Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed: It’s election season in Armenia. Break out your beer and popcorn or ponchiks and piroshkis and sit down for Conversations on Groong. It’ll be fun for the entire family. Mikael Darbinian is a political scientist and former U.S. diplomat having served at the U.S. embassies in Argentina and Russia as Vice-Consul.
He’s currently serving as a security advisor for the Strong Armenia Party and he joins us today for an interesting conversation about those issues.
Hovik: And very quickly, please make sure you’re subscribed, like, comment and share so that we can expand our reach. We really appreciate any support you can give. And thank you. On with the show.
Asbed: Mikael Darbinian, welcome to the Groong podcast.
Mikael: Thanks for having me.
Hovik: Welcome, Mr. Darbinian.
Asbed: Mr. Darbinian, This is your first time on our show, so it’s traditional for us to ask you. Please tell us a little thing or two about yourself, your work, your interests, your background, so that our listeners can get to know you a little bit better.
Mikael: Yeah, well, first of all, it’s a pleasure to be on the show. I follow you guys as well. I know a lot of Armenians follow you guys. You have a really big audience.
Thank you. I’m one of them. It’s good to finally see you guys face to face. So yeah, I’m a former US diplomat.
I served in Argentina as a Vice-Consul and in Russia as a Vice-Consul during the whole year of 2023 and 2024. In Argentina, during the whole COVID crisis time, 2021, 2021, 2022. I’ve worked for three different governments, the Spanish, the Armenian and the US governments in four different diplomatic missions. It was basically consular work, so I’ve been in a lot of consular missions.
In Argentina, for example, I was issuing visas in During that time, lots of visas, tourist visas, study visas, things like that. While in Russia, it was a different case because it was at the height of the U.S.-Russia diplomatic crisis. We didn’t have enough staff. We weren’t issuing visas, so it was basically just looking after US citizens.
ACS, American Citizen Services, visiting US prisoners in prisons, attending trials. You know, different things you renew passports and things like that. In LA, I lived in LA as well. And I worked at the Spanish consulate in LA also on visas, giving Schengen visas and managing as a vice head of the visa department there.
And then I worked at the Armenian embassy in Madrid. I lived in Spain for about 10 years, I I studied there at the Complutense University. So I have a bachelor’s in political science and then my master’s I did at the same university and in international relations. I lived in Artsakh in Nagorno-Karabakh.
I worked for the HALO Trust. If you guys know the HALO Trust, it was a humanitarian NGO from the UK which basically cleaned and disposed of unexploded ordnance, mines, shells, things like that. So that was probably one of the most rewarding jobs for me. I was able to visit almost everywhere in NK.
Yeah. I spoke with villagers. I used to do interviews with them. So…
Okay.
Hovik: Mikael, I’m just very, very interested in your background, and you were in Russia and all these other missions at some very critical times. Do you have any interesting anecdotes or episodes that you can share with us?
Mikael: Look, in Russia, I’ll tell you this. You know, diplomacy tends to be reciprocal. So one side does one thing, the other side does a reciprocal thing. So when we went to, when I first was assigned to Russia, when we walked in Russia, it was, what day was it?
It was in January. It was in January 2023. It was dead winter. It was probably minus 15 centigrade outside.
I walked into the consulate it looked like a ghost town complete ghost town it was a huge consulate normally but look it’s open source information I can say this normally the embassy would start for about 1000 1000 employees diplomatic diplomats different types of support stuff but we had about I don’t know, maybe 10% of that, about 100, 150. So it had gone down because of the bilateral crisis and the US limiting Russian diplomats and Russia limiting US diplomats, tit for tat. It was like a ghost town. So I walked in, it was a huge, huge consulate with computers, everything, but there’s no one.
It was dead quiet. It got scary. It would get scary at moments because you’re waiting for someone to go there. And you walk into some of the rooms sometimes and you just see Coca-Cola sitting there where the people just left it, you know, who knows when, like a year or two before that, you see, you know, someone’s handwriting on a piece of paper that they were taking notes about something that they just left.
So that was kind of eerie. It was kind of strange because it’s probably one of the most observed areas in the world. Same with the Russian embassy in the US or the US embassy in China, the US embassy in Russia is probably, you know, the most one of the most third or fourth most observed areas in the world in terms of intelligence and things like that. I mean, I can’t go into those details, but in any case, it was it was kind of strange efforts because you’re going into a country where you represent, you know, a country that’s the adversary of where you are.
And it’s kind of weird. You know, you walk into a store and, you know, Luckily, I wasn’t really taken as an American and typical American because I speak Russian as well. So it was a lot easier for me. But it was kind of weird just walking into sometimes these places.
I went to Vladivostok a couple of times for a hearing and just walking normally in the streets. I mean, people there, they have no idea who you are. They don’t know you’re a US diplomat. You know, what’s a US diplomat doing in Vladivostok?
And yeah, just speaking to normal people and as a normal person. Not everyone can do that, obviously, because, you know, I speak Russian. That’s why it was a bit similar to I lived in Turkey as well. After my student years, I was interested in kind of assessing how Turkey is.
And I went there as well as an Armenian and that was kind of similar to that where, you know, you’re an Armenian, you’re in Turkey and everyone around you is Turkish. At first, it was kind of a strange feeling like, you know, if these guys knew I was Armenian, what would they do? Or if these guys knew I was, you know, the US diplomat, what would they do? But I think you adjust quickly.
So I think that’s in general, I think it’s always good to be able to adjust to the situation and, you know, put it behind you and So,
Asbed: with this present level of experience, you would expect that Mikael Darbinian is 75 years old.
Hovik: Were you there for the prisoner exchange, for Paul Whelan’s exchange?
Mikael: Yeah, I was there. It was 2024, I believe. I was there. I had my small contribution to it as a consular officer.
It was Evan Gershkovich, it was Paul Whelan, and also Alsu Kurmasheva. These three were US citizens. As consular officer as well, I would visit them in prison. Also, I’ve been to her hearing, but I hadn’t seen her in prison.
To Paul Whelan, I’d visited the ambassador as well and things like that. So I got to know him as much as you can know from the other side of the window. Open up something. I used to actually prepare his care packages.
His family would send care packages and I would package it up and personally walk it out to the post office and send it to him because we had major staffing gaps. We had no one to do it. We had to do those types of things. So, and I was, you know, I was kind of the youngest, maybe the strongest, let’s say I was doing that mainly.
But really, yeah, Evan Gershkovich as well. I met him a couple of times.
Hovik: Wow, so here you are, and now you’re a security consultant for the Strong Armenia Party that is participating in these upcoming elections. That’s great. Can you tell us a little bit about your role exactly? What is your role in the security team?
Well, I think you are an advisor to the security team for Strong Armenia. Tell us a little bit more about that.
Mikael: Yeah. So just to clarify from the start, I myself, I’m not a member of the party. I’m an independent security advisor. Security in the sense of not physical security of people there, but formulating a security concept because All parties, all governments and all parties, they have to have their own program, right?
Like they have their, you know, security program, the economic program, what they want to achieve, what type of economic goals they want to achieve, what social programs they want to bring for the, you know, citizens and security wise as well. Where do you see how you want to build up the armed forces and things like that. Deterrence capabilities. I’ll go into that as well.
But so I’m part of the security security campaign security advisor alongside a couple other people, Artur Avanesyan, Kandaz, his nickname.
Hovik: Who is currently in jail.
Mikael: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Or actually it’s kind of a hard time because I worked alongside him for so much time and literally seeing the same guy and all of a sudden he’s not there. So Artur Avanesyan is an excellent person to work with. I’m very easygoing, direct.
I’m alongside him, I’m alongside, we have two other foreigners as well, a Greek expert Special Forces Officer, Efthimis Turtidis. He’s very tactical as well, but he’s also on the operational scale. We also have the former head of the Israeli anti-air defenses, Tzvika Haimovich. They’re outside, but they’re also consultants when needed to formulate the security concept.
My role here is because of my background, academic and and diplomatic background, I contribute to, I formulate, for example, foreign policy and deterrence related to that not just foreign policy because we have experts we have Armenian local experts for Armenian foreign policy and things like that but as for like deterrence and security wise I contribute to that you know what you have to kind of focus on overall security if it’s energy security if it’s food security infrastructure you have to take all of that into consideration and I’m also a risk analyst sorry I work as an OSINT analyst. I’ve done so for different companies.
And so as a risk assessment, carrying out risk assessment, you have to consider everything, not just military, but you have to consider, you know, if a road is blocked, are you going to have another road? Do you want to put in the program that you guys are going to build a few more roads? Things like that. Yeah.
Hovik: In fact, that’s how I, you know, I was watching the security presentation by Strong Armenia and that’s how I first learned about you in that presentation you said and I’m trying to quote no lasting peace is possible without a stable and developed national security system strong armed forces and a skilled diplomacy tell us more about your understanding of that statement and also how your background you know plays into that
Mikael: Yeah, exactly. That was the 18th of March, I remember, the start of our security program. So strong armed forces and skilled diplomacy, that speaks of deterrence. So every country has to have some type of deterrence.
Deterrence can be considered like a means of persuading an adversary of not doing something that can harm you, broadly speaking. You have an adversary, you have Azerbaijan, you have this or that country, You want to persuade that country or dissuade that country so they don’t attack you. You can do that through military means, you can do that through diplomatic means if you have really good alliances, if you have Russia, EU, China, India. Very broadly speaking, to make it very simple, you call your Indian, the head of India’s head of state, you say, Can you speak to my neighbor?
He’s trying to threaten me. Or you called the European or Russian head of state and say, hey, my neighbor’s amassing troops on the border. Tell him that he shouldn’t be doing that. Broadly speaking and very simply, this can be diplomatic, for example.
This can be considered diplomatic deterrence, having really good ties with big powers that can affect the outcome that can actually dissuade. You can also use lobby groups in the US. I mean, it’s very big, obviously, lobby groups, pro-Israeli lobby, arms lobby, pro-Armenian lobby. You have that as well that can fit into that as well.
You can make use of these types of groups to persuade a government to then talk to another government, the adversary, to not carry out, you know. So deterrence normally has the diplomatic aspect, but it also has a military aspect. And, you know, Karl von Clausewitz, one of the major military historians and theoreticians, he said, and it’s not only him, it kind of follows the logic as well, when diplomacy breaks down, you go, you result on conflict. And so deterrence has diplomacy and also has the military.
So for some reason, through diplomatic measures, your colleagues can’t call them, you have the military, military might, you have anti air defense, you have ballistic missiles, you have prepared troops to go and actually, you know, either punish or deny the adversary of being able to carry out what he wants to carry out. There’s one other aspect of deterrence, but it doesn’t really relate to Armenia, because you have to be a big power to have it. That’s economic. You know, sanctions.
The U.S. has that, for example, also has, I consider the economic aspect of deterrence as, you know, very valid for the U.S. because it can sanction other countries and persuade them or dissuade them to not do something. It doesn’t always work. Many times it doesn’t, but, you know, it’s one of the ways, tools that they have. In my background, in this sense, So, since my student years, besides just reading as a hobby and my master’s thesis, I wrote it on the US-Russian foreign policy confrontation in the South Caucasus.
This was 2015-2016. And eventually, I I thought that eventually these two can come to a clash. If there’s no other force, eventually they may come to a foreign policy clash. It doesn’t mean military, but it seems like things have kind of changed with a different variable now with Ukraine, because US kind of went to Ukraine, the Europeans, it’s kind of a long, long thing in this sense.
My experience in foreign policy and deterrence comes from my education, my master’s thesis, also working at the embassies because I saw how diplomacy works, how you call colleagues, you call counterparts from different countries, you sit down, you talk, one says this, one says that. So I can’t really open that one up too much, but from my experience in that, I can see that having really good Really good counterparts, countries, you know, alongside you helps.
Hovik: One more question about this security team that Samvel Karapetyan has. Obviously we’re talking about advisors. There’s you, former U.S. Vice-Consul.
There’s the Israeli General Haimovich. There is a Greek, you know, Greece is part of NATO. There is a Greek military person. And then there’s Kandaz.
So I mean, there’s this perception that Samvel Karapetyan’s team is very pro-Russia, but it seems like he has been able to gather a very non-pro-Russian team, or at least based on the background of the people involved. So how did that come about?
Mikael: Well, it just kind of breaks the myth of him being pro-Russia because, I mean, yeah, he always has capital in Russia, but he has capital in Greece, he has capital in other parts of Europe, in the UAE as well. So it’s not just having capital in Russia, but it breaks the myth right there. That’s what many people say. Many people don’t know that, but he has capital around the world.
And second, I’m kind of quoting him. I may be missing a couple of words, but Samvel Karapetyan basically said, you know, Armenia has no right to be on bad terms with any with any global power. And so, I mean, I think he as a businessman, self-made businessman, he’s been able to see a lot of things that I personally haven’t seen or, you know, others that if they haven’t been in that position, they hadn’t seen. But I think he kind of bases himself on the logic of being on good terms with different countries and not depending just on one country.
That’s actually the party’s whole One of the main focuses for the party, especially in terms of security that we’re in, is don’t rely only on one security guarantor. Russia is great to have, but also US, but also China, but also Iran, but also EU. see if you can you know create several different security partners and that way you’re not dependent on only one if something breaks down for some reason you know one of the security partners is tied up or for some reason can’t help you know you don’t stay alone and you know face the challenges so in the current environment I
Hovik: mean the current regime essentially I think has managed to degrade Armenia status diplomatically and strategically almost with anyone involved even with the EU I think Armenia is at a position of an alms seeker trying to get you know like you know anything it can you know in terms of the Armenian society when you ask the Armenian society who should Armenia be partners with there was this You will find an equal number of answers. Some said EU, some said Russia, some said US. So there is no alignment in terms of the public on foreign policy related to security.
I’m not even talking about Armenia diaspora relations which I would think are very important security but you know you in your speech you called for a mobilization like this you said that this is an Armenian Pearl Harbor moment and we need to mobilize our national potential do we have any potential left after Pashinyan that we can mobilize assuming that the opposition can come to power
Mikael: Yeah, and on this end, maybe it would be more correct for me to speak for myself and not for the party, although there may be overlaps there. But speaking on behalf of myself only, there is potential. I see potential. And actually, I think the party also sees potential in that, in lots of people.
And so in speaking about on my behalf potential, we have lots of, you know, lots of educated people. We have really good diplomats here. Honestly, I’ve met people here that, you know, just blow you away. It’s it’s tremendous.
You know, it’s incredible. People, for example, with Middle Eastern studies or former diplomats or, you know, this or that or You know, sociologists, you know, that have years of experience and you talk to them and, you know, you wonder, you know, how we have so much potential. There are lots of experienced people here, but they’re not being used. They’re not being used to do what they like to do.
So I think Pashinyan and his government is not about that. He’s about putting, you know, we’ve at least what I’ve seen is assigning people loyal to him to maintain basically his rule, his power in different security ministries or this and that ministry. So I don’t see him making any use of this potential. And I know lots of people that would simply not collaborate with him.
And that’s a huge loss. And that’s why I think, personally speaking, the 7th of June, he has to go through elections. going through. Armenia has seen lots of failures with him.
Asbed: He’s a very divisive person. I agree. I agree. Mikael, what is the role of the diaspora in this national potential that you see?
Mikael: There’s a lot. There’s a lot. So members of the diaspora from LA to Moscow to Spain to Argentina, for example, experts, lots of experts there, you know, people that bring different ways of thinking that here in Armenia is a bit different. You know, Armenia, it’s a small country and not everyone is able to go out and travel or, you know, work alongside French people, Russians, Americans or, you know, different And I think you learn a lot from working with different people.
And what the diaspora can bring is innovation. Innovation in a sense of new ways of thinking, new ways of doing things, new relations, for example, Marketing, economy, technology, just broadly speaking, new ways of thinking. I think that would be a huge potential for Armenia to be able to enrich what we have or what Armenian society has now. I think it’s fundamental actually for the diaspora to be able to contribute to further development of all of this.
Asbed: I want to talk about the sovereign territory of Armenia that’s been invaded since 2021. Approximately 252 square kilometers of Armenia’s territory proper has been invaded, essentially, including critical heights that give Azerbaijan fire control over Armenian villages and infrastructure. Your analysis shows a staggering amount of sovereign territory is currently occupied. Can you walk us through The strategic implications of the 103, I think you have said, Azerbaijani positions currently inside our borders.
Mikael: Approximately, yeah, yeah. So, we know that after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, you know, the Pashinyan government ceded Karvachar and the Lachin area. Actually, Lachin, some of Lachin was already taken militarily, but ceded Karvachar, Karvachar, to the Azeri side without a shot being fired. He ceded that territory, which is right next to Gegharkunik.
The biggest gold mine in the South Caucasus was under Armenia’s control inside Armenia. Karvachar is right along Gegharkunik and other villages as well and as he ceded that territory he ceded that in November of 2020 Monte’s birthday I’m sorry? Yeah, yeah. That’s true.
Hovik: Monte Melkonian’s birthday, I think November 25th.
Mikael: Yeah, it did coincide. Now that you say it did coincide. So he ceded those territories. There’s lots of snow because the majority, a good portion of those heights there are about 3,000 meters above sea level.
Two and a half thousand, 3,000 meters above sea level, that’s very high. And there’s lots of snow that melts only in May. So So it was ceded in November in 2020 and spring comes the next year, late April, early May, and Azeris, you know, they wait for the snow to melt and they just walk, in some areas literally just walked on into Armenian territory and just, you know, pitched a tent and military position and that’s all. Without any resistance, the issue here was Again, another failure by the Pashinyan government.
They did not secure any border positions. I mean, knowingly, having ceded these territories, Azerbaijan, eventually you’re going to have an issue like that. They’re going to walk up on the border. He did absolutely nothing and just soldiers would with a small trench dug up by themselves with a shovel standing in the middle of nothing with literally nothing, no tents in some areas, no tents, no fortifications, absolutely nothing.
So it was ceded and Azerbaijan slowly came in, you know, in some areas they just walked across the border and stayed along those heights. In other areas, there were clashes. I think you guys saw my presentation then on the 25th of March it was. So in 2021, 2022 and 2023, there was a series of clashes, border clashes, about five or six a year and a lot happened.
If we consider a border clash like a one day, two day occurrence or more, there’s numerous that happened. Throughout the years, Azerbaijan basically slowly, slowly invaded in some areas, just walking across or shoving, pushing, you know, Armenian soldiers. Armenian soldiers, they weren’t able to, from what I’ve seen and from what I’ve heard, they weren’t able to respond because they had orders not to respond,
Asbed: not to shoot, not to,
Mikael: yeah. And there comes the September 2022. September 2022, Azerbaijan invaded It was a two-day invasion. It seems like nothing for a country like the US or Russia, which big powers are involved in armed conflicts, but for Armenia, two days is big.
In these two days, they were able to break Armenian defenses, which were minimal. And, yeah, come to acquire 80 square kilometers just outside of Jermuk. And the 252 square kilometers that I measured, it’s actually the territory between the military positions. So it’s the midpoint between two military positions.
If you actually count up to the Armenian military position, it’s even more. Because in any case, it’s rendered useless, this land, because you can’t even use this. I’ll get into that. I’ll tell you guys a story in a second as well.
But so basically, how did it come to how did Azerbaijan come to, you know, gain to occupy 252 square kilometers? I mean, its government basically did nothing after the 2020 NK war. No border, no, no borders, no fortifications, no mobilization, nothing. And just ceding one after another.
Asbed: And they lied about this, by the way, to the people, because they said that they had fortifications, they said they had border guards and everything, but they didn’t.
Mikael: Yeah. It’s bad. It’s actually really bad. Even now, even now, you have a lot of border positions that, I mean, that’s not where- Well,
Hovik: there are reports, I’m citing 168, that say that for some positions, Armenian soldiers have to actually be allowed to go to their post and come back through Azeri military. I don’t know if they frisk them or whatever, but it’s ridiculous.
Mikael: In a couple areas, yeah, I think. I think in the Tavush area, for example, and maybe in Syunik.
Asbed: Mikael, I don’t mean to interrupt, but what’s the plan to deal with this invasion of our territory?
Mikael: What’s the plan? The party’s plan or a general plan?
Asbed: A general plan of strong Armenians to deal with this issue.
Mikael: Strong Armenia, the whole security, the security concept of it is defensive. It’s not offensive because Armenia is a small country in itself and even having Azerbaijan next door Azerbaijan has very strong diplomatic ties with lots of countries, has a huge GDP, lots of income, has the latest technology and arms that Armenia stayed behind these past several years. And so militarily speaking, I think the party is tilting more towards diplomatic means, having good allies. I mean, it’s obviously Obviously having really good partners and finding new partners is fundamental for the party.
That’s actually part of the plan as well. Strengthen, not strengthen, but recover our relations with some of our partners because they’ve gone really sour. You know, so recover our relations with some of our partners. find new partners, maybe in Latin America, maybe in Asia, and in general have, for example, major powers, U.S. and U.S., Russia, who are still kind of negotiating over the Ukraine. Why can’t they negotiate over Armenia?
You had the Minsk Group, it was the U.S., Russia and France, Obviously it’s a bit different now, but nonetheless, you know, major powers, all countries have their interests. So I think part of the plan is that converge different powers and, you know, make sure converge different powers that have overlapping interests in the region. So they kind of lose security and, you know, through negotiations come to that eventual result of that.
Hovik: Yeah.
I mean it’s it’s I strongly agree with that and the fact is that if the Armenian government says you know this border post is not really important for us this church in Stepanakert we’re not gonna say anything about it I think foreign powers are elated because there’s no pressure on them to do anything so the number one point the primary defender has to be Armenia Trying to state that those are red lines those are important for Armenia and then foreign governments will some will follow others won’t but when you have an Armenian government that is capitulating then it actually removes the burden on anyone else to why should why should Spain or why should China spoil its relations with Azerbaijan if the Armenian government is actually basically echoing Aliyev’s words but
Asbed: I think even Russians said we can’t be more Armenian than Armenia.
Mikael: Yeah, you mentioned red lines. Sorry, I just want to mention this one really quickly. You mentioned red lines, and actually part of the foreign policy as well for deterrence, because deterrence, as we mentioned, has the foreign policy, has diplomatic, and it has military. One of those is red lines, you know, a foreign policy with red lines, which we don’t see right now, but that’s what the party wants to bring.
Red lines, non-negotiable, you know, to have alongside that, you know, strong military to speak from a position of power as well.
Hovik: Yeah. I want to move us forward to this idea of the TRIPP, which Pashinyan, Trump route for international peace and prosperity. The Azerbaijanis call it the Zangezur Corridor.
Pashinyan is pitching this as a regional connectivity solution and everyone is echoing that again because why should the Russian government say hey you know I know you’re implementing regional connectivity but it’s only east-west you know how are you going to connect to us how are you going to connect to Iran no one is saying anything about that and you argue that I think diplomacy works when the homeland is strong and I’m going to read another quote from one of your speeches. You said only the balance of strong armed forces and skilled diplomacy can help create effective deterrent mechanisms.
Can you tell us a little bit more about that and especially in the light of transforming this corridor trip from the Zangezur Corridor, what I think the Turks perceive it as, to a real regional interconnectivity solution. And also, sorry, and how this differs from some of the other opposition ideas, for instance, Robert Kocharyan also has similar ideas, but I think on record, Samvel Karapetyan has been the most open in accepting TRIPP, but saying that security guarantees have to be negotiated into it.
Mikael: Yeah. So I think one thing that stands out about the strong Armenia party and in general, the program is that they’re working off what they’re going to inherit. I mean, it’s always good to have plans and everything, but they know that they’re going to be inheriting this whole mess, if you want to say, all these challenges, all these difficulties. So I think based off of that, considering if the TRIPP is further elaborated through bilateral agreements between the US and Armenia, I doubt it.
I think it’s going to take a lot longer, but basically the strong Armenian Party wants to incorporate, wouldn’t be against incorporating different world powers, you know, different powers in that to maintain a balance. So it’s not only, you know, U.S., because if it’s only the U.S., you have Iran there as well. Iran’s also an important trade partner for Armenia, and it’s the only border that’s really open besides Georgia. And you don’t want to You can’t do it.
You live in this neighborhood. You can’t go stepping on people’s toes like that.
It just makes things worse for you. you’re seeking is broadening this and that when you look at the actual the TRIPP agreement it’s it’s not finalized obviously because if you look it said you know I mean it’s expected it’s it’s foreseen this and that so the TRIPP that was published the TRIPP the document I was published in February is still not completed it’s gonna take I assume it’s gonna take you know a year or two to actually finalize iron out all the old issues that But so you have one of the exclusive rights that’s given to the US by the Armenian government is to create companies right third party companies and.
But it also says it kind of contradicts because it says the U.S. can bring basically any third party company operator to help them operate this, but only in accordance with their Armenian counterparts. So, I mean, it’s kind of contradicting because the U.S. can create this or they can sign contracts, but it has to be in agreement with the Armenian government. And now I think the The most interested parties here would be, you know, Israeli companies, Turkish, Azeri companies to be inside Armenia right on Iran’s border. I mean, it’s for the geopolitical, you know, for their long term.
So I think having What we’ve seen in Pashinyan’s government is a government that’s not really pursuing national interest in this sense. It’s just ceding one after another. In this sense, the strong Armenian party would not agree to something like that, obviously. They would renegotiate with the US and say, you know, not the Turkish, not the That certainly makes sense because if you talk about Azerbaijan and Turkey as
Asbed: guarantors of security, there’s a clear conflict of interest because they’re guaranteeing their own benefits. Where’s Armenia’s benefit in that? There’s not a neutral party that’s providing the security guarantee.
Mikael: Yeah, Armenia’s weak. From this weak position, it can’t do much. I mean, against the U.S. on top of that, you know, here’s Armenia, here’s the U.S. There’s also a comparison in terms of strength and everything.
So, you know, it’s and there’s not many, not much, very, lots of people in the South as well, in Meghri, for example, I know this personally, they’re still, they don’t know what’s going on. There’s nothing that’s really been implemented on the ground. It’s still, you know, on paper. They don’t know how it’s going to work out.
Is it going to go through Agarak, the town there, or is it going to go through this area? People are completely blind in the sense that they have no idea what’s going to go on. They haven’t been informed.
Asbed: Mikael, in your presentations, you’ve advocated for moving away from emotional reactions, resentment towards sober judgment and cold calculations. We want to know exactly how you would translate some of these thoughts into foreign policy and policy strategy. For example, if strong Armenia were to come to power, what are the kinds of policies that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have to adopt so that you move in this direction?
Mikael: Yeah, first of all, I think there’s a lot of work ethic in this as well. Dedication, lots of dedication, lots of work ethic, and constantly keeping Armenia’s national interests on top of everything. You’re doing it for this. Keep that in front of you.
I do a lot of open source intelligence reports, and for that as well, I do that cold heartedly. I’m going to bring an example of investigations I do, how I do that to kind of relate it to this. Now, let’s say, you know, you have a client tells me to do a person of interest report. I used to do this a lot in LA with a company that a client calls and says, hey, This, this person with this name and this, you know, telephone number, he called us, he threatened to shoot us.
So, you know, to put an explosive device, et cetera. Can you find this guy on social media? See if, you know, if he’s dangerous or not, what do you post? So, yeah, I will take the telephone number.
I take the name, whatever. And cold heartedly, without assuming anything beforehand, you know, you draw a plan. You first use, for example, use the intelligence cycle. What do I need to find?
What’s my objective right there in foreign policy? What do I need to reach an investigation? What question does a client want me to answer? The client wants me to see if he’s dangerous or not, or if he’s a threat or not.
And then you go into planification methodology where you’re going to get this information. Now I’m kind of talking on the investigation side, but you do it cold heartedly. You don’t assume because a guy called all of a sudden, you know, this guy is dangerous. Maybe it’s just, you know, mentally unstable individual that called, but he’s maybe the softest person.
So don’t assume things be cold hearted. In terms of foreign policy, you have to do the same. And something that I would always I would always suggest is be open, always be open, use network. and network yourself open up to people speak with people everywhere you go make a broad network of contacts of friends that’s something that the foreign that the Ministry of Exteriors the MFA could do broaden for example their their reach to local Armenians not only Armenians but local organizations pressure groups or any type of local actor in different countries where the embassies are that will help kind of you know bring in information
Asbed: So how would the strong Armenia-led government deal with the rights of Artsakh Armenians? This is an important issue. Also, we have a war going on to the south in Iran, especially if that war heats up and starts engulfing Azerbaijan and Turkey on Iran’s northern borders. How would strong Armenia react to these events?
Mikael: So okay, Strong Armenia’s position on this, and again I’m not speaking on actually Strong Armenia on behalf of Strong Armenia because I’m an independent advisor, but from what we’ve seen is basically One of the main things you can see is institutionalized discrimination against Karabakh Armenians or Artsakh Armenians. There’s a lot of that in the government here. I know a lot of people from NK as well, and personally, very few of them are working in government. The military, for example, a lot of men in Artsakh, they’re in the military there.
And they came here to Armenia, instead of joining the military, they didn’t join the military. They weren’t let in or they weren’t given good conditions or this and that. They, you know, a lot of them, either they’re driving taxis or working as security guards.
Hovik: And some of them are the most hardened soldiers who have direct fighting experience, tens of thousands. I mean, at least 10,000, let’s say. And that’s the same thing I have heard. Yeah.
Mikael: Yeah, exactly. Exactly. So I think one thing that the strong Armenian Party would do was end this institutionalized discrimination. First of all, things like banning the word Artsakh.
I mean, that’s just wild. I never even thought I’d be hearing something like that from an Armenian leader. Things like that. Second of all, It’s, as I mentioned previously, the party itself is working with what it’s going to be inheriting.
So it’s going to be inheriting this whole jumble, all these challenges. And obviously, you know, going straight back there is wishful thinking right now because there’s no security guarantees for any Armenians in Azerbaijan. So you see that there are Lots of initiatives. There are still initiatives of Artsakh Armenians in Europe, mainly in Europe, but you have them sometimes in the US or a few other different countries, but I think it’s mainly in Europe that it’s more active.
In the Swiss, for example, Switzerland as well, kind of like a government in exile. So I think they can partner up. You know, if they see people from the outside, outside countries actually talking about this, they’d be able to cooperate with them, collaborate with them as well, and kind of bring it back to the international agenda and not just say, you know, it’s completely closed. We’re not going to talk about this because, you know, internationally speaking, they have their rights as well.
And if, you know, we’re abiding by international law on one side, you can’t just ignore, you know, Karabakh Armenian, you know, rights as well. So I think the party in general, they’re not, they’re ruling out, I think they’re ruling out basically closing the chapter. That’s one thing. They want to incorporate Artsakhtsis as well in Armenian society and perfectly.
They’re citizens as well. They want to give them opportunities. And I think Samvel Karapetyan, he’s actually, he’s been doing this for a while. He’s actually been several thousand families, I think, he’s supporting right now.
It might have gone down a bit because some of them maybe they left the country, you know, but he’s helped thousands of Artsakh families with housing, with all types of costs and everything. So I think giving them an opportunity to work would also help.
Asbed: I’m very interested in seeing what a new government will do about this because obviously I want to make sure that, let’s say, a strong Armenian-led government does not think that standing up for the rights of Artsakh Armenians is too emotional or you know what I mean, right?
Mikael: Yeah, I don’t think that’s the case in this sense. I don’t think that’s the case because you also have someone that’s the prime minister or Samvel Karapetyan when he becomes prime minister. He has a big network of people as well, all around the world. And he knows how to negotiate as well.
And as I mentioned before, you know, having a big network of people always helps when you network with people.
Asbed: We’re talking about 150,000 people who became homeless in the last five years. So, you know, it’s not too emotional to say that these people have rights and they need homes. To me, that’s not emotional. That’s a sober judgment.
Hovik: Yeah. I mean, that’s all I think Right, but I want to actually push you a little bit on this. Aliyev is basically mentioning that any assertion of rights of Artsakhtsis, even saying that, you know, hey, you know that church that you destroyed that was made for this, you know, thousand year old community in Stepanakert? That’s kind of wrong.
Don’t do that. If you say that, Pashinyan says it is perceived as an act of aggression. It will bring war. So, in an environment where you have threats like that, and both Aliyev is threatening and Pashinyan is reinforcing that, what does sober judgment mean?
I just don’t know how to, I mean, if we say that, yes, Azerbaijan is strong, and Azerbaijan is making that as its red line, saying that you have no right to even talk about this. How can a new government change that or challenge that?
Mikael: Several ways. One thing is having red lines. That’s the basic, you know, you have red lines, you’re not going to cross those red lines. Second is Through alliances.
As of right now, for example, I’m just talking as from historic examples, any countries trying to kind of bring themselves back from a big disaster. Military wise, it’s always difficult because it requires time and a lot of money and an organization.
Having good allies is a bit quicker to get, you know, one of the ways I mean, you can do that is creating different work groups in different countries, ad hoc groups specifically dedicated to, you know, shuttle diplomacy between US and Russia or, you know, Iran or China or, you know, different powers, regional world powers to bring them together and say, hey, you guys have You guys have overlapping interests in this region, for example, Russia, you have capital here, you have a military presence, US, you have a big embassy here, you have a huge diaspora, lots of Armenians, etc., etc., different, you know, you guys have overlapping interests in that, you guys all want stability.
Let’s work together. I’ll bring you guys, you know, maybe at a low, not at a ministerial level, something lower than that, you know, a vice, not even a vice minister, maybe even lower than that. You bring together these groups, you know, say, hey, let’s work together. Let’s find what you want, what you want.
Let’s see if we can secure some security for Armenia. That’s another way. I think the quickest way would be finding allies like that. Not allies, but finding good partners that are ready to act as deterrence, persuading or dissuading a country like Azerbaijan that they shouldn’t attack Armenia because, you know, they’re going to The costs are going to outweigh the benefits of it.
Second, any country as well. Normally, if someone sees you as weak, they’re going to pick on you, you know, as much as you know, someone may be weak, but they’re going to they’re going to pick on you. So you have to eventually stand up for yourself. And I think that’s what Armenia needs to do.
You know, needs not to be afraid. It needs to rebuild itself through allies and, you know, militarily reorganize itself. But, you know, it just needs to put in red lines and say, hey, this is it. You know, we’re not going that far.
I think in Pashinyan’s case, he’s literally collaborating with, you know, with Turkey and Azerbaijan. I think he kind of went visa shopping as I’m an ex-consular officer, so that I always have the visa shopping concept. Visa shopping is when one person is denied a visa in one consulate, they go to a different consulate, a different one, a different one, and try their luck, see if they’re approved there. Well, I think Pashinyan basically, in my opinion, did support shopping to Russia, US, Iran, China, this and that, EU, and he eventually found support from Azerbaijan and Turkey.
I think he was always kind of inclined to their objectives as well, but I think he found support in them. And the EU jumped on board as a means of using Armenia’s leverage against Russia in the whole context of the Ukraine and the confrontation with Russia. So I think what we see right now is just literally collaborating with Turkey and Azerbaijan, countries that have shown on numerous occasions they want to destroy you. Turkey may be a lot softer after the 1915 genocide, the 22 genocide, but Azerbaijan clearly, a proxy of Turkey, has not shown disinterest in that.
Hovik: Mikael, I think you used that term visa shopping figuratively, but I think, God willing, if June 7 he’s out, I think he literally will have Visas from both Turkey and Azerbaijan and maybe even a private plane to take him there. But that’s my… I don’t think they’ll need visas for that.
Asbed: Mikael, let’s turn to a final section. What’s going on right now, as you were mentioning about the EU leaders and stuff like that, they’re all in Armenia for the EPC meeting, the European Political Community, the European Political Community meeting. In his speech, Macron, I think, mentioned indirectly that Armenia’s value to the EU is really not in its statehood, but in its ability to disconnect from Russia and act as a nuisance for the EU to Russia.
Hovik: Can I elaborate? He basically said that all of these EU leaders are here in Armenia now and they weren’t in Armenia eight years ago because eight years ago Armenia was perceived as a Russian satellite now Armenia is not a Russian satellite so all these wonderful European leaders who brought the war in Ukraine are now visiting Armenia
Asbed: In a diplomatic world, every country is going to be useful for us. You know, I was joking on Groong a month back when Armenia established diplomatic relations or strategic relations with Zimbabwe. You know, I’ve been thinking that that’s, well, whatever. What is the importance of the EU here?
I think it’s 450 million people with a huge GDP and tons of money, but can the EU be a security guarantor and security partner for Armenia from that far away when the enemy countries are on the eastern border and the western border?
Mikael: You know, in this sense, I think I agree with Macron that the EU really doesn’t care much about Armenian statehood. I’ll be honest with you. It’s always good to have, you know, EU has, you know, it’s a really good partner for cultural collaboration, going to universities there and everything and, you know, other things. I think I agree with Macron on this, that they don’t really look at the statehood of Armenia, because where were they in 2020?
Where were they in 2023? Where were they, you know, where they right now where you have over 100 people have been jailed on trumped up charges, you know, priests, you have women the other day, they arrested one of the one of the one of our colleagues at the party members, Gohar Humashian. She has a 40 day newborn baby. and they arrested her for a day or two and they released her. Where are they right now?
I mean, they know. I’m sure they know. But the thing is, I have to speak about Ukraine here because I honestly think it fits in this context. The conflict in Ukraine For Europe, it’s not going as planned.
I mean, Russia’s slowly, slowly advancing. It’s obviously slow, but I think for Russia, it’s more of a strategy of attrition as opposed to, you know, just jumping in there, throwing all the troops you can get and high casualties. I think Russia wants to keep a sustained conflict, sustained military operations. And the way to do that is to go slow through attrition as opposed to using all your force and in energy.
So in that sense, I think the EU is unable to confront all those countries helping Ukraine. They’re unable to really change the situation on the battlefield because Russia is still slowly advancing. And with Mr. Donald Trump’s election, he’s turned himself kind of away from the EU.
He doesn’t seem very in favor of supporting the Europeans. And so I think the Europeans are looking at another avenue to get at Russia. And I think Armenia, look, they lost Georgia through elections a couple of years ago after years of trying the same thing, you know, bringing a pro-EU individual to Georgia, Saakashvili, for example. And after him as well, there was a persecution of the church, of the Georgian church, kind of similar to what’s happening here in Armenia as well.
And Georgia eventually, you know, they turned the other way. They said, no, we live in the Caucasus, we live in this region, we can’t go against Russia. All of our trade comes from Russia. It’s not that we’re necessarily pro-Russian, but we’re neighbors with Russia, we’re neighbors with Iran, with Azerbaijan, with this and that.
We have to stay in our neighborhood and the EU is too far away to be able to come to our rescue or it’s too costly for us. I think they eventually lost, the EU lost Georgia. And to get back at Russia, in a way, I think they’re looking at Armenia. And they look at Armenia as leverage against Russia.
Leverage in the sense of eventually removing, having Russia withdraw its two military bases. And one thing also I want to mention, it was the EU joint declaration, something very, very important here. They signed it, what’s today, the fifth, they signed, they issued it today, a joint declaration where, you know, EU joint declaration with Armenia, big, pompous words, lots of nice sounding phrases, integration, trans-European, et cetera, et cetera, growth. There’s one part of that that said the EU and Armenia are looking to decommission the nuclear power plant in Armenia.
They’re working on a plan to decommission it. Do you guys know how many percentage of energy comes from that? It’s around 30%. Armenia gets about 30% of its energy from that nuclear power plant.
And who actually supplies the nuclear material, who maintains it? It’s Rosatom. It’s a big Russian company, a very big Russian company. And I think that clause found its way in the joint declaration Strictly because it’s reflecting the EU stance on Russia and what they want to use Armenia for.
They’re pushing for Armenia to open up borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Look, it’s always good to have good relations with your neighbors, but you have to think about your national security and your Yeah, you have to think about national interest as well, not just open it up. But I think as the EU is also pushing and they mentioned in that joint statement, they’re pushing for Armenia to open up as soon as possible the borders with Turkey, because as soon as they open up the borders with Turkey, the Russian military bases are no longer going to be needed because there’s no security threat. Mr.
Pashinyan is going to say, you know, Russia, you have to withdraw your military bases. Sorry, we don’t need them anymore. Just like, you know, Saakashvili did in 2004, 2005. And the thing in Armenia is this is the last Russian military presence in the region.
So, I mean, symbolically and strategically for Russia, it’ll be a
Asbed: Mikael, the whole situation is like fractals. The more you dig into it, the more details become evident. I think we’re going to have to leave it there, even though as you brought up the issue of Georgia and the EU losing Georgia, that is a very interesting topic, but maybe we’ll leave it for our next discussion. I still don’t understand how Armenia can be part of the EU without Georgia.
As the EU calls it, with Georgia being in the Russian sphere, which, by the way, I would dispute, but still. Anyway, thank you so much.
Hovik: We didn’t even drill into the Iran war that much, so we should definitely talk again, Mikael.
Mikael: I’m happy to do that. I’m monitoring it on a daily basis as well, so I’m curious of what’s going to happen.
Asbed: Right. Thank you so much for joining us and your insight. We’ll talk again.
Mikael: Oh, I appreciate it. Thanks. Thank you guys for the time. Bye-bye.
Bye.
Asbed: That’s our show today. This episode was recorded on May 5, Cinco de Mayo, 2026. We’ve been talking with Mikael Darbinian. who is a political scientist and former U.S. diplomat, having served at the U.S. embassies in Argentina and Russia as Vice-Consul. He is the founder of Security Observer: Expert Voices from the Global South.
He graduated from Madrid’s Complutense University, having lived and worked in eight countries. Darbinian is currently, in 2026, a private security consultant for the Strong Armenia Party with Samvel Karapetyan.
Hovik: Thank you folks for joining us. Just a quick reminder to like, comment, share and make sure you’re subscribed to our channel. Thank you very much. I’m Hovik Manucharyan.
Asbed: I’m Asbed Bedrossian. We’ll talk to you soon.