Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed Bedrossian: Hello everyone and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. The world’s geopolitics keep swirling, shifting alliances and changing national political landscapes. With concerns about forever wars mounting, does the US have a coherent foreign policy approach to world politics, world events? Is the Western alliance less coherent than it appears?
And if so, what exactly is Armenia pivoting to? Ms. Christine Arakelian joins us in this conversation. She is a Fulbright Scholar and lawyer with expertise in international law and finance and has worked with the CIA’s Office of General Counsel.
Ms. Arakelian, we’re always happy to have you on the Groong Podcast.
Christine Arakelian: Thank you so much. It’s a real pleasure to be here. Thank you.
Hovik Manucharyan: Welcome, Christine. Glad to have you back again.
Christine Arakelian: I’m thrilled to be here. So, but let’s jump in.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yep, let’s jump in.
Asbed Bedrossian: So every day we wake up to weird statements from Trump saying things like, I might strike Iran. I haven’t decided yet. I might or I might not. We have the greatest military in the world, totally rebuilt by me, by the way.
So we can do it very easily, very quickly. Would like to not do that if we can. We’ll see how it plays out. We’re ready for anything.
Believe me. Well, I’m not sure what to believe, to be honest. Does the United States have a coherent foreign policy or do the president, Congress, national security apparatus, donors, allies all pull in different directions?
Christine Arakelian: So I would start with this. First of all, democracy is messy. So you’re always going to have different constituencies pulling in different directions, right? We have Congress, we have the House and Senate.
We have different pressures within the executive branch. We have different departments, et cetera, okay? So there’s an inherent messiness to it. The key thing is not really, is there consistency across the board, okay?
It’s very difficult, even in one’s own life, to be consistent in everything. The key question for this administration and where the US is right now is, is what the US doing even coherent, okay? Let’s leave aside Iran for a moment, okay? But just in terms of, let’s just say, for example, the Anglo Alliance, okay?
Trump spent a lot of time criticizing the Germans for not being German enough, right? And he goes through Europe and basically says, you’ve turned your back on your people, you have rampant immigration. Okay, so let’s use that yardstick now with respect to the United States. Let’s see if the United States is basically within an Anglo framework at this point.
We’ll start with UK. We now have Prime Minister Andy Burnham, brand new. He gives an interview with the BBC. He basically says, I’m going to do what’s right for the UK.
Now, he didn’t come out against Trump, but he’s hedging. He’s hedging. At the beginning of the Trump administration, Trump deprioritized a free trade agreement with the UK. We don’t have one.
That was a priority for the UK. It was not a priority for us. UK went ahead. UK entered into a free trade agreement with the GCC countries.
We have not. Church of England. That’s about as Anglo as it gets, right? The Anglican Church voted to hear and listen to Palestinian voices.
This is on the footsteps of basically the Anglo countries, Canada, Australia, and the UK, recognizing the Palestinian state. Now let’s turn to Australia. You have very prominent Australian politicians, former PMs, former foreign ministers turning on AUKUS. This is just fact.
Now let’s turn to Canada. In case your viewers have not been paying attention to Canada, Trump has basically indicated that he’s going to turn his back on a treaty that he negotiated during Trump I, called the USMCA. It was basically a successor to NAFTA. And he’s going to put 50% tariffs on him.
So right now, the US is out of sync with the major countries in the Anglo orbit. So again, how is this coherent and is it sustainable? This is to leave aside nothing of the fact that the Anglo world, at least historically, has stood for due process and other key things. Free speech that should be important to the United States.
So I’m less concerned about consistency. Democracy is messy, but I am concerned about a lack of coherence because that lack of coherence in terms of how it’s viewed externally actually does weaken the United States. Does that make sense? We’re just out of sync.
At this point with our allies starting with our Anglo allies which historically have been emphasized by the United States for obvious reasons.
Asbed Bedrossian: What about Europe then? Our relationship with Europe is a little weird. Maybe we’ll talk about that in the context of NATO. But if we were to take circles of trust and let’s say the US trusts the Anglo world the most, then the next circle is going to be Europe, the Western world.
But we don’t seem to have a good relationship with them either.
Christine Arakelian: No, no, we do not have a good relationship with them. It’s a kind of funny thing. Because a number of people in the United States, especially those, let’s just say, who view themselves as being on the right, have had a penchant to kind of come into countries like Germany, for example, and start criticizing political parties and taking sides. This is very popular now, by the way.
There used to be a notion that democracies don’t interfere in other democracies’ elections. No longer.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, I only have one million examples. That’s not true.
Christine Arakelian: I used to think that that would be the right thing to do. Evidently, that’s been discarded as well. For example, in Germany, we’ve angered the government there by taking the side of the AfD. Now, I can understand that Trump would perhaps view his party or the MAGA movement as being more in sync with AfD versus, you know, CDU, SPD, etc., the other sort of standard bearer parties within Germany.
Having said that, though, be careful for what you wish for. Is the proper lens really right versus left, which is sort of a US-centric way of viewing it, or is it more nationalism versus Atlanticist? Meaning, if the AfD’s in power or Le Pen’s in power, is that necessarily going to be better for the United States? Be careful for what you wish for.
But Germany as an Atlanticist power, which has basically been within the construct of post-World War II, is going to look very different than Germany as a central European power looking east. To date, it has not done so. And when it does, the geopolitics on the continent are going to change significantly. Macron is basically going to be up for election next year, whether he wins.
It does not appear that he is favored to win. So the U.S. is going to be facing some seismic challenges within Europe in short course. And I don’t know if you saw this, but basically there’s a screaming match at the U.N. There was an election in which the US took an opposition to a French position, and they were hurling insults publicly.
Again, you just have to ask yourself, how is this beneficial to the United States of America? So again, if the United States is not going to be the leader of the West, or it’s not going to be the leader of the Anglo world, what is it? These are important questions for the United States because otherwise you’re playing a tactical game versus a strategic one.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, I think that’s a very important question. If it’s going to be the leader of the West, I have a little bit of trouble with that because it seems like it has a lot easier time entering wars and then defining victory and getting out of it. Why does the United States have so much trouble getting out of wars?
Christine Arakelian: Well, In part, I think because there’s a huge war machinery built up around wars that people don’t want to pull the plug. It’s not so much basically that people don’t recognize the limitations, but unfortunately, people start going into an echo chamber. There’s a psychological component to it. And there’s a thinking, I push it one inch further, two inch further, I’m going to get my way.
Okay, so there’s a lot of psychology that goes into war. There’s an analytical component, but there’s a component of human psychology that ultimately dominates and you have to look at those components to understand why wars last. Just open up your history book and you see many wars that should have ended and basically people pushed it beyond the point where it could be sustained and outcomes became very different than what people originally anticipated.
Asbed Bedrossian: Okay, well, Christine, I want to talk a little bit more domestically. Let’s talk about Trump’s base, which is not always on the same page, it seems. Was America First ever a coherent foreign policy doctrine, or was it just a coalition of groups that opposed different parts of the pre-existing consensus?
Christine Arakelian: Yeah, so I don’t think America First ever had a coherent foreign policy. If anything, I think the foreign policy as articulated was sort of a reaction to what they saw wrong with the prior consensus. It was globalist. To be honest with you, I think Trump is really at his best in critique.
He was right. He was right on a lot of different things. There is a strong globalist component. It was not good for the people of the United States.
It was not good for people in different parts of the world for many different reasons. It created an elite caste, much of which we’re dealing with today. But was there a coherent? No.
First of all, he didn’t expect to win his first term. He was in shock, basically, when it was announced that he was president of the United States. And he didn’t have his cabinet in place. So this has been an evolution.
Now, for Trump too, he did manage to put together a larger coalition, much of which related to foreign policy. And that coalition is just not going to be holding together for the midterms. There’s just no way.
Asbed Bedrossian: So with Trump 2.0, initially he came on board with a peace agenda. He was preaching peace . But now we see Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran. In fact, we’ve had over a year of war on Iran with only intermittent ceasefires, essentially, since June of 2025.
And we can see that this is causing some splinters. Can you tell us what you think that these wars have done to the MAGA coalition?
Christine Arakelian: The MAGA coalition is fractured. And in fact, Some groups within the MAGA coalition may never come back. One of the things that MAGA made a point of doing during the most recent presidential election is reaching out to Muslim Americans, reaching out to the Orthodox, reaching out to effectively religious minorities in the Middle East and their diaspora populations. I would even put the Greeks within this bucket, okay?
Many of those constituents will never come out for MAGA, never come out for Trump ever again. And I can’t tell you who said this, but Trump made some calls to some pretty prominent religious authorities prior to the November presidential election. The general feeling is they were used like a tool. And that cuts across the board.
The Muslim populations in Michigan who voted for Trump, they’re not voting for him again. So that coalition is fractured because what Trump promised was not just basically that he was going to end forever wars. That was one component of it. But fundamentally, he’d have a foreign policy that’s more inclusive.
Of religious and ethnic minorities in the United States. That has not happened. It’s not happened by a long shot. And people aren’t going to be fooled again.
Fooled once, shame on you. Fooled twice, shame on me. That trust has been fractured, and I do not think the Republican Party as currently constituted will get it back.
Asbed Bedrossian: So in the current situation, can Trump then retain both of his pro-Israel interventionist constituency and voters who expected them to avoid these wars?
Christine Arakelian: There’s no way. There’s no way. I mean, look, a lot can happen between now and November, to be clear. OK, but.
The factions between the pro-Israeli evangelical cohort and the other side of the MAGA coalition, which was non-interventionist big tent, those fissures have only grown larger. There’s really been very little to no fig leaf extended. All you need to do, by the way, is take a look at how Vance has been treated relative to others in the administration. Vance is effectively the proxy, so to speak, or the face of the non-interventionist component of the Trump administration.
If you take a look at any of the media, what they’re typically saying is Vance is the guy who’s sent out when basically Trump has an initiative that’s going to fail. Meanwhile, Witkoff and Kushner are basically sent out when he wants to come out with the deal. But it’s very clear that the non-interventionist component of the MAGA coalition has been demoted.
Asbed Bedrossian: Christine, what is Rubio then?
Christine Arakelian: Rubio is not a negotiator. His experience is in the Senate. So we need a strong State Department to negotiate deals. Rubio didn’t cut his teeth on deals.
He sat in the Senate, and he basically received things that were distilled from other people, meaning at the exact time that the United States needs an A++ negotiator, we have somebody who’s never negotiated in his life. Then, of course, we turn to Kushner and Witkoff, who have literally not a scintilla of foreign policy experience or otherwise. At the beginning of this administration, there were quotes from people in the incoming administration celebrating the fact that their Middle East team had literally no experience in the Middle East. They said that Kushner’s book was required reading I can find you the articles.
I think it was written in Politico, if not one of the other mainstream DC periodicals, celebrating the fact that they were coming into the Middle East with a clean slate. That’s how you get into situations like this one. Because effectively, you’ve put yourself in an echo chamber. And that’s what we’re dealing with in DC today.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah.
Hovik Manucharyan: In light of what you said earlier about the midterms, what would a Democratic control of the House change in practice, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy? I’m thinking about the Ukraine war , which was started by the Democrats, Iran, Israel, even closer to Armenia, the TRIPP, for instance. On domestic policy, There are a number of issues, but what do you think are going to be the most likely issues that will change or that will have a different spin on them with the Democrats now in control?
Christine Arakelian: Right, so if the Democrats gain control of the House, what’s
Hovik Manucharyan: going to change? And also, what do you think? House, Senate, or both?
Christine Arakelian: Okay, so let’s talk about this. So the Democrats need three seats to flip the House. The general thought is that the Dems have a pretty good chance of winning the House. Okay.
And you couple that with the fact that the governing party during midterms, a lot of times the base doesn’t come out. Okay. They don’t have the momentum. Okay.
So now in terms of how a Democratic-controlled House would differ, we now have a situation where the progressive wing of the Democratic Party is ascendant. And they’re very much against the Iran war, what’s happening in Gaza, Lebanon, etc. They’re motivated. So this is going to start creating some seismic shifts.
And it is a big concern. If you take a look at the Israeli press, one of the things they’re saying that they’ve really messed up is the fact that Israel used to be a bipartisan issue. It’s not anymore. They have to regain it.
But having said that, and this just came out in the past day or two, AIPAC spending is up 50% relative to the midterms that most recently took place in the prior administration. That’s quite a bit of spending. So AIPAC is still pumping money in. Okay, big money.
So where this ends up, it’s hard to say, but I think also that what happened to Thomas Massie is a big wake-up call for people. Who’s controlling our democracy? Okay, Thomas Massie should be able to speak and think freely as he sees fit. So should any American.
What I find concerning, and again, this has now become a feature of this MAGA government that we have. What I find concerning is that when Trump criticizes Netanyahu, thumbs up. Nobody questions him. When Thomas Massie does, then it’s an issue.
That differential treatment fundamentally cannot stand, okay? Because at that point, you’re really infringing on the right to free speech. Political thought and other things. And so we’ve created a caste system in which certain people can say things that are critical, say of the status quo, and other people are fundamentally voted off the island.
That is an unequal treatment of Americans. And in a lot of ways, and I’ve said this before, what’s taking place right now in the United States in terms of foreign policy is in many ways a civil rights issue. Can you kill Palestinians in Gaza and come home and treat them on an equal footing? If they object to what’s taking place, does that mean that you basically have the authority to suppress free speech because of a foreign policy power, which under US constitutional rules is sort of a plenary authority of the executive branch?
Do you see what I’m saying? This is becoming very problematic. Because the world has gotten a lot smaller than it was 100 years ago. You could do things 100 years ago, in other words, that you can’t do today.
Now I want to go back to your question on the Senate. The Senate basically has about 15 competitive seats, okay? And the Senate’s going to be a lot harder to call because you have sort of environmental issues like the economy, gas, oil prices, casualties in the war, general discontent, et cetera, job losses, all these things that are basically the backdrop of general discontent. You also have a structural component that more of the Republican seats are basically at risk than the Democratic seats.
But then you’re dealing also with the fact that the Republican states that are in contention in terms of the Senate went for Trump? So the question is, can you peel away these seats? The Dems are going to have to keep basically the three seats that are in question, in terms of a contested election, because a lot of the elections are safe, so I’m not even talking about those, and gain at least another four seats in order to turn the Senate. That’s going to be a harder haul.
It’s possible. A lot’s going to depend on what happens between now and November. And I’d remind everyone that Trump has basically said he doesn’t care about the midterms. Now, other people do, other people do in his party, but evidently Trump does not care about the midterms.
So whether that’s posturing, but Trump will have a very difficult time if the Dems win the House and the Senate.
Hovik Manucharyan: Let’s turn our attention to the war on Iran. Now, it’s already producing visible strains in Washington, which we already talked about. And on July 23rd, I believe, the Republican-led House backed the measure directing the president to stop military action without congressional authorization, the Senate blocked a similar measure. But despite this slap on the wrist, just a few days ago, the reconciliation 3.0 bill gave Trump another $73 billion to finance the war.
Where do you see this war going? And what does victory essentially mean for the United States? Does it mean something else for Israel? And what does victory mean for Iran?
Christine Arakelian: Well, we’ll start with the easy part, which is what is victory for Iran? I think that’s a lot easier to define. First of all, they want Israel out of Lebanon. They’re not going to back off on that.
They want to control the Strait of Hormuz, and they’re making analogies to Suez and the Dardanelles, in other words, if Egypt controls Suez and Turkey controls the Dardanelles, why aren’t we controlling Strait of Hormuz? This is ours. That Strait is basically 21 miles across, approximately. Okay, so the thing is, is that arguably, and again, I’m putting on my Iranian hat.
I’m not making this argument as Christine Arakelian. Arguably, it’s their territorial waters. Now, you have a dispute about transit passage, innocent passage. These are technicalities in international law that I don’t want to get into on this program because it’s a more technical discussion.
But nevertheless, they want to come out. They didn’t have that before, and they’ve now realized the power They’ve also indicated that they want U.S. bases out of the Middle East. Now, what that means, nobody knows. Does that mean the U.S. goes and packs up its bags and goes leaving?
I mean, that’s just not going to happen. But the Iranians have been quite clear in terms of what they think victory looks like and what they are not willing to accept. They have the benefit, basically, of waiting. Waiting us out.
We always knew that, by the way, we always knew basically that they could wait us out. OK, now let’s look from a U.S. perspective. I don’t think the U.S. has clearly articulated what winning looks like because it’s shifted so dramatically. Clearly, at the beginning of the war, the intent was we’re going to decapitate the regime.
We’re going to Maduro. We’re going to do a Maduro and basically take out the Supreme Leader. Well, they took out the Supreme Leader, but it ended up being even worse because the prior government basically was not intent on getting a nuclear weapon. This one is.
Now this changes the calculus. Now we go back to, okay, we have to basically deal with uranium enrichment by the Iranian government, et cetera. That was an issue that has now come to a head precisely because we started the war. But by the way, that’s now a back burner to the Strait of Hormuz because of oil prices.
So what winning looks like for the US right now is first of all, getting the strait open. I think that that has to be the top priority of the Trump administration is to open that strait. They have to get the oil prices down. And there’s a pretty big reason why those oil prices have to come down.
First of all, some of the media basically said, well, why were people freaking out that oil is going to go to $150, $200 per barrel, right? It peaked basically at $126. But as it turns out, when you look at the data, the reason it didn’t go up higher is because the Chinese held back on their purchases, okay? So did the US.
OPEC spare capacity is about four to five million barrels per day. So what does that mean? That means that when the Chinese, by definition, have to sort of start restocking their stockpile of oil, that they’re going to exceed the OPEC spare capacity. And by the way, we have to replenish our strategic reserve as well.
Meanwhile, the Houthis have basically shut down
Hovik Manucharyan: the flow of oil.
Christine Arakelian: So at the end of the day, where does this leave us? This leaves us in a very big predicament. I think Trump at this point would be happy with resolving the Strait of Hormuz, but I don’t think that that is going to be possible because effectively Israel has a veto right on the agreements that were striking. And this is basically one of the big problems, which is you have a veto right from a party that’s not in the room.
You can see that also with the agreement that the US reached with Saudi on putting a nuclear power plant, a civilian nuclear power plant. He comes out, he announces it one day later, only if you sign the Abraham Accords. So in other words, who’s in charge? Who’s in charge and what is the worth now of going through the hoops, negotiating an agreement with the United States that one day later basically is you pull back from?
Hovik Manucharyan: We defined what victory looks like for both Iran and the US. I’m wondering what the Israelis think victory looks like. And is it possible for there to be any kind of a solution that ends this war?
Christine Arakelian: I don’t see any way that the US can force a military victory in the Strait of Hormuz. I just don’t see it. The fact is, is that it doesn’t take a lot of money, a lot of skill to basically have enough drones to come after oil tankers going through the strait. That’s not hard.
It requires very little capital. And so at the end of the day, these are very sensitive straits or transit passages in which the hint basically of a military action will effectively shut it down. So how can you stop that? Is the U.S. going to put in ground forces to basically control that whole region?
Even what they did in terms of, okay, so the U.S. Navy is going to escort ships through. It didn’t work. If it would have worked, we know by now.
But the fact is that the Iranians don’t need a whole lot to continue attacking ships that are transiting through the Strait of Hormuz. So how do you deal with that? We have an asymmetrical problem, which is the US has very, very expensive equipment, capabilities, etc. that are effectively being undermined by the scrappy underdog. Okay.
It’s the cheap drones that are actually more effective. Okay. We’re running low on the Patriot interceptors, super expensive. We’re blowing through cash.
There’s a cash component to war, right? It’s not just a military hardware issue. So where’s the money coming from? Okay.
So there’s asymmetric advantages for our adversaries that have not really been fully internalized by the United States government, which is why we’re in this situation again and again and again. If you recall, Trump basically said, I’m going to take care of the Houthis. Remember this? We’re going to take care of the Houthis once and for all.
He lost. Now, he brushed it under the rug, etc. But nevertheless, there is not a military solution. Now, are there ways to put pressure on the Iranian regime?
Sure. We’re looking at sanctions. We’re looking at other things. But fundamentally, you have to deal with the fact that Iran is a 90 million person state that goes back at least 5000 years.
That isn’t going anywhere. And so you’re just basically gonna have to deal with that. Now, in terms of what Israel wants, Israel seems to want, and I could be wrong, but Israel seems to want effectively extraordinarily weak states surrounding it, okay? Syria, weak.
Gaza, chaos. West Bank, Right? Settler violence every day. Turkey, apparently, according to some Israelis, is the new Iran.
So you really have to ask yourself, other than UAE, who is Israel’s ally in the Middle East? UAE, US, who else? I don’t know. Can you think of one?
I mean, is that a sustainable position for the US to support? You know, for the long haul, because that’s what we’re looking at. We’re looking at basically Israel having a strong ally in the UAE. And the UAE, by the way, has become isolated relative to its other Arab states in the region.
Saudi and UAE no longer see eye to eye on foreign policy. So what’s that going to look like for the United States to have basically, how to say, a GCC where there’s fundamentally not a unified voice. It’s going to get very messy and difficult for the United States moving forward.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah. Christine, a few days ago there was a worrisome escalation in the Caspian Sea where Ukraine essentially bombed an Iranian ship and they have walked it back. But initially Ukraine was saying we have all the right to do that. It was carrying weapons for Russia.
Now they’re saying something like they didn’t apologize fully, but yeah, it was very ambiguous. But it raises the question of why they would do it in the first place. It doesn’t seem like an accident. And some of the analysts I’ve read point to this being a deliberate US deep state foreign policy to put Europe in more dependence because it cuts off China European trade.
Do you agree with that perspective on why this happened? And also the trip can be also viewed as part of that. Do you think that’s what because I don’t see any other beneficiary from this activity. So this goes back to the U.S.-Europe relations.
What kind of relations, if that is the case, is essentially the U.S. trying to force Europe’s arms into a long-term dependence relationship with the U.S.?
Christine Arakelian: Okay, so we’re talking about Zelensky’s strike in the Caspian, correct?
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah. Right.
Christine Arakelian: So to be clear, he struck in the Caspian, also Sea of Azov, and also Black Sea. So let’s kind of look at these holistically, if that’s okay. In terms of his strikes in the Caspian, clearly what he’s looking to do is he’s looking to merge into a single war, the war in Ukraine, with the war in Iran. Why?
Because the rationale for strikes in the Caspian were effectively mutual Russian-Iranian assistance to their respective wars. And he took it upon himself to make a strike.
Hovik Manucharyan: I’m sorry, I’ll let you continue. Do you think that he has an agency to take it upon himself to do that without support from a major world power. Well, you know, the United States with its large ISR capabilities, because to me, that seems like a very complex military operation to, you know, I don’t
Christine Arakelian: I personally I do not think that Zelensky ran it by the United States.
Hovik Manucharyan: I do.
Christine Arakelian: I think Zelensky has basically been had to say not quite under control.
Asbed Bedrossian: Or opportunistic, in my opinion.
Christine Arakelian: Yes, opportunistic is a good word. The fact is that two or three years ago, the US government was holding Zelensky back. Zelensky wanted to make long-range strikes on Russia several years ago, and the US was saying, no, don’t do that. Risk of retaliation, tactical nukes, et cetera.
So it was the US basically holding Zelensky back. Then I think we had that sort of disastrous meeting between Zelensky and Trump, right? He’s kicked out. And I think the general thought was, okay, yeah, okay, we’ll supply you intelligence.
You can buy some munitions, have Europe pay for it, and get back to me. I’m going to put you on the back burner, okay? And I think part of the rehabilitation of Zelensky has basically been, well, we’re having our asses handed to us in Iran, and therefore we need a foreign policy win. And a lot of people in the foreign policy establishment are saying now Zelensky’s winning.
We’re winning. We’re winning. And he needs a narrative to say that he has a winning foreign policy. Zelensky, I think, though, is being opportunistic and basically seeing how he can merge the two wars.
Why? Because right now, Zelensky needs Patriot interceptors, like yesterday, and he can’t get them. They’re being reserved basically for the theater in the Middle East because we have a lot of troops there and allies who need protection from the Iranians and the various missiles that they’re lobbing. So at the end of the day, that’s what this is coming down to.
This is an effort by Zelensky to precipitate that. I don’t think actually that there is an appetite, at least with some in the US to basically have things go in that direction. It makes things very difficult. And the question is, okay, Zelensky is going to basically need to be reined in.
The other thing that Zelensky did, by the way, is he struck Caspian Pipeline Consortium assets that impact the exports of oil from Kazakhstan. I think it’s a stretch to say Kazakhstan is pivoting to the West, but Kazakhstan has more strategic autonomy at the moment. And as it turns out, most of their oil exports are dependent upon Russian infrastructure. My hunch is basically someone in the US said, don’t be doing this because we want Kazakhstan to be friendly to the West.
And if you’re basically going to start attacking assets that impact Kazakhstan, our ability to access critical minerals is going to be impacted. Having said that, I think that the US is more than happy to have Ukraine attack Russia’s fleet in the Black Sea, but Russia’s also making attacks in Odessa. Ukraine cannot make up the exports that are not going out of Odessa with routes to the EU. I think what they’ve done is a grave injustice to Ukraine, because the fact is that If there was any ever intent to integrate Ukraine into the EU, they would have made trade possible.
But the Poles and others have been able to effectively shut down Ukrainian trade and with strict quotas or other conditions that make it extraordinarily difficult for Ukraine to have anything other than a wartime economy. And that is going to be extremely problematic because that means Ukraine is effectively on a permanent war footing.
Asbed Bedrossian: Christine, earlier you talked a little bit about the effect of the midterms maybe on US domestic politics. Let’s look at it from the perspective of the war in Ukraine. And I’m not just talking about just the US midterm elections because there’s an October election in Israel as well. So how might the Israeli election and the US midterms affect the timing of some kind of a compromise or possibly an escalation.
I’m not sure which one is going to happen. Would Netanyahu benefit more from a major military success, a prolonged emergency or some kind of a negotiated settlement? And also kind of similarly about Trump. What benefits these leaders the most?
Christine Arakelian: Right. So these are great questions. So let’s start with Trump. Trump is going to want some type of success.
That he can speak to as a talking point. Again, it doesn’t even really matter whether it’s true or not. What matters is the optics. Can he spin it?
Because many times, and you’ve seen him, he takes positions that really are not defensible, but nevertheless, if he’s ardent enough and basically promotes it enough, he basically gets away with it. He lets it slide. Does he have a defensible story on a win? Number one.
And number two, is he going to get the oil and gas prices under control? What do they look like? That’s going to be a huge factor. And third, US casualties.
If a lot of Americans start dying, and by the way, I mean, the Pentagon has underestimated the casualties. They’ve been playing games with the website. I don’t know if you guys have seen that. Reportedly, the casualties are 600 and above.
I know they’ve changed the criteria.
Asbed Bedrossian: You mean specifically the United States casualties, Christine?
Christine Arakelian: Yes, that’s correct. Casualties meaning dead and injured, because traditionally injured are part of casualties. The bottom line is that they’ve been playing games with the definitions Such that you can’t accurately determine since the onset of the of the war with Iran, how many Americans have died, how many Americans have been injured. So I even have to look at it and say, what is it?
But those are the sort of three big buckets of things that are going to matter to Trump in November. But if he can eke out a win and sort of just allow the Republicans to focus on the midterms, he potentially could basically walk away with the success. OK, now, in terms of Netanyahu, I don’t see where he benefits from this type of arrangement at all. Fundamentally, Netanyahu and Trump are at odds in terms of what they need to see from this war prior to their respective elections.
And of course, the Israel and U.S. elections are within a week of one another. One week. Okay? So the thing is, is that Netanyahu is really going to benefit from some type of larger confrontation in which Israelis can rally the flag.
Okay, so that’s what it is. So now you could say, okay, we have casualties, etc. But nevertheless, I think Netanyahu is going to push things in that direction. And I will say, if you take a look at the Suez Crisis in the ’50s, basically, Israel is not opposed to taking large military actions within a week of a U.S. election.
I just want to remind everybody of that. You just have to open up your history book. So there’s a lot of risk. There’s a lot of risk at this point.
And by the way, there’s even talk about the Iranians sort of gaming it in terms of How they time attacks or how they time some of their actions to influence both the Israel and U.S. elections. So we’re in a volatile period in which things could cut in a number of different directions, but I think it’s fair to say that Trump and Netanyahu are not aligned in terms of politically what is the best outcome for them or what they need to see prior to their respective elections.
Asbed Bedrossian: Right. And this is with less than 100 days to go to the American elections.
Hovik Manucharyan: Correct.
Asbed Bedrossian: So we’ve been pivoting a little bit from the Iran war towards the Ukraine war. And of course, the Ukraine war has essentially become Russia versus NATO. And as there was a NATO summit recently, I was thinking about what these three phases are because they’re talking about NATO 3.0. So NATO 1.0, maybe we can say this was the territorial defense phase against the Soviet Union.
That’s why it was created. NATO 2.0 was kind of an out of area intervention after the Cold War. They were in the Middle East, Iraq, et cetera, Kuwait. What is NATO 3.0?
Christine Arakelian: Okay, so there are some just basic components of NATO 3.0. The first of which is what is called the burden shifting. If you heard basically what Trump has been saying and is now being articulated, I think pretty much even in a bipartisan manner, it’s U.S. has been carrying the weight. U.S. has been carrying the weight for Europe.
You got to pull your fair share. So that is going to be a key component of NATO 3.0. Other component, the Europeanization of their defense. Now, that’s going to be two-edged.
It’s going to be two-edged because, yeah, they’re paying more of the bills, but more of the contracts are going to be going to European defense contractors. They’re not going to be going to U.S. defense contractors. So how that plays out remains to be seen. We’re still in the early days of this, but you can see that those trends are accelerating.
And last but not least, the US wants to reduce the conventional forces in Europe. And in that regard, it was just announced this past week that the Pentagon is doing a force posture review across Europe. And so consequently, basically, they’re going to be looking at all the conventional forces and basically saying, what do they do? The withdrawal of troops from Germany was a little bit unusual because it didn’t happen as part of an overall process, at least as far as I could tell.
OK, it seemed like more sort of a reaction from Trump. But all these things are sort of converging. And yes, so the US posture in Europe is going to change considerably over the next six to 12 months by virtue of NATO 3.0.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah. At the summit, I think, just like you said, the key elements, decisions that were reached was that they want European members to go to a defense spending that is at 5% of their GDP. They’ve also committed $50 billion to rearming themselves and also $70 billion to Ukraine. So there’s a lot of money we’re talking about here.
The interesting component from all of this is when Europe ramps up to this kind of a defense spend, who’s going to start calling the shots? Who’s going to call the policies, especially when, let’s say, European and American interests start diverging a little bit?
Christine Arakelian: Well, clearly, I think that the Europeans are going to be asserting their own strategic prerogatives. I assume that’s a
Asbed Bedrossian: good thing.
Christine Arakelian: Let’s put it this way. I think it’s a healthy thing. It’s a healthy thing. Because the fact is, is that the European domestic largesse in terms of their social programs, none of that would be possible unless the US were paying the bill on the defense side.
That is actually the truth. Effectively, they’ve shifted those bills to U.S. taxpayers who do not have the same social programs as Europeans, not by any stretch of the imagination. We’re also faced with the fiscal crisis in the United States where Social Security and Medicare are under maximum pressure to the point where basically these benefits are at risk. We’re going to be severely curtailed.
So when you put it in that lens, it makes sense from a U.S. perspective to say bear the burden. But yeah, there’s always going to be a price to be paid for that. We’re not going to be calling all the shots. It’s not going to be done in our direction.
And it really means that we’re just had to say we’re less relevant in a European theater. OK, now. Is that a negative for the United States? Depends.
I will say this. I personally believe, and particularly with respect to the EU, that the EU has effectively deprioritized US bilateral relationships with European countries. So I would not see basically the diminishment of the EU as necessarily being a negative for the US. I think it could be a positive.
Okay, so it really depends how these sort of trends work themselves out, but it certainly would be very beneficial, okay, for the US to step up its bilateral relationships across Europe. The general thought was, and I’ve seen this thinking, okay, so I’m not speaking sort of not based on firsthand observations, but the general views seem to have been, were the US We just want to deal with a larger aggregator like the EU, France, Germany, you’ll make the decisions with some input from the UK and shove it down everyone’s throat. That structure of the EU is just not going to work anymore.
So there’s many changes that are afoot, not just with NATO, not just in terms of the defense posture, not just in terms of the budgets, but in terms of who’s making the calls. I know that there’s an effort from France and Germany to effectively consolidate power and have it continue to be basically the EU effectively as a decision-making structure that prioritizes the French and Germans. It’s not sustainable.
Asbed Bedrossian: I just want to make a quick comment, Christine, because you did say correctly that the US has taken on the burden of defense for the entire, let’s say, North Atlantic for the last, whatever, 60, 75 years. And so US taxpayers have essentially footed the bill for All these European countries being good socialist countries and offering all these social services while we do not have that here at home. Now, I would be very happy with the outcome of them taking on the burden of their own defense if only we would actually see a better defense spend and a little more to assure that our folks here are taken care of when they retire.
Or health benefits and things like that. But I’m a little discouraged because Trump asked for a trillion and a half in defense budget for next year. That’s a 50% increase.
Christine Arakelian: I agree with you. I will tell you that one of the things that the Trump administration did that greatly angered me, if you recall, there were Americans basically volunteering in Africa to deal with the Ebola crisis. Remember this? And Trump basically says, for doctors or medical personnel who contract Ebola, we’re sticking them in Kenya.
Excuse me? That American paid through his or her tax dollars for your state-of-the-art medical facilities in the United States. And now basically they can’t come home to be cared for. Is that America first?
So I agree with you. I mean, we have to prioritize other things besides the defense budget. I don’t necessarily think that that is shared with Trump personally, I think one of the things that he has said in the past six to nine months is a number of the social obligations he’d like to push to the states. So I want you to imagine if Medicare is run by the states like Medicaid instead of basically the federal government.
Well, it’s a very different contract with the American people than what has been discussed to date.
Asbed Bedrossian: You’re right.
Asbed Bedrossian: A final question about the NATO summit before we pivot to Armenia. I got the sense that the UK is building its own axis inside NATO, let’s say, with its relations with Turkey, Israel, Eastern Europe, that are not 100% aligned with those of the US. I’d like you to comment on that. And also, in the same vein, if you could comment on Turkey’s growing international clout.
Christine Arakelian: Sure. Well, I mean, if you want to know the winner of the NATO summit in Ankara, it was Turkey. Turkey and Ukraine. I was amazed, and I mean amazed at, how to say, Trump’s embrace of Erdogan as being a great friend to the United States, as being a stellar leader.
Turkey is obviously extremely important to the United States. Even though I am Armenian, I’m rational enough to know that Turkey should be a strong partner of the United States. But that’s a very different matter than Erdogan personally. At that meeting, there was an Istanbul mayor sitting in jail, I think for a little over a year.
Nobody cares. Is that Western values? Is NATO about Western values? Because you might want to notice that the opposition candidate is sitting in jail and nobody cares, okay?
That should not have escaped Trump’s attention. It demanded attention. But, look, Turkey plays its cards well. I mean, you have to hand it to them.
In all seriousness, they’re simultaneously in NATO. We have a new military, how to say, strategic aggregation, sort of loose confederation between Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi, and Egypt. We had Turkey flirting with being a party to the Saudi-Pakistan Mutual Defense Treaty, okay? With Pakistan, of course, as a nuclear power.
How do all these things converge? At what point, a lot of effort or a lot of time has been spent on Turkey purchasing the F-35s and you have the S-400s and you have to divest them and it’s U.S. law. Okay, great. That’s great.
But you might want to notice that Turkey is looking at other strategic alliances that may conflict with its NATO obligations and not turn a blind eye to that. Now, part of that is Trump. The State Department, NSC, which is obviously under Rubio, but part of that is the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey.
U.S. Ambassador to Turkey is basically in the back pocket of Erdogan. That’s just a fact, okay? He’s also simultaneously the special envoy to Syria and is having a disproportionate impact, really, in our understanding of the wider region.
This is part of the reason, I think, that the U.S. constituencies in the United States, diaspora constituencies from people in the Middle East are a little bit upset. Not just the Armenians, there are others as well, because their perspective has been skewed. So Turkey’s playing its cards perfectly. Turkey is doing what’s in Turkey’s best interest, which is what they should do.
They certainly should be a strong ally of the United States, but I will tell you, Trump absolutely has the capability to stand up to Erdogan. He wrote a letter, what was it, I think it was 2019. He wrote a letter basically to Erdogan, get your forces out of northern Syria. Remember this?
There was an evangelical pastor in Turkey. Trump basically stood up to Erdogan, he was released. Meaning he has the capability to do it, he has to have the interest, and he has to understand why it’s not just important as a matter of principle, but also as a matter of geostrategic interest to the United States. The Cold War was not just a battle.
The Cold War, how to say, was won just as much on the basis of ideas as anything else. Ideas matter. And this goes back to the first part of our conversation in terms of what is the West? You should be able to define it and actually stick up for it, because absent that, I don’t really know what we’re fighting for.
Christine Arakelian: So let’s turn to the UK. The UK and US at the moment are not strategically aligned at all. The UK economically is not doing well. I don’t think that is a news flash to people.
And so consequently, they are entering into trade agreements. I told your listeners earlier they had an agreement with the GCC. They have a trade pact with India. They declined to enter into a free trade agreement with Israel, by the way.
Just for your listeners to be aware. Fundamentally, if you’re going to have an Anglo type of confederation that are aligned on geostrategic priorities, it’s also important to have some level of economic convergence in terms of where the areas of importance are. That is lacking. And not only is it lacking, Trump basically, at the beginning of his administration, deprioritized the free trade agreement with the UK.
Okay, now Trump is basically looking to the UK to come up with a, how to say, a coalition that will maybe not police the Strait of Hormuz, but facilitate trade, ensure that things are running smoothly. This is now at the behest of the UK. Okay, so ask yourself if the U.S. can continue to impose costly obligations on the U.K., which, by the way, it is doing in its best interest because freedom of navigation is a key priority for the U.K. The U.K. is a naval power.
That’s very important. So freedom of navigation for the U.K. is extremely important. But nevertheless, relying on U.K. when fundamentally their concerns were deprioritized. And we’re obviously not in alignment in terms of how we view the broader Middle East.
These are differences that will not get better. They will get worse over time if they’re not dealt with at the moment. And what that really means, though, is that the US is going to have to have his own maturation process and listen to some of the voices in its own population that have taken issue With some of the foreign policy decisions that it’s been making, like in Gaza, etc. I realize that that is unpopular for some of the people who may be listening to this, but nevertheless, it’s a necessity.
Hovik Manucharyan: Christine, from one country where the opposition is rotting in jails, let’s go to another one. And I’m talking about Armenia. It’s been almost two months since the June 7 elections, Pashinyan and Civil Contract , they got 49.8% and effectively 64 seats in the new parliament. That gives them a three-fifths majority, but they got that and we’ve covered this on our podcast as a result of numerous irregularities.
Including specifically, I would say, doctoring the results so that one of the opposition parties was kicked out of the race. And that’s what gave them, that’s what determined whether they have a simple majority or a three-fifths majority, which means they have much more leeway in calling shots in Armenia. Now, I wanted to ask you about your opinion on these elections, the political system in general that these elections are a component of, and what do you think about the outcome in terms of the mandates and what Civil Contract can do and can’t do?
Christine Arakelian: Sure, so let’s just start not with my opinions, let’s just start with fact, okay? I am looking on my screen at something called the International Election Observation Mission. It was a statement of preliminary findings and conclusions. It was put out by the OSCE.
So I was not there during the Armenian elections. But I had to say, there were documented concerns about the manner in which the election was run, both prior, during, and afterwards. We don’t have the final report. It’s going to be a little bit before that report comes out.
But that is a European body that effectively is coming in on the ground documenting what they regard to be concerns about the Armenian election. Those are just facts. So one of the things that I want to do here is frame this in terms of facts because the way these arguments usually go on Pashinyan, you’re pro-Pashinyan, you’re anti-Pashinyan. I just want to stay focused on the facts because I think it’s going to illuminate where we’re at.
So the Civil Contract party got 64 mandates, which is about three-fifths. It did not get to the 66% two-thirds And that’s relevant because Azerbaijan is basically demanding that Armenia amend its constitution. That’s a condition for peace. So having that two-thirds threshold is going to be very important for Civil Contract party.
As we speak, numerous bishops, priests, politicians are in Armenian jails. That’s fact. What can I say? The opposition basically took up their mandates.
I’ve heard some discussions, even on your podcast, was it appropriate for the opposition to take up the mandates? I say yes. I say yes because, first of all, the proper way to resolve issues is to get into the fight. The fight’s in the parliament, get into the parliament, argue your position.
Second thing is, and I think this is important, Prosperous Armenia was basically bounced out, right? They basically had the three polling stations invalidated. But for the other opposition parties, even the polling, let’s just say for Strong Armenia, I never saw a poll. And by the way, you guys are much closer to this than I am.
So if I’m incorrect, please correct me. I never saw a poll in which Strong Armenia was going to gain more mandates than Civil Contract. I never saw a poll that put Strong Armenia in the lead. Okay.
The fact is, is that the opposition had an opportunity to sort of come together many times and did not. So meaning there were irregularities, Prosperous Armenia, arguably should it be in the parliament, but it doesn’t mean that Civil Contract leadership at this juncture is illegitimate. Does that make sense? Because I never saw a poll that basically said that Civil Contract wasn’t going to get the plurality of votes, even if it wasn’t an outright majority.
OK, given that, I mean, yes, there were irregularities in the election. Is it entirely illegitimate? That’s a strong statement. OK, so bottom line is I do not support basically arresting your opponents, keeping them in prison.
But at this point, Armenia is going to need to move forward. And that’s in fact what you see the opposition doing. We have to be in the game and continue to basically push ahead and have a democratic process insofar as that it’s allowed. Now, do I think that Armenia is effectively becoming a, how to say, a managed democracy?
Is it a true democracy anymore? It’s not a true democracy. It’s not. I think that the 18 and 21 elections were much more fair and open and accepted.
And I think Armenia is now in a period in which effectively the power of the state is coming to bear and taking away the freedom of thought, freedom of speech necessary for a healthy political process. Those things are necessary in order to have a fair political process. And regretfully, the Armenian government has decided that it’s not going to allow full debate.
Hovik Manucharyan: We’ve talked about this before, but given that there have been a number of new developments, what do you think of still the Trump route for international peace and prosperity project? Armenia Going through the motions, pretending that everything is on schedule, it is building it out, and it’s inviting US experts to come and do surveys and things like that. But in light of what’s happening in the Iran war and the repetitive continuous threats by Iran and reminders about these red lines, Do you see the TRIPP project continuing as it was initially presented by the Pashinyan regime and the US government?
We also have Russia complaining, making noises about TRIPP and trying to, I think, in my opinion, trying to get more of a stake in TRIPP. So what do you think about the future of TRIPP and especially in the same way that it was presented on August 2025?
Christine Arakelian: Okay, there’s a lot to unpack, so let me just begin. Again, for your listeners, TRIPP is a riskier deal for Armenia than it has been presented to the Armenian public, and now I’m going to explain why. I’m going to make some generalizations that maybe exaggerate a bit, but I think it will prove my point. The weakness of TRIPP, and let’s take away the geostrategic considerations for the moment, we’ll get to them, but the weakness of TRIPP from a US perspective is that it resides strictly within the executive branch.
So one of the features of Armenian foreign policy, and this has been consistent, okay, with Makunts and the current Armenian ambassador to the US, it is very focused on the executive branch. Very focused on the executive branch. Why? Because it’s easier to get quote unquote wins.
Okay, so let’s take a look at the TRIPP Development Company. That TRIPP Development Company was set up by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, meaning it’s already been authorized by statute. It works in different places in the world.
That’s why basically Congress gets a notification, but there isn’t anything in particular that Congress needs to do for that TRIPP Development Company to be stood up. Now let’s turn to the 200 million plus or minus that the State Department has said they’re going to put into the kettle at the get-go.
Asbed Bedrossian: For all of the South Caucasus , not just Armenia, by the way, or not just TRIPP.
Christine Arakelian: Correct. And there’s a reason for that, because actually the two funds Basically, that were used to finance that are, and I’m just reading from my paper here next to me, so I just took a couple notes so that I would be accurate when we discuss this, Post-Soviet Enterprise Fund Freedom Support Act mechanism. That’s actually where it comes from, which is why it couldn’t be Armenia specific. There’s actually no guaranteed minimum spending for Armenia.
Through that corridor as it was currently constituted by the US government. There was no congressional approvals or authorizations necessary. So why is this important? Because when you’re going to make a strategic pivot as important as Armenia’s is at the moment, you should not just have support of the executive branch, you should have the support of Congress, including the House and the Senate.
Okay? Now, why is it that the Armenian government hasn’t basically emphasized the Congress? Well, because we have Armenian diaspora groups in DC who are opposed to a number the things that the Armenian government, Pashinyan specifically, is doing. That’s why.
And fundamentally, the people in Congress have to respond and be responsive to their Armenian-American constituents, not Armenia. There’s a difference. Meaning, fundamentally, this strategy that the Armenian government is pursuing, leaving the diaspora specifically in the United States out of things, is putting a very low ceiling on their overall strategic pivot to the United States. Why?
Because it is excessively focused on the executive branch. And what does that mean? Easy come, easy go. All you need to do is take a look at how many times Trump has changed his mind so far on all the various agreements that he’s done to see the risk that this poses to Armenia.
And I don’t think that that has been well explained candidly to the Armenian public. Okay. The fact is, is that yes, Trump endorsed Pashinyan as part of the election. Okay.
But I would say this, and I do feel comfortable saying this, that was a marriage of convenience, not of love. Why? Because actually, if you look back, the Pashinyan administration didn’t support Trump during the election. Did not.
It was well understood at the time that the support was for Biden, which is why they entered into that strategic framework with Biden right before the election. Do you remember this? Remember they had that signing ceremony and all that stuff? Right.
Why? Because they thought, ah, it’s going to lock the next administration in. Armenia was kind of put off to the side, kind of like ignored a little bit by Trump. But that structural component is a big risk for Armenia because in order to have sort of longstanding foreign policy decisions in the United States, in order for funding to be there, big funding, not 200 million, not 400 million, That’s a drop in the bucket.
Anybody who thinks you’re going to have state-of-the-art logistics for $400 million even, why don’t you take a look at the Lobito Corridor in West Africa? That corridor, similar concept, so to speak. Similar concept. Lobito funded by the Western governments, including the United States.
That thing’s getting $700-800 million. That’s twice as much in a rougher part of the world than Armenia that’s ostensibly in Europe. So you explain to me how you’re going to get much of anything done for 400 million, plus the fact that if you’re going to attract private investment, seizing private companies maybe is not the thing that you want to do. Because if I’m an investor sitting in the West saying, do I want to invest, and I see people’s companies being seized, I don’t really feel like cutting a check.
And I don’t think any of this should be like rocket science to people. So the U.S. made a bargain. The bargain with Pashinyan was you’ll establish the floor so that Armenia pivots to the West, okay? Because the concept was at the time it’s either Pashinyan West, everyone else Russia.
And by the way, that was a big mistake for the opposition candidates to allow that caricature to take place. Okay? That was a big mistake. I personally don’t like situations where it’s like, this person’s good, this person’s bad.
This is, what is it, is kindergarten? Really? Is it like, is life really like a Marvel comic strip where you have good guys and bad guys? Let’s sit down and talk.
That’s the way I’ve been trained. I’m a negotiator. Okay? But the bottom line is that now Pashinyan, by virtue of what he’s doing, is putting a very low ceiling on what is possible for TRIPP.
Now I want to talk about TRIPP. TRIPP should be reconceptualized. And what do I mean by that? TRIPP, as it is currently constituted, is nothing more than a transport corridor.
That’s why you have the US ambassador to Armenia, I listened to her speaking on one of these podcasts. I forget which one. We’re prioritizing rail. Right.
So the mind of the ambassador is basically, is it rail? Is it road? We’re doing this. That’s not actually the larger strategic play for the United States.
Asbed Bedrossian: I was just going to say, that’s not strategic thinking. That’s like.
Christine Arakelian: Right. The fact is, is that we have a war with Iran going on where Iran’s northern border matters to them. Meaning, that TRIPP corridor, that scenic region, and this is not the first time I’ve spoken about this, as properly constituted or understood should be a land-based Suez Canal, opening up those markets as a middle corridor. Not just for critical minerals, not just as a resource extraction tool, but as something that can fundamentally transform the markets.
You know that the US basically proposed, in the context of the Strait of Hormuz, effectively a multilateral institution that would govern it. So in other words, it wouldn’t be under control of a single country. Why? Because that strait is too important to be controlled by a single country.
That’s actually what needs to be done for the TRIPP corridor. And I’ve put this actually in front of the US government. The two strategic parties who need to be aligned as part of this corridor are India and Egypt. Why?
Because India and Egypt were the economic powerhouses that were sort of the bookends of a comprehensive strategy for the Middle East and Asia. That’s why. And fundamentally, BRICS right now, the issue with BRICS is there’s no economic alignment. See, the problem with BRICS is it’s all talk.
It’s all talk. We’re going to do this. We’re going to do this. Do you think there’s any economic alignment amongst these BRICS countries?
None. But if you can create economic alignment in a larger sphere, effectively, you’ve basically solved the Rubik’s Cube. That’s why. And fundamentally, there needs to be digital assets placed there in this TRIPP corridor that actually unlock from a logistics perspective, because logistics is actually about data.
This is one of the huge mistakes that the United States government has made across the globe. The supply chains are far too expensive relative to the value of what is being transported on them, meaning volumes matter. The US has no volumes to put through that corridor at the moment. Why?
Because they’re already basically being committed through a Russian infrastructure. So fundamentally, for the US not to rethink what needs to happen and trip in light of what’s happening with Iran, and to simply use it as a resource extraction corridor, you miss the boat. You missed the boat. Now, does that mean that people in the US are going to listen?
No. Could be the Armenian government not going to listen, but I think it’s incontrovertible that Pashinyan arresting people, seizing private assets, irrespective of whether you support democracy in Armenia or not, is not a winning formula for attracting private investment.
Asbed Bedrossian: So, Christine, what you said was quite concerning because TRIPP relies on the U.S. executive at present, and we know that Trump is actually theoretically in his last term. So in another two years, he may be gone. Is there any kind of congressional buy-in into this project? Is there visibility of this project, the TRIPP project, in any of the other branches of the government here in the United States?
Christine Arakelian: So look, I’ve had a number of meetings on Capitol Hill. I don’t want to say that they have no knowledge of TRIPP. That would be an exaggeration.
Asbed Bedrossian: But is there a buy-in? They may be aware, but have they bought into it?
Christine Arakelian: I think the answer is no. And I think the reason for that, and this is directed at ANCA, I don’t believe ANCA supports TRIPP. They do not. And so you have basically one of the major diaspora organizations who corrals votes in the United States basically up against it, which is why, by the way, basically the Armenian Caucus has been dealing with, how to say, low level issues.
Why isn’t the Armenian Caucus basically asking for funding, asking for appropriate? Why? Because fundamentally they’re split. Okay, so, no, we’re in a very precarious situation at the moment because, again, it is not that people in the executive branch don’t kind of want to support this, but this is a structural component within the Armenian community that has not been dealt with and, in fact, has been exacerbated by Pashinyan and his hostility to the diaspora in the United States, except, of course, the few people that he supports who fundamentally have money flows back to Armenia.
Hovik Manucharyan: I think it’s a big question, right? The question to ask is, would the ANCA or other diaspora organizations still be so against the regime in Armenia if we didn’t have all these political prisoners in jail? But I think it comes hand in hand with Pashinyan’s policy on giving away Artsakh . So it’s difficult to divorce these issues, but I would agree that Pashinyan doubling down and essentially arresting anyone who speaks against him and persecuting them is one of the exacerbating situations.
Do you think that it would be possible if there was a different leadership in Armenia, if it would be possible to get buy-in from these various diaspora groups or do you think that’s an intractable issue?
Christine Arakelian: Never believe that any issue is intractable, regardless of how difficult it is. But it’s going to start, I think, with the U.S. government. The U.S. government should recognize at this point that they’ve put too many of the eggs in the Pashinyan basket, meaning their endorsement of him during the election achieved its purpose. What they regard as the pro-Russian parties lost.
Okay, they lost. Some are in the Parliament. But by the way, I don’t necessarily think, for example, Strong Armenia is anti-TRIPP. If you take a look at some of his comments, he sort of says, I don’t know, could be good, could be bad.
And what that means is, is that the US shouldn’t continue to allow effectively Pashinyan to basically say, I’m bulletproof because I represent the West and I’m your guy. You want a deal? You deal with me. That’s not a democracy.
That’s a person who’s basically trying to control a relationship between two sovereign countries based on a personal political interest he has versus facilitating it, which is what I’m saying. In other words, if Armenia were actually about supporting a long-term relationship with the U.S., why wouldn’t they be doing more in Washington, D.C.? It doesn’t make sense. What makes sense is that basically Pashinyan saw this as a political survival.
Two or three years ago, I was getting regular calls from people in Armenia. We’re going to be invaded. We’re going to be invaded by Azerbaijan. Okay.
Do you remember this? Well, I still think so. Yeah. And it was every day I’m getting phone calls.
And he had this crossroads of peace. Remember that? You never hear about crossroads of peace anymore. They had that goofy, I get attacked by the way, too, you know, don’t criticize the PowerPoint they came up with.
Asbed Bedrossian: It was a good slide.
Christine Arakelian: It was so goofy. I mean, honestly, like it was childlike looking and nobody even knew what it meant. I mean, I’m just looking at this thing with arrows going different places, talking about peace. That thing’s gone out the window.
You never hear about Crossroads of Peace anymore. But bottom line is, is that He pulled sort of a rabbit out of the hat. He managed to get this strategic thing with Biden, and then basically he moves into TRIPP, he pulls that. Now, I can understand why the US wanted it.
It was good from a US perspective. From that perspective, I completely support it. There are some people who say, well, TRIPP was a terrible thing for Armenia. I don’t share that opinion.
I think it was necessary, and I think it’s good. I think Armenia does need to diversify its trade. I don’t agree, by the way, saying that Armenia having a minority interest is bad. I can explain that to you.
I don’t necessarily think that that is the case. I think those are the wrong optics on it. But what I do think is that if you’re going to make a move like this for Armenia, you make sure that it’s permanent to the greatest extent that you can. And that means you do not make the moves that they are making right now in D.C., relying on a single administration executive branch for decisions that are going to be very long-lasting with broad ramifications for Armenia.
That’s not right.
Asbed Bedrossian: Christine, I want you to talk a little bit more about those optics, actually, because you did say that Strong Armenia is not opposed. No, Strong Armenia is actually saying that they support TRIPP. Kocharian himself was actually proposing an expanded TRIPP, something like 200 kilometers long instead of 42 kilometers long. I did not realize that.
Christine Arakelian: Thank you for telling me.
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, absolutely. Yeah, both of the opposition parties also had TRIPP ideas. So, given that TRIPP is actually the face of the pivot, Pashinyan’s pivot to the West, are we talking about problems with the implementation of TRIPP?
Christine Arakelian: Can I talk a little bit about this pivot to the West because I think that this language is very confusing and I don’t think it’s accurate. Okay? What I have told people is that this pivot to the West needs to be deconstructed because fundamentally the US and EU are at odds right now. That matters.
Is he pivoting to the EU or to the US?
Asbed Bedrossian: Really good question.
Christine Arakelian: Right, because I mean, what does that mean? If the US and EU are at odds, what is Pashinyan pivoting to the West mean? There’s another important distinction too, which is the US is prepared to basically galvanize capital, okay? The TRIPP Development Company, it can make grants, it can make loans, but the point of it is that it’s a force multiplier from a capital perspective.
It’s to attract things coming in and gain other investments, etc. The EU monies that are coming into Armenia, and if I’m wrong, somebody email me, but I did a pretty close look before this podcast so that I could be accurate on it. The EU monies are direct money transfers to Pashinyan. So when they transferred money to Pashinyan, basically to say, well, we’re going to like for the for the agricultural products or other products that were effectively banned by Russia.
OK, they’re making direct transfer payments. Where’s the money going? You have an audit on it? Where’s the audit?
Because the fact is, is that I can see preference for the EU versus US precisely because the EU funding mechanisms to Armenia are different materially than the US funding mechanisms. The US is not making direct transfer payments to Pashinyan as such. There’s support agreements, etc. And why does this matter?
Well, it matters because fundamentally, if the US and EU are at odds, what does a pro-Western stance mean by Armenia? I don’t know. I want to know if you’re pro-US. That’s what I want to know.
And you can’t tell me that you’re pro-US because if you had an intent to have a long-standing relationship with the United States, you’d be acting very differently in DC. And that’s what I just explained to you guys. They wouldn’t be acting the way that they are. Okay?
Asbed Bedrossian: And acting very differently towards the US-Armenian diaspora.
Christine Arakelian: Correct. They need the diaspora. I mean, the idea that you’re going to have a relationship with the United States government that is hostile to its own diaspora population puts a very low ceiling. And this is the risk at this point.
Let’s just say, for example, the US likes the idea of having a, how to say, a land-based Suez Canal that could be a prototype for what needs to take place in Hormuz. Up and running. Well, it’s going to take a lot more than 200 million. And fundamentally, for those monies basically to come into Armenia, you’re going to have to deal with the fact that Pashinyan has effectively capped out the ceiling for Armenia because of the way he’s running things.
Okay, that’s when you really know. And I will tell you this, when you don’t deploy sufficient capital to make something successful, you just lose everything. Then basically people are going to say, why did we ever do this? Well, no, you didn’t deploy the capital properly.
You didn’t have the proper amounts at play. I already explained to you that Lobito Corridor, which is resource extraction only, It’s getting at least 2x the money from the US government. So how serious are they on TRIPP? Even if it’s doubled to 400 million, it’s a drop in the bucket.
And that’s being dispersed across many things. It’s not a strategic play. It’s a resource extraction. Now, I have seen some Russian media where basically they’re saying, hey, you know, this is going to be a NATO transport corridor.
And I will say this, Azerbaijan has conformed itself to NATO standards. Have you seen this? Okay, and that could be basically extending itself through the Organization of Turkic States. I don’t know.
Nobody’s calling me up telling me precisely what they’re doing. But I will say that it’s premature at this point to think that that’s something that’s going to have any near- or medium-term impact. Fundamentally, there’s a much more important problem that needs to be solved, which is structural. Where does the US stand versus the EU in the so-called Western pivot?
And let’s make sure that the US is not capped out in terms of Armenia’s decisions in DC, because in fact, that is what we’re dealing with. Congress and the executive branch will have to support long-term efforts. And do I think people in Congress are being appropriately, how to say, informed? No, I do not.
Asbed Bedrossian: Ms. Arakelian, thank you so much for joining us. This topic has been extremely interesting and I’m sure we’re going to come back to it sometime soon.
Christine Arakelian: Great. Thank you. Thank you for having me.
Hovik Manucharyan: Thank you, Christine. We hope to talk to you soon.
Christine Arakelian: You will. Thank you.
Asbed Bedrossian: That was a very interesting conversation. The show was recorded on July 29, 2026. And that was Ms. Christine Arakelian, who is a Fulbright Scholar and lawyer with expertise in international law and finance, mergers and acquisitions, and corporate strategy.
She has worked for the CIA’s Office of General Counsel and has advised the Republic of Armenia as an iGorts Fellow. Ms. Arakelian consults globally on matters pertaining to national security, technology, cybersecurity, healthcare, law, finance, and more. You can go to our podcasts.groong.org/572
Hovik Manucharyan: Thank you for your support, everyone. This was a terrific episode. And honestly, if I wouldn’t be praising myself, I would say that One of the few platforms out there that is able to bring in a diverse set of ideas and experts and give them an opportunity to talk for extended periods of time without any funding from the West, from any government organizations. So if you appreciate that, we would like your support, your continued support, podcasts.groong.org/donate and also all the other ways that you can support such as liking, commenting, sharing, subscribing.
Support us in any way you can. All right, I’m Hovik Manucharyan.
Asbed Bedrossian: I’m Asbed Bedrossian. We will talk to you soon.
Hovik Manucharyan: Take care.