Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed: Hello, everyone. And welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. We have with us Dr. Sergey Markedonov to give us a Russian perspective on the war in Ukraine , how Moscow views the outcome of the Armenian parliamentary elections in June, and Pashinyan’s so-called Western pivot.
Dr. Markedonov, welcome back to the Groong Podcast.
Sergey: Thank you for your kind invitation.
Hovik: It’s a pleasure to have you, Dr. Markedonov. So let’s begin with the war in Ukraine, which concerns everybody in the region.
Some would say that the war has evolved into a prolonged war of attrition that commands the vast the vast majority of Russia’s military financial and diplomatic bandwidth allies observe frequently and frequently question why a global military superpower like Russia has not finished the job quote unquote or forced a rapid conventional resolution to the conflict meanwhile competitors are trying to make inroads into traditional spheres of Russia’s influence such as Central Asia and the South Caucasus and this perceived grinding status quo I think prevents Moscow from either fully pivoting towards a stable peace or comprehensively securing its frontiers preparing right now for what it seems like a long-term confrontation with a Europe that is actively rearming so why Dr.
Markedonov why is Russia structurally unable or at least appears to be uh or politically unwilling to rapidly escalate and finalize the war in Ukraine allowing itself to remain bogged down while Europe openly prepares for war in
Sergey: the 2030s okay thank you so much this question is one of the most important for Russian-European security in general and at the same time it’s one of the most frequently discussed first idea and let me make some identification issues I am not a military expert I am a political analyst and I will pay attention first and foremost to political dimension of this conflict or special military operation it’s a special Russian definition first the conflict or warfare is not performance It’s necessary to understand.
First of all, Russia is opposed by a very strong opponent in terms of political and military equipments and so on some figures in accordance with SIPRI, a well-known institution in Stockholm, observing the conflicts and wars all over the world Ukraine allocates for military needs about 40 percent of its national GDP yeah it’s the most it’s the highest ratio in the world and in terms of all state expenses it’s about 63% it’s strong by the way don’t forget that it’s not the confrontation between the two powers yeah great power Russia and middle power Ukraine Ukraine is supported by a NATO just uh today uh summit 36th summit of NATO in Ankara finished and question of Ukraine was one of the most important moreover Ukraine became something of test for Euro-Atlantic solidarity because the whole last year since August, last August since the Anchorage summit people discussed the problems in relationship between Europe and United States between the two sides of Atlantic space but this summit in Ankara demonstrates that in spite of some divergences, the US and EU are united in their attitude to Russia they considered peace in Ukraine not like compromise not like deal not like trade or something similar the concept of peace through punishment is on the table some people like Danish prime minister openly said that peace is victory of Ukraine no other results as for Donald Trump because previously his position was portrayed like change of approach from Ukraine to Russia it’s not true by the way we have especially in my country have high level of expectations not me personally I was skeptical since the first second of meeting between Putin and Trump in Anchorage why the problem is not my anti-Americanism of course I analyze facts Yes, the United States, after the Anchorage summit, decreased its aid to Ukraine.
However, indirectly, this aid continued. arms supplies from United States were insured through Canada European partners of Ukraine they were not paid by federal budget of the US but it was produced in the US, by the way of course United States shared intelligence information satellites insured effective attacks from Ukraine to Russia including deeper regions of my country like Ural, Volga, not only borderlines. This is why it’s not honest to portray this confrontation like rivalry or warfare between one power and another power. It’s much more complicated.
I suppose that Ukrainian crisis is wider than special military operation because special military operation started in 2022. after eight years of conflict maybe low intensity nevertheless it was a conflict 15 000 uh people passed away between 2014 2022 that time Ukraine insured seven percent of a gdp for military and security needs not uh 40 like now but seven percent like Israel by the way like uh Turkey or approximately like Turkey and so on and of course they uh trained uh um um 500 000 uh militaries through the zone of so-called anti-terrorist operation this is why this conflict had and now has at least three dimensions one of them uh Ukrainian domestic because Ukraine was a conglomerated country splitted identity and so on and the West especially United States and uh its uh European allies supported only one Ukraine pro-Maidan pro-Western ignoring the rest of the country and this is why it pushed Russia to be more active in 2014 and even after unification between Crimea and Russia or return of Crimea to a safe haven following the Putin phrase Russia tried to balance promoting Minsk Accords by the way which were supported by u.n and other international formats Russia did not realize the universal concept to Donbas comparing with Crimea Crimea was the unique case not Donbas Russia was ready to negotiate about particular status of Donbas and those activities were ignored because the Western partners of Ukraine considered Minsk Accords and negotiations like posts for strengthening of Ukrainian capabilities and so on so on and last not the least dimension second one of course Ukrainian-Russian and third one Russia-NATO Russia-West because for Russia this conflict is considered to be a fight for right to be part of the European and global decision-making process because Russia was not and is not satisfied by NATO-centrism american hegemony in the globe in Europe and especially along the Russian waters and svet and ovik you are absolutely right saying that near abroad or Post-Soviet space is considered to be the zone of particular interest of Russia it’s not imperial claims it concerns on security economic developments special prerogatives existed prior to active penetration of the West of this territory including for example military industrial complex because prior to 2014 Russia and Ukraine effectively cooperated in this area which was very important in terms of Russian security and so on so on this is why this conflict is considered to be the test for Russian capability to play an important role in the decision-making process
Hovik: is it passing the test so from what I hear the conflict is not between Russia and Ukraine thereby we maybe the explanation for why it appears to be a long and protracted conflict did Russian policymakers miscalculate for instance the contribution of NATO towards this conflict of course Russia yeah and also just to add you can answer all of them at once maybe it’s the same question you know is the current pace of the conflict a calculated choice by Russia still or is it essentially beyond Moscow’s control and you know the you know there is there are some bottlenecks that Russia cannot control within its own conventional military capabilities
Sergey: Of course, Russia is in the process of passing these tests. It’s not finished, by the way, because the problem of many analysts, they try to oversimplify observing the cause of this warfare or special military operation, because it looks like swing warfare.
Sometimes Russia won and was more successful, sometimes Ukraine and so on again. it’s not the poor conflict of two neighbouring powers we should also take into account such variable like NATO support diplomatic military training process decision making intelligence and so on and so on yeah it’s I understand that Russian propagandists have become subject of jokes no NATO in the military arena yes of course no soldiers of the United States or officers but officers are in Ukraine training preparing people in Ukrainian army to attack Russian objects and so on with no satellites with no intelligence information shared between the United States and Ukraine it’s impossible to imagine attacks of Ukrainian army to Yekaterinburg, Tyumen and some other areas.
It’s also part of the variable. As for Russian approach and ability or disability to finish the war, it’s kind of paradoxical evaluation. On the one side, Russia is portrayed like very weak country which is not capable to finish war and so on. It’s one side of the coin.
But the other side people who are leaders of Germany, France, Lithuania, especially Baltic countries, Sweden said Russia maybe tomorrow maybe in a year will attack Europe sorry we are weak or we are so strong to attack the whole Europe to destroy it NATO to destroy the Euro-Atlantic solidarity please check choose the option if there’s multiple choice Russia is a weak power which was absolutely disabled to do something or Russia is a kind of boogeyman yeah who could attack Germany tomorrow France in two days and two weeks and Baltic countries immediately it’s necessary to understand As for miscalculations, I can agree with Hovik that miscalculations were done because it’s a well-known proverb that generals prepare to the war of past and of course many people in Russia including the highest level of decision making were hostages of 2014 Crimea victory Crimea story and many people really believe that maybe Ukraine was not so strong as it had been in 2014 but again four years passed between 2014 2022 many things changed and Ukrainian identity became more anti-Russian and Ukraine was supported diplomatically politically and so on however this fact did not abandon some other facts that now European Union especially in lesser extent United States are not ready to deal with Russia to trade with Russia saying okay guys you should do this this and this but we should do this this and that because because last year and for a period between last August and this July many people discussed stubbornness of Russia and raised question why did Russia ignore the ceasefire and so on because ceasefire is good in terms of humanitarian reasons we are all human beings and of course we should think about victims on the ground rank-and-file people see population and so on so on and of course huge losses expenses cynically thinking and speaking on defense and so on however this ceasefire does not discover problems of future status of Ukraine really join NATO immediately or in 10 years 50 years because former chancellor of federal republic of Germany said okay maybe Ukraine will be NATO member in 15 years and what this is not solution for Russia because after collapse of the USSR Russia was not accepted in the club of NATO Russia offered to join this club and always was rejected at the same time NATO enlarged many times the biggest enlargement took place in 2004 it was 10 years prior of Crimea because the beloved argument of European Union yes maybe we are radical now maybe we are not so positive to Russia and sometimes anti-Russian but it happens because Russia violated this this and this guys it’s uh necessary to be honest it’s uh my address not to you personally but to the wider uh audience in the West you enlarged NATO many times you intervened in the Balkan countries and Post-Soviet space please Georgia five days war in 2008 and so on you ignored Russian reasons for indivisible security multiple uh uh uh multiple security not uh singular uh uh for uh and with uh nature or species and so on so on Crimea was a consequence not prerequisite of this crisis, by the way.
This question of status of Ukraine, its affiliation with NATO, European security is on the table. It’s not resolved, by the way. And one more problem of United States is a discrete approach.
We should discuss Ukraine, not Transnistria, not Caucasus. okay we maybe let’s let’s imagine yeah let me make some fantasies Trump tomorrow will change its views and will be ready to meet with Vladimir Putin and they will reach treaty strategic treaty blah blah blah and so on okay on Ukraine what’s about Transnistria in two days the question of Russian peacekeepers will happen are the occupants there or peacekeepers question of Abkhazia South Ossetia United States are not ready to find comprehensive solutions and especially European Union they are dreaming only on loss of Russia on the battlefield it’s not accessible this is where Russia is going on as for a Russian test passing right now in the process there are many problems many people said oh Russia should ensure mobilization but mobilization concerns every Russian family it’s risky by the way and Russia had experiences of 1917 for example yeah and we remember results of it it’s risky some other things Russia can make escalations yes of course some people some radicals in Russia say okay we will attack a residential area of Zelensky kill him and so on so maybe but we could also have measures from that side it’s also necessary to understand just recently observed Iranian experience Iran lost 40 highest rank officials 40 not one too just recently they provided farewell ceremony with Rahbar Ali Khamenei even Rahbar was killed and his son his fate is not quite clear by the way this is why it’s also necessary to take into the account Russian leadership takes into account mobilization resource Ukrainian and Russian Russian is bigger it’s not bad it’s not good it’s it’s not dependent
Asbed: on my color of my passport and so on professor okay you you’ve mentioned a number
Asbed: of problems um essentially all around Russia from a strategic standpoint how can Moscow realistically prepare for the broader Western encirclement as we’re discussing when the primary military forces and command structures in Russia are entirely consumed by this Ukrainian theater
Hovik: and can I just also add uh you know we are we have heard voices in uh Russia such as Dr. Sergey Karaganov who say that Russia should now consider actively uh the use of uh tactical nuclear weapons the West rather than trying to achieve peace is escalating the conflict and that should be an option in the Russian toolset so is it really that the issue has come down to that but that now nuclear weapons are being considered
Sergey: it’s so comfortable for some Western observers and politicians to show Karaganov saying oh please Karaganov is advisor of Putin and he suggests to apply nuclear arsenals and so on it’s one of viewpoints in Russia There are some other points. Moreover, I can quote some of my colleagues, for example, Ivan Timofeev, who is Director General of Russian International Affairs Council, one of influential think tanks, who said that this issue is rather problematic.
The other viewpoint article by Vasily Kashin published recently in Russia in Global Affairs, who criticized the Karaganov’s approach, and so on, so on. it’s cozy to say that Russia is totalitarian country no discussions we have discussions and Karaganov’s viewpoint is not the only one moreover Vladimir Putin publicly criticized Sergey Karaganov I understand that Karaganov could be used maybe directly indirectly like a special tool for the discussion with the West guys we have potentially have this instrument but it does not mean that this instrument will be finally used maybe you know that in the time of Friedrich the Great or Louis XIV there was a popular Latin slogan Ultima Ratio Regis the last argument of our kings yeah it’s last argument I’m not sure that Russia is ready to apply to use nuclear arsenals immediately hypothetically maybe but not immediately it’s not the issue on the table Russia concerns first of all its place its role in global European decision making security of its borders and clarification of status of Ukraine guarantees and so on how to prevent similar scenario in Ukraine properly and in some other conflict points it’s also necessary to understand you can say that yes Russia is emphasizing Ukrainian dimension and Ukraine in theory first of all but in the beginning of our discussion you rightly noted that results of special military operation will very important maybe not decisive but very important factor predetermine our relations with Kazakhstan Uzbekistan all the countries of Central Asia and South Caucasus I am not a champion of ukra determinism saying that everything in Nagorno-Karabakh or Central Asia Abkhazia are connected with the direct influence of Ukrainian crisis however a lot of traces of indirect influence can be uh uh can be can be found uh of course Azerbaijan used the Russian emphasizing on Ukraine to make pressure on peacekeepers in Karabakh of course and uh to promote uh a critical at least uh in some aspects anti-Russian atmosphere in mass media and so on.
Of course, this situation was used in favour of one side, Azerbaijan, to strengthen Azerbaijan and Turkish strategic ties and so on.
It’s true. and of course some elements of historical policies just recently we were witnesses of a conference in Shusha covering ethnopolitical situation historical legacies and so on when Russia was blamed for so-called genocide of Circassians and ethnic discrimination and so on of course the more or less successful variant for Russia will open new windows, new ways to strengthen ties with post-Soviet countries and it will be proof that Russia is able to change situation to deserve its right to say something to object they use hegemony and pen NATO security system because one more problem of NATO is not Ukraine only because NATO claims to be universal organization not only Euro-Atlantic North Atlantic Treaty organization for example Arctic or Afghanistan is not part of Euro-Atlantic world by the way but NATO is present everywhere trying to diminish the role of u.n.
OSCE some other international institutions and so on Russia is not happy and of course the value of this Ukrainian conflict is much higher than our predictable neighbor Ukraine it’s wider by the way but of course Russia should take care of victims among the population and some economic vulnerabilities because Ukraine can stop any things about money expenses and so on they could wait help from Trump from Merz from Macron and so on Russia has no Macron and Trump
Hovik: yeah let me let me be we mentioned a lot of things that we should probably start talking about including the South Caucasus but I do want to ask this one last question so it seems that given that the nuclear option is not you know the we just discussed is not one of the primary tools in the tool set yet in light of that and a lot of the current issues which it seems to be To the contrary, this situation is not going towards peace.
It seems to me escalating more What is the minimum threshold of territorial control maybe or or some kind of political solution that Russia requires before it considers the Ukraine conflict settled we hear Russian officials talk about Novorossiya and for those who don’t know that means I guess Odessa it means essentially Ukraine that is a rump state is that now at least can we ascertain if that is now you know uh the the plan and if not where where is the plan at what stage will Russia consider okay this is somewhere where we can at least freeze the conflict for a long time uh we said already
Sergey: that uh Russian special military operation was a evolution from special to military yeah because initially Russians thought about kind of replica of 2014 maybe but then situation began changing and of course taking about the Russian official position we should not quote some deputies of State Duma thinking about Odessa or Novorossiya and so on there is a question on the table offered by Putin, Lavrov and so on and deliberation of the rest of the Donetsk region, small tiny territories of the Donetsk region offered to be part of the solution. liberation of two people’s republics, Lugansk and Donetsk it’s also necessary to understand that Russian position evolved it was not primordial in 2014 Russia considered Crimea as unique area historically in terms of memory legacy identity and so on not Donbas Donbas became part of territorial issue only after failure of Minsk Accords.
The last round of negotiations took place on February 10, 2022, two weeks prior the start of special military operation those negotiations continued more than nine hours nine hours but no solution this is why a problem of territories of Donbas then problems of buffer zones because Russian borders especially Belgorod Kursk were attacked and you know that part of Kursk region was captured by Ukrainian troops and it takes some months Russia also took care seriously on victims on minimizing of human losses and so on it’s also necessary to take into the account because there is a problem of conventional wisdom saying that oh Russia is based on stalin’s experience of World War II and so it’s not true by the way this is why the territorial problem is not and was not it a fix for Russia Territorial issues were used to strengthen position for negotiations and security of neighboring areas on the Russian side, like Belgorod, Kursk, Rostov, and so on.
Because in the current Western narrative, there are photos and screenshots of Russian attacks on Kyiv, Kharkov. It’s impossible to ignore. I’m not going to do it.
However, victims on the Russian side absolutely ignored are not taken into consideration just recently I was in Serbia Belgrade and had access to some European channels no info on victims among civil population in Russia and so on just recently for one of attacks of Ukrainian army on the Moscow region one boy of six months not a year was killed no info about it of course Russia should take care about buffer zones and territories are used to reach more or less reliable platform for negotiations because Ukrainian position is we should return to the borders of 1991 okay but in this situation this scenario will be considered to be victory of Ukraine and loss of Russia all the questions raised by Russia prior to special military operation will be ignored what will it mean in two four five years maybe Russia will strengthen its position recent event will be still alive and what should we do to start new special military operation yes yes yes vicious circle one of my opponent who supports totally Ukraine Michael Kofman military expert of U.S. recently published the article in Foreign Affairs and he raised this question being completely disagreed with my position or position of Russian expert community he said about political results we should take into account political dimension of these warfare not only military because if the sides will find political solution for example decreasing of Ukrainian territory and status of neutral power May be kind of finlandization okay all those things could be excluded in 2013 in 2010 for example even make an interview in 2008 2007 Vladimir Putin did not uh identify Crimea as a Russian territory but ignoring of Russian reasons interests inside Ukraine around Ukraine around and about European security will ensure what we have right now it’s also necessary to understand because the problem of the Western narrative is absence of shared solidarity okay we can recognize mistakes miscalculations of Russia maybe some ambitions and so on and so on okay good but please recognize your own mistakes no mistakes I observed Ankara summit, it looked like Congress of communists in Stalin’s time, the Congress of winners.
Everything is good, democracy, stability, security, but with no Russia. Sorry, we are so big, we are too big to fail.
Asbed: Yeah, and you’re absolutely right that it’s very difficult to find. Actually, it is possible to find the Russian side of the issues in the United States, but you really have to try because they don’t come up, for example, in Google searches. You cannot find them on social media. They are often censored or they come up with a whole bunch of warnings, extra clicks that you have to go through to get to those news sources because they’re Russian sources.
So it’s not easy for people to find that information. as easily for example the information that you can find about Ukrainian losses
Sergey: so you’re absolutely right and let me express briefly my uh sincere gratitude to this opportunity because with your help we try to fix the disproportion in discussion of the special military operation or Ukrainian war if you want taking into account the Russian angle of observation you can disagree with me completely yeah but you allowed me to express discussions in my country and to better understand the Russian reasons behind this conflict and Russian angle of observation thank you for this opportunity
Asbed: thank you professor we’re going to talk about Russia’s view of what’s going on in Armenia but I want to focus for a moment just on TRIPP the Trump Route project I should say so it’s increasingly analyzed
Asbed: through a cold military lens rather than just a purely commercial one. Specifically, it’s viewed as a Western mechanism to project strategic logistical a corridor through the South Caucasus to the Caspian to the Central Asian plateau. Effectively, this seals Iran’s northern border and it tries to contain Russia from the south. and Tehran has repeatedly drawn a very firm red line regarding the inviolability of its border with Armenia. Meanwhile, in parallel to all this, the U.S.-Iran negotiations are seen more and more as a pause in the second war on Iran, rather than a step towards a comprehensive peace.
Once again, we have a process. We don’t necessarily have the peace itself. The pause affords the US and Israel to reload their militaries for the next phase of hostilities. And generally people and lists are expecting that after the October and November elections in Israel and the United States, there could be a flaring up, a possible third war.
Now, just last week, Israel’s cabinet, there was a resolution to recognize the Armenian Genocide and after many conversations we’ve realized that it is not viewed as a moral awakening, it is more of a calculated geopolitical wedge designed to provoke and coerce Turkey out of its neutrality and into an active role in the next phase of a broader anti-Iran military campaign so looking at TRIPP from a realist framework which is your specialty realist frameworks how can a transport corridor running through Armenia ever function peacefully when it is structurally designed to act as a Western containment wall to isolate Iran and encircle Russia from a southern flank
Sergey: First point, I cannot treat TRIPP like a clear economic instrument. In my Soviet youth, there was a special university subject as a political economy. It’s political economy, of course, it’s not clear economic project.
As for Russia, this project in perspective is not so comfortable because it will cover only 40 or 50 kilometers. it’s it’s not so long by the way right and I’m not sure that it will be breakthrough in terms of transportation logistics I am not seeing any transformation of this plot of the land to the global industrial logistical hub let’s see and compare the situation with the railway connection Baku-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Kars a lot of rumors a lot of discussions but practically zero effectiveness by the way in terms of tons kilograms of supplies and so on so on however these 40 kilometers will establish a lot of problems for North-South Corridor because the key to this door will be in United States hands it’s not so good for Russia and of course for Iran because for Iran of course Middle East is the top priority so South Caucasus till recent years Iran was not so active trying to keep off Armenian-Azerbaijani problems but after the second and especially third Karabakh War South Caucasus became more important for Iran because Iran considers TRIPP corridor as an instrument how to ensure isolation of this country Russian position to the Caucasus is much more flexible than Iranian because for us there are some nuances in policies of Israel, Turkey we register the problems between them problems between both of them and the United States and their strategic alliances and so on for Iran there is a triangle of challenges Israel United States plus UK and Turkey no differentiations maybe there are some reasonabilities in this approach I suppose however Russia especially when TRIPP was initially proclaimed demonstrated its readiness to cooperate with the United States and this dispute is not over some officials not only journalists or experts but even some officials said yes Russia can join this project having particular interest in Armenia no necessity to give a monopoly of transportation logistics to United States as for Iran only one response no in this way we can share our positions many things will be dependent on American behavior in the Ukrainian crisis of course because now we see the escalation from American side it doesn’t mean that last year Trump became pro-Russian no of course he was more less radical now he became more radical of course the consequences of escalation in Iran because a week ago we discussed the finish of Iranian-American escalation maybe we discussed some options for peace deal between Tehran and Washington no frankly speaking I was skeptical again to this because it’s one of the most beloved method of Trump combining some methods of peace through punishment, pressure and openness for dialogue right methods realistic by the way you said about realistic perspective Trump demonstrates its realistic perspective he is very far from values like previous administration of course we can say it was a manifestation of hypocrisy and it was not honest position yes of course nevertheless values were part of the set of American approach now no only cynicism sometimes looking like social Darwinism maybe, but we have what we have, of course.
Hovik: Dr. Markedonov, if I can just ask a follow up.
You mentioned that Russian position with regard in regard to the South Caucasus and TRIPP especially is more nuanced than Iran’s which it seems to be right now a very thick red lines in terms of what the U.S. can do I mean at least this before the war and it appears to have continued but does Russia have any red lines when it concerns TRIPP at all we’ve seen Russian policymakers and Russian analysts talk about being reengaged or being somehow engaged in TRIPP and now talking about November 9 and 10 we’ve heard them talk about the Treaty of Turkmenchay but uh is that a like nice to have desire or is that a red line what is Russia’s red line with regard to TRIPP okay
Sergey: first of all one clarification Russian position is nuanced in some aspects because Russia is so skeptical in perspectives of realization of TRIPP and many experts like Stanislav Tkachenko or some other economists published recently a special report concerning the transportation in the South Caucasus and he concluded that no real options for TRIPP implementation let’s see I uh I’m discussing a TRIPP project not like uh witness uh outside of the region or witness sitting in the cabinet uh thinking dreaming about some utopian ideas I I was in Syunik I I walked around those places and in many uh parts of this potential route no railway connection some parts of this connection is replaced by autoconnection it’s necessary to have a couple of years to evaluate the potential of this road using some methods of geography and, of course, economic matters should be taken into account.
This is why Russian position is much more nuanced in this situation. Of course, Russia understands also its role in Armenia. We will cover this problem a little bit later, but economic presence of Russia is incomparable with the Iranian one. And, of course, for Russia, Caucasus has been priority for a long time.
For Iran, no. This is why Iran looks at the South Caucasus like a new potential area of hostilities and insurgent of the country also. This is why it helped us to explain the divergences between Russia and Iran.
As for red lines, if United States will push Russia to leave the region or for example United States will do something to organize peace treaty signing between Azerbaijan and Armenia United States claims to replace Russia as key moderator and it’s supported by European Union but at the same time for us this area is not top priority it’s also necessary to take into account and for them a peace treaty is not problem number one to do it immediately or tomorrow this is why it can be used to reconfigurate the Russian presence in the region I suppose that strengthening of security presence of United States in the region will be treated like red lines and one more point Russia unlike Iran has an opportunity to observe the Iranian-American conflict not like engaged country it’s our prerogative yeah uh maybe cynically speaking or realistically speaking profit yeah to observe the rivalry between two powers and we should you take into account results of this rivalry first and foremost
Asbed: to formulate red lines okay professor you mentioned the railway situation in Syunik
Asbed: that you have witnessed the railway concession of course is in the hands of Russia until I think something like 2038 now Pashinyan accuses Russia of not investing properly in this concession and not maintaining the railways properly and wants to take over those concessions. And there’s, of course, conflict between Armenian viewpoint and the Russian viewpoint. I’m not entirely sure what the conflict is, but I feel from what we understand is that Turkey and Azerbaijan have told Pashinyan that they don’t want to use the systems unless they are not under Russian control.
So essentially it’s a little bit of a coercion to kick Russia out of Armenia. And one more aspect of this is that Mikhail Galuzin has recently said that Russia must be involved in TRIPP project or they want to have a role in it. What is the role that Russia wants in all this?
Sergey: first of all railway connection in Armenia is variable only in the wider context not properly properly this plot of the land is not valuable and Pashinyan understand this should understand at least as for Russian investment Russia invested in this plot of the land as this railway connection but understanding that it’s not profitable enterprise by the way it’s not a beneficiary it’s also necessary to understand and having a infrastructure problem inside the country we at the same time found money allocated them ensuring more than 5 000 jobs in Southern Railway Company it’s also necessary to take into the account of course Russia is not benevolent organization it’s understandable and Russia is interested to minimize geopolitical risk offering and some other persons to be involved in a TRIPP project if this project as Trump said is not against Russia it’s not about replacement of one mediator by another one okay we are ready we should use any chances because again Russia is blamed for absence of productive approach radicalism and so on but Russia demonstrated many times readiness to cooperate with outsiders even in the territory of the Post-Soviet space yeah we treat this territory as a zone of priority interest yes but let me remind you that Vladimir Putin when Russians had gabala radar offered United States to cooperate even deterring Iran okay guys if Iran is headache for you please this idea was not accepted now we offer to be engaged in TRIPP project but it seems to me Americans are eager to be the only candidate the only actor in the region it’s not so good for Russia by the way and let’s see because the United States wasted a lot of words demonstrating its reliability for Armenians, but no security guarantees, no real effective mediating between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and no serious economic investments.
It’s also necessary to understand. Coming back to your question on Israeli initiative, initiative of the government of this country, I don’t see here any moral stances.
Of course, cabinet took into account position of expert human rights community of Israel, because those guys discussed this question a long time ago. long time prior to the initiative of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel and they demanded to recognize the Armenian Genocide but only now Netanyahu and cabinet decided to recognize the Armenian Genocide and there is a paradoxical situation Armenian government ignored these decisions saying that this is not a topical issue and Pashinyan rejected the idea of international support He called it weaponization yeah yeah yeah yeah yeah because he prefers to build Real Armenia frankly speaking I don’t know how it is possible to build a future with ignoring all the past the Bolsheviks did it and the guys leaders of French Revolution but in both cases they failed didn’t end so well yeah yeah they they had to restore some elements of Ancien Régime yeah in the first case or the imperial Russia in the second one and and so this is why I don’t believe in it and speaking about this initiative of government let me finalize I’m not sure that it will change geopolitical status quo in both middle east and South Caucasus as for Azerbaijan yeah Azerbaijan demonstrated its dissatisfaction however it will not be obstacle for deepening military cooperation between Tel Aviv and Baku I’m not sure as for Turkey and Israel at least for last 15-20 years we witnessed a lot of crisis in relations between Tel Aviv and Ankara in many cases United States helped to reconcile and so on I suppose United States will do a lot to reconcile in order to ensure peace in this family of allies I concur with your opinion here
Asbed: because I read that Israel actually coordinated its recognition or attempt at recognition with Baku but nobody in Armenia yeah
Hovik: to me it’s not they’re not friends they’re not enemies they’re frenemies and they’re not just frenemies they’re best frenemies so
Hovik: anyway uh let’s uh let’s move to uh uh to the results of the uh june election in Armenia to the outside observer and maybe we’re wrong so we’d love to to know your point of view as well the the aftermath of the june elections seems that And it seems to us that Pashinyan’s political leadership continues to signal a definitive strategic pivot towards the West.
Ursula von der Leyen was just in Armenia promising all kinds of support for Armenia in exchange or in order to supplant losses from the Russian market if Armenia has any and that includes tariff-free access infrastructure grants lines of credit and so forth the election has also re-engineered the Armenian political landscape Pashinyan still maintains a majority in Armenia but the number two power now in the opposition is Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia which became the primary opposition force and that is also viewed as a change from the Robert Kocharyan led opposition in that you know Robert Kocharyan was more associated with the war in Karabakh and he had many people on the team that were also associated with the war in Karabakh and some of the Karabakh is more known as a businessman as a why not oligarch and more as a pragmatic person so what is your view what is the view from Moscow on the outcome of these elections and about the possibility of Russia to work with both the government of Armenia and also
Sergey: the opposition in Armenia let me briefly react on your quote on Ursula von der Leyen’s help he promised a package of 52 million euros yeah I talked recently with my good friend who is an entrepreneur in Armenia he covers the sales of flowers he said this help will cover two three days of his work good yeah two three days of one entrepreneur it’s kind of personal concern for Armenian businessman Okay, but let me keep off jokes and turn to a serious discussion and analysis. First result of parliamentary elections in Armenia.
They demonstrated that Armenian community, Armenian society is split half-half. because a little bit less than 50% of all votes were for a ruling party, a Civil Contract .
At the same time, it doesn’t mean that 50% of the whole population voted for it because only 1,476,000 people voted it’s a little bit more than 50% about 60% but nevertheless yeah it demonstrates that Armenian community Armenian society is not something primordial singular yeah it’s split up and as for party results they are rather controversial because you’re right the ruling party got an opportunity to form a cabinet with no coalitions it’s good however they lost some very important seats 72 in previous parliament 64 in this one and it’s not guaranteeing the constitutional majority but the key issue of Armenian not only domestic but foreign policy life is question of referenda on constitution because Azerbaijan insists on constitutional amendments excluding their declaration of sovereignty adopted in August 1990 it’s crucial prerequisite for peace treaty signing and the idea of referenda is not so popular and it helped us to explain why Pashinyan did not identify a referendum with electoral process parliamentary process as for Strong Armenia interesting option because this party has not existed even for one year Samvel Karapetyan was no name prior to last year he was a well-known entrepreneur with a Russian passport and so on but in Armenian political life he hadn’t played any role but for less than one year he established organization.
Asbed: Can I mention one thing, Professor? Samvel Karapetyan was well known for philanthropic reasons and also the businesses that he had in Armenia. So the name was definitely well known, although, like you said, in politics he was not a presence.
Sergey: Let me clarify.
Yes, it was well known by whom? maybe teachers of universities, businessmen, politicians not to rank-and-file Anna, Ashot in Vanadzor or Artashat, I’m not sure not a political presence and in political life he was absent and it reflects the request of the society for the third way third version political project yeah third power by the way because legitimacy of Pashinyan since the first day of Velvet Revolution was assured by the arrival between Real Armenia New Armenia Current Armenia and past so-called people belonging to the party of war and so on but nowadays those notions are not looking like fresh because New Armenia sorry but Pashinyan is in power after 2018 May not one year not two years yeah Levon Ter-Petrosyan was a president for a little bit more than seven years as for Sargsyan and Kocharyan ten years But Pashinyan eight years and he got support for more five years.
Totally, hypothetically, he will be in power for 13 years. More than Sargsyan, Kocharyan, Ter-Petrosyan. New impressive record by the way. What’s about novelties?
What’s about new dimension of political life? This is why we see the transformation of revolution process and revolution legitimacy to their prolongation project.
It’s interesting transformation because even now Pashinyan exploits the revolutionary rhetoric, saying new stage revolution, new type of revolution, saying that all the people who voted for opposition did it for bribes and the hypocritical and so on and so on. he announced new wave of cleansing of political space in Armenia or maybe Sanation this Sanation started with parliament then government then judicial branch of power then Karabakh elite in de facto state prior to second Karabakh War and 2023 third Karabakh War and liquidation of infrastructure of NKR and so on now next point is extermination of opposition forces existing now which are treated like pro-Russian it’s also necessary to add some nuances because Vladimir Putin said about pro-Russian forces talking with Pashinyan not naming exactly persons whom did he meant but Nikol Pashinyan specified this issue saying that it’s triangle three heads of dragon, Karapetyan, Kocharyan, and Tsarukyan.
However, in the course of electoral campaigns, Karapetyan allowed a divorce between Armenia and CSTO.
He said, maybe if we would find some options or reasons to go out to leave this organization, we did it. this is why it’s also new situation of course both Pashinyan and Karapetyan or Kocharyan are pro-Armenian politicians but they had and have now their specific images of Armenia Real Armenia or Armenia based on historical legacy maybe traumas maybe losses but continuing this tradition of Armenian statehood and so on or something revolutionary of course these elections will be also known and discussed due to their geopolitization in my viewpoint those electoral processes were geopoliticized first time after the Armenian independence in 1991 let’s see on electoral campaign of 2021 Russia United States France all of them did not compete each other they did not compete for personality of Pashinyan did not uh target this party or that party like pro-Western pro-Russian and so on uh Pashinyan expressed his gratitude to Putin first then to Macron and Biden in 2021 and Russia of course congratulated Pashinyan on his victory in 2021 moreover Russia did not do any serious attempts to label so-called pro-Russian troops or forces yeah in Armenian political arena in 2026 we had geopolitical dimension Pashinyan was totally supported by the West moreover violations of democracy administrative resource and arrests of leaders were absolutely ignored by the West J.D.
Vance attended Armenia and this visit was accompanied by attacks media and legal attacks on Catholicos no objections J.D. Vance is well known due his traditionalism support of Christianity Armenia is the first Christian country in the world country adopted Christianity’s official religion 14 years prior to Roman Empire did it
Asbed: professor even even last week when Ursula von der Leyen was in Baku and and Armenia she did not raise any of these issues regarding the Armenian POWs regarding Christian monuments being uh heritage being erased etc etc these are not their concerns apparently democracy heritage identity
Sergey: When she congratulated Pashinyan on his victory, the victory of his party, she especially noted that spirit of Velvet Revolution was alive. Democracy, blah, blah, and so on.
Asbed: President Putin has not congratulated Pashinyan. Is that something in the works or is not coming?
Sergey: But can I also add something?
Hovik: Because we’re seeing now a complete persecution of the Armenian opposition. A criminalization, as a matter of fact, a criminalization of the opposition. So besides just congratulating or finding a way to work with Armenia, is Russia going to do more or is it gonna allow Pashinyan to trample all of the Armenian opposition? To sanate…
That is a word if I… essentially destroy the Armenian opposition, or can Russia do something to maybe with soft power to help the army in opposition to work with both sides? And how do you see this issue resolving?
Sergey: Okay. As for Sanation, these words goes back to the times of Józef Piłsudski in Poland. it means cleansing of political playground from opponents through criminalization defamation by the way media campaigns and pushing to immigration and so on so some replicas of these practices seen now in Armenia as for Putin’s congratulations let me clarify it’s interesting that just on the eve of voting day Putin congratulated Nikol Pashinyan on his birthday after some restrictions imposed by Russia and crisis which became more or less clear for all people observing the situation in Armenia and Iran.
It was also a kind of invitation for Nikol Pashinyan to think some more times about keeping relations with Putin.
Let me discover our own secrets, our cuisine. but prior to our talk we discuss some vectors of Russian-Armenian relations scenarios for crisis measures and so on and my idea was Russia is trying to keep off Ultima Ratio Regis last argument yeah uh understanding uh the uh narrow space for maneuver for nicole Pashinyan it’s not coincidence michael Mishustin prime minister of Russia formally colleague of Pashinyan formally not the factor right but formerly colleague of Pashinyan uh talked on him via telephone then they met in person in Yekaterinburg for a prestigious technological forum in the capital of Ural Yekaterinburg one of the biggest cities in Russia very interesting cities by the way the first president Boris Yeltsin and so on and of course it was symbolic however I’m not sure I more than happy I would like to be optimistic but my expert conscience is an obstacle for this professional optimism I’m rather skeptical because I suppose the visit of Pashinyan is not return to old normality it’s a search of reconfiguration of the Russian-Armenian relations maybe it’s kind of new normality I’m not sure that Russia will rush with recognition of results of Pashinyan in his party I am I’m sure that Russian leadership and especially Vladimir Putin will analyze the situation demonstrating Armenia arsenal of potential ways guys see restriction is one way telephone talks and hopes to reconcile the other option dependence on export import and so on please it’s kind of variations it’s invitation to choose
Asbed: I have a quick follow up on this. You mentioned the exchange of birthday wishes and I consider that sort of an olive branch let’s talk is what they were saying. You know, a recognition that there’s a new situation. and let’s talk about it but then after the elections in the last week or so we read enough times that Pashinyan had tried to raise Putin on the telephone and Putin had not been picking up the phone so somewhere along the line we felt like Pashinyan crossed a red line we don’t know what that red line is exactly do you?
Sergey: frankly speaking I’m not a great fan of this concept red line because all the red lines are discussed as an editor-in-chief now I’m in preparing of new issue of our journal concerning the problem of borders very paradoxical phenomenon on the one side borders are proclaimed every time every leaders like sacred like something not disputed but at the same time they changed many times from time to time yeah u.n was established by 51 powers now the number of u.n members is uh 193 a little bit bigger than initially this is why I suppose red lines will be and could be changed however Russia is interested in its economic presence yeah and its role as mediator in relationship between Armenia-Azerbaijan and final a peace treaty Russia is not accepting the deal outside of our role our presence like outside model from United States from European Union plus United States Russia is taking care and concerning about growing European Union role because Ursula von der Leyen is not honest thinking about humanitarian aid or some cultural dimension visa-free regime the European Union launching mission along the Azerbaijan-Armenia border claims to be part of security system of Armenia but it’s a challenge to the Russian exclusive position although things are considered to be challenges and Russia is not interested to cooperate economically with Armenia observing when Armenia is replacing the security contacts military contacts and so on so on I suppose maybe in a short-term perspective Russia will address Armenia with some constructive offers as we say constructive offers to be discussed let’s see on their results I hope we will have opportunity if you want if you are not disappointed in communication with uh no no no we will we want
Hovik: that you always have a blank uh blank uh invitation to come to our uh podcast Dr. Markedonov uh on on on this
Hovik: do you have anything else to add in terms of the Armenian-Russian relations in the next let’s say three to four months what can be expected or do you believe this is going to be a longer period of readjustment trying to find each other out and coming up with the modus vivendi
Sergey: a new modus vivendi I will have to say more or less definitely that we will have new normality it’s impossible to return to the previous model of strategic alliance like existed prior to second Karabakh War or especially after 2023-2024 however we have interest for both of us to cooperate to reconcile because no special guarantees from the Western side.
The West uses Armenia like a tool how to diminish the Russian presence in one selected country in South Caucasus in general this is why we have clear interests however many things will be dependent on background factors now the role of background factor is stronger than two three five years ago I mean here Ukrainian dynamics of course especially in direct impact of these dynamics on the battlefields role of United States conflict in Iran because United States tried to make revenge for its previous failure yeah maybe they hope to and hope to replay this game this is why our bilateral relations of course are dependent on our will and wish but on other background factors many things are not quite clear right now the interest is clear a request for a reconciliation is clear but we will see behavior of Armenian elites because just recently the Serbian leader Aleksandar Vučić talked with representatives of Kyiv and they raised some not quite pleasant issues for Russian-Serbian agenda and President Vučić interrupted his fellow saying sorry for us this viewpoint is not acceptable if Pashinyan will interrupt Zelensky in Yerevan saying no discussion here on bombardment of Moscow I suppose reaction of Russia was different not so positive taking into account Zelensky himself in Yerevan but it will be seriously different if Russia observed and catched the Pashinyan’s attitude to Zelensky not like admire like symbol of Europeanization and so on and of course it’s necessary to take into account failed Europeanization experiences in Georgia in uh Moldova in uh Ukraine and price of
Asbed: the question Dr. Markedonov just like you said I think that it’s going to take a long period of readjustment and we hope to keep up with you to understand how the adjustments are going between Armenia and um Russia so thank you so much for joining us today that was an insightful conversation uh we’ll talk to you soon
Hovik: Thank you. Bye. Thank you, Dr. Markedonov.
Asbed: All right. Well, that was our show today. The episode is being recorded on July 8th, 2026.
Hovik: And thank you for listening to our show, everyone. Your confidence in us rewards our dedication to bring you intelligent and independent coverage of Armenian news .
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Asbed: to becoming oligarchs that’s for sure we’ve been talking with Dr. Sergey Markedonov he is a historian and analyst specializing in Russia’s foreign policy the South Caucasus and Post-Soviet conflict regions he is a leading research fellow at MGIMO University Institute for international studies and editor-in-chief of International Analytics for more information you can go to podcasts.groong.org episode number follow the links for his bio and other links that we put in there. Thank you very much. We will talk to you soon.
I’m Asbed Bedrossian.