Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed Bedrossian: Hello, everyone, and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. We’re talking with Hrant Mikaelian, a political scientist and multidisciplinary researcher on social sciences based in Yerevan. We have a lot of topics on the docket with him. For example, we want to talk about the new Armenian parliament, Armenia-Russia-Eurasian Economic Union relations, European aid for Armenia, church national identity, and Armenian economy.
So, Hrant, welcome to the show. We’re always happy to have you here with us.
Hrant Mikaelian: Thank you for having me.
Hovik Manucharyan: The inaugural session of the Armenian Parliament opened on August 2nd.
Hovik Manucharyan: And we’ve covered this already in our weekly review, but we’re going to dive a little bit more into some of the nuances. And although the opposition still calls the June elections falsified, it has chosen to take up the mandates and perhaps a pragmatic move. The opening speeches, of course, set a combative tone that will likely foreshadow what will happen in the parliament for the rest of the convocation. Now, one speech caught our attention, that was a speech by Ruben Rubinyan.
Even before he was officially voted in, as a reminder to our listeners, the Civil Contract-aligned media announced that he was chosen to be the nominee for Speaker of the Parliament. And interestingly, Turkey’s special representative on Armenia-Turkey negotiations congratulated Rubinyan on being elected, quote-unquote, as Speaker of the Parliament. We have discussed claims that Rubinyan was Ankara’s preferred candidate to begin with. In the previous parliament, just as a reminder, Rubinyan was both a deputy speaker, And also Armenia’s special representative to negotiations with Turkey.
How much has he to show for his negotiations ? We don’t know. The border still remains closed. Ankara still ties normalization of relations with Armenia to Azerbaijan’s approval.
But when asked why he had taken on the negotiator role and whether Ankara had favored his appointment, Rubinyan said that he voluntarily took it in order to fulfill a promise he had made to himself to never allow Armenia again to be in a military conflict with a large neighbor such as Turkey, a large and more powerful neighbor, of course. And as a reminder, Turkey not only was involved in the military conflict in 2020, there are reports that actually Turkey commanded the war against Armenia.
What’s interesting about this argument is that the opposition, with at least some circumstantial evidence says that, you know, that has been our policy for many years until you came along and started a direct confrontation with Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Hovik Manucharyan: So let me go to you, Hrant. Given Rubinyan’s statements, can we ask you whose policies led Armenia to a direct confrontation with Turkey and Azerbaijan that led to the disastrous results in 2020 that we’re still reeling from?
Hrant Mikaelian: Well, first of all, if your objective is avoiding the war, then we have a historical track record that appeasement of aggressor is not the best way to do that. And appeasement of aggressor, as we all know, was a policy by Chamberlain and Daladier before the Second World War, which resulted in the Second World War because Hitler thought he can do whatever he wants. And ultimately, this led to the Second World War. And the same happens here.
I mean, whatever we see, any signal from Turkey and Azerbaijan objectively studied shows that they are preparing for the new war. That’s the reality. Now we have the fake reality where we are approaching peace, centennial peace and so on and so forth. And then there is a question.
Okay, if he doesn’t want the war to happen, what does he do to do that? First of all, what you need to do is assure that war is not beneficial for your enemy. That’s first. Second is to try to improve relations with your enemy.
Okay. Now, in which form? And then another question is that if you don’t want to have a war, you don’t create new enemies. Whatever Rubinyan and his colleagues do, they create enemy out of Russia.
And believe me, Russia is stronger than Turkey and can pose more problems to Armenia than Turkey, even more. And can also work through Turkey or through Azerbaijan. At least Russia can blind its eyes on their aggression against Armenia, which it effectively did because of also policies of Pashinyan. So effectively Russia can push Armenia militarily without doing anything.
In fact, Russia doing nothing is enough for Armenia to be militarily hit. That’s the reality. And then there is a fake reality where Rubinyan is creating peace with Turkey. Okay, and now then there is another question.
Is Rubinyan capable of doing so? We have seen that Turkey is very glad of him being elected to this position, appointed in reality, because he was not elected. Then he has studied in Turkey. He has worked in Turkish think tank, the policy think tank, Istanbul policy, if I’m not mistaken, and so on.
So I have doubts. I’m not even sure he has ever worked in Armenian think tank. So which interest does he represent? Okay, he’s very, very nice partner for Turkey.
But you can be nice partner for your enemy, but it does not mean that you are well representing your country’s interests. So I have many questions too. And of course, I don’t buy any of his statements.
Hovik Manucharyan: But what’s interesting is that the statements imply that Armenian government has learned some lessons from the 2020 war and that now with him at the helm of Parliament and Pashinyan at the head of the government, those mistakes won’t be repeated. What lessons did the Pashinyan regime learn and who created the precondition for what happened in 2020. Do we know anything about that? Okay.
Hrant Mikaelian: On one hand, Azerbaijan and Turkey have been heading towards the war before 2018 as well. And we can say that at least starting from 2014, they have been preparing for that war. And 2016 April war was a try that failed. Importantly to mention.
Then they have held several minor attacks in 2017 and 2018, which also failed. And then Pashinyan comes to power. And by the way, between 2016 and 2018, there was a negotiation round within the Minsk Group where Azerbaijan failed and Ilham Aliyev had to state that he is being forced to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. And by the way, that’s answer to all insinuations by Pashinyan that any Armenian government has recognized Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan.
But at the same time, we can remember how Josep Borrell said that Pashinyan is the first to do so. And by the way, Pashinyan himself also did that, but he declares that for the foreign audience, but for the local audience, especially for his own supporters. He says all that land was given 30 years ago. It’s just others did not know that.
Okay, now going back in reality. On one hand, there have been lots of preconditions to this war and major preconditions were first Turkey’s involvement in the regional affairs. High prices of oil and conflict between Russia and the West. So these three were major preconditions.
And those three were also preconditions to the power change in 2018. Because Russia-West rivalry created instability in Armenia and it brought Pashinyan to power in the end. Which was in the beginning playing both sides, Russia and the West, but then Finally landed towards western side with which he was connected earlier. So after that he has basically cancelled all the negotiations where Armenia was already winning the whole track and he started the direct negotiation track with Azerbaijan which he also called the Dushanbe agreements.
And direct negotiations, by the way, the package regarding these negotiations was published by Azerbaijan just two days before the 44-day war . So in reality, he failed the negotiations. That’s first. Second, he stopped all the re-militarization plans which have been developed by Serzh Sargsyan’s government in 2017 and 2018.
And believe me, those were very extensive. So Armenians should have been prepared to the war. The war was almost inevitable. Armenia should have been prepared.
He canceled all preparations, failed the negotiation, and then during the war, all his governance was disorganizing. So I don’t see any other reason for Armenia losing the war besides the Pashinyans government. And well, of course, foreign intervention and, you know,
Hovik Manucharyan: The geopolitical, I guess, reality.
Hrant Mikaelian: …Situation where he considered and his foreign partners considered that if Armenia loses the war, it’s very good time to push Russians out of South Caucasus. And that’s what he was trying to do, by the way, because when Russians have started interventions, intervention towards Artsakh itself, I mean the so-called peacekeeping operation. At that time, Pashinyan has prepared a seeding Stepanakert. Which is also important.
By November 9, they have moved the capital towards Gandzasar. Which means they have prepared to cede Stepanakert. Which meant that the war is over, we are losing and Russians forced him not to do so. But in the end, he had another try and he won whatever he wanted to achieve.
At the same time, of course, Russia also failed its mission and Russia failed when Turkey was increasing its presence in the region. Russia failed to recognize that it’s against Russia and it’s against Armenia. So we have, you know, geopolitics, we have failed management, and we have overall long-term development. That’s what I would say.
Okay, if Armenia has ever created conditions for Turkey to be involved in the South Caucasus War, this means that Armenia is to blame. But let’s look at it in a proper way. Turkey is 30 times bigger than Armenia and Turkey decides what to do, not Armenia. And the victim blaming here is only to save perpetrators face and to blame the real victim, which is Armenia in this case.
So this is completely fake statement and completely shifting narrative in favor of Turkey against Armenia. That’s what it is. And what the lessons they have learned? The only lessons they have learned is To appease Turkey to do whatever Turkey wants and maybe the next day they will say okay this bans your own statehood and they will do that as well because otherwise Turkey will have the precondition to start the war.
Because what in reality they say is that okay Armenia should not talk about genocide, not talk about Artsakh. So Armenia talking equalizes to Turkey militarily attacking. That’s what this fake narrative is promoting. And this is, of course, promoted by Turkey itself and just repeated by Ruben Rubinyan.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yesterday we had an interesting conversation about the exchange between Ishkhan Saghatelyan and Ruben Rubinyan as well, and that had to do with Armenia possibly conceding Tigranashen going forward at this point. We’ll skip that because we talked about it yesterday. So let me turn our attention a little bit about the relationship between Armenia, Russia, and the Eurasian Economic Union ever since the elections.
Asbed Bedrossian: Since the June 7 elections, the Erdogan regime has claimed that relations with Russia
Hrant Mikaelian: will recover.
Asbed Bedrossian: However, after failing to secure an immediate meeting with Putin , and I believe that Pashinyan tried multiple times to try and reach Putin, but without any success, his eventual phone call with Putin yielded no reassurance that things are on a good footing because the Russian statement that was very brief after that phone conversation noted that Putin reaffirmed the May 29 Eurasian Economic Union position that Armenia must comply And must promptly hold a referendum on joining the European Union.
And meanwhile, Armenia reported that Pashinyan had requested an end to Russia’s unofficial sanctions, adding that a referendum is only practically possible after submitting an official EU application. So I guess it was okay to pass a law in Parliament to join the EU, but it’s not okay to hold a referendum. Hrant, what do you make of all this story? What do you make of Russia’s demand for an Armenian referendum on joining the EU?
Hrant Mikaelian: Okay, very quickly on Russia-Armenian relations conceptually. Both Russia and Armenia failed. Russia failed because it led Turkey and Azerbaijan on its side to lobby against Russia-Armenian alliance. Armenia failed because it allowed West to lobby against Russia-Armenian alliance.
So in the end, Russia-Armenian alliance failed on both sides. Now, the results are, of course, worse for Armenia, because Armenia is a smaller country, but for Russia, those are very bad as well. And Russians don’t realize that properly, because ultimately, after the corridor, after anything, then there will be Central Asia geopolitical debate, and lots of things will start happening, not only in the Caucasus, but Central Asia as well. And then Russia proper.
So I think it’s a big story, both for Armenia and Russia as well. Now regarding the current situation. The situation is the following. Pashinyan had hope that after elections Putin as usually will deal with the status quo.
And since the new status quo is Pashinyan winning the election and gaining some sort of new legitimacy, then Putin has to negotiate with him. And he underestimated that the relations level has lowered and the factual quality of relation is so low that it’s no longer possible to do anything with just talking. So whatever you want to do, you call, you try to discuss, but you cannot fix it because the policies are the opposite. Russia was usually accepted to listen to some kind of argument on the side of the head of the state, but it’s not this time anymore because the relations quality is so low this time that it’s not going to improve.
Asbed Bedrossian: Also, the level of trust has become so low between Putin and Pashinyan personally at this point.
Hrant Mikaelian: Well, level of trust, I would say, was low after 2019 overall. It had no place to go lower. It’s not interpersonal anymore. It’s just between the states.
Hovik Manucharyan: But what about the referendum? I would imagine, as much as it pains me to say so, that if there was a referendum in Armenia, most people would vote yes to join the EU. So is this some kind of a game being played by Russia trying to force Armenia’s hand and trying to move the referendum soon to happen sooner? And can EU really accept Armenia?
And is the EU really interested in having this referendum?
Hrant Mikaelian: First of all, Russians don’t want Armenia to have a referendum on joining the EU. Russians want Armenia to have a referendum on leaving Eurasian Economic Union and joining EU. As a single act. So it’s not just joining the EU, but it’s leaving Eurasian Economic Union.
Now, before heading towards what the game Russians are playing, I want to go on why the referendum is possible or impossible. First of all, when there was an initiative of HayaQve, like four years ago, Then, Pro-Pashinyan groups in Armenian politics started an initiative called Eurovote. Eurovote means the referendum for the EU. So they wanted, first of all, to overshadow the HayaQve initiative, which was pro-Artsakh initiative, and then to support the EU accession And then the government was very supportive.
They have even declared that they will have a referendum. And at some point they stopped talking about referendum. And I see there are two possible reasons, and most probably both were present. One is EU maybe at some point declared that, you know, you might have a referendum, but this does not affect in any way Our position of Armenia joining, because you are too far.
And the second thing was, if they have held referendum back then, then even then, Russians would start the process of removing Armenia from Eurasian Economic Union. And economically, it would be too big pain, not only for Armenian economy, but for Pashinyan’s government as well. So I think that at that point, they understood that it’s not proper time to do that.
But what Russians are doing now, they understand that if referendum is held today, majority, although I don’t think it will be overwhelming majority, but I think that will be kind of 60 to 40 or something, maybe 62 to 38 or something, will vote for leaving Eurasian Economic Union and joining EU. Why so? Obviously European Union has Stronger soft power. But the real reason is not that.
The real reason is that the pro-EU and anti-Russian propaganda in Armenia has been very active last six years. And that’s the result. I mean, of course, there are some objective reasons for mistrust towards Russia. But there are no objective reasons for trust towards EU.
So neither Russia nor EU have gained good ground for trust in Armenia. And by the way, there is a funny initiative in Italy to make Armenia as a ground for removing migrants, you know, Morocco migrants and some other migrants from EU towards Armenia. They have this deal with Albania as well. And by the way, with Ukraine too.
So kind of creating a kind of toilet out of Armenia. For European Union. Sorry to say that, but that’s the idea. And then we have this situation when Russians have decided in fact that they want to force Armenia out of Eurasian Economic Union.
And since there is no legal procedure in Eurasian Economic Union to remove a member, they want kind of legal or at least legitimate reason for that. And whatever they have now is political. It’s not legal and not legitimate. That is why they are forcing to achieve a legitimate reason.
And the legitimate reason will be the result of referendum. They will say, OK, your people want that. Go there.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, Hrant, about the exclusivity. Of relationship here, whether you’re going to relate with the Eurasian Economic Union or the European Union, are they mutually exclusive because at present the EU and Russia are in a little bit of a zero-sum geopolitical game? Or is there another reason? Is there some kind of an economic reason why you cannot have a country like Armenia cannot have relations with both unions?
Hrant Mikaelian: Well, you can have relations. The problem is not relations and not even a goal to join European Union. The problem is if you go in European direction, then there is a whole approximation package which implies politics. And this politics includes that Pashinyan is going after any pro-Russian politician here and even not pro-Russian, but, you know, someone who can be blamed pro-Russian or who is not pro-EU, let’s say.
And not only politicians, but also citizens and then Russian businesses. They are saving Russian businesses or Russia-connected businesses. And, you know, everyone can understand that America would not tolerate that and no major party would tolerate that. So this is a result of approximation to the EU.
It’s not a technical problem because Eurasian Economic Union in the beginning was built to be united with European Union. If you remember, Putin and Merkel have declared back then that they want to have Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok, and Eurasian Economic Union was built for that purpose, but Russia wanted to have big package, to have good bargaining power towards EU, and achieve equal agreement with European Union. And then Americans said if Russia is achieving equal agreement with European Union, And they joined their forces, then neither U.S. nor U.K. have no ground in European continent.
And what was interesting for them was not Ukraine and not even Russia, but primarily Germany, France and other countries, European Union. And they would lose grip over European Union. That’s the thing. That’s my kinder style of geopolitics they’re pushing until today.
So this is a big reason. And since European Union now is fully merged with this approach, European Union, I mean Brussels institutions, because I’m completely against equalizing Europe and the European Union as the same as many people do, because it’s not the same as we all know, as, you know, at least those who follow European politics. But anyway, if European Union right now is kind of being engaged in military conflict in Russia, at least proxy military conflict with Russia.
And especially since last, you know, half year, because last half year since Americans have been withdrawing from Ukraine conflict and European Union was forced to get engaged or abandon Ukraine, they started getting engaging more and more and more. And ultimately, they are, you know, completely faced against Russia. And since European Union and Russia are completely against each other, so it’s not technical, not economic, it’s purely political and geopolitical. But in today’s world, everything is political and geopolitical.
Asbed Bedrossian: So I’m very interested in that because it’s possible that at some point when the politics change, and they will change, that’s standard, where will that leave Armenia? And the other thing that I’m going to ask you about is Russia vis-a-vis the TRIPPP, because right now they’re talking tough against Armenia, but we are wondering The comments that Russian officials have made about their presence in the TRIPP project being beneficial, the railroad system, their proposals for the next Armenian nuclear power plant, etc.
I’m just wondering if these are negotiation tactics and therefore at some point when Armenia says, okay, we’ll buy our next nuclear power plant from Russia or yeah, we’ll do the concessions or whatever. If these are all going to be And therefore, a year from now, all of the rhetoric is going to be different and Armenia and Russia are going to be very happy friends again.
Hrant Mikaelian: Well, it depends on geopolitical trends and on Russian-Armenian relations trends. I mean, political trends, geopolitical and political trends, because there is a lot of potential in these relations. But as of now, there is a lot of potential for these relations to spoil again. And yes, Russians genuinely want to build a nuclear power plant here.
And the conditions, economical conditions, are very beneficial in reality. But then it’s again geopolitical, because if you build a nuclear power plant, it means that technologically the country is connected to you for the foreseeing future, let’s say next 50 years. And well, they have detached Ukraine from Russian Uranium and other stuff, but still it’s very hard and not very safe. So Russians are ready to pay for the engagement and technologically their preposition is also good.
But then it’s again geopolitics and politics and, you know, in reality Armenia did not choose to be involved in this conflict and not even Pashinyan himself. But this conflict is existing in this region and Pashinyan is structurally engaged in it. So he is dependent on the West. He cannot do anything which is not in line with the Western policies because otherwise he will lose power and then he will be jailed.
And at least that’s what he believes. So for him, Western support is very important. And as of today, there is no other Hayant, one of the
Hovik Manucharyan: Things that is currently on the chopping block of Pashinyan or in the news is that Armenia wants to take away Russia’s railway concession, the Russian railways. He wants to so-called nationalize it, which means actually privatizing it and passing it to his cronies. But has anyone done a financial calculation of what will be the price tag that Armenia pays for this move?
Hrant Mikaelian: Well, they might pass it not to the cronies, but to other countries. Maybe Kazakhstan and Emirates, maybe even Turkey, they also want it. But the question is, well, Kazakhstan will not buy it if it’s forcefully taken from Russians. That’s obvious.
So not even Emirates. And I’m not sure even about Turkey. So if it’s forcefully taken from Russians, then I don’t see somehow these railways operating, because in reality, these railways are very problematic. They only cause negative financial balance to Russians.
Russians have promised to make big investments there, which they did not. But at the same time, they did at least some investments. So they somehow operate this railroad, which by 2008 was completely collapsed. And as of now, it’s just, you know, a little bit above the water.
That’s what the reality is there. And now Pashinyan wants Russians to make investment into all connections with Turkey and Azerbaijan and then force them out. And Russians say, okay, if we, with our money, repay all these roads, Then we should have a say, some, some, you know, some place on the negotiation table. That’s what they say.
That’s why they want to get involved in TRIPP. Because in reality, TRIPP is projected in many ways against Russia. And they say, we’re not against TRIPP, but let us in. And then they neutralize the TRIPP as a project.
And then, of course, Pashinyan has said that there is no way Russia is going there. And then Russians say, OK, if we should build it and then leave it to you, that’s not going to work. And then Pashinyan says, if you are not building the road, which is, you know, the railroad is yours, so you should build it, then we will take the railroads forcefully. But I don’t see this working out in any meaningful way because Whatever step he makes in this direction will cause Armenian economy more and more damage and then someone has to cover it.
Armenia has no possibility to cover it because Armenia has a deficit budget and a very big deficit annually. In reality, if you look at percentages, it’s almost comparable to our American budget deficit, which you know is really big. And the situation is even worse because American economy is slowly growing economy and having big deficit is, you know, at some point even understandable because the economy is not growing fast. That’s why they have to finance all the liabilities and so on.
But Armenian economy last five years was growing very fast, but still the deficit is high. So the government is not able to cover its expenses with the current economic growth. Create more and more futures. Well, basically, that’s how they win the election.
But anyway, not only that, in reality, that’s also the management of economy of country and so on. So Armenia is not able to handle all these consequences. And then they will go to the EU and you will say, OK, OK, we will finance, we will give you 52 million euros. But then you ask, OK, but we are losing 520 million euros.
OK, that’s what we have for you. That’s how it is. So I don’t see how this is going to work out good for any side which is involved there.
Hovik Manucharyan: And it is indeed the case, right? European officials have provided some small amounts of aid to cover just the economic losses from the de facto Russian sanctions that are currently occurring. But all the experts we talked to, including yourself, I think, are mentioning that this aid that Europe has promised so far, I don’t even know if it’s been delivered or how it has been delivered, but it’s a pittance in comparison to Armenia’s potential losses just from the current Economic crisis where Armenians are not able to export goods into Russia. So what exactly is Europe offering Armenia to help offset the current economic impact?
I’m not even considering hypothetical future ones.
Hrant Mikaelian: Okay, the European Union, Brussels bureaucracy, let’s say, is offering Armenia to believe in European values. That’s what they offer Armenia. It’s not important that these values change over time wherever Brussels bureaucracy has new objectives. That’s not important.
The important thing is to look at the flag and believe in it. That’s what it is. Because in reality, I think all 52 million euros have been delivered because the first part was first 34 million euros was delivered like a month ago. And then there was discussions that they are Transferring or preparing to transfer the remaining 18 millions like two weeks ago maybe.
And I think it has been delivered. It was delivered to the government. And then government has some program for logistical firms which may be ready to transit goods to European Union. But the problem is that neither this help nor decreasing of the tariffs is enough.
That’s a problem. And in reality, for Armenia, the good markets are, you know, Asian markets, Russian market, post-Soviet markets, the Middle Eastern market, but not European market. European market is too competitive, too far away and has lots of non-tariff trade barriers.
Hovik Manucharyan: Government officials are saying that the EU is going to help offset all the losses or significant amount of losses. Is that not happening? Just very quickly, because all we’re hearing from the government is, hey, Russia is not buying our products, EU will.
Hrant Mikaelian: Well, look, even in January, June of 2026, we had 12% decrease in agricultural production. It’s already in production, not in sales. Because in sales, decrease is much bigger. If we look at the agricultural exports, it has been decreasing like 70% or something.
So basically, if we look at expected overall losses, I don’t want to speculate here, but it’s easily overpassing $1, $2, or maybe $5 billion. And especially, Russia has lots of financial flow through Armenia. Everyone knows. No need to hide it already.
And it’s about five billion dollars annually and even more. It’s just financial flow. And then there is re-exporting and some other stuff. In reality, if those are stopped, That hit will be much bigger for the economy than agriculture and so on.
So the losses might overpass, you know, $10 billion or something. What 52 million euros we are talking about? I mean, that’s nonsense.
Asbed Bedrossian: Hrant, following on the same thread that change is going to be an important factor for Armenia, a couple of days ago we were talking to Christine Arakelian. Who was deeply concerned about the TRIPPP from a policy perspective. Because she said that Armenia had engaged entirely with just Trump and the White House. And the entire effort was done at the executive level.
It was just basically Trump and the White House Doing the TRIPPP with Pashinyan. So when Trump goes, she was very concerned that there’s not a whole lot of visibility at the legislative level. I want to ask if you have a sense of how things are in Europe. Macron is not even running for re-election.
He is term limited. So he is one of the prime proponents of Armenia trying to join the EU. But he’s going to be gone. France and Germany are tending towards a conservative trend right now.
So when these people go, when the current leadership in Europe goes, does Armenia have proponents in Brussels, but also in France, in Germany? Does Armenia have the same kind of backing from Europe if a change in leadership happens?
Hrant Mikaelian: Okay, good point here, and I’ll try to Put it as I see it. First of all, regarding the main European trio lately, which was Starmer, Macron and Merz, all of which had near 10 to 15 percent approval rate, which shows that they have no backing in their countries. They are in line with Brussels, in line with Euro-Atlantic agenda, but not in line with their voters. So this is very important.
And yes, this policy is fundamentally unstable. But I would not connect it to just personalities. I mean, the overall Euro-Atlantic line, which has been developing the last 30 years, is very deeply connected to what is happening in the Caucasus. Because TRIP has not been just Trump’s project.
It’s a very long-term American policy. And you can remember the Goble Plan and lots of other plans. And overall, Nagorno-Karabakh resolution projects on the American side always included this or that kind of corridor because it’s connecting Ankara to Central Asia and that’s a very big geopolitical story. So the TRIPPP might change the name but as a project it will continue at least until the whole Euro-Atlantic line will collapse and I don’t see it happening soon.
Another thing, and I don’t see also, they say, okay, Macron is supporting Armenia’s pro-European policy and so on and so forth. In reality, I don’t see any backing on Macron’s side on pro-European Armenian policy. It’s just propaganda. It’s very important.
Whatever they say, it’s not what they do. Just simple. Because poor European Union, Giving $1 billion to Armenia or maybe $2 billion to Armenia is nothing. It’s really nothing.
It’s very small amount. Their GDP is, you know, $20 trillion. But they have made three times, they have made promises to Armenia to provide Armenia with 2.5 billion euros. First, they were talking about conference of donors.
Then they have talked about direct finance for Armenia. After the Karabakh war and then they were talking about 2 billion in credit and 400 million in grant. None of those were delivered. So I don’t believe in any statements on European Union side and especially those who are spreading, you know, pro-Brassels propaganda in Yerevan.
Because Brussels policies are very strictly detached from what they say. And I don’t buy anything which Macron says and so on. So they say they back Armenian succession to European Union. They don’t back it.
They just talk about it because they need Armenians to vote for Pashinyan to make the corridor reality. That’s what they need. The rest is not important here.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah. And do you believe, I guess, there will be a change in those policies? Or do you think that those policies, maybe even baiting Armenia into going against Russia, will persist even when more conservative forces in Europe come to power?
Hrant Mikaelian: Look what happens with conservative forces in Europe. First, as they see, and in America as well. First, they see the flaws of the system. They say our system makes too many worse, too many Too many budget deficits and so on and so forth.
And we need to get out of all this. We need to change the policies and so on. But then, even before they get into the big politics, the system starts assimilating them. And we have seen several cases of that.
Hovik Manucharyan: Meloni in Italy being your prime example.
Hrant Mikaelian: Meloni is prime example. Then we have Trump. And then we have UK on the go, the former UK party, whatever it’s called today, you know, the Reform Britain or something. And then we have AfD in Germany, which also in the process of assimilation by the by the government.
So by the deep state in reality. So what they do on one hand, they create a strong push on this party. They persecuted attack on it and say that Oh, if you do this or don’t do that, then we will forcefully close you. So party starts somehow restructuring itself and then new people appear and then they start, you know, some money offerings from on the on the local oligarchs side and so on.
They they get involved in the European high level politics and become the same establishment party, maybe a part of the
Asbed Bedrossian: same system.
Hrant Mikaelian: Yeah, so the system is able to assimilate them. If there is a big, you know, conservative wave or whatever you can call it, then the situation might change, but the system is efficient in preventing a big wave, so they work with these parties until they are becoming the system parties.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah, well, it can be said that The Pashinyan regime’s relationship with Etchmiadzin, the seat of the Armenian Apostolic Church, always was in some form of tension. The attacks against the Armenian Church became intensified once the Vehapar talked about the rights and security of ethnically cleansed people from Artsakh. The attacks have not abated. And even after the elections, and in fact, Pashinyan has promised as part of his campaign to remove the Catholicos.
We saw that the Catholicos was not present during the inaugural session of the Parliament, for instance. This is unprecedented. But on this relationship with the EU, if one is to believe that There are some official values that the EU holds, and those values are enshrined in its charters, and one of those values is separation of church and state, and that is one of the prerogatives of a democratic country. But the European response to Pashinyan has so far been complete silence, looking the other way.
And in fact, even the head of the OSCE was tricked into saying that he supports Pashinyan’s or he will try to see what he can do to help unseat the Catholicos and even change Armenia’s religion. He was being pranked by Russian pranksters, but he’s on record saying that. And we’ve also seen European bodies criticize the Georgian Orthodox Church as well. Is the Brussels bureaucracy interested in matters concerning the Armenian Church in what way?
Or is this mainly like a political expediency because the Armenian Church is standing in the way of some of Brussels policies? Or is it intrinsically against any kind of organized church, whether it’s Orthodox or Eastern Christian?
Hrant Mikaelian: Okay, well, first of all, the late Euro-Atlantic project is very clearly anti-religious and especially anti-Christian. That’s what we observe everywhere. It’s not only Armenia or Georgia, it’s everywhere, but especially anti-Christian. And it’s obvious that two countries with a very strong Christian background And also very strong social support for church and especially Christianity should be targeted in this way, especially if these countries are in orbit of European Union and so on.
And also we have seen that in 2018, after Pashinyan accession to power, one month later, which shows that the report was prepared beforehand, the so-called civil society organizations have prepared a big report named the You know conceptual framework for Armenian future strategy or something like that. So they have prepared whatever Armenia should do in the next years and basically Pashinyan has followed most of their proposed policies and one of those were equalizing Armenian church and sects and in reality there is no even equalizing because Armenian church is always persecuted and sects are always you know supported.
So they increase their Coverage and influence and Armenian Church is being forced to decrease its influence. That’s what is going on. And last year has always been followed by the direct attacks against Church. But of course, the first attack against Church was started a month after Pashinyan came to power.
When he declared, you know, well, it was not himself directly, but his supporters, let’s say. The movement named New Armenia, New Catholicos. That’s what they were declaring, New Patriarch. New Armenia, New Patriarch.
So they tried to remove Patriarch and Catholicos and it did not succeed, but they have tried it several times again. And obviously he will try to do that as well now. It’s just that the Catholicos tried to stay away from politics beforehand, before, you know, during the whole pre-election campaign. Maybe if he was more active during the campaign it would be on one hand it would be painful for Pashinyan and it would be problematic for Pashinyan.
Catholicos would increase his grip over the politics but at the same time Pashinyan would gain the casus belli against the church and against Catholicos himself to attack if Catholicos would you know make more stronger statements during the campaign. So that is where we are right now. I think that even despite the fact that the current Karekin II, Catholicos, is not very popular and is not very active, he is still very big piece to swallow for Pashinyan. And even during all this campaign, approval rate of church as an institute and Catholicos and as a personality and as of, you know, institutional player has increased.
Even despite the fact that there was, you know, All day propaganda against the church. So I don’t think it will be easy to swallow, but I don’t think also that Pashinyan will stop. And I think also that it’s not European bureaucracy which is the main driver here, but it is Azerbaijan right now. And Azerbaijan says whatever and whoever speaks against Azerbaijan interest in Armenia, speaks a bit about Artsakh, about right of Artsakh to return.
About Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, I think we should not forget that, because Artsakh is not only, you know, population, is a republic. So whoever speaks about that should be targeted and should be silenced. And Azerbaijan wants also this to be included in new Armenian constitution. Well, basically not Armenian, but imposed to Armenian constitution.
So that’s where we are. And that’s why I think it’s not it’s not, of course, only only Only European Union, by far not only European Union, it’s also Pashinyan himself. We know he is supporter of this kind of sects and so on. But then there is a bigger story because whatever they declare is that anything national is extremist and anything which is anti-national is very modern and progressive.
So basically current state and they have also changed the name of national institutions. So national opera is right now the state opera and so on and so forth. So basically they have built an anti-national state and anything national is anti-state. That’s the dichotomy we have right now.
But then there is another story, bigger story if we go back to the European Union and Euro-Atlantic project. Which is, lately, yeah, definitely they also back this policy because at least we have seen in the articles by the authors closer to bureaucracy to Brussels, London, or Washington, they have been supportive of this campaign and they have been declaring that Catholicos is pro-Russian. And this is lately a widespread fake narrative. That whatever is not blindly pro-Western, Trump is pro-Russian, Xi Jinping is pro-Russian, Modi of India is pro-Russian, and of course, Iranians are pro-Russian, and the Armenian Catholicos is pro-Russian.
You know, I have bad news for Brussels. Armenian Catholicos representing Armenian Church is bigger than both Brussels, Russia, or whatever they imagine. And especially Pashinyan’s government. That’s what it is.
Asbed Bedrossian: Okay, let’s move to talk a little bit about the economy, Hrant. And the top line is that the economy grew from January to June. 7.9% or 8%. Now, the inflation ticked up, the unemployment has marginally gone down, but the major issue here is what’s going on with the trade. Can you talk to us a little bit about what’s going on?
Hrant Mikaelian: Well, basically, we need to understand that economy, as of now, is not in bad shape. It’s not in bad shape. I would say, overall, it’s in good shape. It’s not healthy shape, but it’s in good shape.
Why? Okay, we see on one hand the trouble with agriculture, which is obviously not only connected to Russia, but also with policies and with weather conditions, climate conditions, which were hard this spring. So on one hand, we have troubles with agriculture and maybe some other fields, but at least we have some other sectors growing. We have construction growing, we have finances growing, and we have IT growing, and some other things.
So, as of now, the economy is still continuing its growth. I think the growth might slow down, and even significantly slow down, but let’s say also that the Russian restrictions have not included the majority of Russian-Armenian trade yet. Not even Russian-Armenian trade, not to say about whole Armenian trade. So as of now, Russian sanctions or whatever restrictions, how we can call it, they are just painful.
Asbed Bedrossian: Hrant, let me interrupt for just a second. If Russia hasn’t really, really affected Armenian trade, then why is there so much talk about these markets needing to be replaced, diversified, blah, blah, blah? And what is it with all the farmers, for example, the fishermen, what have you, complaining that they’re unable to find new markets for their products? If the pain is so great, how come Russia hasn’t really done a whole lot yet?
Hrant Mikaelian: That’s where I was going at. Look, on one hand, we have economic growing on macroeconomic level. And on another hand, we have lots of pain. And how does it work out?
Well, let’s look at which sectors are growing. For example, the mining sector. The mining sector has very small employment in numbers, but has very big industrial output also in numbers and in figures and So it’s not about employment. It’s not about people, but it’s about figures.
Now regarding construction. Construction is a bit wider because it’s also connected to the property market. But again, it’s a narrow market, both as a labor market, especially given that we have lots of foreign laborers involved there, but also as a property market because not many people can buy a new house and so on. The number has grown, but it’s still small.
So second market is a bit bigger, but still it generates lots of growth, but it’s still not wide in terms of population. Then finances. Well, that’s obvious. The finance sector is big in terms of numbers and it’s growing, but it’s small in terms of, you know, number of people involved.
And then IT, which is also, so we see the similar pattern over here. Armenia’s macroeconomic picture and also, by the way, gambling sector, which has been growing the last 10 or 12 years, which has also shown lots of growth, but also does not create real value for economy. You understand that. So in reality, we have macroeconomics on one hand and we have people on another hand.
And obviously, since 36% of population lives in village, this will affect Virtually all of them. Virtually all of the village rural population, which is 36% of population, which is huge for any democratic country, which unfortunately Armenia is not. But this would be a huge story. And of course, it’s not only agricultural story.
There is something else, but still not that much. But I think we can say that maybe up to 40% of population is affected. But very small share of economy is affected. Maybe up to 10% of economy is affected.
Not even contracted, but affected. So you see the discrepancy here. That’s one discrepancy. And another discrepancy is political discrepancy.
Because in the situation of polarization, of increasing authoritarian tendencies in the country, and in the solidarization of the society, We see that, you know, okay, this 40% suffers, the next 60% does not care. That’s the reality. So still there is majority who is not affected in the population and the vast majority of the economy which is not affected in any way. Yes, Russia still has potential to affect more sectors, but yet they did not do that.
Asbed Bedrossian: Are we still increasing the national debt in 2026?
Hrant Mikaelian: Yeah, we do that. By the way, the projected increase of debt in 2025 was bigger than what happened in reality. They saved, kind of saved against projected growth of debt $250 million, but still the growth of debt is high and the very significant share of the budget is allocated towards the debt. So that’s also the reality.
So I can say That is not a macroeconomic problem yet. This is also important to understand because yet it is at about 56% of our GDP. But if dram rate will decrease and it will happen if Russians continue pushing against Armenian economy, then it might grow to 62% or 63% of economy, which will overpass a certain threshold, which is set by IMF. The healthy relation of debt to GDP is rated at 60% and lower.
So Armenia can go there. But also we need to understand one thing. On one hand, Armenia inherited zero debt from the Soviet Union. Because by 1990, America has already had a big debt collected During previous governments, let’s say, but Armenia had zero of it.
Then it grew in 90s, but by 2008, during the years of economic growth, Armenia has also decreased the share of debt towards GDP. So state debt towards GDP was 14% in 2008, which is minor. Since that, during the Serzh Sargsyan ’s government and during the economic crisis and during the Pashinyan’s government, the share of debt towards GDP has increased significantly. But yet it’s manageable.
But I would say that it’s unacceptable that in conditions of 7%, 8% or 9% of economic growth, Armenia is still increasing its state debt. But given that Pashinyan’s objective is to stay in power and is He is ready to spend, you know, the future money of Armenia. For that, he will go for increasing the debt. So he makes big spendings on some social projects, some political projects and for, you know, for additional payments for state employees and so on.
So that is why and for police, by the way, which is also important. So that is why the debt will continue growing, unfortunately.
Asbed Bedrossian: So last question, how much of Armenia’s economic health going forward is dependent on a better relationship and better policies between Armenia and Russia?
Hrant Mikaelian: Well, significant share. They are talking about diversification right now and in contrary to security where this diversification policy Has been very flawed and very, you know, misinterpreted by the government itself. In economy, we really need that. But diversification does not mean that we sell less apricot towards Russia and sell more apricot towards European Union.
That’s complete bullshit. And that’s wrong understanding of diversification in economy. First of all, we need to diversify what we produce and what competencies we do have. And then only after that, we can sell to other markets.
Because as of now, well, as of, you know, May 3, let’s say, Russia was buying whatever Armenia was ready to produce. So Armenian export towards Russia was limited not by the amount of Russia buying the Armenian export, but by the amount of Armenia producing. And, you know, there are very little number of countries which have unlimited market and especially which are not able to utilize this unlimited market. So the problem in reality is on Armenian side because Armenia in the post-Soviet period has switched from the economy of production from productive economy towards economy of consumption or you know economy of services let’s say.
So industrial towards services and of course we need services but it does not mean that we need to We don’t need to develop the real sector of economy. So here is a problem. We need to diversify economy. And we need it, you know, 30 years ago.
We need it 20 years ago. Armenian exports is very primitive. And that is why we cannot replace Russian market right now, because the goods we are sending shipping towards Russian market, we cannot send them to European market. They are not competitive there.
And not only they are not competitive there, but there are logistical and non-tariff barriers. So it’s very hard to export it there. We need to explore neighboring markets. We need to explore whatever we can produce.
And also we, of course, need to explore European market. But we need to understand that European market does not need Apricot for Armenia. We can say that Apricot is an Armenian apple and that Romans knew that Romans are not here.
Asbed Bedrossian: So we have to reshape the economy in addition to just diversification. Okay. Well, let’s leave it there for today, Hrant. Thank you very much for joining us and we look forward to our next conversation already.
Hovik Manucharyan: Thank you. Thank you, Hrant. Much appreciated.
Asbed Bedrossian: All right, that’s our show today, recorded on August 4, 2026. We’ve been talking with Hrant Mikaelian. He is a political scientist and multidisciplinary researcher based in Yerevan. For more information, go to our show notes.
We’ll put as much information in the show notes as possible.
Hovik Manucharyan: Thank you for listening, everyone. Don’t forget to like, comment, share, and subscribe, and help us out in any way you can, including donations, if you can afford it. Podcasts.groong.org slash donate is the URL for that. And thank you to everyone who has already supported us.
I’m Hovik Manucharyan.
Asbed Bedrossian: And I’m Asbed Bedrossian. We’ll talk to you soon. Bye-bye.