Transcript: Iran Talks, Election Challenges, and Political Retaliation | Ep 561, Jun 21, 2026

Posted on Wednesday, Jun 24, 2026

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Transcript

Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.

Asbed: Hello everyone and welcome to the Armenian News Network Groong Week in Review

Intro to Groong’s Week in Revidew for June 21, 2026

Asbed: for June 21st, 2026. Hovik, how are you doing?

Hovik: I’m doing great. How are you?

Asbed: I’m also fine. Thank you.

Hovik: So what should we talk about?

US-Iran negotiations

Asbed: Well, let me start with the U.S.-Iran negotiations because they just concluded in Switzerland. Okay, so there was general agreement to extend the ceasefire for another 60 days. Both sides appear to be using the brake to patch their own wounds, so to speak. For Iran, some frozen assets will be released, oil and gas trade is not going to be sanctioned, and a recovery and reconstruction fund may be allocated to Iran.

And for the U.S., You know, with the strategic petroleum reserves at a very low level, the resumption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is going to be a key achievement because it may stabilize both energy as well as financial markets. That’s very important for Trump.

Hovik: Last night we talked with Dr. Arman Grigoryan and we explored what a real U.S.-Iran agreement would do. It’s an interesting episode, so be on the lookout for it. Actually, it should be published before this one, so…

We’ll see. It will have global implications, but at the same time, I myself am skeptical, and I think Dr. Grigoryan also acknowledged that there is good reason to be skeptical that this agreement would stick and would lead to a genuine end to the conflict, because there are multiple stakeholders who can essentially veto anything in here. And we’re mostly talking about Israel, I think, as the primary stakeholder.

But I’m also actually I mean, maybe it’s the same thing, but many, many of Trump’s lieutenants, many in the U.S. What is it? War Ministry?

Asbed: No, the deep state establishment.

Hovik: No, but the Secretary of Defense or the Department of Defense or Department of War, people like Marco Rubio, people like Hegseth, To me, it’s going to be difficult for Trump to, even if Trump is genuine and is a goodwill actor on these negotiations, I don’t see him, I mean, I wish that he was successful, but I don’t see him having even success trying to corral his own party members and his own top lieutenants in this.

Parsi’s notes on progress in US-Iran negotiations

Asbed: Yeah. I was reading one of our favorite Iran analysts this morning, Trita Parsi. We’ve had him on the show before, and he noted some key points that show some interesting progress. I guess he’s a little more optimistic than we are on this show.

He said that the U.S. defined the regional ceasefire as an American goal, not just an Iranian demand. And he said Iran became a partner in resolving the crisis in Lebanon, which was very, very interesting. So essentially, Iran was excluded from deciding the fate of Lebanon, and now they’re going to be party to it. So I think that’s a very interesting outcome of the negotiations.

Parsi also noted that J.D. Vance acknowledged that all countries in the region have a right to self-defense, not just Israel, which is pretty amazing in my opinion.

Hovik: I mean, it’d be really nice if there’s a new understanding of the balance of power in the region. So I don’t want to be a complete naysayer. But again, I believe that this could also be there’s a high likelihood of this being a trap for Iran. And I really hope that Iranian negotiators and policymakers are planning contingencies if this thing does not go through.

What is the “Mink deal” trap?

Asbed: You’ve said that, you know, one thing that Iran has to look out for is not to fall in the Minsk agreements trap. Can you explain what that is?

Hovik: Well, I mean, basically that was how there was Minsk 1 and Minsk 2, how the entire West tried to establish a ceasefire with a goal towards long-term peace in Ukraine.

And we all know that behind the curtains, the West was essentially planning on not observing the agreements and rearming Ukraine in order to fight Russia from a stronger vantage point from a stronger ground and I think that’s entirely plausible in this case as well so yes I mean negotiations are good not killing each other is a good step but if this thing drags on and you know there are no concrete results then it’s quite possible that the US and I mean Israel will not only use this time to rearm and including, you know, filling up the petroleum reserves, including, you know, getting getting all the sort of things that they got wrong in the first time, learning the lessons and then attacking Iran with more might than before and with more, you know, with those lessons learned.

So I think Iran also has to work with its partners, China, Russia, and try to prepare for those contingencies.

Russian embargo of Armenian products

Hovik: The Russian-Armenian relations are a key topic that we always discuss, and we know how a few months before the election, Russia increased its criticism of Armenia, essentially implemented a de facto embargo We know that the Armenian regime brushed those threats aside and even said you know we’ll just go to Europe even though we’ve analyzed multiple times how that was just a I mean a naked statement because we we know how difficult it is to sell you know switch your entire market in one night but the Summary is that Russia is continuing to keep up its criticism of Yerevan.

We had a statement from Maria Zakharova. about the outcome of the elections and its drift towards the European Union and you know there’s an interesting article we’ll link to some interesting articles on this but suffice it to say there’s no indication that Russia is stepping back from its embargo of Armenian products whether it’s de facto or de jure but you know it’ll be interesting to see what happens because we have followed many analysts who basically say that around August and September is a time when the impact to the Armenian economy will be obvious or will start to show from all these embargo items essentially Armenian villagers, Armenian farmers and producers of goods are forced to either sell their products at a very low price subsidized by the government through EU loans or through EU aid and you know in this environment it’s not just a short-term issue right if you think of how the economy works these farmers these manufacturers these producers must plan for the future so do they plant new crop for next year given that the measly income they received this year given the threat of Russian further Russian sanctions and it affects not just the economy today, but also the psychology and the future planning of the economy.

And I see that as a big risk.

Asbed: Yeah. So the EU provided 50 million dollars of which they expedited because Ararat Mirzoyan was in was in Belgium. I can’t remember. And he demanded that they expedite to do something very fast.

And they expedited at least I think 34 or 38 million dollars of immediate aid which has reached Armenia. I’m calling it a bailout. Basically, they’re bailing out those farmers whose crops are going bad by not being able to export the flowers and fruits and stuff like that. That kind of money is only going to last about a week or two in the economy and I don’t know how many weeks they’re going to send 35 million dollars or 50 million dollars just to keep Armenian farmers afloat when you know a little real agreement with Russia could open the pipeline again and they can sell they can really sell their products is what they can yeah

Hovik: and Russia has not even played their biggest cards for instance I shudder to think what will happen come winter when Russia decides to increase the gas prices. So I would say that this issue, if it’s not resolved, it just has the potential to become even more dire. And all of this is happening not because Russia is… I don’t want to be Russia’s defender because Armenia is suffering and we don’t want Armenia to suffer but through the policies of the Pashinyan regime essentially they have made Russia an enemy and How would any major superpower deal with that?

I mean, Russia has all the leverage. Why would you alienate Russia so much to drive them to do this? At least Russia is not doing a Maduro operation and kidnapping Pashinyan and jailing him. But there is another example of how other superpowers have dealt with this.

Russia so far has said, you know, we’re not going to bankroll your trip to Europe if you’re going to do that and you’re going to disassociate from the Eurasian Economic Union . And I think that to many analysts, to many independent observers, this is a legitimate claim.

Asbed: Yeah. Basically, they’ve said, we’re not going to pay you to become our enemy.

Election aftermath

Asbed: Let’s turn a little bit to the election aftermath. There are six opposition parties, Strong Armenia, Armenia Alliance, Prosperous Armenia, Wings of Unity, DOK Defenders of Democracy for the Republic and New Force , they all applied to annul the election results. The Constitutional Court over the weekend accepted these applications as a single package and said it would hear the case on June 26, later this week.

Who are the judges making headlines in this case?

Asbed: Judge Edgar Shatiryan was appointed as the presiding judge. Two judges, Artak Zeynalyan and Vladimir Vardanyan, were recused from the case because I’m not entirely sure who pronounced this, but they have biased opinions. And Armenia Alliance attorney, Hovhannes Khudoyan, said that they’re also applying to remove another judge, Seda Safaryan, from the case as well. You know some of these names way better than I do.

Who is Edgar Shatiryan?

Hovik: Well, I know what I know from the media, but he was one of the first appointees of the Pashinyan regime to the Constitutional Court. And let’s just state the fact that the current Constitutional Court is made up completely of Pashinyan appointees. This has never happened in Armenia. When Kocharyan came to power, He had to deal with a Constitutional Court that had some Levon Ter-Petrosyan appointees.

He appointed his own people. When Ser Sarksyan came to power, he also had Levon Ter-Petrosyan Appointees and Kocharyan appointees and he appointed his own judges so now one of the key things that we did this was the Constitutional Court standoff that happened in 2019 and 2020 he was able to clear the slate and appoint all judges and many have shown in the past to toe the party line from the Civil Contract. Edgar Shatiryan is rumored to be in the media a college classmate of Alen Simonyan, who is a very high-placed Civil Contract official.

Now the two judges that they recused from the case I mean, it is stating the obvious, but Artak Zeynalyan is from the Republic party. He used to be a former minister, I believe, of justice.

Asbed: To be clear, not the Republican Party, the Republic party led by Aram Sargsyan.

Hovik: Yeah, which is very pro-Pashinyan. Vladimir Vardanyan was an MP, a senior MP from Civil Contract. So shortly before being appointed Constitutional Court judge, He resigned from the party and suddenly found independence and balance and so forth. Now Seda Safaryan also is affiliated with…

Is she Stepan Safarian’s sister? Yes, Stepan Safarian or Stepan Safarian’s sister. She also joined the… I believe it’s the…

For the Republic party in the past. So she has in previous, I believe in 2021 elections, she was running as an MP candidate for the For the Republic party, which is another basically cutout for Civil Contract. They have the exact same goals, complete dissociation with Russia, and essentially they are pocket opposition. They support Pashinyan whenever they can.

The Republic party is actually represented in the Yerevan City Council, so Artak Zeynalyan’s party is in coalition with Civil Contract in the Yerevan City Council. Now, all that said, it is clear that no one on this Constitutional Court is going to, you know, do anything to alienate Civil Contract that much, Nikol Pashinyan. But I’ve heard some arguments that…

Why is the opposition stating that there are indications that the court could judge fairly?

Asbed: So why has the opposition come out and said that there are some positive indications that there could be a fair judgment on the part of this court? They’re saying we’re giving the court the opportunity to come out and show that they are an independent body.

Hovik: I think that is unfounded optimism, to be honest. And I think that one of the arguments I’ve heard is that these judges, whatever they are, they are supposed to be lawyers, they have a reputation to protect, so they are no longer Civil Contract officials, and the law demands them to find some legal justification. And given that you have entire precincts where your opponent was winning, invalidated. I mean, that’s just one of the things that the opposition is challenging.

It’s very difficult to find any sort of law that will back this decision up. So I think that many in the opposition are clear that this is such a falsified, such an illegal move that the Constitutional Court has no choice to do that. But I think that If it does happen, if the Constitutional Court annuls the election, maybe then that is to Pashinyan’s liking as well. We’ve talked about the fact that Pashinyan may be preparing for a second election where he bans all the opposition parties and maybe this is how the Constitutional Court will hand him the second election.

Is it normal for the court to ask the NSS, ACC, Prosecutor Gen., Radio-TV commission, etc for information?

Asbed: Let’s talk about that in one second because I have another question. The court has asked for the CEC, the Central Electoral Commission, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the NSS, the National Security Service, the Anti-Corruption Committee, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Commission on Television and Radio to submit information so that they can make a judgment. Is this a little strange or is this standard operating procedure?

Hovik: Look, I’m not a lawyer. I’ve just followed this from afar in the past, but I don’t see anything wrong with it. I think the Constitutional Court, if the allegations of the opposition are about how the NSS is behaving, which is jailing opponents. Hundreds of opposition members were being arrested by the NSS.

Many of them ended up, like, I think a majority of Maybe even 75% or 80% don’t even have charges, but they were prevented from participating in the elections, they were prevented from organizing their parties, and they were prevented from and their reputation was harmed then I think all of those need to be taken into account you know how the CEC made its choice to invalidate the three precincts I think that only the CEC can answer that I can agree with that public and and one thing right you know during the on the last day of the election during election day The public TV, I mean, they have always been biased, but they were just playing all of those arrests of opposition members in a loop.

They kept showing how the opposition is being corrupt, even though there’s been no judgment, and most of the people who were arrested don’t even have a charge. But the state TV aggressively tried to set a narrative that the opposition is essentially trying to falsify elections and so forth. So, yeah, all the institutions in Armenia that had a role in these elections, I think the Constitutional Court will examine all of them, but again, Knowing the makeup of this court, I don’t know what to expect.

I think the opposition should, in goodwill, work through the court, and then, depending on the results, then they have their own, hopefully they have their own contingencies. It’s an uneasy silence right now, right? I mean, the elections happened. It was obvious that there were tons of falsifications.

These elections cannot be considered free and fair, no matter what the Western media try to portray but there’s a silence in the atmosphere where people are not being told to hit the streets people are not being told people are being told hey we’re meeting the opposition parties are meeting we are trying to we have a strategy and I think that despite this silence I think the atmosphere is very ripe for tensions and for conflict depending on how the results of these Constitutional Court hearings go and I just don’t think that Samvel Karapetyan and Robert Kocherian are going to, you know, just be settled or satisfied with taking like sort of, you know, less than, you know, a minority position in the Armenian parliament where Pashinyan gets to dictate all the terms.

And then for another five years, we have what we have. So I would call right now, right now, a very uneasy peace and basically calm before the storm.

Asbed: Yeah, and I think that’s exactly where we are right now, especially since we have a date of June 26th for this. I guess we’re now going to have all these backroom meetings and strategic decisions and what have you until the court makes a decision and then we’ll proceed from there. But let me just say, Hovik, that on

The ruling party actively oppressing and harrassing Opposition leaders

Asbed: On the other side, the ruling party is not sitting still. Over the past week, we’ve had lots of pronouncements. We’ve seen them in the articles. We’ll try and link the articles in the show notes.

There have been pronouncements on the Electric Networks of Armenia. This is Samvel Karapetyan’s company. Tsarukyan’s cement factory, Tsarukyan’s casino. There’s been a ban on Kocharyan from traveling for I don’t know exactly what reasons.

Absolutely just ridiculous where he shows up. I’d like you to talk more because I haven’t seen the video. I think you may have seen the video. Every day when I look through the news, there is the almost obligatory vote-buying article that is attached to either Strong Armenia or Armenia Alliance.

And it seems to me that the ruling party is basically trying to build a case in the court of public opinion that there’s been vote buying because another thing that’s been going on in parallel to all this, there are parliamentary bills that have been introduced. The goal would be to prevent parties accused of vote buying from Parliament, from entering Parliament.

So essentially, if you look at these two things, they’re trying to build a case that strong Armenia, Armenia Alliance, prosperous Armenia are associated with vote buying, and then they’re introducing bills to keep these parties out of the parliament or even running in the next election.

Pashinyan working on multiple fronts

Hovik: I mean, that is a strong hint, but I would say that Pashinyan is working on multiple fronts. So that’s one of the scenarios that Pashinyan is preparing for, a new election without the major opposition present and I mean there’s a big unknown whether this will happen like immediately now like when the Constitutional Court annuls the election Or the Constitutional Court may present some very vague things saying, you know, in the past, there have been cases where the Constitutional Court said, you know, for solidarity purposes, there needs to be a new election and the government can decide when to do it.

So maybe Pashinyan chooses to do it six months from now or nine months from now. But it’s clear that Pashinyan is preparing for this scenario. But at the same time, They’re introducing, I believe, legislation to change the constitutional law on referendums. So I think one of the things is they are trying to limit the number of people who can vote in the elections based on how long they have been out of Armenia.

So even if you’re an Armenian citizen, I think if you’ve been out of Armenia for more than six months or more than 12 months, I don’t know what the cutoff is, they want to prevent you from Yeah, they want to prevent you from voting, and that will ensure a smaller electorate, which means that it’ll be easier for them to get the 25% turnout they need for a referendum to pass. So in order for a referendum to pass, you need to have at least 25% turnout, and more than 50% of those who turned out must vote yes on the referendum.

So if he reduces the electorate from 2.5 million to 2 million then he only needs 500,000 to show up I mean and almost 500,000 would have to vote yes on the referendum which is unrealistic but it works out better for him and I think they might also introduce some changes to the constitutional law so that their three-fifths majority that they illegally obtained right now will count as two-thirds so essentially they can somehow push through a referendum because one of the outcomes of this election was that they don’t have the necessary majority in order to authorize a referendum which is two-thirds but we should also be wary that right now in the next until the new parliament session starts I don’t know if it’s like one month or maybe one and a half month period Civil Contract still has constitutional majority in the current parliament so I’m wondering whether they might try to initiate the referendum right now well initiate it right now and say I don’t believe

Asbed: that they have a I don’t think they have a new constitution ready they’ve been working around the clock but I don’t believe

Hovik: that they’ve succeeded at that they can do it overnight for them there’s no you know you know the limits for

Asbed: They can always put TBD in it for content

Hovik: and then they make spelling errors and then they come to correct the law but anything that you know to just gain the advantage but I do I do believe that

Kocharyan travel ban for no reason, and security video leak

Hovik: the threat to the opposition of arrests and you know banning is is real we saw how for instance Kocharyan right was stopped so Kocharyan announces that he’s going to go on a two three day visit out of the country that was announced the day before on the day that he goes to the airport to the security checkpoint his the authorities prevent him the authorities meaning the division from the National Security Service which the Border Border Guard service prevents him from leaving the country And there is no justification of why. So if you’re prevented from leaving the country, you have to say there is a criminal case against you.

There has been some injunction against you from leaving. There was no order and he was just turned around. And just the following day, we found out that the Armenian authorities have filed three cases against him for something that he has done as the president. So 20-year-old cases, so there are several things wrong with this, right?

Why bring these cases up now? Number two, the Constitutional Court already has shown that this, with regard to the March 1st case, that if the President does something while executing his official duties, then he’s immune from prosecution.

But even then, the crimes that he’s being accused of which is like small corruption you know related stuff is first of all we have to say the presumption of innocence there is no indication that he’s even guilty but they have statutes of limitation that have expired a long time ago and it’s very weird that in Armenian law there is this provision that even if a statute of limitations has expired even if a judge cannot legally issue a guilty verdict they can jail you they can take you through courts Just like a normal criminal case and then later you’ll be found guilty but with

Asbed: the statute of limitations expired You can be forever

Hovik: in pre-trial detention purgatory So that’s what’s being done to Kocharyan and as I said one of those things was this tennis court that he apparently the government gave or transferred to this company I mean it’s a tennis court it’s a building used for tennis and it still is a major landmark in Yerevan apparently the government consigned it to another company and they’re challenging whether that was done legally that was more than 20 years ago 22 years ago And this is the ridiculous situation that Armenia is in.

Asbed: More topical, the video of Kocharyan’s incident at Zvartnots airport found its way, leaked, to a pro-Pashinyan newspaper. How is this possible?

Hovik: Exactly. And it’s clear from the vantage point of the video that this video belongs to the National Security Service, right? So it’s without doubt from National Security Service.

Asbed: When Pashinyan was asked about it, it’s like, well, if the NSS feels like they can release it, they can release it. That, to me, is a huge privacy gap. If it’s legal, it should not be legal. If it’s illegal, then somebody should be held responsible for this.

And of course, it’s leaking straight to a pro-Pashinyan newspaper, which is, in my opinion, a garbage tabloid.

Hovik: Yeah, he basically flat-out acknowledged it. Usually in the past, when they leaked things, they are ambiguous about it. But he basically said, yeah, if the NSS wants to Leak It Doesn’t Matter If It Contains Personal Information Doesn’t Matter If It Contains Evidence That Might Be Used In The Court In The Future Just To And The Headlines That Went Along With That Leak You Know I Mean Kocharyan Is Trying To Escape The Country And He Was Prevented From Doing So I Mean Absolute Slander

Asbed: And Libel

Hovik: Stalinist behavior I can’t believe that we’re even discussing this but I don’t know how to communicate this in English to our audience that they understand the situation that Armenia is in right now they can leak anything about someone just to make him look bad in the press I mean yes this happens in other places but in the airport which is special security zone with cameras belonging to the National Security Service. They could have said, oh, well, it was just a passerby recording and they leaked it, right? But I’m sure many analysts are sure that this violates the operating procedures and even the law.

But what does Pashinyan care about the law? So we are where we are.

Team Telecom and Azertelecom commercial agreement

Asbed: Okay, Hovig, let’s turn our attention. There were a couple of interesting developments. There was this commercial agreement that an Armenian telco and Azerbaijani telco struck up. Why don’t you talk about that?

Hovik: So Armenia’s Team Telecom, which has become one of Armenia’s major internet providers by taking over the previous Russian operator, It is owned basically struck a commercial agreement with Azertelecom to provide mutual transit of internet services through the territory of two countries and the aim is to diversify regional telecommunications channels I mean it’s it’s obvious that this is being done by political motivations Team Telecom is owned by the Yesayan brothers who had this company called ADC in the past and actually I think one of the brothers is also one of the founders of this Firebird AI project or you know a co-founder so very well placed with the Pashinyan regime and the way that they were able to acquire the Russian operator before was again through threats and through the support of the Pashinyan regime.

So it’s very clear that these individuals are closely aligned with the regime. And yeah, apparently a country that wants to take over Armenia and create Western Azerbaijan. Now we’ll be able to route internet traffic for us. Now, what is this?

Asbed: I mean, as a security person… What’s the agreement about, by the way? What are they trading with each other? What’s the commercial aspect here?

Hovik: I mean, if you’re going to send traffic to the internet, you might… Right now, Armenia’s main internet outlet is through Georgia, which also… is controlled by an Azerbaijani company. So Azerbaijan has been making very, I don’t know, maybe it’s very deliberate, but it’s very fortunate, I guess, that they have acquired telecommunications assets in Georgia and a fiber optic cable that Armenian traffic is routed through. Now, instead of actually worrying about whether Georgian authorities will allow an Azerbaijani company to wiretap illegally Armenian internet traffic, now we’re just saying, hey, we’re routing our traffic through Azerbaijan.

So it seems like part of the Armenian internet traffic, at least the part that’s controlled by Team Telecom, will go through Azerbaijan. Now, I don’t know how much of the traffic they will route through Azerbaijan but if it does go through Azerbaijan then there are I think several different security risks and as a security person I am concerned about this so first of all is metadata right they are able to collect which IP address is talking to which IP address traffic volumes timing patterns And through auxiliary ways, there are services that, based on an IP address, can fingerprint an individual.

So maybe they will even have, in some cases, the ability to identify who that IP address is being used by currently. So that’s the metadata level that they are that they’ll for sure, the Azerbaijanis will for sure be able to collect and snoop on. But also, I mean, I think in most cases, Armenian internet traffic in general is encrypted through HTTPS, so the contents of the traffic will not be you know visible to Azerbaijani intelligence agencies but they will be able to see that hey I talked to this Super Secure Server, maybe somewhere from Armenia. So that may actually then help them narrow down their intelligence.

Asbed: That’s already good intel right there.

Hovik: Yeah. And then they’ll try to figure out, okay, how can we narrow down the attack surface even more, try to sort of figure out who owns this IP, and maybe they can try to compromise their computer. I mean, I think that’s a very simplistic explanation, and that was done deliberately on my part.

Asbed: I’m having a little bit of trouble understanding What we gain by this. So our current, you said our primary way of contacting the rest of the universe through the internet is through that fiber optic cable. I think it’s the only Fiber Optic Cable That Connects Armenia To The Rest Of The World It Goes Through Georgia And Then Goes Through The Bottom Of The Black Sea And Off To Europe Right So And That Company Is Owned By Azerbaijan I’m Very Sure They Can Tap It Not The Government But Yeah It’s

Hovik: A Company

Asbed: Yeah, that’s right. You can’t own a company like that if you’re not in bed with Aliyev ’s government. Okay, so now these guys, Team Telecom, make this agreement with Azertelecom. Azertelecom will now be able to route data through some future TRIPP infrastructure.

They will lay cables across Syunik and Nakhichevan, they’ll be able to connect the mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, but then what’s in it for Armenia?

Hovik: Look, what’s in it for Armenia to import some fake rice and petrol from Azerbaijan in order to show, I think this is mostly for PR purposes, but You know, yeah, it’s at the dictates of the Pashinyan and maybe Aliyev regimes to show that, hey, you know, Armenia and Azerbaijan are collaborating more. It makes Azerbaijan look more lenient and better in the eyes of the West.

But yes, I mean, Armenia’s blockade , internet blockade, not just a physical blockade, and uh it has been real and it has been due to um the conflict but i think that you know announcing this deal right now in the timing of it the uh is is meant to be a pr and the worst part is that if this um causes Armenia to establish a dependency on this traffic right if Armenia doesn’t plan for um more contingencies then this becomes a strategic dependency that Armenia will have on Azerbaijan even more so Armenian authorities are already saying that we will import gas natural gas from Azerbaijan if Russia increases the price we will import grain from Azerbaijan even though it’s Russian grain and it’s Russian gas coming to Armenia so the concern I think of Establishing a strategic dependency for your internet communication, for your entire bandwidth on Azerbaijan is actually more concerning to me than the individual security risks, which are still present.

If your traffic is unencrypted through misconfiguration, through weak security implementations, then it can be snooped. But even more… Or if your keys are stolen.

Asbed: I’ve tried to look at this with an open mind, because I feel like if you have the ability to do multi-pathing to the rest of the internet, it’s a good thing.

I still remember the time when this Caucasus Online cable went through some Granny’s backyard in Georgia and they I think they were digging in the backyard or something like that and they cut off all of Armenia’s internet because they cut through that cable okay so now you have a way to route your traffic out to the world through Azerbaijan that would be a good thing but I really am concerned about this because Without any kind of an agreement or peace between the two countries, creating this dependency creates huge cybersecurity risks for the country. So that’s where I stand. And we have a lot of issues to work through.

Hovik: It’s key to highlight that the dependency risk is a strategic component of this.

Asbed: And if these Firebird data centers are going to connect through this path or this route, that’ll be interesting to see how things go.

Hovik: Okay, well, I think that’s enough for today. So thank you for joining us. And this was another week in review for the week ending on June 21st. I hope you enjoyed this discussion and please continue to support us by liking, commenting and sharing and the occasional donations, which we haven’t been getting that much.

So it’s not even occasional. It’s rare nowadays. I’m Hovik Manucharyan.

Asbed: And I’m Asbed Bedrossian. This is June 22, 2026. We’ll talk to you next week. Bye bye.

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