Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed: Hello, everyone, and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. We have two main topics on our mind today, the U.S.-Iran negotiations and the ongoing aftermath of Armenia’s parliamentary election earlier this month. So we are joined by Dr. Arman Grigoryan, who is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania.
Dr. Grigoryan, we’re always pleased to have you with us on the Groong podcast.
Arman: Always a pleasure to be with you, Asbed, and with you, Hovik.
Hovik: Nice to have you, Dr. Grigoryan.
Asbed: So, as the U.S.-Iran negotiations continue, now in Switzerland, we can see that there are many benefits to a positive outcome. If Iran and the U.S. were to actually hammer out an agreement that breaks Iran out of isolation and sanctions, the risk of violent conflict in the region goes down significantly. But there are also risks to the process. For one thing, many of the players who are not even at the table have near veto power on this process.
Israel, Hezbollah, they can do whatever they want and torpedo the process. Some analysts also express skepticism about the motives of the Trump administration, arguing that the present process is an effort to delay the resumption of hostilities due to depleted petroleum reserves, which we’ve read about, and an upcoming U.S. midterm elections that’s looming in a few months. And they warn Iran not to fall into yet another Minsk deal, like happened 12 years ago for Ukraine. How would you assess the present?
I guess it’s a memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Iran, and does it have a chance to hold? And would a real agreement to resolve the ongoing conflict strengthen Iran or weaken it?
Arman: Well, to answer the last question, first I think it will… Indisputably strengthen Iran. If there is an agreement that sticks, that the parties decide to adhere to, it will undoubtedly strengthen Iran. Whether or not this agreement will stick, they will be able to hammer out something Real, credible and stable.
That’s a whole different question. And people’s skepticism that these negotiations are serious can be justified because there have been many attempts to hammer out an agreement and there have been many Episodes where it seemed like the United States was serious about the negotiating process only to backtrack or to violate the terms of understanding of what that agreement would be. Going back and forth on numerous occasions with his rhetoric, with his demands, with his own predictions about what is likely to happen. So people could be justified in treating this skeptically, given that experience, given that record.
My view is that Donald Trump is actually serious. This is not a very popular view, and he has been serious for a very long time. In fact, I think Donald Trump didn’t want this war. And there is enough evidence to justify such a claim given his statements over the years.
And we know also the process by which the United States was dragged into this war. And again, these are not conspiracy theories. These are statements based on based on the pronouncements of high-ranking U.S. officials. And on the third or fourth day of the war, it became clear that the United States had gotten itself into a mess from which it would like to extricate itself, but it wasn’t clear how it would do that.
Now, I think the process has been ongoing. It has been serious. There have been forces in the United States that have been in favor of finding a resolution. It is quite clear that the military is not enthusiastic about escalating this war because they don’t have very good options, very good military options.
But the problem is that, as you pointed out, there is an important veto player there, which is Israel. I think to some extent perhaps Hezbollah is also such an actor, but I think Israel is the more important veto player in this process. And Israel has been vehemently opposed to any agreement. I think short of regime change, short of full-scale war with Iran, Israelis don’t think anything is acceptable.
Although it is not quite clear what Israelis have in mind in terms of escalation, what they think will happen if such escalation takes place, their theory of victory is not entirely clear, but it is clear also that if An agreement is reached, it will weaken Israel, it will make Israel more vulnerable, and it will certainly be a political catastrophe for Netanyahu and his government, which is why they have all the incentives to sabotage it, and also they have the means to sabotage it, as it has been demonstrated several times.
And I’m not only talking about The exercise of the influence of the Israel lobby in the United States, I’m talking about their repeated violations of the terms of this agreement, or not violations of the terms. I mean, they didn’t even accept.
Asbed: I was going to say, they’re not even at the table.
Arman: They’re not even at the table, but since Lebanon is part of the agreement and Iranians insist on making Lebanon part of the agreement, they have an easy way of sabotaging it by simply violating any ceasefire agreements there or not agreeing to any ceasefire. Now, as far as Trump’s rhetoric is concerned, knowing Trump, knowing his administration, he’s not somebody who is going to come out and say, look, I’m powerless over Israelis. I can’t do anything about that. Please, dear Iranians, let’s just make a deal.
Don’t make me do something which is beyond my reach, beyond my power. I cannot restrain Israelis, so we have to We have to somehow figure out a deal that does not require the United States putting pressure on Israel. But he’s not going to say that. He’s never going to admit to weakness, to inability to get something done.
So he’s going to present it as, well, Iranians in the end did not agree to this or that, and it’s unacceptable. and we’re going to continue putting pressure on Iran and we’re going to obliterate them blah blah blah and it is simply designed to show that the United States has options and they’re going to make it look like it’s their decision to not sign the agreement and to walk away from the negotiations. At the same time, of course, the United States government and the United States military is not proposing anything that could dramatically change the situation in their favor.
So this is just an exercise in dragging their feet and hoping for the best. And, you know, for the time being, since they don’t have any good solutions to the problem of Israel’s veto. Now, if I may say a couple more sentences. I think even though the Trump administration is loath to admit its weakness and inability to coerce Israel and to put pressure on Israel.
I think this problem, the problem of the disagreements between the United States and Israel on this and many other issues has not only come to the fore, but it’s acquiring a very interesting flavor. I think it’s becoming already, you know, the tensions are becoming quite obvious. And there is something unprecedented in the willingness to openly talk about that by some high ranking officials. I think J.D.
Vance’s recent statement on Israel is particularly noteworthy and it is indicative of a of a deepening rift between Israel and the United States and the public attitudes in the United States are shifting, have already shifted quite dramatically and it’s getting worse and worse for Israel and it is interesting It is interesting that despite all of those signals, Israel is not changing its policy, it’s not softening its stance, and I think it is quite dangerous for Israel because even though the Israelis have quite a significant influence and pull over the United States, political system I think there is a tipping point somewhere there where it’s going to become very difficult to exercise that power and they are playing a very dangerous game in my view and some of these rifts and some of the some of the open confrontations, cases of open confrontation are quite interesting in this regard.
And it’s difficult, of course, to predict how deep it will become, where it will end, but this is something also that we should not ignore.
Hovik: Yeah, Dr. Grigoryan, how would you assess the performance of the Iranian side in the negotiations? And assuming this agreement sticks, how would it affect Iran’s policies in our region, TRIPP, Armenia, and the South Caucasus in general? I think that right after Pashinyan said, well now we have a possibility of the Crossroads of Peace project.
He suddenly switched from TRIPP and started using again the Crossroads of Peace project which had dropped out of his lexicon for the last year or so.
Arman: Well, what you’re hinting at is quite accurate. I think that’s precisely what’s taking place. I think even the Pashinyan government, which is not famous for evaluating and analyzing the international situation properly. To say the least.
It is becoming quite obvious what’s taking place in Iran.
I think both in Ukraine and in Iran early on they had decided that the Russians were going to lose in Ukraine and and they’re stuck in the mud up to their eyeballs and now Armenia has a lot of space for maneuver in its relations with Russia and its attempts to change the country’s strategic orientation and with respect to Iran too, I was following the coverage of that conflict in Armenia on social media and in the In the mainstream media, the views that were expressed by the supporters of Pashinyan were quite unequivocal in their estimates that Iran is going to lose, that this is going to fundamentally transform the situation in the region.
You remember how Ararat Mirzoyan even expressed his concerns about the Iranian attack on Nakhichevan when that, I don’t even know what that was, a lot of people, some kind of a false flag operation, but the Armenian government rushed to express its concern and sympathy for Azerbaijan. Well, maybe sympathy is is a word they would dispute. But in any event, it was quite an interesting step that the Armenian government took.
So now I think you have to be blind not to see what has happened in Iran and how spectacularly the U.S. strategy has failed there. and they have to make certain adjustments and it remains to be seen what the extent of that failure is and whether Iranians are going to take a very hard line on TRIPP and insist that the project is cancelled altogether or they’re going to somehow be more flexible and just insist on having some involvement there and In addition to TRIPP to do certain things like the Crossroads of Peace, which would allow them to maintain their regional presence, etc.
So these are technical issues, but in terms of the principle, Iranians at least are going to demand some kind of say, some kind of a presence. Eventually, if this war ends today, if this war ends with successful negotiations that are currently underway between the United States and Iran, I mean, I know that they have suspended these negotiations, but I don’t think that’s the end of it.
Asbed: Okay. Dr. Grigoryan, a quick question about the switch of terminology from the TRIPP, the Trump route, to Crossroads of Peace. It left me with the impression that actually Pashinyan was uniquely interested in the east-west aspect of the crossroads, let’s say, and that was based on his belief or his assessment or his Ministry of Foreign Affairs assessment that Iran was going to lose, Russia was going to lose.
But as these things are not panning out, he sees that he actually has to adjust and accommodate the north-south. So that’s where suddenly the east-west component cannot be exclusively his interest. He also has to kowtow to the north-south aspect. Does that make sense or am I reading too much about this?
Arman: That’s what I was trying to convey, in fact, that given the change in the strategic environment and the strategic situation, he’s trying to somehow revise his position on the issue. And you’re absolutely right, initially it was just east-west, just TRIPP that they were interested in, that they were talking about. And now there is a certain change of attitude, which is almost certainly the consequence of the changed strategic environment.
Asbed: I’m interested in knowing, as you said, that Iran would be strengthened if there was a true agreement between U.S. and Iran that basically ended sanctions, compensated them for all the damages inflicted, etc., etc. If Iran is going to be strengthened, How does that affect Russia-Iran relations? Because in the past, let’s say a year or so, ever since, I’d say a year and a half since they signed their comprehensive strategic agreement, I felt that that agreement has become a lot more transactional between the two countries throughout these troubles that have started.
Arman: Well, the relationship has always been transactional, as most cooperative relations in international relations are. I think this distinction is often drawn between transactional and non-transactional alliance or cooperative relationships, which I think is a reasonable distinction and one can talk about different types of cooperative relationships. But at the end, I think most cooperative relationships in international relations are transactional, as are Iran’s and Russia’s.
Asbed: I mean, they have a bunch of- So what’s the point of calling it strategic?
Arman: Strategic relations can be transactional. I think, again, these may be semantics and a matter of defining certain terms, but to me, I think strategic relations are the ones where countries have, you know, important shared interests related to their national security, to their survival, to their existential and fundamental interests. And, you know, these are material interests and these, whenever they cooperate, it’s not because they are doing it out of certain feelings and attitudes and admiration for the other side, but They’re doing it because it is in their own best interest.
And that’s why I think the difference between transactional, the distinction between transactional and non-transactional or strategic alliances is kind of a distinction without a difference. Or what’s the expression? Yeah, distinction without a difference. So Iran and the United States have have common interests on a large number of issues, especially with regard to both countries feeling threatened by the West at the same time, and they have obvious natural interest in cooperating against the West and against the West’s encroachments in this region.
Hovik: And it is also possible,
Arman: probable, that Russia and Iran have differences over a number of issues. Don’t rule out the possibility that their views on the strategic situation in the Caucasus may diverge from each other. That Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan or Turkey may not be exactly what Iran prefers. But the question in this case is whether their differences are of the kind and of seriousness that would get in the way of them cooperating with each other on a number of important issues.
And I think overall, Iran and Russia have Very serious common interests, including in this region. I do not imagine Iran and Russia having different views on TRIPP, for example. I think both feel threatened by it. The United States has defined that project in a way that explicitly excludes both countries.
And this is not an attribution, this is a direct quote from James O’Brien’s interview in Armenia, when he gave that interview in Armenia, I think it was 2023 or 2024, I don’t remember the exact year, but, you know, when he was in Armenia He gave an interview to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and explicitly said that not only Russians should have no strategic presence in terms of, you know, guaranteeing the safety of that passage, they should also be excluded from all the projects that will stem from the implementation of the project of opening up communications between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey.
I have no doubt that both Iran and Russia are seriously worried about the implementation of such a project and have a common interest in torpedoing it or at least revising it in a way that does not completely exclude them and undermine their presence in the region. Now, Iran and Russia at the same time may have somewhat different preferences over how that road is managed, how the security is provided. Perhaps the Russians may be more receptive to the idea if they could guarantee the security of that passage.
For example, if the parties were to return to the implementation of paragraph 9 of the ceasefire agreement, the Russians would be perfectly happy. I don’t know if Iran would be perfectly happy with that scenario. But these are things that can be negotiated and I think these are things that they can find some kind of a common ground. This is not a deal breaker.
I think these are mostly technical issues. What I think is fundamental is their common interest not to be excluded from the TRIPP project or whatever it ends up being called when it’s implemented.
Hovik: Do you think that this is a high enough priority in the context of the U.S.-Iran negotiations for the TRIPP and essentially Russia’s role to be part of the negotiations? I mean, somewhere like maybe like a 15 minute breakout to talk about this, or do you think that this is not going to be resolved directly between Iran and the U.S.?
Arman: I have no information about this being a topic of negotiations in Geneva or between the United States. and Iran, but I wouldn’t be surprised that such conversations have taken place. I just haven’t seen any reports to that effect. But what we have seen is clear-cut statements from Iran that this project is at At odds with their interests and they are not going to allow its implementation. Of course, I think there were differences in the statements of different Iranian officials.
At one point, I think Pezeshkian made a statement saying that our concerns have been addressed we have been in contact with the Armenian government but others have been less tolerant in their statements or you know they have taken a harder line in their statements about TRIPP unlike Pezeshkian and actually when Pezeshkian made that statement I believe it was before the war I think now that we have a changed situation in the region and the open conflict between the United States and Iran, I think I wouldn’t be surprised if Pezeshkian’s positions have shifted as well.
Asbed: Dr. Grigoryan, can you say a couple of words about how you think that the U.S.-Iran conflict over the last year and a half at this point are influencing the U.S. domestic politics? As we head into the midterms, it seems like Trump has become a lot more sensitive to what’s going on right now. So what’s your impression of how this is influencing the domestic scene?
Arman: Frankly, I think it has destroyed Trump’s presidency. And this is what Trump is going to be remembered for. I think, however he extricates the United States from this conflict, he’s going to be politically bruised very, very significantly.
In the best case scenario, it’s going to be perceived as a defeat, right? even if they find some kind of a negotiated settlement I mean I know Americans are very good at packaging things but there is a limit even to that and I think it’s going to be very hard for Trump to sell this as some kind of a victory, some kind of a success, especially since it has become a matter of electoral politics and Democrats are going to exploit this to the hilt. And I think it’s going to affect the elections, the congressional elections in the fall, and it’s going to define Trump’s presidency.
I mean, the man came to power presenting himself as a peacemaker as somebody who is opposed to all these unnecessary wars of choice his grand ambition was to receive a Nobel Peace Prize and he kept boasting about all the conflicts he had ended and he did make statements about you know attempts or efforts to to find the negotiated solution with Iran as well and then not only he failed at that he had not only he had a war with Iran he started a war with Iran it’s a war that is not going to be to be seen as a as a successful military campaign it has it I think I actually I’m making an understatement a lot of analysts are talking about the disastrous the absolutely catastrophic you know consequences of this war for the reputation of the of the American military It has exposed certain vulnerabilities and certain deficiencies of the American military.
Consequently, it’s going to affect American ability to project power American ability to exercise political influence and strategic influence America’s relations with its allies and all of this is going to be exploited by by Trump’s opponents and and it’s not just I mean when I say exploited I don’t want it to sound like you know Trump it’s going to be exploited unfairly it’s going to be exploited fairly there is there is a lot of truth in all of those accusations and in all of those claims, and Democrats are going to take advantage of that.
I think the economic consequences are already visible, that if this doesn’t end and if the oil prices don’t come down, if the fertilizer issue is not resolved quickly, I think the economic effects of this conflict are going to be, people are going to start feeling it really sharply. within a few months right before the midterm elections and yeah so this is going to be to have an important domestic political effect I think I mean we already kind of hinted at that earlier in our conversation this is going to have an interesting domestic political effect also with regard to the Israeli American relations and the domestic politics that is somehow related to this conflict and to American-Israeli relations.
Yesterday I read somewhere, I don’t remember where it was, but it seemed like a credible source, Ed Markey has hinted at ambitions to run for president in 2028 and according to that news item that I read yesterday he has suggested that America’s relations with Israel should be an important part of the presidential presidential campaign of 2028 and re-evaluating the relations between the United States and Israel should be an important part of the conversation. between 2028. I think, actually, this is going to happen in one way or another, in one form or another.
I think the relations between the United States and Israel and its effects on the U.S. power, on U.S. foreign policy… And our own democracy, to be honest. And exactly right. And on the American democracy, have become a critical enough issue and also have come to the fore to the extent that it is not going to be possible to sweep it under the rug anymore and I think there is going to be a sharper conversation about this in the upcoming years and in some ways the war with Iran was an important trigger for that conversation and I think that’s also going to be one of the profound effects of that war.
Hovik: Some analysts are predicting that if this deal holds, then it will significantly also weaken Israel itself in the region. And as we know, when the balance of power shifts, if something goes in one direction, there’s a reaction to it. And many, well, I don’t know if many, but I was watching an interview with Douglas Macgregor earlier today, and he said that this could shift the balance of power between Turkey and Israel, with Turkey gaining more leverage in the Middle East, in addition to Iran.
Now, the reason I ask is because Turkey has been, in the context of TRIPP, Turkey has been very sly, very quiet about it, you know, you want to, you know, this is TRIPP, this is a U.S. project, But we all know that Turkey also wins greatly from this and is probably the main beneficiary with Azerbaijan. And just, I think, a few days ago, Devlet Bahçeli, you know, leader of a nationalist party in Turkey that is in coalition with Erdogan, so their ruling, the ruling coalition, said, you know, something to the effect of, let’s stop pretending that this is something called TRIPP, let’s call it by its real name, the Turan Corridor.
Could this deal also have an unintended consequence of even further increasing the power of Turkey? Could it be that in order to now hedge against Iranian influence, now the U.S. places its bets more on Turkey? And how would that be visible on the ground?
Asbed: Can I interject with one thing also? All of the Azerbaijani media that I read call it the Zangezur Corridor and they do not call it the TRIPP or the Trump route. Every now and then the term Trump route is mentioned, but it seems like the whole TRIPP and Trump route thing is for Armenian domestic consumption just to get the Zangezur Corridor and Turan Corridor terms out of the public consciousness.
Arman: Exactly right. And yeah, Earlier, when we were talking about the relations of Russia and Iran, I talked about the simultaneous existence of conflicting and cooperative preferences in any relationship, in any cooperative relationship. between two countries in the international relations. I think this is also true of Turkey’s relations with a bunch of countries, including Russia, by the way. It is true of Turkey’s relations with the United States.
Hovik: It is true of Turkey’s relations with Israel.
Arman: And one of the most surprising things that a lot of people can’t wrap their heads around is this recent escalation of tensions between Turkey and Israel. People are trying to make sense of it. What’s really going on? What is at the root of it?
I mean, there are some serious issues of disagreement between the two countries dating back to the second Iraq war and its aftermath and Israel’s relations with the Kurds in the Middle East and how that has been How Turkey has seen that as a direct threat against their interests. I think they have had conflicting preferences over certain things in Syria, which seems to be currently the most important source of tensions between them.
I think Erdogan’s Erdogan’s ambitions of being not just the leader of secular Turkish government but some kind of a and I don’t want to call him a caliph but he does have ambitions of being a being a Muslim leader with international stature and international influence that also has played some role in in alienating some of Turkey’s traditional allies, including Israel and the United States.
But at the same time, when you look at actual steps that Turkey has taken, and a lot of people point this out, they haven’t stopped cooperating economically, they haven’t shut down the supply of gas and oil too. to Israel and in terms of real tangible steps, there are a few things that Turkey has done to harm Israeli interests. As far as Turkey’s positions on the issue of TRIPP, Yes, I think Turkey is fully on board. I think from the get-go, Turkey has been enthusiastic about some kind of a project like that, dating back to the Goble Plan in the 90s.
There is no reason to doubt that Turkey is deeply interested and invested in this project, even if they are keeping a relatively low profile, not counting the enthusiastic statements of Bahçeli and some others in recent times. So they are deeply interested in the implementation of that project. But again, are they interested in the implementation of that project the same way that the United States is interested in it? In other words, do they subscribe to the same position as James O’Brien when he was talking about totally excluding Russia?
He didn’t say much about Iran, but we can safely assume that the same attitude is also The same attitude also covers Iran. So I don’t know if Turkey is necessarily that adamant in excluding Russia and Iran from that project. I don’t think Turkey would be in a position to insist on something like that, especially if the war between the United States and Iran ends with some kind of negotiated settlement or a de facto American defeat, I think Turkey will have to play ball with the regional powers and with Iran especially.
And again, even if Turkey is interested in that project, even if it’s an important strategic advantage that Turkey will gain if that project were to be implemented, I think if you look at it from the Iranian perspective, At least Iranians themselves have defined it as an existential threat to their interests. So, you know, in the balance of resolve, I think Iran’s position has more weight in a sense than Turkey’s. If the war ends in a way that I just described, that is also going to affect the Russian attitudes and the Russian positions.
And by the way, I think in recent weeks, people think that some of the Russian moves with regard to the pressure on Armenia and Putin’s open open complaints or threats when Pashinyan and Putin met in Moscow and then the statements of several Russian officials and the subsequent closure of the Russian market to some Armenian products. A lot of people are arguing that this was done to influence to have some kind of influence on the results of the elections in Armenia.
I don’t rule it out, but actually, if they wanted to have an effect on the election results, doing it a couple of weeks before the elections was only going to anger some people rather than have the desired consequences in terms of the economic effects and people’s choices as a result of that.
I think this was probably more importantly related to Russia’s own calculations that the United States is losing in Iran and it is going to lead to the reduction of Western influence in the Caucasus and it has opened up a window of four exercising more leverage and more power in the Caucasus which was not available before so again this is a hypothesis of course I may be proven wrong but I think that probably has had some effect on Russia’s behavior and certainly Russians are also not going to be to be sanguine about the implementation of a TRIPP project that excludes them that is completely adjusted to Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s and the West’s interests and does not take into account their interests and their anxieties.
So again, if the war ends with America’s defeat, if the war ends with some kind of a negotiated solution that recognizes the current status quo, in the relations between the U.S. and Iran. I think the TRIPP project at the very least is going to be revised to take into account Russia’s and Iran’s concerns and interests.
Asbed: Dr. Grigoryan, let’s turn our attention to the aftermath of the Armenian elections a little bit. I’ll try and avoid a lengthy recap of the parliamentary situation and the campaigns leading up to it. Probably most of the people who listen to us They’re aware of what’s going on.
I was reading this article by Raffy Ardhaldjian, I think it was in Asbarez, and he put it this way. The parties ran a campaign of fear, giving Armenians the fake choice between imminent war and a slow erosion of their national identity and state sovereignty. And after a high voter turnout of 59 to 60%, commentators aligned with the West and Europe specifically, which spent tens of millions of euros to control the media narrative, claimed that at the end that Armenians were given a clear choice for their future and they chose Europe.
So the question is, were Armenians really given a clear picture of what their choices meant as far as the future of their nation goes?
Arman: Well, if we can call these distorted narratives, these oversimplified Manichaean narratives, drained of all complexity and meaning, clear choices, then yes, Armenians were given a clear choice. But unfortunately, these narratives obscure more than they reveal. Now, in one way, I agree with those European statements. I myself had made made a comment before the elections that these elections are primarily about the country’s strategic orientation and a vote for Pashinyan is a vote for changing the country’s strategic orientation and a vote against Pashinyan is a vote for maintaining the status quo.
But how much the elections were about that, I think that did play a role. I think that has been an important part of Armenian politics for quite some time now. But that’s not the only issue.
I think the most important element in the logic of elections in Armenia for the last two parliamentary elections at least has been the logic of voting against rather than voting for I think a lot of people who have voted against Pashinyan have exercised their, have essentially protested what Pashinyan has done, Pashinyan’s failures, you know, failures to deliver on certain promises, what has happened to Karabakh between 2019, sorry, 2021 and now undelivered promises the the kind of unhealthy political atmosphere in the country and the vote against the opposition was again the vote against Nachkinez against the return of the previous status quo pre-revolutionary status quo now a lot of people may argue that Samvel Karapetyan is not Nachkinez he’s not from the previous regime but he I don’t think he successfully distanced himself from them you know there was an association that people had in mind between him and the previous regime and that was not entirely unjustified in some respects Samvel Karapetyan’s brother was the chief of staff of Serzh Sargsyan and he’s seen as an oligarch and also his ties to Russia which also is assumed to be the same thing as ties of Robert Kocharyan to Russia and Serge Sargsyan to Russia.
Anyway, so these associations also painted him into that corner and a lot of people voted against him for that reason, right?
These were these were these were elections again again driven by negative ratings whoever was hated more whoever had higher negative ratings lost the elections now there are a couple of things I should I should add to to that first of all it was not as clear-cut a victory of Pashinyan as people make it out to be it certainly wasn’t as clear-cut as in 2021 he didn’t get the outright majority I think the combined opposition did a lot better than in 2021 he also had to resort to certain steps and actions that undermine the credibility of the elections a lot of people talk about whether the elections were falsified and rigged on the day of the elections they don’t do it now I mean that’s not how elections are manipulated these days there was a lot that happened before the elections that that kind of affected its results unfairly even the ODIHR report points out the fact that Pashinyan essentially engaged engaged in a practice of bribing the voters before the elections, implementing a bunch of projects, the economic sustainability of which is quite questionable.
And that’s considered an unfair electoral practice. I mean, he declared his victory after only 10% of the ballots had been counted, and then they suspended the counting for several hours, which was totally unprecedented. The annulment of the results of these three precincts which the law is unclear on how these things should be handled but anyway that has cast a shadow over the fairness of the results of these elections and in addition to that I think Moving away from the technical aspects of it and arguments as to whether elections were rigged or not, I think what has happened to Armenian politics is absolutely tragic.
It’s polarization, the kind of atmosphere where if you criticize the government, for anything and there is a lot that this government can be criticized for fairly right but any critic of this government is automatically assigned to the bin of Russia’s agents right of you know of people who are conducting a hybrid war against the Pashinyan government you can’t possibly have any criticism especially any criticism of its foreign policy which is absolutely which has been absolutely disastrous right Any criticism of that automatically assigns you to the bin of hybrid warriors and Russian agents.
And the overall tone of the campaign, the accusations, the threats, The jailing of several people, but also after the elections he stated that 70% of the people who voted for the opposition have taken bribes. Not a single person has been charged with that.
Hovik: Please continue, but let me actually ask a question that’s directly relevant to that. You mentioned all the things that of course happened, administrative resources, arresting many critics, the $1 billion in extra budget handouts, but many also blame the opposition for not being adequately prepared for all scenarios. Now, the leader of Strong Armenia admitted that. He said that not uniting the opposition sufficiently was probably a mistake.
I believe that both Strong Armenia and Armenia Alliance are considering whether to even take up their mandates, but I think they have hinted that they would. But just to remind our listeners, without Prosperous Armenia entering the parliament, which I think was totally falsified, the Civil Contract would get a three-fifths majority, meaning unilateral control of all government levers, with the exception of constitutional change.
And we know that the opposition parties are going to go to the constitutional court, but we know the makeup of that court. it seems almost like a predetermined conclusion now my question was so despite all these cheating that we mentioned by the government what would you say were the maybe drill down I think you also mentioned a few times the mistakes of the opposition but I want you to drill down more into that what were their core mistakes And did they even have real agency to affect the results of this election to begin with?
Arman: I don’t know if they had agency. I don’t know if they would have secured a better result or would have been able to defeat Pashinyan. would have been able to thwart any manipulation or if rigging took place, any rigging of the elections. I don’t know that, but I can say that this was not the most effective challenge to Pashinyan.
I don’t think they should get credit for the The level of support that they got and the reduction of support for Pashinyan because mostly again I think it was negative voting it was mostly voting against rather than voting for I don’t think the opposition the main forces of the opposition let me put it that way offered a credible alternative to Pashinyan first of all on foreign policy which for Armenia foreign and security national security policy which for Armenia has been an important issue of electoral politics as well. I don’t think they offered any credible alternative. It was not clear what the opposition was suggesting.
On the one hand, they were saying, well, they were rejecting Pashinyan’s and his supporters’ accusation that if they were to come to power, They would start a new war. There was a vague sense that they are more pro-Russian than the Pashinyan government. But even then, I don’t know if they have made any statements that has explicitly put them in that camp or has explicitly suggested that they had more of a hostile relationship to the West.
If you look at Strong Armenia and the Hayastan Alliance, the Armenia Alliance, I think traditionally they are perceived to be pro-Russian and certainly Samvel Karapetyan is an oligarch who has made his money in Russia and has connections to Russia but they have not made any statements that strongly suggest They did not suggest that they were going to completely revise Armenia’s foreign policy or that they were going to cancel the implementation of the peace process with Azerbaijan. There was only one person who explicitly said that he would not sign the agreement and that was Edmon Marukyan .
Other than Edmon Marukyan, everybody prevaricated, didn’t articulate a clear position. They criticized Pashinyan for pursuing peace at any cost and you know they are for a more credible process and therefore a process that preserves Armenia’s dignity etc etc but it wasn’t clear what they meant by it right now as far as domestic politics is concerned economic policies are concerned I don’t know what they stood for I don’t know what they advocated what they Vague statements about creating more jobs in Armenia didn’t resonate as much as the leaders of strong Armenia hoped it would. Robert Kocharyan has a fundamental problem.
He has a core constituency that is always going to vote for them. but I don’t think Robert Kocharyan did anything that could appeal outside of that constituency and also Robert Kocharyan plays a particularly negative role in that he is the symbol of the previous regime he symbolizes the pre-revolutionary status quo of Armenia which a lot of people still consider the The thing that Armenia should avoid at any cost, a large segment of the electorate, is voting against the return to the previous status quo. And I think Robert Kocharyan is the symbol of that.
And Robert Kocharyan, instead of admitting to certain mistakes, admitting to certain problems that are justifiably being criticized by people in Armenia, he doubled down and presented a picture of his era as this golden age everything was fine they were doing great and I don’t think it was credible in the eyes of a lot of people and I think rejection of the previous status quo played a very very important role and the opposition didn’t manage to shed that reputation and to kind of change that atmosphere. And then this is the result.
Asbed: A quick follow up, because I really understand what you are saying about the opposition not having defined itself very clearly. Now, they could really define themselves very clearly if they stood up and said, for example, our policy will include talking to Azerbaijan and saying you have to do something about the right of return of Artsakhzis or some something. And then suddenly we realize maybe they’re falling in a trap here, just like Pashinyan fell in a trap of saying Artsakh is Armenia and leading us into a war.
Here we have a situation where, for example, a real distinction could be a stake the ground essentially by the opposition and Pashinyan would have the ability to say, look, they are saying something and Aliyev is saying we are going to attack if that’s the case. So this is the party of war. So from my perspective, I see that they didn’t define themselves very well. They were trying to be very diplomatic or not fall in a trap, but they were caught in that trap and they were not able to get out of it.
Arman: Exactly, and there is another trap in Armenian politics. I’ve been trying to explain this to whoever would listen to me for the last several years, but I have to say I haven’t succeeded in changing the frame of that conversation. I think talking about the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process in isolation as an autonomous process is a mistake. I don’t think the primary aim of Pashinyan is the peace with Azerbaijan, is the end of the conflict with Azerbaijan.
He has that goal, he is working toward it, but I think that is not his primary aim. It’s rather a means to the more important end for Pashinyan, which is the change of the country’s strategic orientation. And their logic is that as long as that conflict exists, we’re going to be strategically dependent on Russia, we’re not going to be able to revise our relations with Russia, we’re not going to be able to build a different kind of relationship with the West.
So the hasty process of of moving toward the resolution with Azerbaijan and signing that peace treaty doing it at any cost you know making any concession that Azerbaijan demands is necessary for implementing that other grandiose project which they define as liberation of Armenia and I think the opposition would have done a lot better if they made that into part of the conversation during the election campaign. if they explicitly challenged that policy.
But I think even a lot of the opposition, as I already pointed out, didn’t want to appear as if they’re anti-Western and too pro-Russian and they prevaricated and they tried to be the good guys for everybody.
Hovik: Strong Armenia even embraced TRIPP almost like a Almost as strongly as Pashinyan did.
Arman: Strong Armenia embraced TRIPP, strong Armenia had consultants from Israel, and one of the most important faces of their campaign was that Israeli general, that toward the end they started underplaying his presence.
Asbed: And the Armenia Alliance doubled down on it, I think. They wanted a bigger TRIPP, a much bigger TRIPP.
Arman: Exactly and you know every time I would watch these conversations I would remember I don’t know who said it criticizing the Democrats moving to the center or to the right over the years in the United States one brilliant American again I wish I remembered who said it he said you know every time Americans had to vote between a Republican and a Republican they voted for a Republican So you know Democrats had in effect become Republicans after Clinton especially and there wasn’t much of a choice and if you have to vote between a fake fake Republican and a real one you know real Republicans are always better so you know yeah I think on on this score at least a lot of people voted for the real Nicole Pashinyan rather than people who tried to be Nikol Pashinyan but better but uh would
Hovik: you say that like I mean I just want to Because we’re talking more about complex issues and I sense that the average voters in Armenia, the rural population, the elderly, probably more voted for what they got in their pocketbooks than anything else. Would you say, I think we had an interview with Arthur Martirosyan who said basically Starting into the elections, Pashinyan already had 40%, no matter what, and he only got like those extra 9% who really voted for him for policy reasons. Would you agree in the ballpark with those estimations? So we had to contend with a 40% Pashinyan to start with.
Arman: Usually people put the incumbent advantage at 20%, 25%. So I don’t know, maybe Arthur Martirosyan knows something that I don’t know. with regard to the 40% in principle I agree with him and again this dovetails with my earlier discussion about the anger of the lingering anger of a significant part
Arman: of the Armenian electorate against the pre-revolutionary governments pre-revolutionary status quo and a lot of people are voting not to return to that and let me say one important let me add one important element to it which a lot of people misunderstand a lot of people focus on the corruption of the previous regime and the economic aspects of it the plunder etc etc I think what what is far more important than the corruption and the economic mismanagement and the economic suffering of ordinary people during those years was how the dignity of people of the society was compromised by the behavior of that regime I mean the local warlords and the oligarchs bodyguards and their you know and their children doing all sorts of things and you know I don’t want to name names you know so that people don’t sue me for libel but you all know what I’m talking about right I mean there was There was a local warlord in one of the regions in Armenia whose son was notorious for picking fights and hurting people and he beat up a guy who lost his eye in that conflict and he wasn’t even charged with a crime.
Everybody still remembers what happened to Poghos Poghosyan in the Poplavok Café And again, the bodyguard of Robert Kocharyan spent, I think, he had a suspended sentence or spent one year in jail.
Hovik: But when they’re doing that, are they also rumoring what happened to Sona Mnatsakanyan? Many Civil Contract leaders behave the same way, and especially regional thieves, maybe not as blatantly, but we’ve seen complete impunity by the Pashinyan regime. So I’m wondering how much of a factor is that, you know, In people’s memory. I honestly, you know, question whether it is, you know, people really like remembered all the injustice of the past, therefore I’m gonna vote for the injustice of the present.
Arman: I’m not I’m not disputing that that. retort and I myself have been angered beyond description when Sona Mnatsakanyan was killed by the motorcade of Pashinyan.
Alen Simonyan spat in the face of somebody who had yelled davachan to him after he ordered his bodyguards to hold the guy’s arms and we can cite probably some other examples but Having said I mean accepting all of that and agreeing with all of that I think the perception that people have is that these are episodes that are not indicative of a system what we had before the revolution was a system system of kind of some kind of a new feudal system of of permanent humiliation and you know The kind of ugly unrestrained behavior of certain types, which now you see things like that happening and statements and ugly behavior, but that’s not systematic.
Now, whether or not that perception is correct is a different issue, but I think there is such a perception. the Pashinyan regime and his supporters should be given credit for having succeeded in creating that narrative and making sure that people remember what happened before 2018 and don’t remember what happened yesterday but I think there is a strong perception I think it’s a fact and I do talk to people And what seems to be the more important element in remembering the experience between 1998 and 2018 is that permanent sense of humiliation, fear that you may wind up getting into a conflict with the wrong guy in the street and being unfairly treated by some warlord or by some government official and you would have no recourse I don’t think that perception is quite as strong now even if it exists so this is an important matter and there is a there is actually political science and psychology literature which talks about how much more of a motivator you know lost dignity is and attempt at restoring dignities than material or socio-economic matters and this is another thing that the opposition A lot of people who support the opposition don’t appreciate it sufficiently.
There is one other thing. The criticisms of Pashinyan for Karabakh that have also been quite common since the war of 2020.
They also ring hollow, especially when they come from any political force in Armenia other than the Armenian National Congress and people in Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s camp, because every single political party, political force, political leader was not only in support of the same policies that Pashinyan was pursuing, they were criticizing Pashinyan in the period of 2018 and 2020, for having come to surrender Karabakh and he’s a Soros agent etc etc and now everybody all of a sudden has become a realist I mean you listen to Robert Kocharyan right he sounds like one of the ANC supporters before 2018 except Robert Kocharyan is one of the people who was arguing that the Karabakh conflict has been resolved and there is no compromise to be made and not an inch of land should be surrendered right And when they mobilize and criticize Nikol Pashinyan for his reckless policies and for his reckless diplomacy, etc., etc., which I do also, right?
But a lot of people ask questions about the credibility of those criticisms given where it’s coming from and a lot of people think that what representatives of the previous regimes must do is first of all admit to the culpability of pursuing the same kind of policies of generating the kind of environment that made compromise very very difficult And also saying a word of regret about those things that had happened in between, you know, in the 20 years that preceded Pashinyan’s Pashinyan’s revolution, and instead what they hear is that everything was hunky-dory, everything was fine, everything was perfect, and the Soros agent came and ruined everything.
That is not a winning strategy. I think that does not fool the Armenian electorate.
Hovik: Okay, Dr. Grigoryan, I want to move on to a few more questions.
Hovik: We know that the opposition is moving to challenge the results in the Constitutional Court, and the opposition is criticizing the results of these elections. They’re not accepting it. But surprisingly, the calls for not recognizing the results of this election are also coming from pro-government camps, specifically like the NGO camp backed by Western money. Daniel Ioannisyan said some harsh things about the results of this election, and we know his role.
For instance, he’s the chief poster boy for Western donations and Western money in Armenia. He is rewriting the Constitution. He is on the Anti-Corruption Committee. Anyway, so his challenge seemed to be pretty stood out.
Now also on the other side, we have Azerbaijani commentators who are saying that Aliyev should not congratulate Pashinyan because Pashinyan did not get constitutional majority and he’s not going to be able to deliver promises that he gave the concessions, including the constitutional changes.
Asbed: Meanwhile, Pashinyan That’s funny because Erdogan has congratulated.
Hovik: Yeah, but I think he basically said I would not even believe if your family members came and voted for you. He said that to the opposition. So he said you received all your votes through bribes and just like that the his regime officials started pushing through legislative changes to ban political parties. from running in future elections if those parties are found guilty of bribery, maybe even in public court, because so far we haven’t seen any single judgment of bribery, let alone, I believe, a start of any court session.
So do you believe that Pashinyan is trying to angle for new elections as well, and maybe as a result of banning the opposition parties, maybe trying to reach for the two-thirds majority that he so covets in order to enact Aliyev’s demands. He may be.
Arman: I think there is some kind of a poison pill in these elections, especially in the in the cancellation of the results in these three districts and quite blatantly leaving Prosperous Armenia out of it so that he could get three-fifths majority. I think most people are, as you pointed out, even some of his supporters are not closing their eyes on these actions and are openly criticizing it. So he may have certain concerns and I think the crisis is not over around Armenia. At a certain point he will have to make certain decisions, right? with regard to the constitutional changes, with regard to the peace treaty with Azerbaijan.
He’s going to have to make decisions with regard to the country’s strategic orientation. Russians have already quite unequivocally stated that you’re not going to be allowed to sit on two chairs at the same time and you have to make certain tough decisions.
Is he going to get out of the The CSTO or the Eurasian Economic Union is he really going to start a process of full integration with the European Union although nobody from the European Union thinks that this is this is on the agenda but he’s going to have to make very tough decisions and whatever decisions he makes is going to generate a crisis sooner or later as a serious political crisis and I think he may be preparing for that by all these hints to change the legislation with regard to parties and also this idea of banning any any citizen of Armenia who has spent more than six months of the year outside of Armenia from being able to vote the country And these steps may be…
Asbed: A very strange thing at a time when he is claiming that 65% of those people abroad would vote for him.
Arman: Yeah, but nonetheless. So I think he doesn’t believe what he says either. So yeah, I… I think that seems to be the most reasonable conclusion from observing some of his steps and statements that he’s trying to prepare for new elections.
He’s trying to prepare the political system and political environment to the looming crises which are going to come unavoidably and inevitably. and he wants to be as well prepared for it as possible and especially since he didn’t get the landslide that he hoped he would get he knows that he can’t be as confident in the level of support as he was and also the opposition, who knows, maybe the opposition will learn from its mistakes and not make the same mistakes before the next elections, which will make Pashinyan’s life more difficult. So I think he is preparing for those eventualities.
One other thing I should point out, Pashinyan’s government, Pashinyan’s regime is a revolutionary regime. Do you know of a revolutionary regime that has not degenerated into an autocracy, eventually, right? I mean, some of them become draconian totalitarian states immediately, but that’s not the only path. There are some revolutionary regimes which come with massive public support, but after a while they just descended to authoritarianism, especially if it’s a personalistic regime, which the Armenian regime certainly is.
I mean, you take Pashinyan, how many votes will a Civil Contract get in the next elections, right? I mean, who’s going to vote for a Civil Contract if Pashinyan is not there? And one other thing which I also have spoken to a great extent over the last few years, I mean, there is something specific about revolutionary governments and revolutionary regimes. Not ordinary political teams, ordinary political regimes.
The name revolution itself suggests that they are there for profound fundamental changes, which are always traumatic, which always meet a particular kind of resistance, which upset the status quo in very dangerous ways. And in order to deter challenges, in order to make sure that their revolutionary grandiose changes are successful, they have to resort to all sorts of means, and sometimes these means are going to be anti-democratic. And what also, the parallel logic to that, to the revolutionary logic, is that they all think they are rescuing the country, they’re rescuing the society.
They’re not just changing, improving, They are, you know, saviors. Basically, the savior mentality of revolutionary regimes is also very dangerous and creates psychological attitude whereby they think no cost is too big for implementing that salvation project.
Asbed: Yeah, there’s definitely messianic delusions going on right now that they’re the only people who can save the country from war and destruction. Let me ask one final quick question here.
Asbed: Given everything we discussed right now, is a re-election, a new election, favorable to the ruling party or the opposition?
Arman: I don’t know. If the opposition doesn’t draw certain lessons, here’s what needs to happen. We need to turn this page of the opposition has to be able to credibly present a new agenda, new people, right? Forward-looking.
Clearly, that’s right. I mean, even the political party that I’ve supported, I’ve spoken to them privately and I’ve had many conversations.
Hovik: For our listeners, let’s just say the political party is ANC. Was it during the ANC years or during the HHSh years that you were associated with them?
Arman: I mean, my association with them, I’ve been a supporter, I’ve been a vocal supporter of them. ANC itself has never been in power. It was created in 2008 and I’ve been a supporter of them primarily because of their views on Karabakh primarily because they advocated a peaceful resolution and they were proven right in the end although when you’re in such a tiny minority and you’re proven right People do not conclude that, oh, you were right, we should change our positions and kind of concede the point to you. The hatred toward the ANC quadrupled after they were proven right in the Armenian political system after 2020.
So there are lots and lots of objective reasons why the ANC didn’t succeed. Even when you look at the ANC, they have not clearly articulated a forward-looking agenda.
A lot of their, you know, presentation and a lot of their arguments have been backward-looking and kind of the sense that, see, we were right, and at some point it can become annoying, right? and also they think to and I don’t say this with you know by meaning any disrespect to Ter-Petrosyan whatsoever but they think to get out of from under the shadow of Ter-Petrosyan and carve out an identity that is not simply well Ter-Petrosyan was our leader and he was right and see what happened to the country since we didn’t listen to Ter-Petrosyan.
I think ANC’s agenda also needs a profound reform, adjustment and clarity and it needs to become more forward-looking. and its criticisms need to be more understandable to the electorate and these concerns to every political force in the country right so they have to articulate a clear alternative to Pashinyan I think it’s not enough to point to Pashinyan’s flaws because they have to understand that if they choose between a bad incumbent and an alternative that they don’t know that they can’t properly evaluate other than that does not have much of a track record and does not clearly articulate its own agenda forward-looking agenda even a bad incumbent sometimes is preferable to such an opposition and I think the opposition needs to sit down and think about these things very carefully and articulate a clear understandable alternative to Pashinyan and also make sure that they are rid of this logic of the present government and the previous regime stops dominating the electoral process.
That should be the primary agenda of the opposition in the coming years.
Asbed: Dr. Grigoryan, thank you for taking the time and holding these candid conversations with us. We really appreciate it.
Arman: Always a pleasure to talk to you, Asbed and Hovik. Thank you.
Hovik: Yeah, likewise.
Asbed: That’s our show today. This episode was recorded on June 22, 2026. We’ve been talking with Dr. Arman Grigoryan, who is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University.
He has a Doctorate in Political Science from Columbia University in New York and a Master’s in IR, International Relations, from the University of Chicago. His research has appeared in International Security, Security Studies, and a lot more places. Please check the show notes and follow the links to his bio page. That’s podcasts. groong. org slash episode number.
Hovik: And thank you for continuing to watch us and if you are still watching I want to thank you for allowing us to bring these podcasts to you which I think are truly unique in their nature because we’re not funded by any foreign money we’re not funded by any political parties we try to bring you the appropriate balance and what we think is the truth now to do that we need your support even more than you have in the past so please consider providing us donations you can go to podcast. groong. org donate We are doing a lot of changes to Groong, which you’re not fully seeing yet.
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Even our expected but unexpected AI bill was pretty big last month so consider helping us and I promise you that you will see good results and the changes are coming soon so thank you very much and if you can’t support us financially just like comment and share that also goes a long way and also make sure you’re subscribed if you just found us through some random search. I’m Hovik Manucharyan.
Asbed: And I’m Asbed Bedrossian. We will talk to you soon.
Hovik: Take care.