Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed: Hello everyone. Many of Russia’s friends are under attack. Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, Syria and all of that just in 2026. And much of its periphery is at risk as former Soviet states are heavily courted or actually pressured into anti-Russian relationships with the West, the US and the EU.
In this Conversations on Groong episode, we’ll discuss the current global geopolitical storm. We’re joined by Dr. Anatol Lieven, who is the Director of the Eurasia Program and the Andrew Bacevich Chair in American Diplomatic History at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
Hovik: Thank you for listening to us. And I would just like to urge you to subscribe, ensure that you’re subscribed, like, comment and share this podcast so we can get in front of more eyes. Vamos. On with the show.
Asbed: Dr. Anatol Lieven, welcome to the Groong Podcast. Hello.
Lieven: Glad to be here.
Hovik: Honored to have you, Dr. Lieven. And let’s just start our discussion with Ukraine. You know, I want to get your thoughts on the 90-minute discussion that Putin and Trump had last week on the issue.
From Trump, we heard the usual bluster that a deal on the Ukraine war would happen very soon. And then we heard that Putin offered help on Iran, but Trump didn’t echo, I think, that sentiment. Meanwhile, just this Monday, yesterday, Zelensky is in Armenia, from where he threatened that Ukraine would use drones on the Victory Day Parade in Moscow, on the May 9 Parade in Moscow. How do you see this war ending?
Is it up to Russia? Is it up to Ukraine? Or is it up to Russia and the US? And who decides how many more Russians and Ukrainians have to die before the conclusion of the war?
Lieven: Well, I mean, as far as I can see, there is one still impossible Russian demand, and that is that the Ukrainians should withdraw from the whole of the Donbas. Now there is a certain tragic absurdity to this because you know this is a very small area and frankly you know towns that nobody had heard of before the war. I used to drive through them without noticing them frankly on the way from Kharkiv to Donetsk or Donetsk to Dnepropetrovsk. But it has become a matter of immense symbolism for both sides.
I was told in Moscow that without even capturing the whole of the Donbas, it would be very difficult for Putin to claim that Russia has achieved a real victory in this war after such huge casualties. But on the other hand, it is morally and politically impossible for the Ukrainians to withdraw from territory that they still hold and for which they have made such immense sacrifices. So we seem to be stuck on that.
And contrary to all previous expectations, it doesn’t appear that the Russians can actually break through and capture, you know, even the rest of the Donbas, because drones in particular have completely transformed the nature of war. and made accumulating the mass for a for a breakthrough suicidally dangerous. I mean, it is still possible that the Ukrainians will simply run out of men. But, you know, with drones, men are simply much less important. If it were simply a question of manpower, the Ukrainians would have lost long ago.
Now, the other possibility is that the US will Well, it may be compelled to cut off arms sales to Europe to provide Ukraine. We don’t know how Disastrous that would be because you know the Ukrainians are producing a lot now themselves and the Europeans are helping what would be disastrous for the Ukrainians is if the US cut off intelligence support especially satellite intelligence but that doesn’t cost America anything and that would you know have to be a decision by Trump uh really to uh to punish Ukraine and the Europeans.
Now, he may do that, you know, we see that he’s extremely angry with the Europeans, but he seems to be trying to punish them in other ways rather than via Ukraine. Now, there’s another factor involved, however, and I think myself that Zelensky’s Threat to attack the May 9th celebrations if actually carried out would be a disastrous mistake because the Russians, contrary to much Western reporting, have not in fact used their full firepower against Ukrainian cities.
You only have to compare the Russian campaign with what the Israelis have been doing, for example, to see the difference. but uh they could uh and if Zelensky were actually or the Ukrainians were to attack you know the Victory Day celebrations which inevitably involves uh you know civilian casualties in Moscow I think the Russians would simply you know lose all restraints now the thing about that is from a Ukrainian point of view that doesn’t win Russians the war I mean and obviously it Alienate still further the population of Ukraine.
But of course, the more damage Russia does to Ukraine, the more money will be needed for Ukrainian reconstruction whenever it actually begins. And the more Ukraine’s chances of joining the European Union, if it ever can, will be delayed. And as the Russian fears and anger shift from the US to the Europeans, Keeping Ukraine out of the European Union becomes as important to Moscow as keeping them out of NATO. And in fact, they’ll never get into NATO because the US simply will not guarantee them.
Nor will the Europeans, by the way. On the other hand, of course, Putin is under increasing domestic pressure from the growing economic crisis in Russia, inflation, war weariness, his popularity is sinking. He is being criticized in public, even by some old allies. So, I mean, my sense is, if the Russians could capture the whole of the Donbas, they would stop.
They would declare victory, you know, do a deal and stop. But it seems they can’t. There is… I mean, Europe could play, I think, a much more important role, a positive role, if it were to offer As Bart De Wever, the Prime Minister of Belgium has suggested, the normalisation of relations with Russia, the lifting or suspension of sanctions and the resumption of energy purchases from Russia, that would be a great incentive, especially if of course tied to America doing the same thing, to Russia to give up its unacceptable demands and make peace.
But the Europeans still seem to be thinking that, you know, if they can go on and on supporting Ukraine, that Russia will eventually collapse. Or, of course, it’s simply that having, you know, talked and talked and talked and talked for four years about the impossibility of doing a deal with Russia, the present leaderships now find it impossible to do so.
Hovik: Dr. Lieven, speaking of the Europeans who have just pledged another 90 billion to Ukraine, what is their strategy? Is it just to hold ground and hope for some change as a result of the midterm elections in the US and hopefully swaying the decision in Washington more towards the EU? What’s being hoped for by the EU?
Lieven: Yes, I mean, it’s that, that Trump will come under sufficient domestic pressure to change his policy towards Ukraine. And I mean, by the way, there are powerful factions within the Trump administration who want to do that.
I mean, one of the big stories of recent months… above all of course as demonstrated by the war on Iran but has been the return of the neocons under Trump which nobody expected at least well I say I didn’t expect it and they of course uh you know hate Iran but they also hate Russia well they hate everybody they hate Russia China they’d you know anyone who mildly disagrees with uh with America uh so the Europeans you know can hope for that uh They also hope, as I say, that Putin will come under such domestic pressure that he will, in fact, give up his demand for more territory and that you may still have a peace settlement, but that it will be one that can really be presented as a Russian defeat.
Or if, of course, the Europeans can go on you know not just for one year but for two years producing the money they hope that if this war goes on you know through 20 2027 and 2028 that the Democrats will win in 2028 and basically you’ll go back to Biden and full support for for Ukraine so that is some that seems to be the the the European approach but of course There’s a big wild card there which is that next year in France we have presidential elections and we don’t know of course what a Rassemblement National government would do as regards Ukraine but we do know of course that they’ve been at heart much less enthusiastic about support for Ukraine they are very hostile in many ways to the existing EU leadership of von der Leyen and they would be very hostile certainly to any moves by the European Union that would require significant economic sacrifices by the French population so conceivably that could change things in the opposite direction but we just don’t know
Asbed: Professor, you mentioned the resumption of possible trade relations between the EU and Russia as something that was proposed by the Prime Minister of Belgium. Do you think that is really possible or do you think that the US would sabotage something like that? Because the US has been a key beneficiary of the stoppage of that relation now that they’re selling all their liquid natural gas and everything over barges to the EU. There are all these conflicting interests between the West, let’s say, which is not just a monolithic thing.
There’s the US and the EU as their own poles, and then there’s Russia.
Lieven: Oh yeah, absolutely. There would be two things that would act against that. The first is simply if the economic situation in Europe and Of course, and the rise in fuel prices as a result of the Iran war becomes so grave that there just is massive pressure from European business, European populations for the resumption of Russian energy. Because you see the damage being done to Germany, you see the damage being done to Britain.
More and more people, even people who are committed in principle to radical action against climate change, are saying that the existing cost of energy in Britain is one fundamental reason for Britain’s inability to grow economically. That’s one factor. The other would simply be, in Trump’s mind, the balance between US economic interests and his desire for a peace in Ukraine that he could present, of course, as a great success for him. But just at the moment, part of the problem is, you see, that we thought this Trump administration was going to be much more effective and disciplined than the first Trump administration.
And on domestic policy, I mean, it’s of course made terrible mistakes, but yeah, I mean, there has been a certain unity of purpose. But on foreign policy, I mean, who’s to negotiate peace in Ukraine? You know, that was handed over to Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law, Kushner. Now they’re now completely occupied with, you know, negotiations with Iran, which they don’t understand either.
Marco Rubio the Secretary of State he’s both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor but it’s not at all clear on these issues what he’s actually doing if anything because he doesn’t seem to be responsible for the negotiating process Vance Vice President was supposedly leading or playing a key role in negotiations with Iran but he seems to be to have been shoved to the side and I mean his his role has been significantly diminished and just at the moment nobody you know I mean still occasional conversations taking place, but there is no negotiating process at the moment over Ukraine between you because the Europeans won’t talk to the Russians and the Americans don’t have anybody who can talk to the Russians I mean obviously what Trump should do is Find a professional diplomat who can do that.
But the level of distrust in the Trump administration for the traditional State Department is such that they wouldn’t rely on anybody. They know very well how detested Trump is in the US Foreign Service. You could just hand it over to Rubio, but then again, does Rubio even want peace in Ukraine?
Asbed: Right. He is a key neocon right now in the administration.
Lieven: That’s what I mean, these deep, deep divisions in the Trump administration and the return of the neocons who do not actually want peace.
Asbed: Right, right. Professor, last month, Viktor Orbán lost a key election. He lost the prime ministership in Hungary. He was a nationalist who was seen as refusing to arm Ukraine against Russia and continuing to do business with Russia, energy relations, trade relations, despite various sanctions.
Is his departure from the scene going to affect any kind of relations between Russia and the EU? Do you see that as any kind of a seminal event?
Lieven: Well, I mean, he was obviously playing a key role in holding up the EU loan package or aid package to Ukraine so from that point of view yes but you know in some ways even more significant was the question of what to do with Russia’s suspended assets 300 billion or so you know held within the EU but actually held in Belgium And there it was not Hungary, it was actually Belgium and France which blocked seizing those assets and giving them to Ukraine. There is a good deal more resistance to really going overboard for Ukraine in Western Europe than necessarily always comes out in public.
And as some sensible commentators have said, You know, to some extent, Orbán was a very convenient scapegoat for the West Europeans. You know, they could put all the failures to help Ukraine on him, rather than having to take responsibility themselves. So, I mean, that’s the first thing. The second thing is, Hungary was important, but it’s a hell of a lot less important than France.
You know, if the French elections next year lead to a really significantly new French policy, that will completely eclipse, you know, the role of Hungary. Oh, and finally, of course, on, you know, Hungary buying Russian energy, the new Prime Minister is equally determined to go on doing that, and the Europeans are so happy to have got rid of Orbán that they’ve
Hovik: You talked about Iran just a while ago. I think the current state is that there are tensions, but the ceasefire still seems to be holding. There was some news about ships being attacked in the Strait of Hormuz, but it doesn’t seem clear to me how the negotiations are going. I guess it’s good that guns aren’t blazing, but What’s your assessment in terms of the trajectory of negotiations and do you see a possibility for a diplomatic off-ramp?
Lieven: There’s a possibility I mean I think the latest thing that’s been happening is you know Trump trying so often to you know present himself as tough and successful you know by ordering American warships to escort these, you know, vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. And, you know, well, the US has actually attacked, destroyed a dozen or so Iranian boats.
But by the look of things, you know, there are a very limited number of ships that the US Navy can escort and as long as you know the Iranians can be confident of holding up 90% say of the traffic through the Strait of Hormuz they can still bring huge pressure to bear on the world economy and therefore the US economy if the US were really able to you know convoy The great majority of the trade, that would be a different matter unless they deploy a much bigger part of the US Navy.
And secondly, of course, they would have to be prepared at some point to lose ships, or at least risk severe damage and significant casualties, which so far Trump has been desperately anxious to avoid. I mean, the I mean, the key problem is, I mean, I think there’s a perfectly reasonable deal to be done, but it would be along essentially along the lines of the JCPOA, you know, 2016. Well, since Trump tore up the JCPOA and described it as a disaster, I mean, maybe Trump is capable, you know, and we have seen this before, of carrying out what amounts to a surrender and then presenting it as a great victory.
But of course, the other wild card is Israel, because clearly the Israeli agenda is still, you know, the radical weakening or even destruction of the Iranian state. They don’t want to compromise. And, you know, in any peace deal, Trump would have to be prepared, you know, really to get tough with the Israelis and tell them, you know, to call off their war in Lebanon. Because without that, it would be very difficult for the Iranians to make peace.
But finally, of course, this negotiating team, Witkoff, and still more, of course, some Kushner, Kushner, a close personal friend of Netanyahu. Netanyahu even stayed in his bedroom. Who is Kushner representing in these talks, actually? Yeah, it’s crazy.
Madness. I’ve never seen anything like it in the entire history of diplomacy. Well, I suppose if you… Medieval times, maybe.
Well, yes, in which you never knew whether the Duke of Brittany was really on the side of the King of France or the King of England, maybe. But you would have to go back that far. I mean, there’s been nothing like it in modern diplomacy, at least not in public. There have been endless sort of traitors, but they did maintain a certain discretion about it, shall we say.
Hovik: Dr. Lieven, I was going to ask whether we can confidently state that Iran has survived this war, but I think you actually used even a stronger term. You said it’s a defeat for Trump. But then following that, I think I want to ask, is a nuclear Iran an inevitability at this point, especially coming from the perspective of Iranian decision makers?
Lieven: Well not I think in the short term because you know if Iran were to really drive for that the you know the war would go on Trump would simply have no choice and of course you know the Iranians have declared again and again that they don’t actually want nuclear missiles I mean they clearly want the capacity to I mean it could take could take generations but eventually the US will simply get tired of this you know it will get well you see it in you know in the population already will get tired of
Asbed: About the question of Putin offering Trump to maybe take ownership of the nuclear stockpile from Iran and Trump refusing that, why is that?
Lieven: Well, from Russia’s point of view, it makes excellent sense. Russia is helpful to the US, it’s helpful to Iran. This was, by the way, part of the JCPOA negotiations as well. I mean why Trump has refused I mean it’s very difficult to say what’s going on in his head I don’t know if you saw an interview with Tucker Carlson in the New York Times came out day before yesterday I think and Carlson you know said he had you know lots of long conversations with Trump they used to be very close and he couldn’t actually work out what Trump was thinking about Iran because he seemed to have understood that war was a bad idea.
He’d certainly run on that platform before and yet he seemed to be somehow bewildered or not. And this ceasefire on the one hand Trump declared that the US was going to blockade Iran. Clearly, at that point, Iran was going to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. The only way to keep the full ceasefire going and also to reopen the Strait was for both sides to exercise to exercise full restraint.
Now, of course, on the other hand, the Iranians may have had and may have in future no choice if they want to raise the money to restore their economy. But it does just seem that Trump is still hoping for some kind of really significant, if only, symbolic victory. And for Trump, no doubt, On the one hand, if Russia could help him out of this mess, he could use that as a justification for pressing for a new effort to gain peace in Ukraine and for normalizing relations with Russia. They helped us, we helped them.
Transactionalism, which is supposed to be what Trump is all about. But whether he is capable of thinking in this joined-up way. And of course, I mean, Russia would exact a price for that. It would expect something in return.
But I suspect that the basic problem is just that Trump still does want, hope, dream of And a peace settlement that depended heavily on Russian aid would not be seen by the world as a Trumpian victory.
Asbed: So just as the US is sort of a beneficiary of the break between the EU and Russia, it’s benefited in this energy trade gap, let’s say. It seems like Russia has maybe benefited In an interview a couple of weeks ago, I think it was Dmitry Peskov who said that Russia is not a participant in the Iran war. It’s not our war, he argued. And as cynical as it sounds, Russia should extract maximum benefits from the Iran war.
What does Peskov’s statement really mean? Is the Russia-Iran relationship strategic or is it transactional?
Lieven: Oh, highly transactional. I mean, all this ridiculous talk in the US and in Western security circles of an alliance of authoritarians or alliance of disruption between China and Russia and Iran absolute nonsense there’s been you know significant cooperation in certain areas you know obviously the Iranians sold Shahed drones to Russia in the Ukraine war Russia is probably helping Iran you know with satellite intelligence I don’t you know after the help that America has given to Ukraine you know help which has killed Russian generals you know led to huge economic damage to to Russian infrastructure.
I don’t think it could stop the Russian military from giving some help to Iran, but they’ve kept it very discreet. They clearly still want to try to keep good relations with Trump. So yes, this is a very transactional relationship. I think on the Iranian side as well, there’s very little for Russia in The only question is how much practical benefit can Russia extract.
When it comes to the increased earnings from Russia’s energy sales, that is important. I think a year ago it would have been much, much more important, but it seems that in the meantime The Russian domestic economy is in such trouble. Inflation has risen to such an extent and war weariness has grown in the Russian population to such an extent that the increased earnings from oil, of course they’ll help, but they can’t simply sustain You know, the Putin administration to carry, you know, to go on and on and on and on with this war.
I do think Putin wants out of it now, but of course, you know, it must be admitted, you know, Russia has I think, above all, simply because of Russia’s failure to advance on the battlefield, its inability to do so. There’s this line that Putin is still pursuing his maximalist demands. No, he isn’t. The Russian maximalist demands were for the whole of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.
Well, before that, it was obviously much bigger still. Now, in territorial terms, it’s just for this tiny sliver of the Donbas. They’ve agreed to a huge Ukrainian army and whether the Ukrainians can actually support an army of that size. But, you know, so many of the of the initial points, you know, for example, Russia was demanding at Istanbul in March 2022 being given up.
But I think that’s the problem, as Russians tell me, you know, Putin has scaled back Russian ambitions so far that it’s more or less you know come to a come to a halt all right and I think unity the offer of help to America over Iran is you know is a Russia hopes that that would actually get you know shift America but as I say you know America is too distracted at the moment and the Europeans seem implacably stuck on their their existing line
Asbed: Dr. Lieven, the third big power in Asia, another partner for Iran and Russia is China. It’s also a major stakeholder in open trade routes and corridors through the region. And in your op-ed in the LA Times a month ago, I think it was April 4, right?
You noted that Beijing has so far been careful not to arm Iran and not to stir up any regional conflicts or to exploit even America’s difficulties in the region. Now, if the US continues with this naval blockade on Iran, how long can China stay out of it?
Lieven: Well, as a matter of fact, I just spent two weeks in China, in Beijing and Shanghai and asking, you know, the Chinese, Chinese officials, Chinese experts, think tank people just this question. And I mean, there are differences in China, but the certainly the official line in private as well as in public is still extreme caution and prudence. They really do not want to get into a clash with the US. They don’t know who would significantly support them.
They were really emphasizing that there would be no Chinese military aid to Iran because you know I obviously asked some earlier in the Ukraine war after a conversation in which some of the Americans were getting very angry with the Chinese about China supporting Russia allegedly in Ukraine with trade and dual use technology and
Hovik: And afterwards,
Lieven: this Chinese official said to me quietly, you know, I do hope your colleagues realize that if we were actually to support Russia, Russia would win this war in three months. You know, I mean, China could give so much, so many drones, missiles, ammunition to Russia that it would just be game over for the Ukrainians. And so I basically asked them, Are you tempted to do that for Iran? Obviously, if the Chinese were really to help the Iranians, you’d have half a dozen American warships at the bottom of the Indian Ocean.
But they really don’t want to do that. Even the ones who do want China to play a more active role are really stressing multilateralism. Now, can they stick to that? I think at the moment they’re hoping that domestic pressure on Trump will basically push the US into an agreement.
They wouldn’t like it, but they don’t regard paying a toll to the Iranians. as a permanent toll, as something that they have to fight against or really reject.
I think that what they’re hoping is that if the world economic crisis, particularly in Asia, becomes sufficiently bad they could lead you know an international coalition not a military one but a diplomatic one to put pressure on the US this would then greatly strengthen their hand with Europe you know because they worry a lot about Europe joining in US sanctions against China and of course it could be a wonderful opportunity for them to lead India or at least I mean you know restore relations with it with with India on Chinese terms even perhaps you know if if the energy crisis gets bad enough even perhaps with Japan and South Korea to a degree so there’s a lot you know the Chinese have a lot to play for diplomatically through caution and wait wait and see I suppose it’s conceivable that when the war is over, you know, the Europeans are talking about, you know, guaranteeing the security of the Strait when the war is over.
Possibly, I mean, China might propose something by the United Nations, you know, with the Chinese role there, but not to fight, of course, but, you know, for China to to play a security role in the region. But my whole sense from my talks in China was that that is as far as the Chinese will go. They will not run serious risks over Iran.
And of course, an absolutely key reason is that they know that if You know, if they do things in the Middle East that really, really annoy the Americans, and Trump in particular, there is a risk, I mean, especially Trump being Trump, that he will respond by, you know, for example, recognizing Taiwanese independence. And at that point, all the Chinese say, that’s war, we have to go to war, you know, have no choice in the matter, we would have to fight. They know that, of course, that would be taking a colossal risk. They really don’t want to do that.
Because even if they won, the economic damage would be catastrophic. And then again, if it looked as if they were winning, the chances that America would resort to nuclear weapons would be Very great. So, you know, for the Chinese, as they said to me again and again and again, for us, everything comes back to Taiwan. You know, Taiwan is it.
Not that they are determined to seize Taiwan in the short term. Everybody I talked to denied that. They said, no, no, all this talk of Xi Jinping being determined to get Taiwan by whatever it is, 2029, is wrong. But Making sure that Taiwan does not declare independence and does not, you know, get American bases on its territory, that is absolutely central.
To prevent that, they are prepared to do anything.
Hovik: Dr. Lieven, coming to the South Caucasus, where I think regional states, especially I’m talking about Armenia and Azerbaijan right now, are posing complications or challenges, let me just say, for Russia and Iran in terms of geopolitical policies. I want to take us back to after 1990.
In fact, in Trita Parsi’s book, The Treacherous Alliance, he was talking about how after the Soviet collapse, Tehran feared that Israel would get a foothold in the South Caucasus but it feared that Armenia would be the conduit through which that happens and ironically it was Azerbaijan that for many years has become essentially a very strong and close partner with Israel and even today the Aliyev regime maintains that deep strategic partnership Armenia meanwhile was once seen as Russia’s partner and aligned with Russian and Iranian interests it has shifted under Pashinyan and following the 44 day war in Karabakh and his recognition of Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan which is unfathomable to many Armenians still it triggered a cascade of geopolitical changes and we’re talking about mainly I think right now trip This Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.
The Azerbaijanis and Turks call it Zangezur Corridor. I think it depends on how different parties see the legal framework of that corridor, which is still ambiguous. But in the context of this war on Iran, Can Tehran realistically tolerate Azerbaijan’s deepening alignment with Israel? And initiatives like TRIPP, it sounds like essentially a US project meant to encircle Iran.
Or could the South Caucasus become a renewed front for confrontation?
Lieven: Well I mean there is, though, one very important additional factor there, and that is Turkey because you know Turkey is still obviously very important for Azerbaijan more important in the end than Israel by a long measure and also obviously the you know the the real economic driver of TRIPP in the end is that it should go through Armenia to Turkey, that it should become part of a whole east-west corridor between Central Asia and Europe through Turkey. Now, Turkey is, of course, by now on very bad terms with Israel. And this isn’t just Erdogan.
It is also, of course, because The entire Turkish establishment loathes the Israelis apparently at least preparing or encouraging the Americans to back Kurdish rebellion in Iran, which would contradict every central Turkish interest and security doctrine. So the Azerbaijanis have to keep that in mind.
Hovik: as well. You know,
Lieven: they’d be making a fool’s bargain if they, in the end, chose America and Israel over Turkey, while at the same time alienating, well, making an enemy of Iran and, of course, at the same time alienating Russia. Then their position would be hopeless. I think that they have enough basic sense and caution to understand that. And if they don’t, I think Ankara will be telling them.
So it seems to me that the Azerbaijanis will probably continue to play a relatively restrained approach. They will not, for example, become openly the source of attempts to create a rebellion in in Iran because that of course is the is the huge danger from from Azerbaijan as far as Iran is concerned I’m not saying that it would work because you know the the Azerbaijani population is is very well integrated I mean the Khamenei family by ethnic origin but I mean even the the the The threat of it would, well as I say, it would directly infuriate the Iranians and indirectly the Turks.
As far as Armenia is concerned, I’ve been covering the Caucasus for, oh my God, how many years now? 34. No, no, 36. I first went to Armenia in the autumn of 1990, when it was still the Soviet Republic. And what I have observed over these years is that, you know, of course, countries in the region operate under tremendous external pressures.
But in the end, they do make up their own minds and they change. to their own minds. One of the amusing things is that if you take Georgia and Armenia, it’s almost as if the Georgians are Armenians, whatever one does at a given time, the other is determined to do the opposite. For so long, Armenia, as you say, was very much in the Russian camp, and Georgia was bitterly opposed. Now, the Georgian Dream government is widely seen as not moving into Russia’s camp, but certainly very anxious for good relations with Russia.
And of course, under this government, Armenia has become bitterly anti-Russian. Well, give it 10 years and maybe it will have all swapped around again. We have to see how TRIPP will go. Obviously there are great potential advantages for Armenia as long as it doesn’t involve paying some terrible price to Azerbaijan.
And as long as it doesn’t, you know, involve actually, you know, an east-west or cutting the north-south corridor. Because I do remember, you know, I was also in Armenia, you know, during the terrible winter of 92 to 93. And it was Iranian energy, above all, which, you know, kept Armenia going then.
Hovik: Did you say Iranian energy?
Lieven: Yes. Armenia and Iran have been neighbours for what? 2,500 years? Depends on how you judge it. 3,500 years. Hell of a lot longer than America has been in the Caucasus.
So keeping that I think balancing multi-vector, as the saying goes now in parts of the former Soviet Union, especially Central Asia, a multi-vector policy makes excellent sense. But I’ve never believed it was in the core interests of Armenia to put all its eggs in one basket, either in the Russian basket or in the American basket. Because, well, I mean, As we see, Russia was not nearly as reliable as Armenians thought it was. But look at Trump.
Can you really regard the United States as a reliable partner now?
Hovik: Some would argue that it wasn’t fully dependent on Russia to protect Armenia but Armenia had agency in this as well many Armenians I think mistakenly assumed that Russia should have protected them when there were miscalculations on the Armenian side as well but the result of this shift by Pashinyan if the intention was to obtain geopolitical strength by switching poles from Russia to the United States. It seems completely the opposite has happened. Armenia has been severely weakened, if not outright dismantled as a result of the war.
And it seems the current leadership is constantly appeasing Azerbaijan, essentially capitulating to any demand. And what’s worrying is that the status quo seems to be acceptable to major players like the EU and the broader West. Of course, I would say, you know, if Pashinyan is saying, you know, Azerbaijan is OK, whatever they’re demanding is OK, then why should they risk their relations with Azerbaijan when Armenia itself is not posing a challenge? But I mean, I see Armenia accelerating towards more capitulation.
How would you assess, maybe I’m wrong, how would you assess the sustainability of Pashinyan’s model of so-called peace when all it is, in my opinion, is just concessions?
Asbed: Appeasement.
Lieven: Well, I mean, the critical issue obviously there is Azerbaijan’s claim to parts of Armenia. to more you know to Armenian territory in Armenia proper on which you know if you look at the the rhetoric of the Aliyev regime it has sort of gone in one direction and then the other I mean clearly what Washington and and Europe are are strongly opposed to that and you know that if Azerbaijan were to do that Well, firstly, I mean, I don’t think that, you know, the Pashinyan government could could surrender Armenian territory. I mean, that’s unheard of in international affairs.
But and also, I think that Azerbaijan really would, you know, isolate itself. But yes, I mean, I have said this to Armenian officials of this government who of course are so angry with Russia for not fighting for Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh well nor did France nor did the United States nor did anyone nor of course tragically has anyone ever Historically, you know, despite so many promises and statements.
But of course, the other key thing is simply that, you know, Armenia has always been, you know, just by where it is and Russia’s lack of other allies, very important for Russia, not necessarily in ways that have been good for Armenia, but at least, you know, Russia has to care America doesn’t have to care you know one of the things that the the last few years have revealed of course is that the Armenian diaspora is you know has less influence in the US and you know had been thought and hoped uh you know when it comes to actually dictating US policies I mean well there’s this whole debate of course was it a mistake to nail themselves to the genocide issue so much rather than to the interests of the Armenian state but that’s a question for another time but a Georgian friend said to me years and years ago now sadly I mean he was a filmmaker you know which of course gave him a particular perspective but he said you know in the Soviet solar system We were like Venus.
We were really important. We had a great image. We were the source of wine, fruit, but also we had an image. We had tourism.
Everybody in the Soviet Union knew about us. Georgian cinema was something. It counted. All these things.
He said in the American solar system, We’re an asteroid. We’re Pluto. Russia thought about us, if not every day, certainly every week. Lucky if even members of the American establishment think about Georgia once a year.
That, I’m afraid, applies to so many places. Or, of course, when they do in the US Congress, it’s only to adopt some stance that will allow them i.e. the individual senators and congressmen or congresswomen to make some kind of name for themselves and prance about. It ultimately has very little to do with real support, let alone knowledge of the countries they’re dealing with. They are basically using them as glove puppets in their own domestic drama.
That is a sour reflection after, you know, I said I’ve been covering the Caucasus for 36 years now. Well, I’ve been covering, you know, Washington, D.C. for 26. A somewhat disillusioning experience, I have to say.
Hovik: Dr. Lieven, I just want to… Respond to that. You know, look, both Asbed and I are descendants of Armenian Genocide survivors.
Most Armenians are members of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Now, diaspora policy aside, whether it could have been more pragmatic, more realist, that policy aside, the major poles of Armenian identity, whether it is the Armenian Genocide, whether it is the struggle for historic justice in Artsakh or even the church are being dismantled not just by Aliyev but Pashinyan and by dismantling I mean even in the real form I think two weeks ago one of the main cathedrals in Stepanakert, true, built after the war, but still it was demolished completely and even Pashinyan himself said well that’s their territory they can do whatever they want.
I mean I’m paraphrasing but that was the gist of it. I can assure you that for many Armenians that’s catastrophic, really. Now I mean we can talk about the reasons why people aren’t rising up but do you think it’s possible to have to follow Pashinyan’s line of narrative that forget about Armenian Genocide Forget about Karabakh, we’re going to close the chapter completely, not even care about the rights of return, of security, of residence of Karabakh, and even cultural artifacts.
I haven’t seen examples where a war on identity has been so successful, short of, let’s say, the… the Japanese, I mean, that took a nuclear bomb, right, in Japan, and in Germany it took a complete capitulation, but it seems like without any major military, most of Karabakh was handed over just on paper. Pashinyan is essentially implementing these policies. What do you think about the sustainability of these attacks on identity? And is that possible to take root?
Is it possible to reshape identity in that way?
Lieven: You know, I’ve been in Hungary recently. I actually was based in Hungary for a year way back as a journalist for the Financial Times. As I’m sure you’re aware, you know, by the treaties that ended the First World War, Hungary lost more than two thirds.
Hovik: But they still have a political party called Tisza and no one is telling them not to look towards the river Tisza, just like Pashinyan is removing Mount Ararat from the passports and everything. That’s the difference, I think.
Lieven: Yes, but the thing is that you will never remove from the Hungarian consciousness The idea of the Kingdom of St. Stephen, the idea that whatever you want to call it, Kolozsvár in Transylvania is a Hungarian city. But it has been accepted on a pragmatic basis that the There is no chance of actually reconquering these territories for Hungary. Now, of course, thanks in part to the European Union, despite tensions, the Hungarian minority in Romania enjoys far greater.
Well, the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan doesn’t exist anymore, of course. I’m half Irish. You know, if you ask most Irish people, you know, is Northern Ireland part of Ireland? The answer is yes.
You know, should Ireland be a united country? Yes. Can we actually make that happen at present? No.
And so, you know, we have to get on with Britain, we have to get on with the Ulster Protestants, we have to… A lot of Irish people don’t like that at all. You know, military reality is military reality. I mean, I would have a somewhat different attitude if there was any chance of Armenia and Azerbaijan both being members of the European Union.
I mean, at that point, you can actually bring serious leverage there and appeal to European rules. But of course, without that, Well, you know, also if you’re in the European Union, as Orbán demonstrated, you know, you can, well, you can really glue up the works and force them to listen to you. But of course, all that, you know, the Europeans are interested in really, really, in the end, you know, as far as Azerbaijan is concerned, is energy, you know, especially since the Ukraine war. And they have demonstrated again and again their willingness to throw their talk of peace and international law into the waste-paper basket.
I think it’s foolish and unnecessary of the Pashinyan government to carry out new symbolic steps of submission, if you like, like taking Mount Ararat off the banknotes, because it clearly infuriates sections of the population and the diaspora, and it’s humiliating. It’s foolish of this or any other Armenian government to recognize military reality which is you know that the Armenian army was defeated and that it would be just as it’s you know Ukraine can hold its existing lines against the Russians But it is foolish to dream of being able to defeat the Russians and reconquer its lost territories. Militarily, that just does not look possible.
And that being the reality, Armenia’s realistic options remain diplomatic manoeuvres.
Asbed: Dr. Lieven, thank you for your time. It’s really too bad that our connection was so weak today, but hopefully we’ll piece it together and we appreciate your time and your insight. Hopefully we’ll get to talk under better network weather sometime soon.
Lieven: I do hope so. And if anything brings either of you to Washington, let me know.
Asbed: Okay. Very good, and we’ll talk to you soon. This episode was recorded on May 5, 2026. It’s really too bad our connection with Dr.
Lieven was so bad. He is the Director of the Eurasia Program and the Andrew Bacevich Chair in American Diplomatic History at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He also served as a member of the Advisory Committee of the South Asia Department of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and is on the academic board of the Valdai Discussion Club in Russia. He holds a BA and a PhD in political science from Cambridge University in England.
For more information, of course, you can go and click the links at podcasts.groong.org slash episode number.
Hovik: Please don’t forget to subscribe and also like, comment and share to help amplify our show. And we hope you liked this interview. Thank you very much. I’m Hovik Manucharyan.
Asbed: And I’m Asbed Bedrossian. We’ll talk to you soon. Bye bye.