, exactly. But I think your point, you know, I’m more prone to say that the number one, the primary reason why Nakhichevan is being militarized is against Iran and I’m worried about all this Turkey, Azerbaijan, I mean, both in terms of Turkey, the Turkey, Azerbaijan axis and the Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia axis. And eventually those axes might actually merge and we might have a very strong concentration of power and violent force in our region. Not just potential, but kinetic force.
So what is Armenian government doing? Just playing poodle. Nothing. Nothing.
I think you phrased it well.
Asbed Bedrossian: Let’s talk a little bit about the domestic politics. There were a lot of interesting speeches in the parliament over the past week and a half, Hovik. Do you want to tell us more?
Hovik Manucharyan: You know, we said that it was going to be a tense convocation and Pashinyan set the tone, actually, even when 10% of the votes were counted by saying that what he’s going to do to the opposition. Edgar Ghazaryan, who’s been a guest on this podcast before, he’s a member of Strong Armenia, he had a speech in parliament where he accused the regime for a responsibility in the war and its consequences. And he just used some colorful language. He said that this is the face of this government, war, casualties, losses, and bonuses.
And all of that is right. I mean, humongous losses from the war, humongous casualties, and astronomical bonuses. He went on to also accuse the ruling party of shamelessly exploiting the lives of soldiers. I think the Armenian word is .
And every day in Parliament, the response from, I mean, it almost turned into a brawl for us on that day. Then, every day, Civil Contract reminded the opposition to stay within its lanes. I think Hayk Konjoryan, who was chairing that session at the time, said, you know, if you don’t remove yourselves from this chamber, you will be removed and thrown out of this chamber and the National Assembly building, completely, essentially undermining the rights of He was not insulting anyone specifically. He was using language that has been the norm in Armenia, and I would say it’s like 10% in terms of potency to what Pashinyan would use.
But what’s interesting is the reaction of the opposition. Now, I mean, I think a lot of the opposition members individually and the Armenia Alliance supported Edgar Ghazaryan ’s speech. And so did some from Strong Armenia. But Narek Karapetyan, who is the leader of Strong Armenia, essentially said that, you know, they will discuss the issue in an internal faction meeting.
You know, you could see from the responses that they were trying to set a more conciliatory tone. And at the same time, Ruben Rubinyan and others from Civil Contract reminded Strong Armenia or the opposition about some kind of an unwritten agreement in terms of ethics. And then he said something to the effect that our agreement is almost This close to being dissolved. I’m not sure who is part of this agreement, what this agreement is about.
What are your thoughts about this conciliatory tone from Strong Armenia and this alleged agreement between the Civil Contract and the opposition to keep the tone within limits?
Asbed Bedrossian: Well, yeah, this is quite interesting. What you just described is actually my impression of what’s going on as well. I’ve been thinking that basically Strong Armenia is trying to bring in a modicum of civility so that they can achieve a certain number of real business, let’s say, instead of just being stuck on the fact that everybody wants regime change, well, we’re not going to get that instantly, we’re not going to get that without street action, but we can get a few things through Parliament.
I think he’s trying to achieve that, and it’s been very difficult and elusive, especially because if there are some agreements, and we don’t know anything about these agreements, That means a relationship of a superior entity and an inferior entity has been established. So basically a civil contract, because they have the power of the police and the army over the opposition, they can tell the opposition, do this or say this or don’t do this or don’t say this or you’ll be kicked out. I don’t understand how this kind of a relationship can continue for very long. So you have in the past said that this convocation is not going to last five years.
As of last week, I’m starting to think that, well, I mean, I don’t know how long it’s going to have, but it probably doesn’t have five years.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah. And all of this so far has happened without Pashinyan even stepping foot in Parliament. And we know that when he does, he’s going to actually pour gasoline on the fire, right? So I can’t see the point of collaborating with civil contract Hovik,
Asbed Bedrossian: if they’re going to collaborate because they want to set up some zoning laws or parking meters and stuff like that, frankly, I don’t care about that stuff. There are bigger issues on the fryer.
Hovik Manucharyan: So you do not compromise your number one issues, which is Artsakh , which is Armenia’s sovereignty, which is Armenia’s essentially becoming a historical entity now because we’re at the precipice of that. Just so that you can set up zoning laws. But I don’t get what the strategy is. I think that there is still some room to, okay, give the benefit of the doubt to Narek Karapetyan, and Strong Armenia, but you’re not going to increase your base by complying with civil contract and playing their game.
It’s clear that Pashinyan is not going to change his geopolitical orientation because you’re, you know, now suddenly addressing him as Mr. Prime Minister instead of, you know, de facto prime minister. So again, if that is not the case, then what is the deal?
Asbed Bedrossian: I still want to know what the deal is, what kind of an agreement has been reached between Strong Armenia and Civil Contract as far as civility and language and You know, their MO, their relationship. That is very important. And we didn’t know prior to the last few days that there is anything like that.
Hovik Manucharyan: And I think basically the deal is nothing about Armenian politics. It’s nothing about parliamentary strategic direction of the country. It’s solely about how much pressure Narek Karapetyan himself and Samvel Karapetyan himself will feel in terms of criminal prosecution. And that’s my worry.
So those are questions that need to be answered to the Armenian people, to the people who voted for Strong Armenia. And Armenia Alliance, because, you know, Armenia Alliance, I mean, Hayastan Dashink, they’re continuing their strong criticism of the regime, right? But if they repeat the same thing that they have done for the last five years, and there’s no change, then all of this, okay, let’s enter the parliament, let’s try to sort of accomplish things in the parliament, and somehow I don’t know what makes sense or what doesn’t make sense. I just don’t see the strategy of driving towards regime change right now.
That’s the problem. Let’s talk about two or three issues also that have come up. I wanted to mention that Armen Grigoryan, who was the national security chair, was sacked.
Asbed Bedrossian: And now Alen Simonyan, who had lost his job, Having gotten essentially sacked politely from being the speaker of the previous convocation of the National Assembly, he is now the National Security Chair. Just a couple of notes about this, Hovik. It shows to me how tight the circle of trust around Pashinyan is. It’s like a revolving chair situation.
If somebody is moved away, somebody else has to come and we know like the circle of ten to twelve trusted people that are constantly going from one position to another.
Hovik Manucharyan: There is another element to this, actually. Armen Grigoryan was said to be the trusted protege of this pro-Western NGO community, and he had established a very good rapport with his boss’s boss, Aliyev and Hajiyev. I think it also came as a surprise to Armen Grigoryan because the news is that Armen Grigoryan said that he’s not seeking any other appointment in the government. Of course, that may always turn out to be false because this is a revolving door.
Asbed Bedrossian: The same thing was said by Alen Simonyan, that he refused any other positions in the parliament. He was going off to some kind of vacation, and then we heard all the news that he was disgruntled, very unhappy, calling Pashinyan, asking for a position. Well, he finally got the position. Additionally, there was one more thing.
Of course, he has made a very strong relationship with Hajiyev, so I’m sure their cell phones are connected with each other. But I think that Armen Grigoryan is also educated here and has strong relationships in the State Department.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah, exactly.
Asbed Bedrossian: And probably the CIA as
Hovik Manucharyan: well. So I think that either in the past, I used to believe that he was essentially the the handler for the handlers. He was being handled by Armenian handlers and he was being told what to do from the State Department. Maybe we underestimated the role of Pashinyan himself as being the chief dealmaker in Armenia.
It shows weakness both for Alen Simonyan and Armen Grigoryan because they can be replaced easily. And we’re now seeing the staff, there’s news reports about the various staff worrying because they’re now shuffling the cabinets and people are losing their jobs. And the one thing that remains is Nikol Pashinyan doing the shuffling. So it seems like his importance for the West and for Azerbaijan and for Turkey may have been underestimated by us.
I’m not sure.
Asbed Bedrossian: Other things that happened, Arusyak Julhakyan, who is the leader of the civil contract faction in the parliament, basically confirmed that the constitution that they are going to try to enact is basically a pro-Azeri Basically, they’re going to enact all of the things that Azerbaijan has demanded. Of course, the opposition slammed that, but since we were talking about how the opposition strategy is unknown, okay, that’s great that they’ve made a statement, but I don’t know where that’s going to go.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah. And of course, their argument is, yeah, we’re not being forced to do this. It’s our own choice. It’s like saying, you know, hey, I’m giving away your children’s future, but, you know, we’re not being forced to do this.
It’s our own choice. But it’s still a question of how Azerbaijan and through Civil Contract will be able to pass this constitution. I still think that there will be a period when there will be a ban on the opposition parties and new elections, and then that’s when they will solidify their majority. The only other way that I can see that this parliament, because parliament is the only gatekeeper for a constitutional referendum.
If two-thirds of the parliament doesn’t vote, For a new referendum on the Constitution, it will not happen. The only other way I can see it is if they’re able to twist enough elbows in the opposition that they make some of them flip.
Asbed Bedrossian: And a lot of people actually believe that half a dozen people can be found.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah, they require about as much, about half, six people, right? Yeah.
Asbed Bedrossian: They currently have 64 and they need, I think, 69 to overcome.
Hovik Manucharyan: And I think this is related to why the opposition, the Civil Contract was so hard on Edgar Ghazaryan’s performance and speech because they want him out. So they’re going to create a very tough time for the opposition in parliament. And maybe they might, I think their goal is to force Edgar Ghazaryan to give up his mandate. There’s talk about that, actually.
And if that happens, I’ll be completely dismayed in Strong Armenia. But that is their goal, to weaken and chip away at the strength that the opposition has right now.
Asbed Bedrossian: In other news, Martun Grigoryan, a former member of the parliament from Gyumri, was arrested. Opposition groups basically accused Pashinyan of using legal warfare to force the snap elections and take over Gyumri’s municipality. So that’s still ongoing because the opposition is very proud of the fact that they were able to retain, despite all of the efforts from Civil Contract, they were still able to retain control of the second largest city, Gyumri. That’s the story on that one.
Hovik Manucharyan: What’s funny is that every week, it seems like, the number of political prisoners in Armenia increases. I went to this website, The Detained. It’s about political prisoners across… Someone sent this to me, a friend of mine.
It talks about political prisoners in Belarus. There are 1,294 political prisoners in Belarus, 1,287 in Russia, 171 in Georgia. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan. Armenia is not on this map.
It’s a funny representation of the world. It’s very comic that most media will present Armenia as a bastion of democracy. And I think this is why it’s so easy for foreigners who just consume mainstream media about Armenia are excited about the news. Hey, there’s an AI data center.
Rejoice. This is cool. Armenia is doing these cool things. But in reality, Armenia is just as bad.
If you take into account the total percentage in terms of population, and if you take into account the various states of detention, right? They were detained for pretrial purposes. Then they were under house arrest. Now they’re under administrative supervision.
They can’t leave the country. So all those are forms of persecution against the opposition. And if you actually expand your scope, then you might have thousands of people. And if you take it as a percentage of the total population, I think Armenia might be at the top of that list, if it was a fair game.
But it’s not. And also I think Armenia is doing this cleverly, or whoever is advising Armenia is telling Armenia to do this cleverly, where they’re using the pre-trial detention just enough so that it doesn’t set off any big alarms, and then putting people under house arrest, putting ankle bracelets on them, monitoring where they are
Asbed Bedrossian: at all times.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah, it is pretty brutal and it’s pretty… Repressive. The other news was that Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan was acquitted.
Hovik Manucharyan: This happened before last week. What was one of the most influential Archbishops in the Armenian Church arrested for? For his speech, for something he said. He was dragged through courts for more than a year, and he was found not guilty, but the prosecutors have appealed his case.
So essentially, they are pulling out all stops in terms of prosecuting. Even if there is a pro-opposition verdict, they will continue prosecuting them as much as they can.
Asbed Bedrossian: Right. They just want to continue the harassment is what it is. They’re appealing the acquittal by the court. So, so the harassment goes on.
All right, Hovik, that’s all the items that I had. Do you have anything else?
Hovik Manucharyan: We’ll just be on the lookout for some new episodes that we’re going to push this week. And we’re going to have more interesting guests. I probably won’t name drop it yet, but we’re going to have one new guest on our podcast. One at a time.
Yeah. One at a time.
Hovik Manucharyan: Thank you for your support. podcasts.groong.org slash donate. And thank you for watching.
Asbed Bedrossian: I’m Hovik Manucharyan. And I’m Asbed Bedrossian. We’ll talk to you next week. Bye bye.