In this Week in Review, Hovik and Asbed discussed the escalating US-Israeli war on Iran and the danger of a wider regional catastrophe; we reflected on the tenth anniversary of the April 2016 Four-Day War and what it revealed about Armenia’s military and diplomatic posture; we examined the fallout from Pashinyan’s Moscow visit and the increasingly blunt Russian response, and reviewed the fast-moving Armenian election campaign, including pressure on the opposition, EU involvement, and the emerging strategies of major the various alliances.
Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed: Happy Easter, everyone, and welcome to Groong’s Weekend Review for April 5, 2026.
Hovik: Yes, we’re recording this on April 7, but this Sunday, previous Sunday, was Easter. And on that occasion, we want to congratulate all of our listeners and viewers who celebrate. In Armenian we say, Christos hareav i Merelots.
Asbed: Ornheal e Harutyunuh Christosi. All right, well, Hovik, let’s start with the war on Iran. We’re recording this, as you said, on the morning of Tuesday, April 7th, Pacific time. And the war on Iran by the U.S. and Israel is not going great.
So not great that Trump has so far threatened to destroy every single bridge and power plant in Iran unless they effectively capitulate. And to make sure that his genocidal threats are well understood, Trump also issued a new threat this morning saying, A whole civilization is going to die tonight, never to be brought back again. God bless the people of Iran. I think this borders on insane, but let’s go on.
This is the guy who claims to bring peace to the world and who believes that he deserves the Nobel Peace Prize. Anyway, he’s making so many deranged and genocidal statements that it’s a little difficult to understand. where it stopped being funny and where it has become crimes against humanity. I mean, it just goes beyond the pale of anything, right? Never before in modern history has the guy who leads the prime superpower, nuclear superpower of the world threatened to erase an entire nation overnight.
I don’t know what to think about that.
Hovik: Civilization even. Yeah, I mean.
Asbed: The entire civilization, which has existed for thousands of years. For those hoping that these are just some awesome negotiation skills or the art of the deal by Trump, we’re sorry to inform. According to reports, Iran has broken off all negotiations, even track two diplomacy following these threats. Iranians have also started forming human chains on the bridges across the country in defiance of Trump’s threats.
Hovik, I don’t know if there’s a whole lot to add. What are your thoughts?
Hovik: Yeah, I mean, it is a dire situation and I’m still in shock and I don’t know how to respond. And I hope for the best possible outcome that somehow he chickens out and we learn that, okay, it was just a big bluff, but… I’m not betting on it, unfortunately. And if we want to analyze things in terms of, you know, it’s two main scenarios, right?
One of the scenarios is that he’s not of his, you know, not of a solid mind or non compos menti. And I mean, honestly, there were a lot of signs before, and this is incredible. But, you know, why haven’t the political forces… done anything substantial about this. I mean, we know that, okay, some people are talking about it, but so far, a lot of Democrats, not to say anything about the Republicans, but they have been abstaining from this path, and now it may be too late if that was indeed the case.
Asbed: Yeah, there are some people who are actually calling for the 25th Amendment to be enacted. I mean, it was my first thought when I saw these postings by Trump. The first thing I thought is that, is the government once again gaslighting us, just like we were being gaslit at the time of Biden, when it became very apparent that for the last two and a half years of his term, he was not really in control. It was just some people were signing for him.
And maybe the same thing is starting to happen with Trump at this juncture. You know, he doesn’t seem to be in complete control of his faculties. He’s making statements which to me sound incoherent. I mean, he’s saying we’re going to eradicate you and your civilization tonight.
God bless you all. It makes no sense.
Hovik: He really went to great lengths to say that the people of Iran are begging for him to keep bombing Iran. And whenever he tried to taper down on the bombing, they said, no, please bomb us more. I mean, it’s just insane levels of insanity. I don’t know if that’s even possible.
Asbed: But this morning, a friend was asking us, what do you think? What are your comments? I said, no comments. I think he’s unhinged.
He’s insane.
Hovik: Anyway, I want to take us to Armenia and the four-day war in April 2016. And I think it’s important to talk about it. I think when you compare it with what happened in 2020, some would say, why even discuss this? It seems like a minor thing in comparison, but I think it’s very consequential. it’s essentially for those that don’t know in 2016 was the first time in decades that Azerbaijan in earnest tried to start a war with Armenia and it did start a war with Armenia which lasted for four days it began on the night of April 1st 2016 and it was a violation of the 1994 ceasefire on the ground it resulted in little.
Azerbaijan was only able to take I think like 21 military positions but half of those were recovered by Armenia and in terms of the total land that Azerbaijan was able to capture it was about like 200 to 400 hectares not even the 800 hectares that were being touted or claimed by critics at the time but it came at a huge military and diplomatic cost for Azerbaijan. To me, it went on to show that Armenia was preparing for Azerbaijan for decades. That preparation was successful because Azerbaijan essentially wasn’t able to make a dent in terms of the military objectives it was trying to achieve.
Asbed: Well, after four days, it was pretty clear that they sued for peace through Russia, right? They applied to Russia to talk to Armenia, Serge Sargsyan, basically, and have them stop because the tide within, what, two or three days had turned against them. And Armenia could have taken even more positions. In fact, they could have I mean, I don’t want to speculate too much, but they could have gone and stopped the flow of Azerbaijani oil to the West, primarily to Israel.
So they had to sue immediately and Russia intervened and basically, unfortunately, Armenia stopped. To be honest, they should have continued and put a premium on peace.
Hovik: The next step in the escalation ladder for Serge Sargsyan was to recognize the independence of Artsakh, something that Armenian authorities were deliberately holding off on in order to give negotiations a chance. It’s important to highlight that throughout these decades, Armenia was trying to follow Very clear rules of negotiation, including the number one thing, which is you don’t threaten force or you don’t use military force. Meanwhile, Aliyev, sort of like the deranged psychopath that we see in the White House, was always pushing his luck.
Asbed: It’s interesting, Hovik, that 2016, in my mind, and correct me if I’m wrong, was one of the first times when Azerbaijan explicitly said that they had decided that diplomacy had failed for their ends and that they were going to seek a military solution. Isn’t that what their ambassador in Moscow said?
Hovik: Yeah, they openly admitted it.
Asbed: Yeah, they basically said we’re going to solve this through war.
Hovik: Yeah. So I think the other important thing to highlight about this is that while opposition parties last week were attending Yerablur, the military cemetery in Armenia, were holding events to commemorate the sacrifices that Armenians and Armenia gave, The Armenian government was doing everything to keep this issue off the agenda, and this is one of the reasons why I think it’s also important for us to talk about this today, because that’s exactly what the occupying regime in Armenia doesn’t want us to do.
Asbed: I want to highlight one important thing that I always wank on. We’ve traditionally said 5,000 people died in the 44-day war, over 10,000 to 15,000 injured, and we don’t know the list and stuff like that. Let’s just say here that it was important enough for the Armenian government to know, honor, and publish every single name of the April war. Of course the volume is not the same but exactly… what… 95 people? were acknowledged as lost heroes on the battlefield but…
Hovik: 93
Asbed: 93, but even today After five and a half years, we do not know the exact number or the names of the people who were lost in the 44-day war.
Hovik: I mean, it’s just really painful to imagine that this is what’s going on. The other thing that I want to mention about this four-day war…
Asbed: This was the first attempt by Aliyev, and he failed. And so he went back to the drawing board and put together 2020.
Hovik: No, I would say 2018.
Asbed: Okay, I’m good with that.
Hovik: And on that, I just want to also add that it’s significant because 2018 was the year that Pashinyan came to power, in my opinion, in a coup. And, you know, if you backtrack a little bit, in 2016, right after the war, in the summer, there was this terrorist incident that was related to the war, where, you know, they captured the police station, the Sasna Tsrer incident. And to me, it seems that there were a number of geopolitical gears set in motion, including the 2018, you know, coup that happened just two years later.
The other thing that we should mention and why this 2018 date is important is because when 2018 came along, Pashinyan canceled all of the plans that Serge Sargsyan had in place in terms of military procurement. You know, he bought these SU aircraft for $150 million. canceling all the drones. Armenia had with Azerbaijan, Vienna and St. Petersburg, which would allow for monitoring across the contact line.
And essentially, in collusion with Aliyev, Pashinyan decided not to push that diplomatically. And that was the main diplomatic victory that Armenia had after the 2016 war, was the sympathy of all the mediators who were trying to push for monitoring across the line of contact. Because if Azerbaijan was claiming that Armenia was violating the ceasefire, then that would immediately be… you know, spotted. And somehow Pashinyan agreed with Aliyev that okay, we’re not going to focus on this.
Anyway, the rest is history, as they say.
Asbed: Let’s talk a little bit about the repercussions of the visit by Pashinyan to Moscow, I think a week ago, on April 1st. We were able to touch base this past week with Dr. Pietro Shakarian. I think that was episode 529, the immediately preceding episode to this one.
And we talked a little bit about that visit. He categorized it as a failed mission to convince the Russian leadership to divest of the management of Armenia’s railways. And as we noted in that show, Moscow flatly rejected it. And Pietro noted that the visit was unusually confrontational and indicated that Russia’s patience with an Armenia that is increasingly aligning itself with its enemies, it’s wearing tint.
Hovik, there have been some statements since then. We have had statements by Dmitry Medvedev, Alexander Lukashenko, and also Mikhail Suslov, who is actually well connected to the Kremlin’s foreign policies and stuff. What do you think about the statements that they’re making about how Russia should proceed in relations with Armenia?
Hovik: So before I go into the statements, I just want to say that, you know, the optics of that meeting were, I think to me, I haven’t seen so much acrimony in a meeting with Putin, who was calm and collected, but diplomatically in terms of the the pressure being applied. I mean, the only reference I can make mentally is the January 2025 meeting when Zelensky went to the White House and it looked like a scene from Goodfellas.
But I think it’s clear that the tone from the statements of Medvedev or even Putin himself is that Russia will now be following a very, a much tougher process line on whether it’s possible to sit on both chairs, as they say, to be both part of the EU world.
Asbed: Well, they explicitly said that. I think Lukashenko said that Armenia is trying to sit on two chairs, basically.
Hovik: Yes.
Asbed: Which for Western people is basically saying you are being two-faced.
Hovik: But there is a lot more to discuss, in my opinion, because it wasn’t just about Pashinyan’s goal. Like, Pashinyan’s only goal, announced goal, was this concession, the railway concession. But it was basically turned upside down by Russia in terms of, no, you will not be… trying to join, pretend joining EU or even actually joining EU while pretending to still be part of the EAEU, Eurasian Economic Union and the CSTO. No, it was actually your fault.
You were the one who recognized Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan.
Asbed: And that was an interesting set of accusations across the bow for each other. I mean, Putin basically said that that Armenia recognized it. Pashinyan basically recognized it. Pashinyan said that you had done it before we had.
Look, Pashinyan also accused the previous presidents, Kocharyan and Sargsyan, of having recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. He’s basically accused everyone of recognizing Karabakh before him.
Hovik: I mean, instead of trying to fight for the interests of Armenians and trying to diplomatically maneuver in such a way that Armenia wouldn’t create the circumstances where Putin would even think about saying things that could lend credence to that allegation. He’s saying, well, you, a foreign head of state, have recognized Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan. So therefore, I went ahead and recognized it too. I mean, that’s the absurdity of the situation.
I mean, the only thing I want to mention as part of this is that in this environment where we’re seeing what’s happening around us, it pains me to see an Armenian leader being lectured like a little schoolboy or even a kindergarten child who needs to be given some time off. But we saw what happened when Maduro challenged Trump verbally. We see what is happening with Iran and in this environment to have a stance that is inimical. Because let’s not forget that The EU considers Russia as its enemy, and Russia considers the EU as its enemy, not just political, but also military.
And in an environment where you’re saying, well, you know, we might join the EU later, what are you communicating to one of the biggest superpowers in the world? In response to those allegations, I want to mention that Alen Simonyan, the Speaker of the Armenian Parliament, said, oh, no, we won’t. We’re not leaving yet. But if Russia increases the gas prices, then we will for sure leave the CSTO and the EAEU.
Asbed: And also Kocharyan, Andranik Kocharyan, who is the chair of the Standing Committee for Defense in the Parliament. I think it was just like two days ago that he said, never say never. to exiting the CSTO and the EAEU?
Hovik: I mean, it’s clear that, I mean, Armenia passed a law to join the EU, so it cannot really sit on two chairs. So yes, it is ridiculous to argue that we’re not leaving the… The only one you’re fooling is yourself and the maybe small percentage of the population who still believes in you. The only thing that I can say is the reaction is in the same portion of the… populace, it is panic because we’re looking at gas prices for Armenia increasing fourfold.
If Armenia does join the EU or if Armenia leaves the EU, then Armenia loses a huge Russian market and the Eurasian market Armenian products would not be able to reach. And lastly, I mean, the Russians may declare that, you know, you’re collaborating with an enemy and EU has a ban on airspace communication with Russia so if armenia joins the eu then it will you know there’s a two million strong diaspora in Russia and essentially Armenia would not have any air communication with Russia let alone you know ability to
Asbed: export it would also be banned from its skies and that’s a huge space if you look at the map And two million Armenians in Russia would be disconnected from the homeland. I think they’re one of the biggest sources of remittances, basically. So that might be cut off. It’s a huge effect.
Hovik: We’ll come back to the question of why is the EU wanting to do this? Because I really want to know, but I think we can talk about it in the context of more political developments. In June 6, in less than two months, Armenia will vote on the next parliamentary elections. And it is looking to be in an environment of extreme manipulation and extreme pressure. by the government, along with its supporters in the European Union and the West, and it’s probably going to be one of the most undemocratic elections in history.
But despite this, I think it’s important to say that it’s important to raise the bar for the government to not basically fix these elections so easily, which is what our goal is. And before we move on, I think any talk about elections and politics needs to be talked about the context of the jailed opposition. I mean, the main, the number two candidate in the elections who had a very promising showing is in detention, is in house arrest. He was in jail before.
Samuel Karapetyan. Just today, Armenia time, the Armenian parliament, the civil contract controlled Armenian parliament, an emergency session. to pass a new law. The alliance formed by Samvel Karapetyan is strong Armenia with Samvel Karapetyan. So they’re trying to ban the naming of alliances so that Samvel Karapetyan’s name would not appear in the name of the alliance.
I mean, you could have done this last year, you could have done this two years ago, but the fact that you’re trying to do this now, it reeks of manipulation. If Armenia is trying to be a European country, one of these strong institutions in Europe is the Venice Commission, which basically one of their number one guidances is you should not make changes to electoral law, you know, right before an election. That reeks of trying to manipulate it. But anyway, I mean, we also…
Asbed: So to understand, they’re trying to decide on branding rules during the elections. They’re trying to say you cannot call it strong Armenia with Samvel Karapetyan, whether Samvel Karapetyan is the guy who they think will be prime minister or not. They’re just saying it kind of like you can’t call it the Uniqlo field at Dodger Stadium.
Hovik: I mean, it’s funny, but the government’s claim, to be fair to them, is that, well, this is a minor omission, but in reality it is. You are deliberately reacting, and your changes to the law will deliberately have material results.
Asbed: Hovik, enough about Samvel Karapetyan, but who else is in jail or in detention or whatever? We have many. We have many. So let’s mention a couple of them.
Hovik: I mean, it’s impossible to… There are tens of people and charismatic opposition leaders, Bagrat Galstanyan, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, who’s in jail, Archbishop Mikayel Ajapahyan, who is in house arrest, but it’s equivalent to jail, essentially, and many more. But most importantly, you know, We also want to say that two journalists, Armenia has two journalists in jail. Last week, his sentence was changed from jail to pretrial detention to house arrest.
But it’s still jail. I mean, it still means you cannot go out. Yeah, and even worse, if someone is in jail, at least I maybe can appeal and get a meeting with Vazgen Saghatelyan, but I’m not going to get permission to go to his home to visit him under house arrest. So their visitation conditions are even more stringent in some cases.
But going back to our discussion about this whole trip by Pashinyan to Russia, And what’s in it for the EU? I want to mention that next month in early May, we’re going to have two major campaign events by Pashinyan that are going to be sponsored by the EU. And that’s going to be the EPC. European political community meeting, after which there will be this Armenia-EU meeting where Armenia is not trying to join the EU, but senior leaders are going to be talking about how Armenia can join the EU.
So in the context of the Russian warnings, what do you think is in it for the EU that is doing so much to help Pashinyan?
Asbed: Two things, Hovik. I consider that the goals of EU in Armenia are twofold. Basically, they want to make sure That the flow of oil does not stop between Azerbaijan and the West and the gas, of course, not just oil, but oil and gas. Ironically, most of this oil and gas is provided by Russia.
And they could simply open the pipelines between Russia and Poland and on westward. But they’re not doing that because they’re hypocrites and they don’t want to say that we are consuming Russian gas. So basically, they’re taking the longer way, routed through Azerbaijan and Turkey and through Hungary, et cetera, et cetera. Basically, that’s goal number one.
The second goal is to make sure that Armenia continues being a thorn on the side of Russia and keep some of its attention span busy away from Ukraine, away from Iran, et cetera. I think those are the main goals.
Hovik: I want to underscore what you said, which is the biggest threat to Europe going into a war with Russia, which I’m sure they planned for decades in advance, at least a decade in advance, is how are they going to get gas to Europe? And Azerbaijan was the main one. And if Armenia somehow… got into a war with Azerbaijan, where it had normal patriotic leaders, and Armenia was in an existential circumstance, then the gas pipelines from Azerbaijan to Turkey and to Europe would be the first things that would be blown up. And that is definitely not in the interests of the EU.
And that is the only reason why they’re doing all these acting routines.
Asbed: But interestingly enough, with this EPC meeting, Armenia-EU meeting, all of which were very coincidentally scheduled inside Armenia, with this Iran war…
Hovik: Months before the elections, yes.
Asbed: A lot of people are starting to reconsider whether that should happen. What with the Iran war and this possible warning that Iran will be blown out of… And they’re right next door. What is the danger of the Iran war expanding straight into…
Armenia and Azerbaijan. You and I have noted this, and it’s kind of lucky that the northern front of Iran has remained silent. But if Trump were to suddenly escalate this into a major, major bombing of the entire country or, God forbid, some kind of nuclear thing, people are starting to really worry that European leaders might get injured. God forbid that Kaja Kallas’s nails should be chipped.
Hovik: Yes. Regarding the elections, we’re going to have Hrant Mikaelian next week, and we’re going to go deep dive into this new MPG poll that was released today. But I want to give you guys a sneak peek into two questions that were asked very quickly very quickly, one of them was are you planning to participate in the 2026 elections, and around 60 of the people said yes. Now that is a huge huge indication of participation that I haven’t seen before maybe I’m missing something but
Asbed: You know what’s important, Hovik, is that higher turnout actually benefits the opposition. Because we’ll talk about this, but for the last month or so, all these PR campaigns, photo ops that Pashinyan has been putting together, all of them have been running into people. who are anti-Pashinyan, have a problem with the government, and it’s been turning into a disaster. So you can see that the population is not really with Civil Contract right now. So the higher the turnout, the more of a risk for Civil Contract to retain power.
Hovik: And perhaps that explains all this sowing of hatred and uncertainty that Pacino is doing, because an apathetic population will be less likely to go vote, and fear-mongering as well. But I think that’s not working so far, at least based on these results. The other result that I want to actually, speaking of fear-mongering, is they asked the respondents, Do you believe that people in Armenia have a fear of expressing their opinion explicitly? And around, I guess, what, more than 30% of the people said either definitely yes or significantly yes.
So you can see that the fear-mongering is registering in the respondents. But for whatever reason, it is not demotivating them from going to the polls, at least based on this MPG poll, which we’ll discuss further. And it has many more interesting results. So we’ll definitely bring you these in the future.
Asbed: Yeah. Well, with the time we have left, let’s talk about the various parties and how their campaigns are coming along. The Civil Contract Party basically published its platform, and we’ll put a link in the show notes, podcast.grom.org slash episode number.
They have basically formalized their desire to get rid of the Catholicos and this is in a country where the constitution says that the government has nothing to say about the internal workings of a church and there is a separation of state and church but you know they want to get rid of the Catholicos so they’re they’ve they’ve put that together uh they’re sugarcoating their capitulation to Azerbaijan. Narratives used by civil contract include Armenia is Azerbaijan’s security guarantor and Azerbaijan is Armenia’s security guarantor. I mean, I haven’t heard anything more ridiculous than this, to be honest. What do you think?
Do you feel secure that Aliyev is your security guarantor, Hovik?
Hovik: It’s like saying that Israel is Iran’s security guarantor. I mean, or Turkey is Cyprus’s security guarantor. It’s ridiculous. And this is 1984 level of, you know, mind fuckery, but whatever.
The other thing that, you know, yeah. that was published was that they published the list of candidates, right? The top. And do you want to talk about, maybe like, did you find any surprises in that list?
Asbed: No surprises. I was looking for Armen Grigoryan’s name, but I didn’t see it. He’s the chair of the National Security Council. But the one thing that sticks a crow on my side is Srbuhi Galyan, who is the Minister of Justice, and she is on the list.
I’ve always thought that an attorney general or the Ministry of Justice, the Minister of Justice, really needs to be a nonpartisan person, kind of like appointed like a Fed chair in the United States. The president has nothing to say, cannot fire them. But that’s not the case, obviously. And here, you know, we’ve seen the kind of justice department that has existed in Armenia since 2018.
It’s just become worse and worse. And there’s justice for civil contract, but that’s about it.
Hovik: Yeah. No, I mean, the entire list is basically all the well-known names from civil contract, and they’re all, I mean, I think that list has dwindled down over the years, but these are the core of this traitorous idea that Armenia basically is not going to be part of the Russian-led Eurasian Union, but basically in an alliance with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Now, this was not… in their narratives yet. I mean, Pashinyan, of course, was trying to spread the narrative that we are also the we brought peace to the region, right?
Peace, peace, peace, peace, peace, peace. But and he said that if you don’t vote for us, in fact, if you don’t give us absolute majority, then Armenia will have war by September. And I think I want to actually flip that around. If Armenia retains Pashinyan as its leader, whether through democratic means or more likely through undemocratic means, through the capture of political power by the European Union and the West, then we’ll have another war in Armenia.
And this will be again with Armenia on the side of Turkey and Azerbaijan fighting against Russia and Iran. That’s what’s going to happen if Pashinyan stays in power.
Asbed: Hovik, enough criticism of the civil contract. What about their fantastic May 28th parade, military parade that they’re planning on a week before the elections? I’m sure that’s going to make you feel a lot more secure in Armenia.
Hovik: They’re not calling it a parade. They’re calling it an “accountability initiative” to show off all the cool weapons we received. And of course…
Asbed: Hello George Orwell.
Hovik: …they’re gonna put like one French radar system paraded around the Republic Square and everyone is gonna cheer. People who support them are gonna cheer. This whole idea of relying on EU and Western weapons, all the imagined ways that you could bring stuff into Armenia are going to be blocked during the war. How are French weapons going to go in, even if you were able to fly one in for this parade and parade it around the Republic Square?
How? Exactly how are you going to do that, especially when Iran is getting bombed to hell? Yeah.
Asbed: How are Indian weaponry going to make it to Armenia under the current conditions?
Hovik: The other thing that I want to mention, besides Armenian soldiers not being trained in a single large-scale military exercise, something that was happening regularly before 2018, The other thing that is not happening is Armenia’s domestic industry being developed. Despite there being budgets, despite Pashinyan campaigning on this and every year presenting rosy reports that Armenia is funding its own military industry, all the budgets are at 4% completion, meaning essentially nothing. They don’t spend the money on it. They don’t spend the money, yeah.
It’s difficult to explain this, but that’s what exactly is happening.
Asbed: There’s plenty of money for bonuses, but not for the military, not for Artsakhtsis, not for housing and stuff like that. Hovik, there were some interesting exchanges in the parliament this past week between Hayk Sargsyan and both Andranik Kocharyan as well as Suren Papikyan. But just to stick on the campaign trail, I guess we should not go into those details. Let’s move.
There was an interesting campaign event. Why don’t you tell us about this, the Minasian brothers in the Armenian church?
Hovik: Another arrest of a political opposition. And this time, an 18-year-old kid who was punched in the face by one of Pashinyan’s guards. And when we’re trying to react to it, he was essentially arrested and kicked out of the church. And this whole thing was initiated with Pashinyan coming late to Divine Liturgy on Palm Sunday and muscling his way into a crowd to try to come to the front of the church.
Asbed: Hovik, can I restate that for a second? Just to be clear for our listeners, Palm Sunday Mass is in progress. It’s in the middle. And Pashinyan, with a giant contingent of bodyguards, comes and starts muscling in inside the church through the congregation, parting the congregation, disturbing Mass.
That’s what’s going on here.
Hovik: Yeah. And these teenagers, they’re not opposition members. I mean, I’ve seen the interviews. They are… faithful to the Armenian church.
Every Sunday they are in the church with their prayer books following the mass. And the kid was just sort of irritated that, I mean, the enemy of the Armenian church, essentially, the guy who wants to get rid of the Catholicos, his Catholicos, is muscling his way, pushing him around and then punching him in the face.
Asbed: Well, he was hospitalized. Let’s not forget to mention that. He got punched in the face. He was taken to the hospital.
Hovik: Yeah, one of the brothers is hospitalized right now. The other one is in jail. And Alen Simonyan is accusing these kids, who are still in school, of being engaged in hybrid warfare.
Asbed: And this is the worry that I expressed a couple of weeks back, that the laws right now are built in a way that anyone who disagrees with the government is going to be accused of being pro-Russian and waging hybrid warfare in Armenia, during election time, and will be put in jail. So if you’re anti-government, you will be in jail.
Hovik: Pashinyan actually even went further and said that the kids should be lucky that his security guards or his bodyguards didn’t shoot them. I mean, he defended the actions of his bodyguards fully.
Asbed: Here comes the important point here. He was saying that they have a right to do that, when they are obstructing official business by the prime minister. Well, what was he in the church for? Had he announced his presence?
Had he announced his intention to be attending Palm Sunday at the church? I don’t believe that he had done that. What is he doing in the middle of mass trying to part the congregation? Nobody knows.
The best that one can say is that he was on the campaign trail with his contingent of prime ministerial bodyguards paid by taxpayers. So there’s a real question to be asked. Why was he at this church? What kind of official business was he on, versus campaign business?
Hovik: Now let’s let’s move away from Civil Contract and talk about some of the other parties and alliances participating in the elections. Hayastan Dashinq is. Basically, their platform is being solidified, but they said that they’re seeking feedback from voters and are trying to make it a more democratic process. I think that.
Honestly, I mean, the previous statements by Kocharyan that, yes, I mean, TRIP is a good idea if it can be extended. Even Kocharyan himself said that, you know, this would result in Azerbaijan rejecting it.
Asbed: Well, there’s that, Hovik. But I think that Kocharyan, let me state what I understand of Kocharyan’s idea, is that the TRIPP, which is supposedly guaranteed or secured by the United States, should extend all the way from inside Azerbaijan, all the way to inside Turkey. So from Kars through Nakhichevan, through Syunik, through whatever, Zangelan and Fizuli and all those things, about over 200, 300 kilometers. Point being, he wanted, if this is going to benefit Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and, you know, regionally as well, then everybody should have the same investment and skin in the game.
Right. It’s not just Armenia that’s putting up all this land. And some people say the sovereignty is being jeopardized and other people say no sovereignty is not jeopardized. Well, let’s do the same thing on the Azerbaijani side and let’s do the same thing.
This is my understanding on the Turkish side. If you guys are all OK, we’re going to be OK with that as well. So I don’t think it’s an irrational idea, but he also knows that Aliyev and Erdogan are just going to reject this. Because they want this whole idea to come entirely, 100% at Armenian expense.
Hovik: So I think it’s important because it doesn’t piss off the Americans. Because if you go and explicitly campaign on saying that I’m going to cancel TRIP, That would not be diplomatically probably the best thing to do, fortunately, because Pashinyan is setting that agenda and that narrative. The other thing is that, yes, I mean, voters who have some sympathy for the U.S. as a large superpower may think, OK, well, this is a good idea in terms of that, you know, we’re not canceling trip. We’re actually trying to improve it.
Asbed: There was another topic which has been near and dear to Kocharyan ever since he even came to power in 1998. That’s the Abkhaz Railway. Do you want to talk a little bit about that? You found some interesting links that were fascinating.
Hovik: Okay. To set the scene, Currently, the only way that Armenia can export stuff to Russia via land is through this narrow road called the Lars Highway or Lars Corridor through Georgia, which is snowed in some days of the year, which is a single point of failure. And of course, the other alternative that Pashinyan is trying to introduce is Azerbaijan, basically Russian goods entering Azerbaijan, then going to Georgia, then coming to Armenia. It’s unclear even if there’s going to be a direct link between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but right now that’s the alternative that Pashinyan is presenting.
What Kocharyan is presenting is there’s an existing railway which, with very minor repairs, could link Armenia with Russia, and the only point of contention is this small connection between Sukhumi and Tbilisi, which got severed during the 1992 Georgian Abkhaz War and Kocharyan even during his first term he talked about trying to reinstate that link in discussions with Shevardnadze and he says that he got Shevardnadze’s okay to do that but then Shevardnadze got removed from power and Saakashvili basically
Asbed: The logic totally makes sense. And it also explains why Pashinyan’s administration has not been interested in the Abkhaz railway. There are plenty happy for there to be all these hurdles to doing business with Russia.
Hovik: Yeah. And ever since the 1990s, successive Armenian governments, excluding Pashinyan, have been trying to make this into an agenda, of course, but realizing that at that time, especially with the Russo-Georgian War, It looked dire and not going to happen. And we don’t know even if that’s going to be the case now. But it’s important that last week there was this Abkhazia International Forum.
I mean, yes, it’s an Abkhaz thing, and Abkhazia is not recognized by many countries in the world. But I think it was an important forum where the reopening of this railway… was discussed explicitly, and it was important because of who was in attendance. The first deputy chief of the staff of the presidential executive office of Russia, Sergei Kirienko. And we’ve talked about him in the past, but what else is Sergei Kirienko known for?
He is basically, he has been given the portfolio for South Caucasus recently.
Asbed: He’s very close to Putin. I think he’s the deputy chief of staff in the Kremlin.
Hovik: Yeah, yeah. And this appointment signaled, I think last year, a shift in Russian policies, or I think signaled more attention by Russia to the South Caucasus. And we saw statements ever since related to this reopening of the railway.
First, it was Overchuk, and we saw some media statements late last year and earlier this year that Russia is going to look into reopening this but then it was also a major topic at this conference in Abkhazia so at least from the Russian and the applause perspective this is a possibility but as we know it it takes… three to tango in this case or even more consent, I mean that railway would have to go to Georgia so in the end consent from Georgia would be required for this railway to open And according to our discussions with Georgian experts, including Archil Sikharulidze, who has been on this podcast before, this is a very unlikely scenario.
There were also denials from Georgian railways that this is at all being discussed.
Asbed: This is a political blockage. This is not an infrastructure issue, like you said at the very start. The infrastructure is in place and doesn’t take that many millions to fix, but it’s a political blockage. So a reasonable administration in Armenia would help find a win-win solution to put this railway through, basically.
Hovik: Yes, I agree. And I think that the nationalistic sentiment in Georgia is what’s preventing this. But I keep wondering, and despite Archil’s convictions, I keep wondering whether there’s something that Russia can do if Russia really wants to change things. And if Kirienko is under orders to fix the situation in the South Caucasus, restoring this railway is going to be the key.
It’s going to be a strategic priority for Russia. Yeah. And I just wonder whether Russia has something on the table that it can put against this where Georgian authorities may consider it as something that they would be willing to negotiate with Russia on.
Asbed: I’m sure Russia has some carrots to make it happen at this point.
Hovik: Yeah. It remains to be seen, but the Kocharyan campaign presents this as a viable, realistic plan But I have to say that unless the co-chairing campaign also maybe presents some evidence that Georgian officials are also considering this seriously, then I want to challenge that assertion that this is a realistic plan.
Asbed: Let’s go on with our other alliances. Strong Armenia declined an alliance with Levon Ter Petrosyan and Levon Zurabyan’s Armenian National Congress. So that is not happening. But they did add two additional parties to their alliance.
They added the Heritage Party with Raffi Hovannisian, the first foreign minister of Armenia. He’s not entirely known as a pro-Russian guy. But he does have a strong ideological base in Armenia at present. And Hrant Bagratyan, who actually used to be an ANC member and was a prime minister in that administration, he has this Freedom Party, not a very large base, but he is kind of a brand name in Armenian politics.
Hovik: Yeah. All I can say is that those are definitely much better known names than the previous two parties that they announced as part of the alliance so maybe this alliance will grow but I’m kind of disheartened not to see Levon Zurabyan’s ANC, Levon has been a guest of our podcast before and hopefully we’ll talk to him before the elections again, but so far there they have if they run by themselves, then they’ll be diluting the vote. Because I don’t think that ANC, Armenian National Congress today, has sufficient number of votes to clear the 4% margin. And the best thing for them to do would be to join an existing alliance.
But is it true that there are media reports that Essentially, stronger Armenia has excluded any possibility of an alliance with…
Asbed: I didn’t see any reports that said it’s impossible. And in politics, who knows? The interesting thing in this case, Hovik, was that they didn’t make an agreement. Because I believe that Levon Ter Petrosyan explicitly endorsed Samvel Karapetyan.
Hovik: I mean, not explicitly endorsed, but he talked.
Asbed: There were articles that we can probably find again and just link them here. But he did say, basically, that was his recommendation. And then they didn’t come to an agreement to form an alliance. So it was it was kind of strange as to what could have.
Hovik: I don’t think within the ANC, there is any disagreement on who is going to be the prime minister or candidate. Levon Ter Petrosyan is the head of the ANC. And Levon Zurabyan is the prime minister candidate.
Asbed: So is it likely that they’ll make an alliance and Levon Zurabyan is going to be the choice for strong Armenia? That’s not very likely.
Hovik: No, but all I mean to say is, I don’t think that, I think we disagreed on whether Levon Ter Petrosyan explicitly endorsed Samvel Karapetyan, but I think that they were painting Samvel Karapetyan as positive, maybe as part of these negotiations. But there is evidence that essentially Samvel Karapetyan’s side is a side that pushed, rejected this overture for whatever reason, we don’t know. But hopefully things will change because I think that will be one of the natural places where the Armenian National Congress can fit in these elections and still participate.
Asbed: Okay. You want to talk about Wings of Unity?
Hovik: The other major candidate that has a chance of clearing the thresholds based on different polling that we’ve seen is the Wings of Unity. headed by Arman Tatoyan. We have asked Mr Tatoyan to come on the podcast, and hopefully we’ll have a chance to talk to him soon. But so far, what we can report is that Wings of Unity is possibly going to run as an alliance as well, meaning that their threshold, instead of a 4%, is going to be 8%. And that, in my mind, makes it a little bit more difficult to clear But who knows?
And the two parties that are allied with Wings of Unity is Avetik Chalabyan’s Hayakve civic movement, which has a significant following in Armenia, and Shant Harutyunyan’s party, which is called the Shant Alliance. Shant Alliance is seen as a very anti-Russian party. They have Shant Harutyunyan, the father of the head of the party, is a very strong, you know, he’s not very strong opinions about Putin. So the choice of them in this Wings of Unity Alliance is very, very interesting.
I’m not sure if they have a platform yet.
Asbed: There’s this party called I’m Against All, Bolorin Demem. Do you know anything about these guys?
Hovik: It’s an interesting trick, right? Because there will be like a choice on the ballot that says I’m against all.
Asbed: Do we know that there will be a choice on the ballot?
Hovik: Well, if they’re registered by the Central Electoral Commission, then there’ll be the name. of the alliance, which is I’m against all. So I think this is meant to capture the disenchanted voters who still go to the elections, but then say, I’m not going to vote for anyone. I think these could be people who would alternatively vote. If they end up going to the elections, they would probably vote for the opposition and not for Pashinyan.
So I see this as a threat in terms of diluting or vaporizing the votes of the opposition. And at this point, I don’t know if it’s a significant following. I haven’t seen any polls that would indicate that, but We have two months to see if maybe… And they have some important names backing them, such as, I think, Nina Karapetyan, who is a human rights activist.
There are other forms. But they’re known to be essentially pro-Western IT guys and young people who are disenchanted of anyone in the opposition. And they want to reform the electoral system. So they’re saying…
If we win the elections, which is not going to happen, then we will govern for a limited amount of time under specific conditions, after which we will run another elections with new rules.
Asbed: Are they funded from anywhere?
Hovik: Who knows? Some of them would be probably categorized as being in the Soros camp in the past.
Asbed: Okay, so finally, let’s come to the Republican Party. Serge Sargsyan’s Republican Party has declared that it’s staying home. They’re out of the election, and that’s for the sake of opposition unity. Sargsyan said he has recommended that its supporters vote for any of the opposition parties, so no further news there.
Hovik: I want to actually… I think that a lot of people are criticizing the Republican Party for doing this, but I want to give them credit for recognizing that maybe they won’t be able to clear the threshold with so many opposition parties already in play. I think we will see more from them in terms of specific endorsements of an opposition alliance or party to vote for. I want to hope that the entire resources of the Republican Party will be actively engaged to endorse and campaign for these elections, even if they don’t vote specifically, if they don’t participate as a political force themselves.
Asbed: I agree with you, because the Republican Party, to be honest, is a force, but they have punched under their weight in the past few years. And finally, there is the Republic Party, not the Republican Party, the Republic Party, Aram Zaveni Sargsyan’s party. And this is a pro-Nicole opposition party. I should air quote that, pro-Nicole opposition.
There’s speculation that Unconfirmed speculations, Facebook postings that Gurgen Simonyan, who has lately been gathering a lot of support and following on social media as a political commentator, he may join the party and the alliance. We’ll put the link for the relevant posts in our show notes. But I don’t know anything about this guy, Hovik. You probably know more.
Is this really a force that’s joining the Republic Party? Because do you think that he’s so popular that he’s going to put them over the threshold and get them into parliament?
Hovik: Let’s not announce that he’s joining, but Gurgen Simonyan is shown in various polls that, you know, he has like 1% to 2% vote so far. And if there’s serious effort behind Google and Simonyan’s brand, then I think he will… He might, he threatens to achieve that. But I think that if he joins alliances with, Aram Zaveni Sargsyan, then that will probably reduce his chances because he is basically seen as the only serious alternative to Pashinyan and the formers.
So people who are still infected with the virus of the formers, you know, he’s seen as the only serious, opposition. And he’s also an anti-Russian, campaigner, but maybe political necessity, trying to, be against Russia as a… as a top choice in your campaign, in your platform, not for Armenia, but against Russia, if that is seen as a political necessity by Gurgen Simonyan and his party, then I think that they might consider joining forces with Aram Zaveni Sargsyan, which will be a big, disappointment in my book. But I think it remains to be seen on what they will do, and we will report on whatever we see and hear.
Asbed: All right, Hovik, let’s wrap up. That was our weekend review for April 5, 2026. We’re recording it today on Tuesday, April 7, 2026.
Hovik: And we also want to thank you for watching our shows, listening to us whenever you can on our podcast platform. We are probably everywhere that you are, or at least in some of the places that you are. And our only interest is to bring you truthful reporting of Armenian news without any of the foreign funding or any of the outside influence from nation states that is normally associated with news and media control in our region. So there are no political associations as well.
It’s just the two of us doing our best to be informed and also keep you informed.
Asbed: We’d love for you to join the many supporters who have started giving to us. So go to podcasts.groong.org/donate and become a sustaining member or just give once or twice or many times.
Hovik: But even if you can, also consider liking, sharing, commenting on our shows, and you can do so not just on YouTube, if you’re watching this on YouTube, but all of the other platforms, like I mentioned previously, including Substack, Apple Podcasts, and more. And also, if you write a comment or give us a rating, it helps us with a little bump in our algorithm showing.
Asbed: Yeah, significantly, actually, we have thousands of views and downloads. And on Apple podcasts, we still have only a dozen or more reviews. So folks, if you can give us a good review on Apple podcasts, if you are downloading our podcasts and listening to them on your cell phone during your walks, your hikes, your drives, your commute, that would help us a lot.
Hovik: Yeah. The foreign-sponsored shills have a lot of funds at their disposal. We have to rely on you. So please consider that as important to do.
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Asbed: Thanks for listening. I’m Asbed Bedrossian.
Hovik: And I’m Hovik Manucharyan. Like, comment, and share.
Asbed: Talk to you next week.