Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed Bedrossian: Hello everyone and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. Today we are joined by Georgian political analyst Dr. Archil Sikharulidze to discuss Russian-Georgian and Russian-Armenian relations as well as the wider struggle over the political future of the South Caucasus . Archil recently returned from Russia where he took part in the Primakov Readings in Moscow and the Caucasus Dialogue in Pyatigorsk.
These meetings brought together officials, researchers, and regional experts to discuss political change in Armenia and Georgia, Great-power competition and the future of regional security. Archil has also published several recent articles on his Substack page on Georgia’s relations with Europe, the political divide inside Georgia, Ukraine’s changing approach, shifting approach towards Tbilisi, and Armenia’s foreign policy shift and Georgia’s growing role as a regional transport hub. We are going to include all of these links in our show notes. So please go to podcasts.groong.org slash episode number, check them out.
We’re also going to include Archil’s excellent Substack link in those show notes. It’s definitely worth subscribing to it and reading his articles. Dr. Sikharulidze, welcome back.
It’s always great to have you on the Groong Podcast.
Hovik Manucharyan: Archil, welcome back. Before the show we were discussing and I noticed you were drinking a glass of champagne to unwind and then I’m drinking a glass of coffee. I don’t know if you can see. So cheers.
I need to gear up for the day. So anyway. Cheers.
Asbed Bedrossian: Here we are waking up. You are done waking up and we hope to get there in 12 hours.
Hovik Manucharyan: Archil, let us start with your recent visit to Russia. You attended the Primakov Readings and then also a Caucasus Dialogue forum in Pyatigorsk. Discussions, it seems that both events addressed the situation in Armenia and Georgia, as well as Russia’s evolving position in the South Caucasus. This is in the midst of massive de facto trade sanctions by Russia against Armenia.
What were the main questions being asked at those forums? How do Russian officials and experts assess relations with both countries, Armenia and Georgia?
Archil Sikharulidze: Well, once again, thanks for having me again. It’s nice to be here. Yes, I would like to say that Primakov Readings are one of the most popular probably
Archil Sikharulidze: for international experts to gather there in Moscow once in a year and discuss issues that we all have in our minds. And I was surprised to see how shrinked it was this year. And you could have felt extreme If not dissatisfaction, but seriousness of everyone who attended the meeting. No more jokes, no more surprises, no more beliefs that the war can be stopped in one day or in two days or three days.
And obviously what I found out is that even those who may not agree with the central line of Moscow consider this a confrontation with the European Union. And then they emphasize this, that this is now a confrontation between EU and Russia. And they put aside the United States of America. They say that we will never ever be able to work with the EU like in the past.
No more returning back to the past. And one more issue that was staggering for me that even my fellow colleagues said that we cannot lose this. Whether we like it or not, we should push till the end. And there is no way Moscow can agree on terms that are offered by Brussels.
And I asked, what do you mean? I mean, watch out the terms. And once again, these are people who may not agree with a lot of things that the Kremlin is doing, but they said that we’ve been offered to be “big Armenia” or to win. And they meant here that if they follow what EU offers, Russia will be extremely weakened, divided, and actually destroyed as a superpower.
On the other hand, they have only one way out, to fight and to push till the end.
Archil Sikharulidze: With regard to Pyatigorsk, we met there with my fellow colleagues like Alexander Iskandaryan, prominent Armenian political analyst, my colleagues from Russia. And well, I think the main message was from Armenian side to Russians that do not listen to anything that Nikol Pashinyan is saying. Because to say something and to do something are two different things. They argued that even though there are some political statements, they are mainly for the internal society, for those who are listening in Armenia.
But still, Armenia is incapable of distancing itself from Russia seriously. So whether Nikol Pashinyan said this or not, Armenia will still be highly dependent on Moscow and there are no alternatives. So the message was that this was a pre-election campaign and do not be misled by statements. On the other hand, I know Russian experts were pretty blunt.
They said, No more discussions with everyone. No more excuses. No more options. It’s time to choose.
You are either with us or you’re against us. And this is what actually fits the general narrative that we all understand. There is no room for debate anymore, unfortunately. If previously Armenia and Georgia, we could have debated things with regard to Iran, to our interests.
Nowadays, all sides are demanding to be fully in line with what they ask us. So either Georgia follows what Brussels demands or it is against Brussels. The same with the other one. It fully fits the interests of Russia or it opposes Russia.
And one more thing, but this idea is not widely shared among leading Russian scholars. Some of them argue that Moscow should let Nikol Pashinyan to use his populist statements for domestic use and not intervene. Sooner or later, they argue people understand that the only real ally of Armenia is Russia, not Azerbaijan, not Turkey, not France, or the European Union in general.
Hovik Manucharyan: Do you get a sense that Moscow sees the Armenian and Georgian cases as connected, or do they see it as two different problems?
Archil Sikharulidze: What I’m doing regularly, as well as some of my colleagues, we draw parallels, obviously. I mean, it’s impossible not to remember a step that the Georgian government made in early 2000s, 2008, 9, 10, and even rhetoric, the terms that are used by Nikol Pashinyan and his fellow colleagues, closely correlate with what was being said by officials in Tbilisi. For example, at some point when Russia introduced sanctions, President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, appointed Irakli Okruashvili as head of attempts to diversify export of wine to EU and Ukraine. And even though they tried everything possible, still the lion’s share goes to Russia.
So we see the same in Armenia. We see that Moscow started using sanctions against Yerevan, even though they are not as aggressive as they used to be. And we know this happened by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, who said that we are not going to finance Armenia’s European dream. So they obviously see this pattern.
But at the same time, I think they understand at some point that still timing is totally different. 2003, 4, 5, and nowadays differ extremely. Geopolitics is different. And Georgia itself proved that if you do not push harshly, you can negotiate with such kind of countries. I will remind you that Georgia went from being extremely anti Russian to being moderate, as it is nowadays, and this is despite not abandoning the European way in general.
Because at some point, even the most radical pro-Europeans and pro-Westerners realize that geography cannot be beaten, so you should either kill your state, you should destroy your economy, or negotiate with Russia. And this policy of negotiating with Russia, trading with Russia, started not from Georgian Dream , but was started by Mikheil Saakashvili himself, because he came to a very clear realization. EU and US cannot provide you with economic stability and growth. And I think people in Moscow understand this.
So on the one hand, they’re pressuring Armenia softly, but on the other hand, they are giving Armenia time to think. This is not something that happened with regard to Georgia.
Hovik Manucharyan: We’ve talked with a number of analysts and of course Russia is fighting a big war and it’s understandable that as a result of that some of the projection of power around this periphery is diminished. Do you believe that Russia is adjusting its regional policy now to take this into account after troubles with Armenia for instance and also like a neither here nor there. And what are the challenges to that kind of thinking?
Archil Sikharulidze: Russia’s policy has evolved. Once again, if you look carefully to the Georgian case, I remember because I was young by then, and I remember how harsh it was. Sanctions and the expulsion of Georgians from Russia were very harsh decisions. Prosecuting Georgians.
On the other hand, now you see Armenia in 2018. Revolution, Moscow’s reaction was very soft. Do not interfere. Let Armenians handle it.
It was a bad experience from Georgia. Because in Georgia, Russia interfered. They supported the revolution, then they sacked the foreign minister of Russia, Igor Ivanov, for the mistakes. The same is happening in this case.
Russia realizes that some mistakes have been made in Georgia. I would say extreme mistakes. So now they’re trying to balance, on the one hand, we should recognize there is still this firm-hand policy in Moscow. It’s Caucasian.
You should come with a tank, conquer it, and push people to follow. On the other hand, there are much more moderate and modern political analysts and decision makers who are saying that this time is over. This time is over. We do not send tanks anymore.
Let’s be wiser. Let’s use American and European techniques. Let’s negotiate. Let’s buy.
Let’s invest instead of pushing hard. And in the case of Armenia, we do see this one. Obviously, It depends who you ask, because you said that you have interviewed political analysts. If you ask people who are, what I call them, extreme pro-Westernists in Georgia, they will say that Georgia has fallen into Russian hands, Georgia is pro-Russian nowadays, but their arguments are very weak.
Why is Georgia pro-Russian? Because we do not join international efforts to impose defeat on Russia, but it will be self-destructive. It’s nonsense. So if you ask our colleagues in Brussels, they’re just pro-Russian because we do not work against Russia.
On the other hand, they praise Armenia, even though Armenians do nothing against Russia actually, except making political statements. So the demands from Brussels are extremely different to all three states in the South Caucasus. Baku, no criticism, nothing, because they need oil and gas. Yerevan is still not attached enough to the EU.
So, okay, we’ll let you trade with Russia. Do not do anything against Russia, but make political statements. Strengthen your powers, clean up the political field for pro-European powers. Tbilisi, you can’t do this.
We have invested. We have supported you. You owe us. Loyalty.
And there is a really nice report by International Crisis Group, where they are clearly stating this stuff, that on the one hand, Georgia did ask Brussels to be much softer, not to demand, to put itself in the front of the rivalry. On the other hand, Brussels, which considered that Tbilisi betrayed its geopolitical interests, and that is what led us to what I call a Cold War between Brussels and Tbilisi. We have full-scale Cold War pursued by Brussels against Tbilisi. In this context, obviously, Russia is extremely occupied by the Ukrainian case.
Let’s be honest with this. This is not special military operation. This is a fully waged war. Again, on the one hand, this is Russia.
On the other hand, this is the West, United States of America, European Union, and Ukraine. And Russia has no more powers to impose its will on the South Caucasus unilaterally. It needs actually some support. And this is what Turkey is doing.
Turkey is using Russia’s weakness to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus. But, and here are two questions that we should ask ourselves. Is Russia weak enough to leave the South Caucasus? The answer is no. the South Caucasus is extremely important for Russia.
Maybe not as important as Ukraine and Belarus, but still the second most important geographically attached territory. It will never let anyone dominate here. And it has enough power to hold the ground. And one more question that lots of Georgians are asking themselves.
Does actually Tbilisi want to live in a region which is controlled by Turkey? The answer is obviously no, because if Turkey as a member of NATO state is being considered as a strategic ally, yes, but Turkey separately as a regional power obviously is not something that we would like to see.
Hovik Manucharyan: If you look at real politics, Armenia’s situation is pretty dire, right? But for ordinary Armenians who are caught in the crossfire between Pashinyan, Europe and Russia, And Pashinyan’s policies that are destructive, I believe, to Armenia. It is still emotionally and morally, many Armenians feel betrayed by Russia. Even though betrayal is not in the dictionary in geopolitics, many Armenians feel that Russia could have done more to prevent the collapse of Artsakh .
In Russia, most of the time, many analysts, and I feel that this is a common sort of cliché, they say Where will they go? So it seems like the Russian approach has been nonchalance, meaning that we can do whatever we want and they have no choice. So do Russians now understand why at least it’s very difficult now to win back the hearts of Armenians, some Armenians at least, who have this sense of being betrayed by Russia in the case of Artsakh?
Archil Sikharulidze: It’s a really good question. I think those people who used to say this statement that Georgia cannot escape, this is not something new. We heard this 20 years ago. And the same with regard to Armenia.
They are still on the same standpoint. Because as you perfectly said, there is no such thing as a betrayal in geopolitics. There is geography. You either recognize it or you do not recognize it.
I remember my perfect meeting in Armenia, where representatives of Brussels were persuading us that geography doesn’t mean anything. I was laughing a lot, but at least finally we know that it actually means something. Of course, these people do still think that there is no escape for Armenia. And they look at the geography and they know that this half of Armenia will never ever accept Turkey as a key ally.
Even those who feel being betrayed, that they feel so. But the rest understand that if you need to choose between Turkey and Russia, they do believe in this statement. They will always, always support the Russian side. On the other hand, obviously, there are people who do not agree with the statement.
I would say this is the same people who are calling for the Kremlin to be pretty soft and do not to interfere. Let Pashinyan destroy himself. They say, we could have, but what did Armenians, what did Armenians do for themselves? Why hadn’t Armenians done anything possible to avoid these consequences?
And if we have engaged, would we help Armenians to win? Or we would have inflicted even more suffering, turning Armenia into another battlefield? These are very complicated questions. And obviously, you should keep in mind one thing.
Russians are not emotionally attached to this topic. Contrary to Armenians, And this, you can feel this, you know, when you, for example, if you write questions like Prigozhin’s March to Moscow and Nagorno-Karabakh, Russians talk about Nagorno-Karabakh, relaxed, cold-minded, but as soon as you write the question of Prigozhin’s March to Moscow, you feel the same irritation as Armenians when it comes to Karabakh. No more. No more sophistication.
Emotions take over: Russia cannot be defeated. The same with regard to Ukraine. So that is why it makes people very irritated, not responsive to questions, you know? That is why you must be very sensitive when you come to these topics.
And frequently I tell my colleagues from Russia that I understand that for you, regime-change attempts in Tbilisi are something that are very far away. You can be philosophical, the same with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh. But if you’re smart enough, you should show some empathy. And this is what sometimes I think they really, really lack.
They do not understand this. And then I remember I told them, now think about Nagorno-Karabakh when you speak with Armenians in the same context like Prigozhin’s march to Moscow. And then you will understand why, for me, this is so painful, but once again, from my personal experience, this is very complicated. Usually people speak on behalf of their own countries, they are emotional, but when it comes to other topics, they think that they do not need to have the same feelings.
So to sum up, Yes, there are people who think that you will not run anywhere, and they bring the same Georgian example saying that, look at Georgians. They tried hard, they waged war against us, they did everything possible. At at the end of the day, where do they send the lion’s share? To Russia.
Who are the main tourists? Russians. It’s not because we want it. This is the reality of geopolitics.
But on the other hand, of course, there are people who say that, yes, we made the mistakes, but still, France will not help you. Turkey will not help you. So you have just one option once again, come to us and discuss. What I would advise the Russians to finally, finally, not to wait till Armenians come, finally come to Armenia and talk with people because Russia must, if Russia considers itself to be a regional power, superpower, it must behave accordingly.
That is something that Russians do not sometimes understand. They want to be superpowered, but they do not behave like it.
Asbed Bedrossian: Right.
Asbed Bedrossian: Archil, there’s absolutely no doubt, like you said, that there’s deep distrust towards the Russians in Armenia, and that is the reality on the ground right now. From one perspective, the two countries are blaming each other, essentially, for the deep failures of their foreign policies. At at the end of the day, whether you like it or not, hundreds of thousands of people have ended up destitute and ethnically cleansed from Artsakh. And certainly Pashinyan doesn’t want to bear the legacy of that on his record.
And the same thing with Russians. So whether they say, oh, this whole threat started with Pashinyan or this whole threat started with Russians, frankly, 150,000 people are out of their homes. And somehow we need to find a solution to that one. Back to Hovik’s question.
I want to understand a little bit more. Do the Russians, did you get the impression that Russians understand that Georgia’s cautious and non-confrontational foreign policy at present doesn’t mean that Georgia has become pro-Russian?
Archil Sikharulidze: Well, I think I must actually surprise myself and you too, because usually when we speak about what Russians understand or they do not understand, We are not very positive in Georgia because those who are participating in decision making do not be mistaken. There are a few really nice scholars who understand everything and sometimes they’ve been asked by the Kremlin, but those who are actually making decisions, they do not try to dig deeper and understand. And this is what we get used to. We send them messages.
We tell them, do not do this. Do not do that. Please consider this. But the response is usually, this is Russia.
We know what to do. We don’t need your advice. And we also get used to much more sophisticated approach from Americans and Europeans who always try to understand you. This time, we have the reverse situation.
We have Russians who are extremely pragmatic. They say, we know that you are making money. We know that you realize that confrontation with Russia will lead only to disaster. So the reason why you behave in this way is not because you turned your back on the EU or the United States of America.
It’s because you realize that neither Washington nor Brussels will help you if something happens. So they’re really, really objective about the reasoning, about the arguments, contrary to our friends in America and Brussels. For the first time in my experience, in my, I would say, 20 years of observing political processes in Georgia, we do see that the Europeans do not want to understand Georgia anymore. We meet people who say Georgia is pro-Russian and they ask: “Can you tell me why?” And the reason is you have not introduced sanctions against Russia.
You do not shout glory to Ukraine. You do not want to impose Russia’s strategic defeat. You also listen to your Georgian Orthodox Church and Georgian Orthodox Church is pro-Russian and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. And you realize this is all some assumptions, but then you ask, If I introduce economic sanctions against Russia, what’s going to happen?
Nothing on the Russian side, but they will destroy my economy. Are you ready to help me? No, you are not. My Orthodox Church will celebrate 17 centuries of existence on my land.
So why is it Russian or pro-Russian? Well, because they do not join the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. But why should they? So lots of useless and I would say unethical calls to Georgia to do something that is absolutely against our national interests.
And this is actually pretty dramatic because as you said, Armenians feel betrayed by Russia. I would remind you that according to 2025 statistics, trust in European institutions fell from 65% to 49%. For the first time in Georgian history, below 50%. Because lots of people felt betrayed by the EU.
Not in the sense that they betrayed us, for example, geopolitically, but because they are trying to push Georgia into confrontation against Russia, that Georgia does not want. So we have this almost the same feeling. If you look at Georgian society, I think no one will oppose my statement that Georgian society is divided on those people who said that EU is unfairly trying to impose sanctions on Georgia to punish Georgia. And those who think that this punishment is actually right because Tbilisi dared to have different national interests.
So if you compare Armenia and Georgia, some Georgians have the same feeling with regard to the EU. But what we have expected in this sense is that Russians will understand better Georgian politics than Europeans and Americans.
Asbed Bedrossian: Given what you said about the evolving nature of Russian policies, they think that they are going to try and emulate some of what the West does. Did you see any evidence of how Russians are trying to deploy soft power in the South Caucasus? And if there are serious differences between their approach to soft power to Georgia versus Armenia? In Armenia, I can tell you that having trade sanctions is not necessarily soft power.
That’s an attempt, maybe a failed attempt at hard power. It’s going to cause a lot of hardship, but not necessarily turn anybody around. On the other hand, if they start promising huge amounts of investment, for example, they are offering some excellent deals, as far as I know, on rebuilding the next nuclear power plant and things like that, maybe that’s a way to go forward. What did you experience at these meetings?
Archil Sikharulidze: I will tell you a short story. Before the war, before this that’s happening now, in 2015, we had a meeting with Russian colleagues, and I asked almost the same question. I said, why don’t you follow the same patterns that Americans are using? Invest in education, invest in youth, promote public diplomacy, try hard to avoid political issues.
And the answer was very simple. Because driving tanks into your cities is much easier and cheaper than to use these techniques. And plus, conquering territories by hard force is something that we actually did very well. And soft power, we don’t have staff members to actually follow these topics.
Now we have 2026. And I think the reason why we do not see still soft power being applied is because it demands a lot of knowledge and money. Money that is being sent to the battlefield. So ask yourself a very simple question.
Can Russia invest the same amount of money that Americans invested through USAID? We are speaking about the billions and billions of dollars, of U.S. dollars. Hundreds of people nurturing public diplomacy for decades. And on the other hand, we have Russians who are extremely new in this field.
So, yes, they are trying, but not in a classical way. For example, contributing to the rise in tourism in Georgia. This is one of the ways. Through tourism, try to build new bridges between Georgians and the Russians.
How successful? This is questionable. But still, this is some new wave. Because if you check this data, before the war, situation between Georgia and Russia was much, much worse than after the war.
Georgian cuisine is the second most popular in Russia after the war. Russian tourists are heading to Georgia on a regular basis. We have almost extremely well-built communication between our businesses, and this is despite not having any diplomatic relations at all. I think this is not a bad expression of, if not soft power, but mindset that is being applied, that there should be no more wars with Georgia.
Let’s negotiate. With regard to Armenia, yes, sanctions are not actually well received by Armenians. This is normal. Both Armenians and Georgians, when they are pushed hard, they will try to oppose.
This is normal. But on the other hand, as you said perfectly, we have Rosatom that still offers Armenians really good deals. So they are trying actually to invest in the field that they already know where they are among the best. And obviously, nuclear power plants represent the strength of the Russian Federation.
Whether they have the resources to do something new, I have doubts because we all know Russia’s income comes from oil and gas. Its resources are being directed to the war. So I think they’re trying hard. But once again, you need to nurture new generation of people who look at Armenia and Georgia as not former Soviet states, but as fully independent sovereign nations with their traumas, with their ideas, and to apply new Russian policy.
A policy should not be built on, as Hovik said, one general message that we cannot escape Russia. And another one, if we try to run against Russia, they can always conquer us back. If you somehow reconsider this point, I think Russians can do much better than they are doing nowadays.
Hovik Manucharyan: If we have time, I might ask some more questions about the internal politics in Georgia because I think it’s all related. But since we’re on the topic of Georgian and European relations, your recent article, “Why Does Ukraine Suddenly Need Georgia?” In that article, you argue that Kyiv has softened its approach towards Georgian Dream after earlier attempts to isolate the government. Now, why does Ukraine What other signs are there for this warming of relations? And has Kyiv accepted that the Georgian Dream is likely to remain in power in the coming years?
This is an excellent question.
Archil Sikharulidze: I think there are two standpoints, mine and the opposite one. The opposite view, usually held by strong supporters of Ukraine, say that, well, big brother, we had previously one big brother, Russia, now we have another big brother, Ukraine, decided that Georgia is poor and helpless, that our country is being destroyed by Georgian Dream, so they decided to still communicate with Prime Minister of Georgia and to somehow help Georgia come out of this political crisis. I think this narrative is extremely naive, even though I would say it’s stupid. No power in the world is doing something because they want to help another one.
There are some very deep interests. So we should analyze context that we already have. Vladimir Zelensky sanctioned Prime Minister of Georgia. He sanctioned everyone in Georgia, almost the whole government.
They never talked with these representatives, and at some point they decided to unilaterally initiate dialogue in Yerevan, which was extremely strange. So we see that Vladimir Zelensky meeting with the prime minister whom he sanctioned, who he called pro-Russian agent, and arguing that it’s time for Kyiv to reconsider their positions. Then they had some dialogue between Dmytro Kuleba and Maka Botchorishvili. So what I do argue is that it’s obvious no regime change is taking place in Georgia for the next few years.
Georgia remains number one when it comes to humanitarian help to Ukraine. Georgia remains one of the most friendly country in the world. Hundreds, thousands of Ukrainians still live in Georgia. They get help.
They get all support they needed. And Georgia government never actually wanted to engage confrontation with Kyiv. So I think that at some point Zelensky decided that there is no simple sense, common sense of being a rival system. Especially when they realized that they were unable to persuade other countries that the Ukrainian way is the only truth.
They hoped to persuade India, China, other countries. And then they realized that there is not the same support, the same level of support like they have from the EU. So they need allies. They need a country they can rely on.
And their decision to engage was extremely pragmatic. We need someone, a real ally in the South Caucasus. And with all due respect to Armenia, that all this Armenian shift is mainly based on one person, on one cabinet. It can fall apart at any time.
So this was a very pragmatic decision to simply restore something that shouldn’t have been destroyed at all in general. But still, do not be misled. The narrative is still there. What we do expect is that there will be no more attempts by Ukrainians to contribute to sanctioning Georgian officials and to intervene to Georgia’s domestic affairs.
I would remind you, before that, Vladimir Zelensky had an online speech in front of protesters calling to liberate Georgia from an illegitimate regime. I do think that this reset policy will lead to much softer politics in general. No more such open and direct interventions. And obviously, if you live in Georgia, you do feel that we are going to have another election in two years.
Parties are preparing for new pre-election campaign, and I don’t see any reason why the current government should lose anything. I am very firm in my assumption that you know that I told you before 2024 parliamentary election Georgian Dream was going to win. Now, at the end of July 2026, I can say that if nothing happens and I don’t see what can actually take place here. Georgian Dream will still win.
Hovik Manucharyan: Now, if we zoom out a little bit and think about not just Ukraine,
Hovik Manucharyan: but Europe, Georgia’s importance to Europe, I think, it’s not only political. Georgia is a key part of the Middle Corridor, is a key component of Black Sea transport links, and also even planned energy routes connecting Europe with Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and even China. Now, Armenia seems to be vying for that role, but I don’t think it can be mutually exclusive. Does this mean in European minds that Europe still has to play ball with Georgia?
And is the Ukraine example that we just talked about a sign of that, that Europe will also return to a more pragmatic approach towards Georgia? And lastly, what makes Georgia very difficult to bypass for Europe?
Archil Sikharulidze: I think this is actually a really nice way to present what’s happening on the ground. So let’s once again look at history. 2022, EU demands, as we know the demands, as well as the United States of America, for Georgia to be bold with regard to Russia. We’ve been asked directly, if not to open the second front, to engage in an attempt to impose strategic defeat to Russia. Georgian Dream said that this is not going to happen.
Whether they Thought about Georgian people or their own power, it’s not the issue. Since then, Brussels was trying hard to initiate regime change in Georgia. I know because I talked with so many Europeans who said that this is the first time in history of their practice, they’ve been told by EU officials directly not to have any debate with Georgian Dream members, not to engage in any dialogue. They’ve been not only told, but they’ve been warned.
And when asked why, they said that this regime opposes our interests, this regime is for Russia, it must be destroyed, and we must bring people who follow our main line. This is not something that I’m trying to interpret. This is something that I’ve been directly told by my fellow colleagues. Does Ukraine’s attempts to restore some kind of friendship with Georgia sign that Brussels are also thinking about that?
I think partially yes, because all steps by Ukrainian government are always in correlation with the main agenda that is coming from, I think, Russia and Brussels. On the other hand, I already mentioned the International Crisis Group report. This is the first report where they directly call on Brussels to stop engaging in confrontation with Tbilisi, where they argue that Tbilisi is still pro-European. It’s time to be pragmatic.
So we do see signs. But on the other hand, yesterday, There was the European Union’s 21st package of sanctions against Russia, and they sanctioned Georgian port of Kulevi, which allegedly used Russian oil and then sent it to the third countries. So this is the first official sanction against a Georgian enterprise. So the question is, if we do see some sense of pragmatic approach, why does the EU still try to sanction Georgia?
And these are not the first sanctions. The UK introduced sanctions against Georgian TV channel. Post TV, and they are still trying to push harder in Georgia. So I would argue, and this is also written in the report that I mentioned, that there are two actually groups.
On the one hand, we say Eastern European countries, Northern European countries, who are hardliners. I call them European neocons, who are saying that either Georgia will follow or it should fall apart. I think it’s obvious. They need regime change.
They need the government. They will follow everything that they are telling them. And that’s why they praise Moldova and Ukraine. On the other hand, we have countries like Luxembourg, Like France, like Germany, who are still very moderate and say we cannot push Georgia if we really consider it an ally to fight against Iran, fight against Russia, fight against Iran that we demand.
This is a small country, so we need to introduce pragmatic approaches. That’s why I think there is, we see on the one hand, some signs of introducing pragmatic approach. On the other hand, we have sanctions being sent to Georgia on a regular basis. And one more issue.
I think Georgia is becoming a victim of its own internal political agenda. So many people who used to live on European American manners used to build their own careers on this, I would say, political ideology of Europeans. They are actively persuading Brussels that the best way to deal with Georgia is to push Georgia to the end, to press it to the end. And this message is obvious.
And I would like to bring just one example. The public defender of Georgia, Levan Ioseliani, just recently went to Brussels. He had been interviewed by an opposition channel. They asked, what did you tell them?
And he said, I told them that not everything they get from local opposition must be trusted. This is not objective reality. And he said one more very interesting thing. I told them and I told our Georgian political actors, there are some red lines that shouldn’t be crossed.
Do not forget, he said, that the interests of your country shouldn’t be sacrificed for your own interests. The national interest must be superior. And I think this was a message, clear message to Brussels, that you may not like Georgian Dream, but do not be deceived that Georgian Dream does not represent anyone. It actually represents lots of Georgian voters.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah.
Hovik Manucharyan: Thinking only about the hard geopolitics, Archil, such as, for instance, the transportation routes, such as the Middle Corridor and so forth. Is Georgia impossible to bypass for Europe? Because at one point we saw Europe shifting statements saying that we now see Armenia as one of the primary routes for the Middle Corridor. Do you think that is just hyperbole or do you think that…
You know, European policy has now been set in stone and for them, Georgia being anti-Russian is a higher priority than Georgia being part of a regional interconnected communications hub.
Asbed Bedrossian: This normalization that is being pushed hard by Europeans and Americans between Turkey and Armenia, is this being done for, let’s call it, geopolitical reasons so that there is an alternative to Georgia leading between Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Europe so that they can bypass Georgia if necessary?
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah, an alternative and essentially how difficult, I mean, is it a myth to say that we can bypass Georgia?
Archil Sikharulidze: I think you have a really good point. I’ve been to Tbilisi Silk Road Forum last year. It is a platform where we have discussed the way Central Asian goods can move to the South Caucasus, then to Europe. And to be fair with you, I haven’t seen serious projects that involve Armenia.
Some alternatives, yes, but, and I will tell you a very short story because it was A bit surprising for me. So there are presentations where you could have seen the goods going to, for example, Kazakhstan, from Kazakhstan through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan. And you can see the map in Central Asia. And then I saw that between Azerbaijan and Turkey, there was nothing like white color stuff, you know, like some buffer zone.
And then Turkey, they go to, you know, And I was like sitting there thinking, I do need something here because I see like Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Caspian, Azerbaijan, below is Armenia, then some white stuff and going to Turkey. And then I was like, where is Georgia here? I mean, this white blank space was, what is actually Georgia? And, and actually it was really exemplary, because this is the way Ursula von der Leyen talks about the Middle Corridor.
If you remember, there’s even Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who told her a few times that you cannot bypass Georgia. And they even told her that you talk about Armenia, but you know that Georgia lies between Azerbaijan and Turkey? And the response was nothing, you know? But this presentation actually probably shows us two things.
The first one, alternative, yes. But main road, I think, highly unlikely. Because, once again, I think there is very clear understanding in Brussels that Armenia is very shaky. You never know what happened there.
Armenia is still not as reliable as Georgia can be, because still, the influence of Russia is very strong, while Georgia, its political field has been so cleansed of any Russian influence that they understand at the end of the day, Georgia is still the key ally and Georgia consists of people who truly believe that the European way can be the only way. And I don’t think that they feel the same with Armenia.
So all these initiatives that Asbed mentioned, Trump Route , of course this is an alternative to Georgia, but they also understand that if something happens, the best road is the road that had been double-checked previously, and the road through Georgia is probably the well-known one. And one more thing, do not forget that the new roads, they are very close to the Iranian border too. So the question is, what happens if a new war emerges between Iran and the United States of America, and we have seen that they even hit Azerbaijan territory. So Iranians will not start the debate.
They will not joke. They will hit hard in this case. So I think the answer is yes. This is an alternative.
Yes, this is not the main road. Yes, the key reason why Brussels is trying to push the negotiation between the Baku, Ankara, and Iran is purely geopolitical. It has nothing to do with peace , but at some point it seems that they still hope, I mean Brussels, to pressure Georgia until then. If it will not lead to some positive outcomes, they know that they still can negotiate with Georgian Dream because Georgian Dream is sending every day a public letter to Brussels and Washington calling them to befriend them again.
So they can always come back.
Asbed Bedrossian: All right, Archil, let’s turn to a slightly different topic. In your article, Patriarch of the Family, Not Patriarch of Europe, You argue that the Georgian Orthodox Church will continue to defend the traditional understanding of family, religion, and national identity in Georgia. So the conflict with Europe, has this taken on a cultural aspect as well as a geopolitical one? And can Georgia remain politically European, so to speak, while rejecting part of Europe’s social liberal model?
Archil Sikharulidze: Well, I think, let’s start with your second question. I think it’s up to Europe, actually. Once again, let’s try to discuss what Georgians mean when they say we’d like to go to Europe. Economic prosperity, social prosperity, safety, and well-being.
That is all. When we discussed a European future, we never talked about saying no to Georgian Orthodox Church, to rising up against Russia, trying to defeat Iran. So the whole idea of Georgians rejoining the European family was all about protecting our well-being in general. So when it comes to much more detailed discussions, we actually never had such discussions.
No one ever asked Georgians, would you like to have the Church play the same role as it does in Germany, for example. The churches there are half-empty, and let’s be fair, there is no more God in the same sense as we do consider it in Armenia and Georgia. God for Europeans is democracy, constitution, and liberal or conservative parties. That’s all.
As my colleague used to say, God nowadays is just part of a culture, of tradition. And people go to church because they, as he used to say in German, ich muss, they must go to church to have a cultural dialogue. That’s all. When we talk about God in our countries, we mean much, much more.
And it’s all up to Brussels. If it demands, and it looks like it demands, to follow the main party line, as it was in the Soviet Union, I don’t think that Georgia can do this. I don’t know anyone who will come up and say, for the European future, we can turn the Georgian Orthodox Church into some kind of institution and let it go. This will never ever happen, especially nowadays when we see geopolitical shifts and crises.
Crisis always leads people to unite around something. And what is the main key institution in Georgia that existed for centuries Georgian Orthodox Church, Orthodox Christianity. And that’s why I said that the new patriarch of Georgia made a very clear sign and message to everyone that he is not the patriarch of Europe. He’s not going to make some reforms, let women become priests, help emancipation, praise LGBT pride.
No, he is a patriarch of the family. He said, Three things, and you mentioned my article, he said one thing, all these left-wing theories are nonsense. Men are men, women are women, and family is at the core of our society that consists of men and women. Second thing he said, we do appreciate freedom, but we all belong to the state and to God.
So we have freedom, but women should reproduce, men should defend and fight. And these are traditional rules. And Georgia cannot afford to live otherwise because we have a demographic catastrophe. Our population is getting smaller and smaller.
And he made a final point where he said the Georgians and Georgia in the way we know it exists because there are ethnic Georgians. So people who are devoted to their country, to their language, to their homeland, and to their religion. And this message was extremely controversial for those who support a European future because they say that this is not something that they expected to hear from the head of the Georgian Orthodox Church. So yes, this message was obvious for everyone, and also it was something actually people expected, because the previous patriarch, Ilia II, he was elderly, let’s be fair.
He did not have this energy. The new patriarch is younger and was chosen to push forward. And I will remind you, the new revelation that we just heard from an official representative of Georgian Orthodox Church by Jaghmaidze, a very popular person, who said that at some point Europeans approached them and said that they would like to get help from Georgian Orthodox Church to promote same-sex families, same-sex families. And even, if I’m not mistaken, he mentioned a former minister of Belgium, who asked them, who told them that they need to help Georgian society to develop because they are behind modernity.
And they implied that by preaching conservative values, they will never ever get into the EU. So I think the final answer to your question is the Georgians will never ever let Georgian Orthodox Church disappear. And Europe is not ready to let Georgia become part of the EU without crossing its main red lines. These red lines are pretty obvious.
No diminishing of the role of church in each society.
Asbed Bedrossian: Archil, you’re implicitly answering some of the questions I had in my mind because two years ago in 2024, there was a lot of NGO-driven anxiety in Georgian society about Ilia II And his conservative values. And there have been similar issues with Shio III who was expected to succeed him. But with Georgian Dream in control, that debate has been much more muted, a lot more smooth. So a couple of questions here.
Is Georgian Dream defending Georgian society’s values? Or are they using religion and social issues to strengthen their hold on power? And the other one is, All that NGO-driven anxiety about social mores and values, is that part of Europe’s written or unwritten set of conditions for Georgia to become an EU member? Like, you have to make these changes, you have to bring down your church and its influence on society, etc., etc.
Are these demands driven by Europe?
Archil Sikharulidze: I think with regard to Georgian Dream, it’s very complicated to say because, well, I don’t know, Bidzina Ivanishvili and Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, are they traditional at some point? Yes, they are. Do they believe in the Church? Partially, yes.
But are they such conservatives? No, obviously not. So I would argue that they, on the one hand, They do share the idea that Georgian Orthodox Church played a crucial role in Georgian history, and it must remain. But on the other hand, I would argue that they are playing a conservative role to consolidate society and to keep power in their own hands.
So I would say 50-50. It’s very complicated to argue, but obviously, Bidzina Ivanishvili’s pre-election offer to establish Georgian Orthodox as a state and national level religion was purely a populist statement. It was pushed hard just to send the majority of conservatives in Georgia a signal that we are your party, not our opponents. With regard to NGO, yes, and yes, and yes again.
So those people who argue that EU doesn’t demand anything, they are either stupid or naive or they are being paid to be stupid. Because how can you become an EU member if you do not follow? And there are hundreds, if not thousands of directives. And this is written on the paper.
This is not something we do argue. And one of these demands was liberalization of politics, liberation of society, pushing ethnic minority, sexual minority rights forward. The same was, for example, women’s quotas in Georgian Parliament. This was all demanded from Brussels.
And this is a direct, direct message from Brussels. You cannot be a member of the modern European Union and society unless you have widely accepted same-sex families, ethnic minority issues, also sexual minority issues addressed at the required level. And if there is a church that opposes this, then the church must be put aside. And I would remind you that there are papers, hundreds of papers written by members of civil society organizations, where they tried to reconsider the role of Georgian Orthodox Church, one of the most prestigious institutions in Georgia, in the wake of European integration.
And the role that was allocated to the Church was very, very precise. To help Georgian society to be more liberal, more integrated into European values. But of course, they forgot to mention that liberalization also means diminishing of Georgian or to the church role in Georgian society. And people in the Church are not stupid.
They perfectly understand this.
Asbed Bedrossian: I just try to understand, basically, if the pattern of attacks on the Armenian Church in Armenia by Pashinyan’s government, which basically followed its roots from the NGOs, which were driven from the West, is similar to what you are experiencing or have been experiencing in Georgia.
Archil Sikharulidze: Well, I think we should separate two issues. The first one is NGO agenda. There is no such thing. There is no such thing as a classical civil society in Georgia, in Armenia, in Russia, or in the post-Soviet space.
This is the line. Civil society has been established in European-American societies as a part of cultural and societal development. So when you say about civil society, what we actually mean? An independent group of people, your own citizens, who decided to create and finance a movement and fight for rights and promote some policies.
This is the classical understanding of the civil society. What we have on the ground, a group of people, our own citizens that had been gathered by foreign agencies, financed by foreign agencies to promote interests set by foreign agencies. This is indisputable. This had never been actually questioned.
So I call them “hired Georgian civil society”. So they are a corporation. They represent Georgian society at some point because they do have Georgian passports. They live in Georgia, but they do not create the agenda.
They do not have their own independent agenda, and they are paid for very particular steps. So this is one issue.
Archil Sikharulidze: Second issue, you mentioned Nikol Pashinyan. This also happened in Georgia. I will remind you that the third president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, was actually trying hard to put the Georgian Orthodox Church aside. He was trying to diminish its authority because he was realizing that there cannot be two lions on one mountain.
There can be only one power in charge. So if you have any other institution that’s superior to your government, superior to your political power, then you are under threat. So in this way, obviously, Saakashvili tried hard to somehow fight the Georgian Orthodox Church. He failed.
Something similar is happening in Armenia. Nikol Pashinyan, that has his own view of real Armenian culture, realizes that there are some institutions that can fight back. And one of those institutions is the Armenian Church. But, and that is what makes our churches different.
It seems that Georgian Orthodox Church, thanks to Ilia II, has much more trust in society. It’s much more, it seems from my standpoint, reliable. I cannot imagine even half of what Pashinyan is saying, doing with the Armenian Church to take place in Georgia. The government would have been overthrown immediately.
And I think Pashinyan feels this, sees the weaknesses in Armenian Church and he’s pushing this painful spot there. How far he can go, I think, depends on Armenian society. But once again, this has nothing to do with NGOs. This is political rivalry, fight for authority, for the right to be dominant.
With regard to NGOs, this is a completely different story. This is a story of a small group of people who are hired by foreign agencies, they may believe in these ideas, I do not exclude this, but they have a very particular agenda. It’s not about power, it’s about changing culture and society from inside. And to represent this as if it were the will of Armenian people, while it has been well prepared, financed, supported by foreign agencies.
That is why Georgia introduced the so-called foreign-agent law, where all these people should pop up and say, I’m promoting A, B, C, D because I’m paid A, B, C, D. And people know that this guy is not paid by me, he’s paid by the United States of America. And this does matter, actually.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah. Archil, I want to shift a little bit and talk about relations between Armenia and Georgia. Armenia’s relations with Georgia appear outwardly very collegial, maybe even warm, I would say. And the most eye-catching example was the prompt congratulations by Kobakhidze for Pashinyan’s electoral, quote unquote, victory, when only 10% of the votes were counted.
On the night of June 7th. But Kobakhidze also in the past has made more dramatic statements, accusing local agents and their foreign patrons of trying to create tensions between Armenia and Georgia. And as part of those accusations, he also announced that European bureaucrats would not be successful in dividing Armenia and Georgia. In Armenia, I can say that this news got buried in the pre-electoral news cycle, but it was covered widely, I think, in Georgian press.
Meanwhile, the EU is fully signing on to TRIPP. We talked a little bit about that. Making multi-billion dollar deals with Azerbaijan. Viewing Turkey and Azerbaijan as critical partners in the Middle Corridor.
So we’ll talk a little bit more about that. But first, why? Why did Kobakhidze choose to become the first foreign leader to congratulate Pashinyan when only 10% of the ballots were counted? I don’t think he’s that ignorant.
I don’t think that he doesn’t have any advisors that don’t tell him, you know, Ballots are not fully counted, Mr. Kobakhidze. Don’t do that yet. So why did he do it?
Archil Sikharulidze: Well, first of all, he’s not ignorant, but I think you exaggerate the level of expertise in Georgia. I think what lots of people do not understand, colleagues, we don’t have Armenian studies in Georgia at all. I think sometimes people do not really understand the meaning because I had lots of colleagues and I myself, I was like checking who won, what is this position of power. And when colleagues sent me saying that Kobakhidze is celebrating, I was like, okay, it seemed that he decided, well, he thought that Pashinyan would win.
He is supported by the EU, so nothing is going to happen. We just call him and say, well done. But once again, do not exaggerate. Ask yourself how many times Kobakhidze before the war had been to Armenia?
Maybe once, maybe none. How many times he had been to Central Asia? None. Zero.
How many times My colleagues who are now attending Yerevan on a regular basis had been to Yerevan before these dramatic changes. Zero. So it’s not a secret. Russian studies, Azerbaijani studies, and Armenian studies are nonexistent in Georgia as a serious field.
And I see this on a regular basis. I just ask people what’s happening, for example, in Armenia, they don’t know. They only check a situation when someone from Europe comes to Armenia to say that, do you see, Armenians become Europeans and we are behind. That’s all they know about Armenia.
And the same with regard to Armenians. If you ask what you know about Georgia, they know only about TRIPP. So do not exaggerate the level of knowledge. It’s not ignorance.
It’s about not being interested at some point. Now, why he made these statements? Because people are not stupid. They all know that this money that used to come to Georgia Now are going to Romania, to Yerevan.
And they know, and you can just check it on Facebook, that those Georgian civil society representatives who used to take money from Tbilisi to Yerevan previously, are now taking money from Yerevan to Tbilisi to avoid double-checks on borders. And I think this was a message to Yerevan that we know we are not stupid. We know that now our civil society representatives are coming to Yerevan, getting an agenda, getting money, coming back to Tbilisi. So don’t do that.
Also, it’s not worthy. And obviously, I think Pashinyan also understands that if previously roads were totally different, Armenia was pro-Russian, Georgia was pro-European, and we still had good relations. But nowadays, when the roads switched, Europeans demanded from Yerevan that Yerevan take a much harder line with regard to Tbilisi. And this was a message to the Armenians: do not do this.
It’s not worth it. So we are still the closest allies to Armenia. Maybe we are not very active, but we have no interests against Armenia. We never had.
So keep this in mind.
Hovik Manucharyan: Yeah, but what are the exact tensions that Europeans are being accused of exploiting? I know, you know, we talked about these competing corridors or Georgia, Armenia being an alternative to Georgia, but do you believe that maybe even on a friendly level there is some kind of competition between Georgia and Armenia, just tactically trying to get more money, you know, what are your thoughts about the overall health of the Georgian-Armenian relationship and attempts to divide it?
Because I honestly believe that there was an Armenian analyst, and I talked about it in our podcast a few episodes ago, who was saying basically that Europe, through Azerbaijan as well, will try to create crises between Armenia and Georgia and then solve it with Azerbaijan’s mediation or somehow. So do you see any of that or do you think this is just hyperbole?
Archil Sikharulidze: Actually, what you’re saying reminds me of an interview by, I think it was Oxford professor Neil Mac Farlane, a prominent Scottish scholar who used to study Georgia. And actually, I think he also advised Georgian Dream at some point. And he mentioned the same. This is something new.
He said, after Armenia, Azerbaijan will take the lead with Georgia. And Azerbaijan and Turkey will try to impose its own interests, Turkish-Azerbaijani interests, on Georgia, too. This actually… I would say it was unexpected for lots of Georgians because they do not see the way it is possible.
They still think that Turkey is not a member, so it’s a way of the West and it won’t do this, but they underestimate international interests of Turkey in the region. So these are some arguments and statements on the ground. Whether they are actually applicable, it’s questionable. Because you raised a very good question, but how can they do this?
How can they initiate crisis between Yerevan and Tbilisi? When if you ask me, we have really nice, I would say friendly relationship, but that’s all. I mean, once again, if you ask yourself, do we have really deep, excessive like pressure between scholars? No.
So our friendship is actually based on this historic approach that Armenians and Georgians used to live near each other for thousands of years and we should continue to be in the same position. Let’s not change anything. Let us be neither too close nor too far away from each other. So I’m not sure how can this be possible.
The only way, the only way it can happen if we really see I’m sure that Tbilisi will never do against Armenia anything, so they are smart enough to know this. if Tbilisi feels that political elites in Yerevan are trying to use their cooperation with Europe to somehow influence the situation on the ground in Georgia, if they feel that Yerevan will contribute to some intervention, this may actually lead to some crisis. And I will remind you, this happened with Ukraine. Before this open intervention from Kyiv, no one could have imagined that we would have such a confrontation, but then we felt it.
Representatives of Ukrainian political groups came to Georgia. They made statements. They were extremely unpleasant statements. So unless Armenia contributes to this, I don’t think anything can happen.
But I don’t see the point. Why should the Armenians even try to do this? What are the benefits?
Asbed Bedrossian: Yeah, it doesn’t make a lot of sense. But looking at, I just want to close with a final look at the relationship between Russia, Georgia and Armenia, a triad here. And we’ve talked a lot about the way that Georgia relates to Europe and the way that Armenia is relating to Europe and Russia. They’re not 100% in lockstep.
There are many differences. So I wanted to know if Armenia and Georgia can develop a common regional policy based on balanced relations with Russia and the West that is going to avoid the kind of confrontation that you just mentioned so that they are not necessarily in lockstep, but at least when we talk about strategic relationship between the two countries, they can remain strategic rather than suddenly diverge and start working against each other. And the flip side of that, Archil, is can Russia have a workable long-term strategy for both countries that makes sense for the two countries and doesn’t necessarily pit them against each other?
Archil Sikharulidze: Actually, the answer to your first question is yes. And we had conference with my colleague who is working on logistics and all these corridors, the way goods can be taken from different regions. And his speech was all about this. He said that we, Georgian experts, as well as government, we do not see a threat in TRIPP.
We do not see threat in any alternative corridors. Actually, he said, contrary to this standpoint, we do communicate with our Armenian colleagues, telling them, let’s do it together. Let’s finally join forces and show foreign powers that we have common interests. If we open logistics, we can use our territory to take more goods than we used to to Europe.
An increase in goods coming from Central Asia to Europe will only help us make more money. But this won’t be a rivalry. This will be cooperation for the first time in the South Caucasus that is not driven from outside, but driven from inside. And I think it’s the right approach.
I think Georgian Dream is doing that. I think Georgian Dream actually, well, we’ve been visited by Nikol Pashinyan, Georgian Dream members visiting Armenia, Azerbaijan regularly. I think this is the main message. I think Georgian Dream is saying that we want to live in a prosperous country, we want to live like Europeans, but we are pragmatic and let’s do it together.
Let’s not let countries outside the region to separate us as it happened previously for centuries. And I think the ball is on Armenian side this time, and even though if you criticize Pashinyan, I think Pashinyan is not stupid to not agree on these terms, because his positions are very shaky. And he never knowswhen Europe will turn its back on Pashinyan. I remember one disagreement between Tbilisi and Brussels led to a confrontation, and our relationship used to being built on a common ground for two decades.
But everything collapsed just with a snap of a finger. Now, answering about Russia, well…
Asbed Bedrossian: Oh, I want to hear this. We’ve already discussed Russia.
Archil Sikharulidze: No, but I mean, I highly respect Russians. I understand that they have their standpoint. I understand why these ideas come, from which, what actually pushes Russia to behave in this way. But sometimes I do not understand why some ideas cannot be reconsidered.
You know, some Russians do not want to listen to me or to anyone. And actually, sometimes we tell them directly what we do expect, like respect, consideration for our national interests. They should put aside this harsh militaristic rhetoric. And finally, to take into consideration our standpoint, our pain.
And you mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh. This is pain for Armenians. We say Abkhazian, this is our pain. But unfortunately, what we see, Russians are saying that, okay, your pain is your pain, but you should consider our pain mainly.
And that is what makes our paths diverge, because I don’t think Armenians and Georgians would like to mainly rely on the pain that Russia is suffering, we would like our pain to be considered too. Do I think that there are people who share my views, your views? Yes, they are here. Do they make decisions?
No, they don’t make these decisions. Can they affect? Yes. Should we expect some more sophisticated policy?
If you ask me, we are already witnessing the sophisticated policy. I don’t think that there is anything else we can expect. Because sophistication comes with years and experience, and I don’t think that this experience is enough for Russians to change some mindset. So by saying this, I mean, I don’t think that you should expect that the Russian ambassador will come and openly say that we fucked up, we made a mistake, we are sorry, but we are ready to discuss.
This is not going to happen.
Asbed Bedrossian: Well, I’m going to take the positive notes about cooperation between Armenia and Georgia as a note upon which we can close our show today. Dr. Archil Sikharulidze, thank you so much for joining us on Groong. We love talking with you.
Archil Sikharulidze: Thank you for inviting me. I hope the next time it will be much more positive in general.
Hovik Manucharyan: Well, we all say that, but knowing our region, in any case, thank you for enduring the hot Tbilisi weather to discuss our hot topics. And hopefully you can go and cool down now and have a good rest of your night. Thank you. See you later.
Asbed Bedrossian: That’s our show. We recorded this episode on July 24, 2026. We’ve been talking with Dr. Sikharulidze, who is the founder of the Tbilisi-based research institute SIKHA Foundation the Republic of Georgia.
He’s focused on Russian and Islamic studies, and additionally, political processes and international relations in Ukraine, the South Caucasus, and Kazakhstan. For more information, You know the spiel, podcasts.groong.org slash episode number, click on the bios and get a lot of information that we put in there.
Hovik Manucharyan: And thank you everyone for your support in the past. We would appreciate your continued support because we’re doing a lot of projects, which I’m confident that you will see and you will enjoy the result of, but the URL is podcasts.groong.org/donate. You can become a one-time contributor or, preferably, a monthly contributor. And send us a lahmajoun or a coffee once a month, and that will keep us going.
Thank you, everyone. I’m Hovik Manucharyan.
Asbed Bedrossian: And I’m Asbed Bedrossian. We’ll talk to you soon.
Hovik Manucharyan: Have a great day.