Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Hovik: For generations, Armenians and Russians have spoken of each other as friends, bound by faith, history, war, culture, and a shared life across empires and states. But today, as Armenia is pulled towards the West, that old bond is being strained.
Asbed: Hello, everyone, and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. Today, we’re discussing Russian-Armenian relations in this time of geopolitical storms with Dr. Sergey Markedonov, who is a historian and analyst specializing in Russia’s foreign policy, the South Caucasus, and post-Soviet conflict regions. Dr.
Sergey Markedonov, welcome to the Groong podcast.
Sergey: Thank you for your invitation.
Hovik: Thank you, Dr. Markedonov. U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff visited Moscow on August 6, 2025.
During this trip, he met Vladimir Putin to finalize the logistical and preliminary details for the summit in Anchorage, which ultimately took place a week later on August 15. Now, two days after that planning meeting and before the summit in Anchorage, Pashinyan and Aliyev flew to Washington, D.C. to sign documents, among them the agreement on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, while specific details of the agreements from the summit in Alaska, in Anchorage, are still not disclosed.
We saw that the Trump administration changed its position from a direct supplier of Ukraine, to more of a mediator role, which seemed very odd to us. But regarding TRIPP, Despite objections from some wings of power in Iran, Russian officials were mostly reserved in their comments, at least according to media. And that all changed earlier this year when one Russian official after another started protesting the TRIPP agreement as a disruption of regional balance and even as a challenge to regional peace, invoking the long-standing Treaty of Turkmenchay and saying that that balance is going to be disrupted.
So can I ask if what is the prevailing thought in Moscow? Was TRIPP one of the items or arrangements that was discussed in Alaska? And why was there an initial muted response from Russia regarding TRIPP?
Sergey: Okay, thank you so much for your question. First of all, I suppose this problem is wider than TRIPP properly. It’s not about one project separated or selectively considered from each other. I suppose you raised a very important question on general developments of the U.S.-Russian relations.
I suppose that the most important problem of our relations is discreteness of them. Because for Russia, it would be better to build relations with Washington based on comprehensive principles. We have problems in Eurasia, Ukraine, or Moldova, or Armenia, Georgia maybe. And for us, from the Russian point of view, it would be better to consider all the problems together. in one package, like problems of Eurasian security or problems of European and Eurasian security.
But Americans prefer to provide their agenda, maybe splitting those problems in different packages. It’s not new, by the way, because after the demise of the USSR, we faced the same problem. In the early 90s, the United States was ready to cooperate with Russia on denuclearization of former USSR republics like Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. But as for NATO enlargement, no cooperation.
Later, we can remember the experience of anti-terrorist coalition. Washington was ready, but missile defense or arms control agreements, no. Then reset. United States and Russia were ready to cooperate in strategic stability issues, but not regional conflicts like Syria, Georgia, or Ukrainian crisis.
Now we see practically a similar approach. And for Russia, it’s necessary to ensure a comprehensive approach, of course. As for American interest in the Caucasus, I’m not sure that Trump discovered something new. We can remember the efforts of the United States to be moderator between Armenia and Azerbaijan in previous administrations.
First of all, the vivid example of it is Key West Forum of 2001 or engagement of the United States and OSCE Minsk Group. Maybe it’s impossible to overrate the role of the United States, but nevertheless, the states try to do something to play a role of moderator.
But nowadays, especially after 2022 Special Military Operations, United States and European Union strengthened their position in the Caucasus because previously prior to Ukrainian operation of Russia relations between the the West, Russia, and the Caucasus were how to say competitive cooperation cooperation with some level of competition for example Georgia was a playground of confrontation but not Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict Paradoxically, many American co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group or Secretary of State supported efforts of, personally, Vladimir Putin and Moscow to be moderators in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. in the case of April War of 2016 or 44-Day War of 2020, but after 2022, a lot of nuances, details disappeared and the approach of United States and European Union towards Russian engagement in the Caucasus became how to say tougher than previously and of course Russia considers this engagement like new instruments how to diminish the role of our country in the region which is strategic Don’t forget that Russia is also Caucasus country, because the territory of North Caucasus inside Russia is bigger than all newly independent countries of South Caucasus, and a lot of problems influence each other like problem in North Caucasus security, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia with Georgian-Ossetian conflict or problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan because Russia is a home for numerous Armenian and Azerbaijani communities.
The Armenian community is the biggest in the world. This is why I suppose maybe Having some hopes for the so-called Anchorage spirit, Russia was not so critical. But I’m sure, I’m sure that behind this scene, Russia had a lot of objections and statements quoted by you. I mean here statements of Overchuk about violation of Treaty of Turkmenchay and so on.
It looks funny in some aspects because in the period of Treaty of Turkmenchay, United States followed Monroe Doctrine. It was not so active in Eurasia and South Caucasus in particular. However, nowadays, more active engagement of the United States is diminishing the role of Russia. This is why Russia is taking care about the situation.
Hovik: I mean, the perception for many is that Russia is Too late to the game and Russia is losing leverage, you know, especially still there are issues with Georgia. Azerbaijan is putting on a very tough stance in terms of geopolitics. It seems like the only tool it has is right now threats to gas supplies and things like that, selling gas at normal rates as opposed to discount rates. Do you think that Russia could have done anything over the past few years to prevent the situation right now?
Sergey: First of all, we should differentiate some elements of rhetoric, especially topical on the eve of parliamentary campaign in Armenia and realpolitik, because it’s not the same. Some aspects similar, but not so. Of course, Russia tries to use the electoral situation in order to strengthen position of pro-Russian forces inside Armenia, or maybe it sends some signals to Pashinyan. Be careful with Russia because the electoral campaign is over in June 7 but after June 8 will be and it’s necessary to take into account the role of Russia.
As for perception mentioned by you for your second question about Russia was too late to the game, I’m not sure. Of course, every country has and had some priorities. In 2022 and until now, Ukraine is the focal point of the Russian foreign policy, military efforts, and so on. However, it doesn’t mean Russia is going out of the Caucasus, because again, the Caucasus is a very important area for Russia.
And of course, I don’t believe in perception on final withdrawal. Absolutely not correct perception, by the way. For example, let’s see on Turkey. Anyone in 1975 or 1981 did not conceive that Turkey is an actor in the South Caucasus.
It was impossible. Or Iran in 1950 or 1983, for example, for Iranian-Iraqi war. But nowadays both powers are active participants, especially Turkey. We see the strengthening of Turkey’s positions and so on.
As for Russia, yes, Russia lost some leverage in the region. And you can say, yeah, Russia is not in the strongest stance right now facing Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. However, even now, Russia has resources of influence and interest in all three countries. Let’s see on Georgia.
Georgia claims to be European power, but who are most important trade partners of Georgia? No Europe at all. Turkey, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan. Please, name me one of European Union members.
No one. Russia is one of the most important trade partners. Yes, there are a lot of obstacles for reconciliation. Questions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, public opinion, and one third of Georgian society in favor of opponents of Georgian Dream.
It’s a clear obstacle for normalization. However, interest to Russia is clear, especially after disappointment in European Union or United States. Can we say United States in 2008 August were too late to the game? I’m not sure.
They lost their position, but Keeping interest even now. As for Armenia, let’s see, Armenian community in Russia, economic ties, you mentioned gas, not only gas, flowers, alcoholic beverage, and so on. Frankly speaking, I’m not a great fan of some restrictions provided by our bodies because I suppose they could play on the Pashinyan side. Provoking the consolidation of the Armenian independence, flag, patriotism and so on.
It’s a good chance for Pashinyan’s team to exploit the ideas of patriotism and so on. However, at the same time, we should understand that there is a remedy and disease. Maybe we can discuss the quality of this remedy. Current remedy proposed by the Russian government maybe is not the best.
However, disease is existing, by the way. Because the problem of current Armenian-Russian-European Union triangle relations is not, how to say, the competition between European or Eurasian integration vectors. Because Armenia is a part of Eurasian integration project since 2013. And let’s see, many income benefits shaped, not by Pashinyan or the Russian government, Russian imperialism, by the way, but rank and file Armenians are clear.
Problems of incomes, opportunities to work in Russia, sending some benefits, money transfers to Armenia, which covers about 80% of all transfers to this country, and so on. As for European Union, okay, I would be hypothetically ready to discuss this option if European Union offered something. For example, please, visa free Schengen in 2028 or 29, or please, association agreement in 2027, or maybe start of negotiations on European Union enlargement with Armenia maybe in 2028, no options. Nowadays, European Union represents not only an economic project, but also an ideological one.
And nowadays, European Union’s offer is to engage Armenia in ideological confrontation with Russia. Try to use Armenia-like tools how to diminish the presence of Russia in this region. It’s invitation to Pashinyan’s team or potential government of Armenia. Guys, please ensure your territory like new playground for battle between Russia and European Union.
I’m not sure that it’s a good experience. Let’s see on Armenian neighbors, Georgia. Georgia played this role and unfortunately, we have what we have right now. I’m not sure it’s the best option, by the way.
Asbed: No, no. Georgia seems to have realized what’s going on and decided to assert its independence and play the right game. You were answering a number of questions I had for later on. And one thing you mentioned about the remittances to Armenia.
The money coming from families to families, from Russia to Armenia. I think that’s very important. And the numbers are not the same in Europe. There are lots of Armenians, the diaspora in Europe, but it’s not the same level.
And so Armenia cannot simply replace Russia from a remittances perspective.
Sergey: Asbed, can I interrupt you briefly? Because you mentioned the Armenian diasporas in European Union countries, especially in France, it’s the most numerous in European Union, and United States, of course, especially Fresno, San Francisco, Los Angeles, I was sometimes there. And of course, people in Armenian diaspora try to help, but there is a I suppose a mistaken conception or perception in Russia to portray Armenian diaspora like agent of U.S.-European Union influence. In some aspects, no.
I know many people from diaspora personally, and I was invited for some events, conferences organized by Armenian diaspora, and many people with American or French passport are skeptical to Pashinyan’s effort to replace Russia. People who live in France, United States, and even my friends and colleagues, like Professor Grigoryan, who said, guys, please be careful. Don’t replace Russia. There is no practical real offers from Paris or from Washington.
Asbed: No, no, no. I completely agree with you about this. Considering one diaspora from the other, for example, how the US diaspora behaves from the Russian diaspora. Personally, I think that’s polemics to divide the diaspora and I don’t subscribe to it.
But professor, before we go a little more into Armenia, I have a question about the Russian policies. You mentioned that the focus since 2022 has been on Ukraine. Well, is Russia built to deal with more than one problem at a time? Can it deal with the problem in the European theater and the South Caucasian theater, the Central Asian theater, or is it just capable of dealing with one issue?
Because we Armenians have been concerned with the lack of attention towards South Caucasus since 2022.
Sergey: Yeah, I absolutely agree. And moreover, in my publications and some reports as well as oral presentations, I agree with the concerns of Armenians and even with their criticism. Many Armenians said, okay, we hope Russia will be more active in 2020 or 2022, 2023. Russia was not so active.
Okay. We should recognize the problem in our bilateral relations. Emphasizing on Ukraine, we lost some positions in, you said, Central Asia, South Caucasus. In some years, our government and president understood this lack of attention.
And now we try to reimburse some losses taking place previously, addressing leaders of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan. Just some days ago, Vladimir Putin visited Astana, being engaged in the Eurasian Economic Union Summit as well as bilateral talks with Kazakhstan leader Kassym- Jomart Tokayev demonstrating his interest and interest of Russia to development of relations with other post-Soviet countries but recognizing the problem in our bilateral relations again I am returning to the problem of remedy and disease because if you have a headache Potentially, you will face two recipes.
For example, punishment, cut of your head, head cutting, or maybe following some remedies like aspirin and something else. I prefer the second recipe, not the first one, because I suppose the Armenian leadership made a very serious miscalculation. And it’s not coincidence, Hovik, and you mentioned the perception of Russia as it was too late to the game, yeah? Or Russia as loser, Russia losing control over the South Caucasus and so on.
I know personally, I have some insights that especially French embassy, French diplomats, politicians insisted on this perception. Promote an idea, guys Armenians, you are not taking care, your allies betrayed you and so on and so on. Please follow us. Let’s discuss this variant.
I am not sure France is ready to replace Russian military base in Gyumri. I am not sure that French people will ensure transfers of money and opportunities to work on the French market or maybe And I’m not sure that Macron jogging around Yerevan and his numerous smiles, hearts, and so on will replace real mechanisms existing for a long time between Russia and Armenia. Yeah, we can recognize crisis of those relations, yeah. I suppose that toast diplomacy is not enough.
Toast for USSR, Russian Empire, a long time of our coexistence together, yeah. It’s not enough. It’s necessary to find some new instruments, but Russia is closer. My good friend and colleague, Professor Alexander Iskandarian from Yerevan, said a lot of times, sorry, but Armenia does not border Luxembourg or Switzerland.
Maybe Swiss border will be better than Iranian, Turkish, Georgian, and Russia maybe is more problematic, ambitious power than Sweden and Finland. Maybe, maybe. We can recognize all those things, but we have what we have. We sit where we sit.
We stand where we stand. Armenia borders on Iran, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan. All those borders are problematic. Two of them are open right now, but one of them is connected in the context of American-Iranian confrontation.
One of them is hostage of the Russian-Georgian dynamics. You started our talk with TRIPP as an obstacle for a Russian-American reconciliation, but it’s also a problem in the Iranian context that because hostilities in Iran are not over, by the way. And we are discussing the opportunities for escalation or de-escalation. But prior to the escalation, I suppose I talked with my Iranian colleagues when TRIPP was declared, was announced. with huge advertising campaigns and so on.
And at that time, Iranians were so skeptical. Maybe we knew, my colleagues said, we knew the region of the Caucasus, the problems of infrastructure, because TRIPP is not something making very fast. There is no real railroad there. Sometimes this railroad is broken, by the way.
It takes a lot of time to recover. I personally walked around those regions, Syunik and southern areas of Armenia. It’s a problem. And Iranians were so skeptical.
But after After Iran was attacked by Israeli and American troops, Tehran began thinking more seriously about TRIPP-like potential threat to the Iranian security, not only Russian, but Iranian, in wider extent, Greater Middle Eastern, by the way. It’s also necessary to understand that huge mistake of Armenian leadership is ignorance of different vectors confronting each other because the most popular word right now in Yerevan is diversification. God bless diversification for Armenia. It’s a good slogan, by the way, but if you invite to Armenia different powers confronting each other, you multiply instability in the region.
Instead of one ethnopolitical conflict not completely resolved, I mean here, a protracted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, you will get a lot of geopolitical rivalries. EU, Russia, Russia, United States, Iran, United States, and so on, so on. Inviting different friends who are not friends to each other, maybe rivals or enemies. You would multiply the unpredictability and risks and threats.
Asbed: There’s definitely a level of being oblivious to geography. I have a question about the TRIPP because we have talked to some analysts whom we asked, did the TRIPP replace Point 9 of the trilateral ceasefire agreement of November 2020? And they said, well, that agreement is completely invalid at this point because there’s no more Nagorno-Karabakh and there’s no more Lachin Corridor. Things have changed and that agreement does not really exist except on paper.
What is your thought about this?
Sergey: Interesting point, by the way, because the Trump administration tries to represent this initiative like novelty, like breakthrough. But prior to it, Russia a lot of times raised a question on unblocking the transport infrastructure. For example, in January 2021 there was a special trilateral statement by Aliyev, Putin and Pashinyan only on unblocking infrastructure, specially devoted to it. You can say, yeah, now no Nagorno-Karabakh and on the contrary, there is demonization of this region and many conditions which were topical in November 2020 and after until 2023 are not clear.
But I am not sure that key to the conflict resolution is in the Trump administration’s hands. Why? First of all, they tried to use this mediation or conflict resolution not like self-evident goal, but like tool, how to diminish competitors, the role of competitors. Not only Russia, by the way.
I’m Russian, but the color of my passport is not important in this context. Also, Iran and Turkey And this is why no special goal how to moderate effectively between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It’s point number one. But second point, problem of delimitation and demarcation of borders because many scholars and experts said that Armenian-Azerbaijani protracted conflict was over.
I’m not sure because a lot of points Problems are on the table, problem of enclaves, problem of delimitation of borders, because all states start with state borders, but it’s not clarified till today. The United States did not declare any interest how to resolve all those issues in practice. Moreover, point number three, I attentively read the treaty draft, peace treaty draft, initialed in Washington, D.C. last year, and I could not find some points on, for example, constitutional amendments. in Armenia, because it’s problem number one. Because Baku insists on the realization of constitutional reform, but this reform is not so popular.
Maybe we can discuss about popularity of Mr. Pashinyan and his party, absence or lack of popularity among his opponents, but the problem of constitutional reform is not so popular. It’s not coincidence that Armenian government postponed This referendum, maybe 2027, 2028, who knows, but the problem is on the table.
I suppose without Russia it would be problematic to realize in practice problems of demarcation and delimitation because the maps And the mapping issues generally are in hands of Russia, not in Washington, D.C., because previously Armenia and Azerbaijan were integral parts of the single country, Russian Empire, USSR, and problems of demarcation and delimitation took place at times, not under US auspices and so on. It’s not good, it’s not bad, it’s reality. And I suppose that all those factors show that the United States will not accelerate the peace and general stability, security in South Caucasus.
Because their priority issue is to ensure domination in Eurasia. Because for American strategic thinking, one idea is more or less clear. coalitions, no projects in Eurasia with no American presence. If American presence, yes, please. If no, we would do a lot of things how to diminish the role of competitors.
This is why key issue is treating of peace agreement and peace process like instrument, instrumental approach to this process. I understand that Russia also tried to ensure its interest in the region, but in terms of conflict resolution, interest of Russia is bigger because of proximity. It’s practical things, by the way, because Russia borders on Azerbaijan, does not border on Armenia, but Armenia even now is considered to be an important partner. Russia even now, under the crisis condition, does not reject brotherhood with Armenia or strategic alliance with Armenia.
Even Putin or Peskov repeated, okay, please, Armenian friends, you should make a choice. but we are open for continuation of our integration efforts and mutual multilateral and bilateral cooperation also.
Hovik: Dr. Markedonov, that’s an interesting point because I think that Pashinyan is able to… Some of the reasons why he’s able to successfully pitch this TRIPP is because it sounds grandiose. It sounds like Armenia is going to be an international player.
It’s going to have a major communications highway going through it. Now, logistically speaking, when Armenians… Of course, we have been for years thinking, I would say, limited in terms of contact with Russia because of just… geography and conflicts. For many years we’ve talked about the fact that the only road that connects us to Russia goes through Georgia and it’s snowed in some days, it’s under repair other times.
Now earlier this year we heard Russian officials talk about restarting the discussions around the Abkhaz Railway And, in fact, there was a conference in Abkhazia that I followed beyond words, beyond well intentions. How realistic do you think is it for Armenia to have a reliable rail link to Russia through Georgia, through Abkhazia? Is there any chance of Russia negotiating this with Georgia and opening that railway?
Sergey: Good point. I suppose both parties, Armenia and Russia, are interested to have this connection. It’s very comfortable. And in terms of technical development, it’s faster than the proposed TRIPP.
Because again, I walked around those regions on foot, by the way.
Hovik: It’s a beautiful place.
Sergey: Absolutely, but in some places in Syunik, this railroad connection is not working. It was destroyed, it was broken, by the way, and instead of it, some Quasi-autobahns or auto roads are existing. This is why it will take a lot of time to analyze the situation on the ground, to ensure business plan, to find investors, and so on. As for Russian-Georgian-Abkhaz railway connection, it’s more or less working, especially in Abkhazia, because Russia paid a lot of money to repair these railroad connection.
It was also devastated for a long time, by the way. But the problem is not economic. Economically, it’s faster and simpler than the proposed TRIPP, but politically, it’s a problem. Because the Georgian Dream and the current government of Georgia is disappointed by its efforts to engage Georgia on the right side of history against Russia and so on and so on.
And publicly, Irakli Kobakhidze, the current prime minister, as well as Shalva Papuashvili, chairman of the parliament, declared those intentions many times. All the Georgian leaders should take into account public opinion, because according to the last parliamentary elections results of 2024, about 38% of all voters were against Georgian It’s a serious resource, by the way. It’s not consolidated. No leaders.
Mikhail Saakashvili is in prison and he lost practically all his previous popularity and no new leaders. Today no, but tomorrow who knows. This is why all those things pushed Georgian government to provide very cautious policies. Because just recently, Georgia celebrated its Independence Day.
It was the first public speech of newly elected President, Mikheil Kavelashvili. And he specially underlined his independence. In some of his interviews he said, oh, yeah, I was educated in Russia, but please don’t treat me like the hand of Moscow, blah, blah, blah, and so on. It’s necessary for Georgian leaders to demonstrate, not to their supporters, but even opponents, guys, we will continue following the general line for Euro-Atlantic world and so on, so on.
We will do a lot, not depending on Russia. Politically, it’s a problem. It’s a big problem, by the way, because both Georgia and Russia are interested to develop contacts. Let’s see.
Georgia is… very popular resort area for Russians. Now we have some problems to travel around Europe, but Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan are very popular destinations and vice versa. Russia is one of the most important trade partners of Georgia and our turnover has grown for last three years. When Russia cancelled some restrictions for air flights from Russia to Georgia, we see the growing number of flights, not only from Moscow to Tbilisi, Moscow to Kutaisi and Batumi, not only Moscow, but St.
Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, some other cities of Russia. It’s one set of the issue, because with Georgia we have paradoxical relations. But the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is an obstacle, political obstacle, because recently the head of South Ossetia, Alan Gagloev, attended the parade in Moscow devoted to the Victory Day, and both parties Tskhinvali and Moscow signed a special agreement on deepening strategic ties. Just immediately, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Maka Bochorishvili, stated protest and condemned Russia for supporting occupation.
I’m not sharing this perception of occupation because, yes, Russia deployed its troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but we also should understand the choice of people living there on the ground. They disagreed to be part of Georgia and they had and have now a lot of reasons to follow these principles. It’s not bad, it’s not good again. I am not educating you to support South Ossetian or Abkhazian deal.
As for Abkhazian people, I am sure that it’s not so easy to talk on them how to unblock this railway connection, but it’s possible.
Hovik: Do you think Abkhazians are more inclined to agree to a deal than Georgians? Who is the harder party to convince?
Sergey: I suppose we should convince, first of all, Georgians, because Georgian political elites formulated some preconditions. No dialogue with no resolution of status of Abkhazia in South Ossetia. I suppose it was a huge mistake. It does not mean, it did not mean, it does not mean Georgia should reject any claims for territorial integrity.
It’s impossible. Taking into account public opinion in the country, the role of refugees, because refugees compose a very substantial ratio of voters in Georgia. It’s impossible to ignore this fact, be it Georgian Dream or the United National Movement. But the problem of keeping off political contacts with Moscow is a mistake.
It doesn’t mean that immediately Tbilisi and Moscow will find the best option how to resolve all the issues But it’s necessary to discuss the situation How to build relations beneficially for both parties Because transit potential is important for Georgia, by the way In the case of realization of TRIPP or maybe normalization between Armenia and Turkey, Tbilisi will lose its potential as transit hub. It’s also necessary to take into account pragmatically. It doesn’t mean that Georgia will recognize all the claims of Moscow, but pragmatic things.
Nowadays, I’m not sure that Georgians, Georgian officials, of course, are ready to do this pragmatic reconciliation.
Asbed: Dr. Markedonov, you’ve written that during Armenia’s June parliamentary election, Pashinyan is essentially proposing to reset Armenia’s nation-state project and the Armenian identity itself through a redefinition of the identity symbols as well as its domestic and international relations. He has bundled all of these into a project called Real Armenia, basically. Tell us, why do you see these elections as a systemic transformation rather than just a normal parliamentary election?
Sergey: Of course, first of all, we should take into account symbolic significance of this campaign. It’s the first campaign after de-Armenization. because the Armenian self-determination struggle was different from Georgia and Baltic Republic experience because in 1988-1989 Armenians began their fight not for liberation or escape of empire like Georgians or Baltic nations. They began fighting for compatriots for Armenians living in Azerbaijan.
This situation was characterized as a geopolitical maximalism of Armenia, but I understand the reasons behind, because Armenian nationalism, Armenian project in general, was born on the splits of big, huge empires, Persian, Ottoman, Russian, and so on. And the basic goal of Armenian national leaders was how to ensure existence of Armenians in their own state, where and when Armenians will predetermine their perspectives of the state and so on. This is why Miatsum was national myth, basic national idea of late Soviet and post-Soviet Armenia. And this myth dominated for a long time.
It did not mean that all people completely share this ideology, because after the victory over Azerbaijan in 1994, Armenia got in one package, not only victory, and replacement of image of victim, By image of winner. It was one part of this package, but in other parts were insularity, isolation, closed borders, huge waves of migration from Armenia to Russia, to the Western powers and so on. Blockade, problems with electricity outages and so on and so on. And, of course, people began reconsidering this myth.
It’s not coincidence that, at one point, Pashinyan did not appear from nowhere, of course, yeah? Because Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the first president of Armenia, raised the question of normalization with Azerbaijan, even due to the cost of territories and so on, so on. And from year to year Miatsum was treated not only like victory, like spirit of winners, but burden for development of Armenia. And Nikol Pashinyan was one of the leaders, opposition leaders that time, who raised this question.
However, when he came to power, he dramatically changed his previous approach, because previously, when he was a journalist, opposition leader, he said, why should we have our heroism and And our victories because we were weak after those victories and victims and so on. We should reconsider our foreign policy priorities. And at that time in 2016-17, Nikol Pashinyan raised the question. on secession from Eurasian Economic Union and so on. But then when he came to power he said once that Artsakh was Armenian and final point.
No other discussions. Because that time the Karabakh myth of Miatsum kept its strength and so on. Pashinyan followed this idea also. Maybe being Disagreed with this general vector and so on.
But after the catastrophes of 2020, especially 2023, this myth was destroyed, by the way, not completely, because it has kept like national trauma, because more than 100,000 Armenians left Karabakh, And they are reminders of this loss, catastrophe in Yerevan or some other regions of the country And the Armenian leaders, not only Pashinyan, but all the Armenian leaders faced a real problem about possibility to follow previous myth or to establish new one, by the way And Pashinyan, it’s necessary to recognize his Creativity, by the way. I’m not a great fan of Pashinyan, frankly speaking, by the way.
But it’s impossible to oversimplify the situation. He’s a very creative guy who could be nationalist and populist, socialist and liberal, pro-Western and pro-Russian. It depends on the place, on the concrete developments and so on and so on.
Asbed: How do you trust a person like this? How do you know who the real Pashinyan is?
Hovik: I mean, just two days ago, there was an article in Reuters that the CIA clandestinely is providing support to Pashinyan for Pashinyan’s safety. I want to suspect a little bit that it’s not just a few years ago. It has been for a while, but, you know, so, you know, anyway, that’s beyond the point. But I have trouble believing that This is the charisma of one individual who is able to change himself just for staying in power.
Sergey: In my modest view, he has real problems with strategy. He is a brilliant tactical master, but not strategist, by the way. And coming back to Real Armenia. And Pashinyan offered this idea.
And he tries to be a monopolist on a peace treaty and peace deal. And traveling around Armenia, he says every day to rank and file people, for example, Uncle Ashot or Aunt Granush, please, you lost your kids in Karabakh wars. As for your grandsons, granddaughters, no victims at all. I will ensure peace and so on and so on.
Because people, rank-and-file people, Aunt Granush or Uncle Ashot, are not specialists in strategy, geopolitics. They don’t really understand the price of this choice, by the way. I suppose that idea of Real Armenia looks attractive at first glance, but deepening your understanding, you face a lot of problems. For example, problem of diaspora, because the point number one of this concept starts with statement, the state of Armenia is your motherland.
But just recently we celebrated the memory of Martiros Saryan, a well-known artist, artist of world significance and importance. Maybe you know I am from Rostov-on-Don. I live together with Armenians because in our context there is a New Nakhichevan and Nor Nakhichevan community. We live with Armenians hand in hand and so on.
And I know Martiros Saryan who was He was born in Nor Nakhichevan or New Nakhichevan or Alexander Tamanyan, who established the shape of the Soviet Yerevan, which is subject of pride for many generations of Armenians. He was born in Yekaterinodar, the Kuban Cossack Host.
People from Diaspora Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the first President of Armenia, was born in Syria, by the way, and a lot of Communists from Lebanon and Syria returned to Armenia and helping seriously to recover Armenia after World War II, after Great Patriotic War, and so on, or Vartan Oskanian, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs, by the way, introducing the term complementarism, or Raffi Hovannisian. It’s impossible to ensure, I suppose, maybe politically everything is possible, but okay, it’s problematic to and dangerous to ensure a divorce between diaspora and Armenian citizens, because it was a long-time historical ties.
The question about the role of church, because when last Armenian states and statelets, Cilicia, Ani, and some other disappeared, Armenian Apostolic Church played a role of everything. Role of State, Role of Elementary School, Role of University, Role of Instrument of Literacy, Marriage and Divorces, and so on, so on.
Asbed: Yeah, it was the repository of our culture, essentially.
Sergey: Yes, it’s a repository of your identity, by the way, because it’s a very risky idea how to replace previous identity with long-time roots by a new one. It reminds me the experience of French Revolution and Soviet legacy when revolutionaries try to replace everything, please let’s go to our new world and so on, but even revolutionaries in France return to Catholicism and Napoleon was crowned by a Roman Pope, even taking into account his political pressure on these figure or Bolsheviks. Let’s see a restoration of patriarchy in World War II.
Even Stalin understood the unrealistic efforts to diminish the role of church and even Stalin made liberalization of state-religious relations, understanding the role of Russian Orthodox Church, Islam, Buddhism and so on. I suppose the revolutionary ideas maybe could look attractive, but in practice they ensure a lot of risks, unpredictability, and conflicts.
Hovik: Dr. Markedonov, so the Pashinyan regime has hyped up the fear of foreign interference in Armenia’s elections through so-called hybrid information warfare. He has solicited and attracted millions of dollars and euros from the West to fight against this. Some would say that what they’re doing is actually hybrid warfare, but Russia earlier this year started scaling up rhetoric against Armenia’s EU pivot as well and we have been witness to numerous statements from Russian officials including Overchuk that Armenia will face We know just how much of Armenia’s exports go to Russia.
All of that is clear. But just for our listeners, I want to iterate what the warnings are.
Basically, Armenians would no longer pay preferential prices for gas, petroleum products, or unrefined diamonds, which are Armenia is taking advantage of significantly right now the nuclear power plant which was slated or planned to continue until 2036 now they’re talking about 2031 and we’re of course we’re seeing increased inspection of Armenian products Armenian products are being turned away we talked about Armenian migrants but I think that’s the most sensitive one because there are many Armenians that go to Russia to work seasonal laborers And just a few days ago, I think, May 28th, there was the Astana meeting and the leaders there also repeated those warnings.
So my question is, I mean, it seems logical that you cannot sit on two chairs at once, right? We know that. But the timing of Russia’s complaints against Pashinyan’s EU pivot… Raised a lot of questions when in the past it was clear that Pashinyan was dead set in going in that direction.
Why did the Russian officials start talking about it just now? And doesn’t that also help Pashinyan? He can use that to pitch or increase the flame of anti-Russian rhetoric in Armenia right before the elections.
Sergey: Okay, I heard at least three or four separate questions from you, and each of them requires at least a series of articles, but I will try to be brief. First of all, let me add to your list of potential real benefits of Armenia cooperating with Russia, some more points concerning employment. For example, Russia ensures huge employments in Armenia. For example, Gazprom Armenia.
About 7000 people engaged in or having jobs. in this enterprise, or South Caucasus Railway, about 4.5 thousand people, or Zangezur Copper-Molybdenum Combine, about 5 thousand people, people having family members and so on. They are living and working in Armenia, but with Russian engagement. As for hybrid wars, frankly speaking, it’s one of my beloved questions, because this question is accompanied by a lot of traces of hypocrisy probably. Does Russia intervene in Armenian elections?
Of course yes. It’s not top secret. Why? Because it’s our strategic ally.
Of course we are interested to have a predictable strategic ally. Not inviting Zelensky with his claims to bomb Moscow. Sorry. Or to hear Ursula von der Leyen who asks to crush Russia on the battlefields and so on and so on.
Or to invite European Union leaders who organized one more sanctions packages against Russia and so on, so on. It’s our interest. Of course, you mentioned the factor of Armenian diaspora and Armenian community because Armenians are among top ten most numerous ethnic groups. It’s also part of our Russian political nation, civic, not ethnic, but political and civic nation.
Armenians serve in our army on the Ukrainian fronts. Armenians are our interpreters. Armenians are our officials, commanders, businessmen, actors, actresses, and so on, so on. Our cultural ties are very solid, and this is why our interest is clear.
But if Armenia is interested in the Caucasus, of course, it attracts interest of different players. If Hakan Fidan said, Nikol Pashinyan was a good guy, we should support him in terms of normalization, did it mean it’s intervention in electoral campaign? In some extent, yes, because Hakan Fidan, former chief of intelligence service, influential intelligence service of NATO country, and current Minister of Foreign Affairs demonstrated his willingness to have Pashinyan as the best option. Or Donald Trump recently in Truth Social said, we should make Armenia, not America, Armenia great again, M-A-G-A.
The implication of his popular slogan, make Armenia great again. Not understanding that this slogan is not so attractive for Turks and Azeris, by the way. Armenia great again, between sea to sea. Going back to the times of Tigran the Great or some other Armenian Battle of Avarayr and so on, the glorious times of Armenia.
It’s not so good for Azerbaijani and Turkish ears, by the way. But Donald Trump is not taking care of history, especially the South Caucasus and Eurasia. But can we say that it’s intervention? For example, let’s see, Rubio, Secretary of State, who attended Armenia 14 years after previous visit of Secretary of State.
Hillary Clinton last time was in Yerevan in June 2012. 14 years of great time between the two visits. It’s interesting that Russia is blamed for intervention. Yeah, Russia again has its interest and tries to predetermine the political choice in this country also. However, Russia is the only country who has not appointed the candidate on this campaign Vladimir Putin talking on Nikol Pashinyan said Nikol Vovaevich please ensure the engagement of pro-Russian politicians not naming Kocharyan, Karapetyan, Tsarukyan and so on Tsarukyan is pro-Russian entrepreneur okay but Tsarukyan ensures a lot of Jobs for Armenians inside Armenia.
Having good relations with Russia, maybe he will enlarge his enterprises with new employments, new opportunities for Armenians. But no mentions of Tsarukyan, Karapetyan, Kocharyan. European leaders, American leaders and diplomats as well as Turks-Azerbaijani people said Pashinyan is our guy.
Asbed: They full-on endorsed him, absolutely. That’s a very clear, explicit interference in meddling in Armenian affairs.
Sergey: Let me briefly finish because, again, three or four questions requiring articles. And a question about Russian restrictions, Russian measures. I suppose they are ambiguous. On the one side, it will be a signal for Armenian society, entrepreneurs, politicians, decision makers.
Guys, please take care. Russia is important and our relations are good, but they could be changed. changed if your behavior would not correspond to the standards of brotherhood, friendship, strategic alliance, and so on. It’s one side of the problem. Other side of the problem, opportunities to play the games around the flag.
Because every time, if some forces outside of your country try to make pressure on you, you would reject all those things. And I wrote in my articles and in my oral presentations that it’s ambiguous and risky, because let’s imagine that one party represented by our immigrants will provide Russian Dream organization in Washington, D.C. Maybe being critical to my government, I will reject this initiative because it’s American. It’s not an initiative within my country.
It’s my country. I have a lot of troubles with my government or with my leadership, but it’s my choice. No, it’s not American interest and so on. This is why it’s risky because some Armenians, not many or But some Armenians could have some doubts in Russian political behavior and so on.
And they could vote maybe emotionally for Pashinyan. There is such a risk, I suppose.
Asbed: Yeah. So you’re partially answering my question already because many laws have been passed in the last few years in Armenia. which are now being used to frame individuals as foreign agents, meaning they are pro-Russian, and anti-government speech and sentiments as being part of this hybrid war, meaning that they have pro-Russian views. Is Russia concerned that this Real Armenia project of Pashinyan is architecting a society that views Russia and Russians as enemies?
Sergey: Maybe not enemies, maybe not right now because it’s also necessary to understand that some people who are Russia lovers or have sympathies to Russia also vote for Pashinyan for domestic reasons, not connected with geopolitics because electoral campaign is not about clear definition of your geopolitical preferences. You could be for Russia voting for Pashinyan and you could be for European Union voting for other groups and parties and so on. It helped us to explain why Pashinyan is so careful to Eurasian Economic Union. He said, I am in favor of continuation of this membership.
For Russia, what was the key problem? The efforts to be a part of European Union, while expressing readiness, willingness to play in ideological games of European Union enjoying cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union. Kind of gap between aesthetic things and pragmatic, yeah? It’s necessary to clarify preferences, I suppose.
Maybe we can at least differentiate remedy and disease, but the problem of disease is, as for Real Armenia, maybe we could treat this exercise like maybe methodological or scientific endeavor how to find identity, but the problem that Real Armenia is oriented to cut ties with historic Armenia. But phenomenal historic Armenia is connected with Russia, a lot of ties. I mentioned Saryan, Tamanyan, Loris-Melikov, and so on, so on, yeah? And moreover, one of well-known and popular American historians of Armenian background, Ronald Suny, said that Armenian SSR was established on the ruins of genocide.
Being American, he recognized the role of the Soviets, Russians to promote Armenian identity, to protect Armenian identity. What did Pashinyan do? Blaming Karabakh people, Artsakh identity or Miatsum, he identifies this choice with External hybrid wars. He said that, for example, conflict between Turkey and Armenia is a product of KGB.
Sorry, KGB did not exist when Abdul Hamid was Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. Sorry. Yeah, or he said the Artsakh idea was intervention of the Soviets after 1945, after the victory in World War II. It was not corresponding to Armenian values.
Excuse me, but Karabakh was a part of Armenian reflection long time before 1945. And by 1945, Karabakh was a part of Azerbaijan, by the way. It’s also necessary to understand.
Asbed: Well, I realize that the current flames of animosity may be the result of an election campaign, but we have seen that the Moldova model is being applied to Armenia right now, and Moldova is after the election, and they’re not any friendlier to Russia, as far as I can see.
Sergey: Yes, this is why it helped us to explain why Russia is so active Russian government is blamed, especially inside our country, for a reactive politics. Russia answered, responded for Saakashvili’s activity or Sandu’s activity and so on. And many people ask, guys, please be proactive, making some signals, build some infrastructure of relations, not only responding on some signals from outside. As for Moldova and Armenia, yes, some parallel existed and once my good friend and colleague Ashot Safaryan from Sputnik Armenia interviewed me on the subject of parallels between Moldova and Armenia.
There is one principal difference between Moldova and Armenia. Results of Moldovan elections, both parliamentary and presidential, were ensured due to support of diaspora. People who lived a long time in Italy, Germany, France, United States sent their voices to Maia Sandu’s support. It’s interesting that some days ago some local electoral campaigns took place in Armenia and the representatives of ruling party failed because no diaspora factor, only people living locally.
As for Armenia, there are some Obstacles for diaspora engagement. Otherwise, people from Russia, Belarus, some other republics, republics of Central Asia could vote and I’m not sure that the civil treaty party will win in this situation. This is why one principal difference.
Hovik: Dr. Markedonov, this has been a very interesting discussion. I want to ask one last question before we leave.
Sergey: Last but not least.
Hovik: Last but not least.
Asbed: Actually,
Hovik: if you have time, we would love to continue and we’ll definitely be asking you to come back on very soon. If you could think of anything that was done wrong over the last, let’s say, five years or three years in terms of Russian foreign policy towards Armenia, are there any mistakes that you can identify that Russia could have not done in order to have a stronger position in Armenia and not have these problems with Pashinyan and so forth?
Sergey: Good question, by the way. Of course, being a defender of Russian viewpoint, because it’s not enough represented, by the way, the problem you can hear from voices from United States and France, Russia is not rather represented. However, I see one crucial problem in our relations. I mean here maybe very slow reaction on the second Karabakh war.
I suppose it’s one of the crucial problems because this war should be stopped immediately. Maybe that time Russian attention was dispersed and no concentration. Maybe there were some things that, okay, we will resolve problems of Ukraine quickly, then return to Armenia and South Caucasus in general. I suppose this slow reaction was a problem.
And okay, even understanding the restrictions for Russian resources and opportunities, maybe At least on the terms of rhetoric, Russia should be more active. Again, I have a lot of questions to my government, to my country and its behavior. However, I see no clear alternatives to Russian-Armenian cooperation, beneficial for both sides, because other proposals, Trump’s or Macron’s, are instrumental again. They treat Armenia like Very minor part of greater puzzles in the South Caucasus, greater Middle East, and so on.
For Russia, Armenia has and had and will have, I suppose, its own value, its own value. Of course, understanding all the Russian interests behind, but this element of neighborhood strategic interests are clear. Again, not beneficially only for Russia, because jobs in Gazprom Armenia or South Caucasus Railway or Kavkaz Cement led by Tsarukyan and so on, or money transfers or opportunities to work seasonally in Russia and so on, so on, are existing now not for Pashinyan and Putin, but for so-called and Uncle Ashot. Not in hypothetical perspectives described and portrayed by European politicians.
Asbed: Professor, let me interject really quickly because I believe that during the 44-day war, President Putin actually reportedly negotiated two ceasefire agreements. I think I’m working from the top of my head around October 4 and October 17, which Pashinyan did not accept.
So I think that from that perspective, President Putin Russia was fairly active where I thought maybe Russia was probably could have been ahead of the game was with the inflammatory rhetoric with which Pashinyan was heading into the war saying Karabakh is Armenian and rewarding generals like never before for let’s say the July clashes and things like that where possibly Russia could have said look this is not going to be helpful And in September, almost everybody except Pashinyan was apparently aware that there’s going to be a war.
Sergey: I agree with you. It’s an interesting situation when… You are an advocate of Russia in a bigger extent than myself, yeah? But you’re absolutely right that in October Russia’s offers at that time were more interesting, attractive, effective in terms of Armenian interests because, for example, Shusha was a part of Nagorno-Karabakh only with oral recognition of potential returning of refugees and so on.
Yeah, you’re absolutely right. But I suppose there are complex of issues. One of them is destruction of Karabakh or Miatsum myth, the problem of loss of war and responsibility. Every politician tried to redistribute responsibility favorable for his or herself.
And, of course, for Pashinyan, it’s a beneficiary to say, okay, Russia was responsible. Russia was traitor. No, not ours, not our responsibility at all. It’s not honest, by the way.
And I suppose, and I am repeating again my previous thesis, the Armenian leadership in 2022 especially made strategic miscalculation, believing that Russia is losing everything, Russia is no name in the Caucasus, Russia is emphasizing on the Ukrainian issues, and we should find new friends. But now it is time to finalize those efforts. No new friends. Only instrumental efforts to diminish the role of Russia and to build in Armenia in the scheme of containment of Russia.
I’m not sure it corresponds to the Armenian interest. Okay, forget about Russia and its imperial ambitions and so on. It doesn’t correspond to Armenian interests again. Let’s see on Georgia.
Georgia’s example is more than clear.
Asbed: All right. Well, that was a great conversation. Dr. Markedonov, thank you for joining us on the Groong podcast.
We hope to have you again soon.
Sergey: Thank you so much for this invitation. Maybe our talk was a little bit emotional. I suppose it’s so hard to keep off emotions.
Hovik: These are emotional times.
Sergey: Emotional times, of course. And I told you about my personal biographical particulars. I was from Rostov. I have studied Armenia and Armenian-Russian relations for a quarter of a century, by the way.
Yeah, I’m not so young. And, of course, it’s interesting and I am more than happy to have this dialogue in English because nowadays we are living in the time of monologues. Monologue in Russian, monologue in English. And you gave me an opportunity to enlarge my personal audience Thank you, my special thanks, and I hope people of Armenian background or maybe American, French, Polish, and so on will hear from me some useful ideas.
Okay, disagree with them, but at least listen to them.
Asbed: Listen, that’s right. Listening is very important. And as for Russian-Armenian relations, after hundreds and hundreds of years, they are passionate relationships.
Sergey: Yes, we survived a lot of crisis, by the way, but if we wanted to overcome them, we did, and we will do.
Asbed: Thank you so much.
Sergey: Thank you.
Asbed: That’s our show today, recorded on May 31, 2026. We’ve been talking with Dr. Sergey Markedonov. He’s a historian and analyst specializing in Russia’s foreign policy, the South Caucasus, and post-Soviet conflict regions.
He is a leading research fellow at MGIMO University’s Institute for International Studies and editor-in-chief of International Analytics. He has served as director of the Department for Problems of Ethnic Relations at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow from 2001 to 2011. For more information on the participants, check out his bio on our show notes at podcasts.groong.org slash episode number and follow the links.
Hovik: Thank you everyone for joining we hope you liked this episode and as always we do our best to bring you good content like this if you appreciate that please consider supporting us podcasts.groong.org slash donate and please don’t forget to first make sure that you’re subscribed and also like comment and share so that we are seen by more people thank you very much I’m Hovik Manucharyan. And I’m Asbed Bedrossian. We will talk to you soon.