Dr. Pietro Shakarian joined us to discuss the state of the U.S.-Israel war on Iran, the shrinking chances for a diplomatic off-ramp, and how the conflict is shifting wider Eurasian politics. The conversation then turned to Armenia, including the likely freezing of TRIPP amid the Iran war, Pashinyan’s contentious visit to Moscow, and the deeper low point in Armenia-Russia relations. The final section focused on Armenia’s June parliamentary elections, public sentiment toward Pashinyan, fears over election integrity, and the evolving opposition landscape.
Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed: Hello, everyone, and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. We continue to discuss ongoing geopolitical developments surrounding Iran and the impact and developments that it has on Armenia and the Caucasus. So we are going to be joined by Dr. Pietro Shakarian, who is a historian of Russia and the Soviet Union, and he is currently lecturing in history at the American University of Armenia in Yerevan.
Professor Shakarian, welcome back to the Groong podcast. Great to have you.
Pietro: It’s wonderful to be here. It’s just fantastic to be with you tonight. Thank you so much for having me on again.
Hovik: Welcome, Pietro. Let’s just jump in. At 9 a.m. Eastern time on April 1st, Trump held his much hyped about address to the nation.
I mean, to me, at least, it left a lot of people more confused than, you know, answered any questions. He said that the U.S. could end the war within weeks, despite a deal with Iran, which was very interesting. And he also claimed that Washington should not worry about too much about the Strait of Hormuz, even as Iran appears to consolidate its hold over the strait and essentially impose
Asbed: a toll booth. Yeah, but at the same time, Hovig, the pressure is still building. Trump has already threatened strikes on Iran’s power grid and other civilian targets if Tehran refuses his 15-point ultimatum. And of course, Iran rejected that ultimatum and came back with their own five-point conditions.
Reportedly now, U.S. troops are moving towards the Persian Gulf, and oil prices are rising. We are experiencing this at the pump right now, gasoline sometimes in $7 to $8 range per gallon, and the markets are jittery. Meanwhile, on Thursday, this is yesterday, reports surfaced that Pete Hegseth is firing a number of the military leadership because of disagreements about a possible full-scale ground invasion. So you can see that there are a lot of issues, and this is a much more political issue for America than there’s really a military issue.
Hovik: Yeah. So a lot of brings to the ship and no clear sense of where the off ramp is or whether there is such a thing as an off ramp.
Asbed: So Pietro, do you look at this moment And do you see any path towards a diplomatic solution or are the U.S., Israel and Iran now locked more or less into a greater escalation by sheer force of their own logic? I mean, they do say that it’s easy to get into war, but it’s very difficult to come out of it. So are we there?
Pietro: I think we are, unfortunately there, Asbed. I think that Trump bit off much more than he could chew with this. And also, it’s interesting, you know, he keeps on moving the goalpost. I mean, in this much-vaunted address to the nation.
He was saying, I think, that it was going to be like two more weeks or two to three more weeks or something like this. Well, originally the war was supposed to be four days. And then just kept on, you know, expanding the timeline, just kept on moving, moving, moving for how long, you know, this military operation in Iran was supposed to take. And so I think that Trump massively miscalculated.
I think that he was believing sincerely that this was going to be like another Venezuela, that basically you take out, you know, the supreme leader of Iran and then that would be it.
Asbed: And the country will crumble magically.
Pietro: And the country will crumble magically. And it would be just, like I said, just like a Venezuela kind of style scenario. And what it tells you, Asbed, is that actually whoever is advising… How stupid he is.
How stupid he is. And whoever is advising on Iran policy in the U.S., It really shows that they really don’t know anything about the country, even at a basic level. I mean, they clearly have not taken even any graduate level courses on this. I mean, where is supposedly the area studies trained, you know, intelligence on this, that we don’t have any like there’s no sense of the country.
And first of all, that this is not a government where it’s just one man. It’s not that’s not the rule of one man. It’s a whole government system that’s been there that’s been building up since 1979. that has been kind of institutionalized since 1979. So it’s not going to be taken out if you take out one guy.
And the fact that he believes that really tells me that they don’t know anything about this.
Asbed: You know what’s funny, Pietro? General Douglas McGregor has called on Trump to fire everyone around him. It’s not funny.
Pietro: So you guys agree. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, I think that that would be a good start. But, you know, the problem is that Trump is too beholden to many of these people, most of those people, Right.
If he was thinking about, you know, if he was being principled, they wouldn’t be there in the first place. And that’s that’s that’s a big part of the problem. We’re dealing with political hacks, you know, like Pete Hegseth. Who is he?
I mean, I mean, there’s so much more professionalism in America that out of all the people in the United States that you could have picked for the position of secretary of defense slash secretary of war. Why would you settle on this man? That’s really what I want to know. But going back to the address, I just want to say that Trump really, I mean, there was nothing really new there.
And in fact, actually, it was clear that Trump wanted to kind of get out, but that he understood that he needs to do something to kind of show that, you know, he won and it’s difficult for him to do that. And now, really, he’s also trying to shift things off to others. So he’s basically saying, you know what, you know, you’re up effectively. He didn’t mention them specifically, but he might as well have.
Basically, you know, the Strait of Hormuz, you want the oil there? You go and take it yourself. You go in and you go and, you know, open it up.
Asbed: It’s interesting how we’re seeing a bunch of fissures coming obvious between Europe and the US. For one thing, everybody’s saying that this is a crack inside NATO, but I’m actually looking at the fact that the US never consulted NATO partners on something starting this war. So they’re thinking, why should we be dragged into this? And yes, they have a greater dependency on the Strait of Hormuz, but this is the kind of issue that the US has never been consulting with its neighbors.
It’s just like acting like a… A cowboy on the planet, basically.
Pietro: Absolutely. Well, you see two positions. One in Europe is, I mean, you are seeing splits in Europe. You’re seeing those people like Kaja Kallas, who, you know, they’re staying loyal to Trump and this war.
They’re staying loyal to Trump and his regime change campaign in Iran. Whereas then you have others like Spain, like Italy, surprisingly.
Asbed: Even in the UK, they’ve been talking about.
Pietro: Even within the UK. But I mean, specifically Spain and Italy, they’re not allowing, you know, American planes to, you know, fly over their territory. That’s a big thing. It’s a huge thing that really, you know, to stand up to the U.S. like that.
You’re also hearing voices in Belgium that are saying, you know what, we have to alleviate the sanctions, the EU sanctions on Russia because we’re in a very vulnerable position now. Also, you know, Hungary is talking like that, too. So this is where we are right now. Petro,
Hovik: just this morning, Javad Zarif, former foreign minister of Iran, wrote an article in Foreign Affairs titled, How Iran Should End the War, a Deal Iran Could Take. And honestly, I tried reading it to understand like, you know, all this sort of the fine print in the article and trying to understand the full point. And I wanted to maybe have you break it down for us. What was the point of the article?
And do you think that that could be a basis for an agreement on ending this war?
Pietro: Well, this article by Mr. Zarif, who is the former foreign minister of Iran, what’s so significant about it is he’s actually, and this is somebody who is more in the reformist camp, just to let you know, right? And also this is somebody who was involved with the Iran nuclear deal, going back to the Obama years, all this. What’s most interesting about it is he is saying that Iran has, you know, he’s saying definitively Iran has the upper hand, that Iran has won.
Iran has won the war, basically. But that, you know, what we should do, you know, from the perspective of Iran is we should be magnanimous. And we also understand, too, that if the war goes on any further, I mean, it’s going to also, I mean, there’s going to be immense destruction to civilian life, to infrastructure, all this, and that, you know, nobody benefits by this war going on indefinitely. So he’s basically advocating for this deal, where basically it’s that Iran would pull back from any kind of, you know, nuclear weapons, you know, kind of program, while at the same time receiving sanctions relief in return.
That would be the idea. And also, in addition, there would be, most significantly of all, this is a big point of his proposed peace plan in foreign affairs. And it’s really significant, by the way, that it was published in foreign affairs, which is the leading foreign policy publication of the United States elite. It’s very significant that he actually was published in this magazine.
But the only problem here is that can Iran trust the United States? I mean, I’m sure there are some receptive ears to this in Iran, and certainly in the U.S. Trump is looking for an off-ramp. But can Iran trust the United States after being betrayed twice?
I mean, they were negotiating in good faith. Most famously, back in February, the Omani foreign minister was mediating these negotiations, these talks, and they got, the United States got the best deal from Iran possible. And then the war destroyed all that. So can they go back to that?
It’s a big question. So there’s a lot on good faith that Zarif is, you know, he’s advancing this proposal on good faith. But the question is, can this be realized? uh will will the united states will first of all i mean will Would anybody in the United States, in the current administration, would they actually go for a deal like this, especially given the entrenched interests in this administration, particularly when we talk about Israel and Benjamin Netanyahu? And then on the other side, in Iran, how could they trust the U.S. ?
So it’s a matter of trust. It’s a matter of kind of these sides being willing to kind of do that. And the problem is right now things are so far gone. Trump has found himself… in an extremely difficult situation.
And I’m not sure he could even, he would even listen to something like this. Remember, back on March 7th, Mr. Pezeshkian, the president of Iran, you know, gave this apology to neighboring countries, and that was kind of like an invitation to an off-front ramp. And what did Mr.
Trump do? Mr. Trump dismissed that completely out of hand. And that was probably the last, for a very long time, that was probably the last off-ramp that Trump had in this.
So, you know, I mean, I think that the trust, you know, that the United States has with Iran is, you know, gone. And, I mean, if it’s not… evaporating, it’s gone completely, unfortunately.
Asbed: Pietro, I’ve been reading a lot of articles about the place of Iran shifting on the global map basically.
Pietro: Absolutely.
Asbed: So can you give us a little bit of your thoughts on how this whole war is affecting Iran and its place in the world? But let’s also step back from that and look at what’s going on with Russia and the war in Ukraine. How is that being affected by this conflict?
Pietro: Well, first and foremost, the rise in oil prices is actually helping Russia. That’s number one. That’s the most obvious one that everybody, all the observers are talking about. Number two, the other thing is the fact that the U.S. is less concentrated on the Ukrainian front.
They’re more focused now on Iran. And also in the process, they’re, you know, using resources that might have been earlier used for the war in Ukraine toward the Iranian, you know, front. And you also have to think the stakes are very high because, you know, Trump is issuing a lot of threats to Tehran. He has a lot of desires on remaking Iran, doing regime change in Iran and all this and that, a lot of big rhetoric.
But he’s not able to follow through with anything. And Iran, meanwhile, is the one that has all the cards. If we look, they’re the ones who have closed Hormuz and it’s a massively affecting the global economy. And Trump is trying to actually keep things afloat by creating some kind of, you know, statements about some illusionary.
I mean, some some kind of illusion.
Asbed: Of course, they’ve also taken a lot of damage.
Pietro: Yeah, they’ve also taken a lot of damage in the process. But what actually has happened is that the focus on Ukraine is being redirected away. I mean, already it was being drained away with the Gaza war, with the Gaza genocide, really. I mean, going on with the whole Israeli front down there.
And now… more and more resources are going to be, you know, redirected toward Iran. So you have that. And also Ukraine is running out of men. The manpower in Ukraine is really, really going down very, very fast.
And there is talk about Russia launching a spring offensive, you know, so we’ll see. I mean, this war with Ukraine and Russia has been going very slow. It’s like the La Brea tar pits, right? It’s very, very, you know, very, very, you know, it’s been going very, very methodically, for quite some time.
Asbed: Actually, I was talking to some colleagues just yesterday about the Ukraine war and Some people were suggesting, oh, that conflict has already been pre-decided and it’s a matter of how it simmers down and goes away. Their point was, look at Ukraine, it’s starting to sell weapons and technology to other countries. So it’s not like they even need some of that anymore. Is that conflict over or?
Pietro: No, it’s not over. And actually, Ukraine, I mean, I mean, those weapons probably are coming through, you know, the black market. But Ukraine, you know, I mean, the I mean, like the weapons stock in Europe is being depleted in the Europe. The Europeans have been, you know, they’ve been delegated the the position by the United States to be the ones, the primary suppliers of Ukraine.
Now, it’s still indirectly a way of the US, you know, a way for the US to supply Ukraine. But at the end of the day, Ukraine is in that whole Ukrainian front is in very dire straits. And and like I said, the war, you know, has been waged as like a war of attrition very methodically by the Russian side. And, you know, now, I mean, we could very well see, you know, a collapse in terms of Ukraine.
I can’t say specifically when, but we can you can see that coming. The factors are aligned. that would enable that scenario to take place. But about Iran, I want to also mention about Iran’s place in the world, that Iran actually has emerged from all this, I mean, through the whole Hormuz situation. I mean, it’s at the center of the changing global order.
I mean, Iran, I mean, you have to think, I mean, going back into the history, it’s a civilizational state. You know, I’ve talked about this before on other podcasts in depth. I mean, going all the way back to the Achaemenid Empire. And so really what we’re seeing is kind of a revival of Persia on the on the international stage and that.
Iran is now leading the way in this rise of the rest that I’ve spoken about before on this podcast, that it is at the forefront of the changing global order. And probably to many Iranians who, I mean, even if they might not care for the Islamic government in Iran, And they’re also very upset, obviously, about, you know, the war and what’s going on. I mean, the war also, Trump has made it clear that this is not just a war at this point against the Iranian government, but even against the Iranian nation.
I mean, that’s how people look at it in Iran, that this is that it first meant there were some who were thinking, oh, yes, maybe Trump is here to help the Iranian opposition or something. But it was very clear, especially with Minab.
Asbed: There seems to be a lot of solidarity inside the country, to be honest.
Pietro: It’s rallying around the flag, yeah.
Hovik: With all due respect I’m going to ask, I mean, it all sounds nice and everything, but… What is the likelihood that all of this will happen? Because we’re counting, essentially, it seems like we’re counting our chickens, but, you know, a whole bunch of troops are headed towards the Middle East, and there’s a lot of speculation that Trump is basically, his speech was just to buy time, and a ground invasion is basically an inevitability. I’m sure Israel and the Arab states don’t want a civilizational superpower on their borders.
So is this all going to end up as rosily as we are predicting right now?
Pietro: No, it’s not going to end up Rosalie, as we’re predicting. In fact, actually even, I mean, certainly Israel from day one, their main objective in getting the U.S. and pulling the U.S. I mean, because it’s one factor, by the way. I believe in kind of a fusion thesis.
I’m not one of these people who says it’s completely Israel. Because I also think there’s a larger geopolitical dynamic of Iran and its position in BRICS, its position in Eurasia. I’ve talked about that on this show, too. Also, Jovic, you’ve mentioned about Brian Berletic and his podcast and his very, very astute analysis on this issue.
So it’s not just about Israel, but Israel is definitely one of the factors and definitely one of the agents that, you know, was aiming to see Iran, you know, basically kind of essentially balkanized.
Hovik: They have an ability to throw a monkey wrench in the process at any time. And I’m not seeing Trump being able to curtail Israeli ambitions.
Pietro: Not only that, also you mentioned about the Arab states in the Persian Gulf and how basically they invited these U.S. bases there as kind of like method of protection right that that was supposed to be protecting them but now it’s actually made them targets but in the process now because they’re targets and they they’re they’re seeing themselves in an environment where they’re worried potentially of Iran becoming too strong and so there’s also now a logic that now they want to pull the us more uh you know potentially into a confrontation but the problem here is that A ground invasion of Iran, even an attempt to take one of these islands in the Persian Gulf, one of these islands that is part of Iranian territory, that’s going to be incredibly bloody.
It’s going to be incredibly violent. And it’s not going to be, because it’s not just also about the U.S. taking, let’s say, an island, let alone going into mainland Iran. So even if they were to, let’s say, if they were to go and try and take the Hormuz, if they were going to try and, you know, go into that territory and try and do like a D-Day style landing. I mean, first of all, I mean, you have to imagine, think about the geography.
It’s very, very inhospitable. I mean, it’s very inhospitable geography. Very, very high mountains. The beaches are very limited.
And also Trump, I guess he was proposing to do this with, I think it was maybe 5,000 men. You can’t do that with 5,000 men. Think about D-Day was 160,000 men.
Hovik: No, I mean, I think all of the all the tactical details have been played out by and you can find them everywhere.
Pietro: It’s not only that. It’s not only the matter of just simply taking land, which is bloody enough. But imagine they have to hold it.
Hovik: Which leads me to my initial question, which is Javad Zarif’s article. You know, all I’m seeing is like there is a proposal, but that proposal was there before the war. Iran was basically saying guaranteed non-nuclear development and the U.S. didn’t take it. And I’m not seeing any conditions on the U.S. side that will allow the U.S. to, you know, have a different position on it, especially Israel.
So that’s my point, essentially. I mean, we have to move on, but I think if you have to summarize how likely is the scenario where the US essentially pulls out in some ways while saving face, while tampering, or while preventing Israel from throwing a monkey wrench into this process, how likely are we
Pietro: in seeing that well there are no good scenarios here unfortunately for the US because it’s either you know they pull out and of course it would be embarrassing for a superpower to have to do this after making so many threats and statements and all that but it would be even worse if you then go in and you try to you know go full-fledged you know do a full-fledged ground invasion or an assault on one of these islands, you know, or an action like this. And it actually humiliates you even more. First and also, it costs a lot more life and a lot more, you know, damage and all this and that.
But aside from that, the political fallout from a move like this would be even worse for the U.S. So either, yes, they can admit defeat, um and they can pull out and they would face embarrassment sure but they would face even greater embarrassment if they try to do a ground invasion and then they are humiliated um massively yeah and and that’s that’s how that’s how i see it let’s
Hovik: move to TRIPP because many analysts believe that TRIPP the trump route for international peace and prosperity I can’t believe how easily that thing is coming out of my mouth, but the Turks call it the Zangezur Corridor. And for all the haters out there, for all the Pashinyan supporters, it is the Zangezur Corridor. As much as it pains me to say it, but it is exactly the Zangezur Corridor that the Turks want. So some believe that the Zangezur Corridor will not survive this war on Iran.
Even Armenian officials, Pashinyan tried to, I think, say that, you know, given the war in Iran, the U.S. is sort of, you know, delaying the project. uh but there are also other voices that are saying actually things are moving ahead full steam what do you see, how do you see this TRIPP project coming along and how has the war in Iran impacted the project um i mean it just it’s very weird because essentially as long as the war is going on and we just talked about the fact that there doesn’t seem to be an easy off-ramp This thing is going to be stuck in mid-air, right?
Pietro: Yeah, it is. I mean, so it’s not full speed ahead. I mean, there are many people in Pashinyan’s government who would still, who are trying to kind of, you know, tell themselves a fairy tale that this is, that it is full speed ahead, that everything is just fine, that nothing has changed at all. But the war, I mean, has definitely has changed things.
I mean, even just this past month, I mean, alone has changed things. You have to think before the war, Iran didn’t have control of the Straits of Hormuz. You have to think that Now the U.S. ’s international credibility in terms of, you know, diplomacy, but even in terms of its, you know, coercive power is under, is under serious question.
So now there, and also that’s not, that’s not to say anything about the fact that Iran considers TRIPP, no matter what its name, I mean, TRIPP or Zengezur Corridor, whatever, it’s all the same thing, like you said, Hovig, that no matter what Trump, that no matter what this kind of Trump Corridor, is perceived by Iran as a as a major threat to its security. And they’re not going to, as long, especially if this war is ongoing, they’re never going to allow a scenario where a U.S. military contractor gets its foot in the door in southern Armenia, in Mekri, in Akarak, in places like this, and stays there for 99 years.
It’s just not going to happen. And also there’s even the strategic disincentive from the U.S. side, because, you know, that would open up a whole new front of this war. You know, although maybe there might be some in the U.S., unfortunately, who would want that. But the reality is that it’s just not realistic to expect that this is going to be realized anytime soon.
It’s just that’s why most analysts actually say that the whole idea is completely on ice. It’s completely frozen. it’s not going to be realized anytime soon. So while, again, it’s like they’re trying to kind of convince themselves in Pashinyan’s government that this is actually going to happen. It’s not going to happen.
It’s done for, at least in the foreseeable future, but even beyond this. I mean, Iran is emerging quite strong. It’s actually shown the world that it’s a consolidated state. I mean, it’s been able to at least hold off this war of aggression you have to think again Israel and the United States committed the highest war crime which… is a war of aggression so it’s not going to end well for TRIPP.
I think that the whole TRIPP idea is is pretty much… also there’s another element of this that is very damaging to the whole scheme not only of TRIPP but even to the narrative of peace because Pashinyan is i’m sure we’re probably going to talk about it later in the show But Pashinyan always loves talking about peace, peace, peace. I’m the man of peace. You know, war, peace. This kind of a thing, really.
I mean, it’s very similar to Neville Chamberlain, right? The idea of, you know, peace in our time. And that’s really what he’s trying to do. Really, he’s trying to sell appeasement to the Armenian public.
Well, it’s a big issue if one of the parties of this so-called peace, who is Mr. Trump, if he is waging a war of aggression against your immediate neighbor. And Armenians can see this. I mean, even if you’re living in the most remote mountain village in Armenia, it doesn’t take a scientist to tell you that Trump committed a complete unjustified war of aggression against your neighbor.
Hovik: So Pietro, this whole TRIPP thing, did come up in Pashinyan’s recent visit to Moscow. And in fact, I was actually reading a tweet and I wanted to get the original source, but I couldn’t. But it quoted Russian Deputy Prime Minister Overchuk as saying that Russia would probably have an easier time crossing the Strait of Hormuz than TRIPP. I don’t know how true that is, but I really, really wanted to get the source of that.
So in case anyone has it, leave it in the comments. But let’s talk about Pashinyan’s… trip to Moscow. Essentially, Pashinyan’s Moscow mission was to break the Russian railway management concession and prioritize his Crossroads of Peace initiative, and it was met with fierce resistance. In a tense public exchange, He and Russian President Vladimir Putin treated accusations over who lost Artsakh and then on the shortcomings of the CSTO and how it allegedly didn’t come to Armenia’s aid.
Putin then further warned Pashinyan against barring the opposition from participating in the forthcoming June elections, especially Russian-Armenian dual citizens. I think he was making a reference to some of Karapetyan. He raised the issue of the dual citizens, which I thought was interesting.
Asbed: That wasn’t all. That wasn’t all. I mean, I don’t know if you heard Overchuk. He delivered a stinging dressing down.
He warned that the whole economic relationship between Armenia and Russia is almost going to be completely restructured. He dismissed the railway request. He criticized TRIPP and cautioned that declining nuclear expertise from Russia that is being denied is possible. probably going to cause the closure of the ANPP, the Mezamor Nuclear Power Plant, five years early. These are extremely serious things.
And despite all of this, somehow, Pashinyan came back and labeled the visit very successful, not even just productive, like very successful. He achieved everything he wanted to achieve. Pietro, what’s your take on Pashinyan’s visit to the extent that it’s possible? Just tell us, what does this visit say about the current state of relations between Moscow and Yerevan?
Pietro: I think it says that the current state of relations between Moscow and Yerevan is really at an all-time low. The Russians were never crazy about Pashinyan, really, from day one. They would tolerate him. They were willing to, you know, trust him, you know, and actually you see what happened as a result of that for Russia, ultimately.
It’s not only that. Now the Russians are making no bones about really kind of telling Pashinyan off openly in public, not only about the loss of Artsakh, but even about this whole thing with the EU. So one very important statement that Putin made actually at this meeting was he told Pashinyan directly, look, you know what, you’re attempting to join the EU, but you’re also a member of the Eurasian Union. You can’t sit in two chairs at once.
You can’t, you know, claim to want to move toward European Union membership while also being a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. It just doesn’t work like that. And not only if you were…
Asbed: And Pashinyan came back and said, yes, at some point we’re going to have to make a choice. I mean, that’s ridiculous. That’s basically telling Putin, when it’s convenient for us, we’re going to leave the Eurasian Union. Why would Putin wait for a convenient moment for Pashinyan to do this?
Absolutely.
Pietro: But imagine something else, too, especially in the current context. I mean, Pashinyan doesn’t even read the international news. He doesn’t know what’s actually going on outside of his home in Yerevan. Because at the end of the day, you see how already Europe had big problems with this, you know, LNG gas and how it was, you know, causing the rise of energy prices in Europe.
And now with the Strait of Hormuz being closed, those LNG prices are, you know, skyrocketing. And actually, you think, you know, I mean, in the U.S., you think you have a bed in California with the rising, you know, prices at the pump. Imagine the Europeans. And so compare that with the cheap gas that Armenians received from Russia.
And Putin was pointing out very straightforwardly to Pashinyan, he said, well, if you want to join the EU, fine, but look at how much they have to pay for their energy.
Asbed: Can I add one thing, Pietro? The same with Canada, by the way. Canada’s hurting so bad that they recently, I mean, by recently, I’m talking about this last week, they authorized, they licensed over 50,000 Chinese EVs to be sold in Canada. Yeah.
Pietro: So, yes, that’s the kind of pain they’re experiencing. That’s the kind of pain they’re experiencing. And the other thing I just want to highlight, though, about this visit is just like the outright falsehoods that also Pashinyan espoused. So Pashinyan at one point went off on kind of this idea that, you know, democracy is our brand, which, of course, is a big joke because Armenia now has never been less democratic.
Armenia under Mr. Pashinyan has de-democratized. It’s no secret to anybody who is living here in Yerevan, I mean, who’s living in Armenia. We can see it.
We can see what has happened to Armenia over these past eight years under Pashinyan. Again, somebody who came in promising that there would actually be more democracy, promising that There would be more competitive elections. There would be electoral reform, all this kind of a thing. And at the end of the day, actually, he created this kind of a new regime that was all based on his power and loyalty to him and everything like this.
But the most interesting thing was how he even claimed to Putin. that you know what, and also he was talking about things such as what we allow access to all sorts of different media and different websites, and you don’t need a VPN to access this, which is also part of his electoral rhetoric too. But the most interesting thing, I thought, and this was really rich, and Hovik, I’m sure Hovik would find this to be astoundingly ironic, that Pashinyan claimed there are no, none, zero, that there are no political prisoners in Armenia. The fact that Pashinyan says that there are no political prisoners in Armenia, he says this with a straight face.
Asbed: I mean, that really is rich. That’s absolutely laughable.
Pietro: I mean, that’s absolutely, yeah.
Asbed: Pietro, did you notice that while Pashinyan was meeting with Putin, he was wearing some kind of extremely large map of Armenia on his lapel pin.
Hovik: So Asbed, yeah, I mean, I noticed you’re prepared for this. So I also decided to put on my,
Asbed: you know, I guess he has a lot of these things left over because if you recall about a week ago when he had a run in with regular residents of Armenia, that was Armine Mosiyan, it went viral. People are refusing to take these pins from him.
Hovik: Okay, by the way, I’m going to take this off, sorry. I want to show our viewers what we’re… See, it’s the map of Armenia and the map of Artsakh. I think Pashinyan will have a stroke if he watches this, but…
What’s that inside the map? And then there’s Mount Ararat inside the map, so double stroke.
Asbed: Oh, wow. Oh, my God. We are going to be banned. Yeah, absolutely.
You and I are going to end up in a prison in Yerevan. Nubarashen for us. Anyway. I just wanted to ask Pietro about all this.
Who is he talking to and what is his message?
Hovik: And did he actually also, did he wear that pin anywhere else with political leaders like the EU leaders, you know? So I haven’t seen him wear that.
Pietro: He has never worn it with anybody else. He only wore it, as far as I could see, with Mr. Putin. And I don’t know what his statement is that maybe he’s trying to, again, kind of claim, again, maybe it’s a reference to his belief that which is not supported by any evidence at all that somehow the Armenian, the Artsakh movement was somehow created by KGB or something like this.
And he wants to kind of emphasize to Putin that now we are independent in this real Armenia, in this, you know, 29,000 square kilometers territory. and and that you know you should accept this you know i’m coming here because this little pin is a symbol of our independence from you that kind of a thing and what i think is what’s actually quite you know humorous about this is really passionate i don’t even understand what he even means by the independence because really he’s effectively his policies are just making Armenia dependent on Turkey and Azerbaijan, and by extension also the West, but in the more immediate context, Turkey and Azerbaijan.
So what independence is there?
Hovik: I have no idea, actually. So Pietro, actually, someone sent us a very bad joke on April Fool’s, and I honestly fell for it. I thought it was real. It was an announcement that Pashinyan, that Armenia is going to join The Union of Turkish States.
And I go like, yeah, that makes, I guess, that’s the only thing that Pashinyan has not done yet.
Asbed: Observer status at the start. So the joke was quite realistic.
Pietro: Unfortunately, it sounds almost like something he would actually do. You can see him signing up for observer status in this organization. I mean, that’s why it’s an April Fool’s joke, but it’s unfortunately too close. I mean, more than half of all the things that Trump says, you know, in any other context, you might think that, well, if the president of the United States said that, then that must be, you know, a joke.
That must be April Fool’s or something. But yeah, we’re in an A day and age. where the line between humor and reality is almost nonexistent, unfortunately.
Asbed: Pietro, one quick question before I move on to parliamentary elections. I wanted to ask about that sovereignty independence business that you talked about, because Pashinyan is actually trying to sell the idea or the branding that the TRIPP, the Trump route, is a security guarantee for Armenia. How is that logically going to work? I just don’t understand exactly what the logic is at a time where the Trump route is actually protecting Azerbaijanis from Armenians and Iranians.
No, it’s not protecting Armenians from anything.
Pietro: I remember, I believe it was on Groong. I believe it was on this podcast where you had James Carden come on. And James said that, you know, I actually I’m not sure if it was Groong or 168.am or one of these podcasts that Carden was on. But the interviewer and it might have been you, Asbed, actually.
The interviewer asked, you know, what does this do for Armenia? And James responded, it puts a target on its back. And that really hasn’t changed. And actually, you know what?
It’s even worse now than it was even then, because now there’s a full-scale war going on against Iran that’s being waged by the United States and Israel. So really, if Armenia wants to, it’s not going to make Armenia more secure. It’s going to actually enhance the threats to Armenia. That’s the other thing.
I’ve been arguing for a very long time that even though this is billed as a great peace, in fact, it’s actually creating the conditions for more war. I mean, the idea was really to use the South Caucasus against Iran. That was the whole idea of this TRIPP. That was the whole idea of trying to kind of create a quick peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, because the idea would be to consolidate the U.S. and Israeli position north of the Arax River.
So it is not going to make Armenia more secure. It’s not going to make Armenia more safe. It’s going to make it much more. It’s going to make the conditions in the region much more difficult and the overall security situation much worse for Armenia.
Asbed: OK, well, let’s move on to the parliamentary elections in Armenia because they’re just two months away. It’s hard to believe, but it’s right here. So let’s discuss some of the developments on that front, because despite the formal start of the application process for registering political parties with the CEC is set on, I think, April 14. The outline of the political field is actually starting to take shape.
Pashinyan and the civil contract party have already been campaigning for, I don’t know, about nine months ever since Samvel Karapetyan was put in jail. That was the first salvo, I think. And the Armenia alliance has started having public meetings. sending out some messaging. So we are starting to see some of these platforms come together.
However, I don’t think that we’re going to see these parties releasing their formal platforms until essentially after the start of the election season. So you are on the ground there directly. What is the general mood that you are seeing in Armenian society regarding the elections and the position of Pashinyan in this campaign?
Pietro: Well, it’s quite interesting because people are getting really more and more and more into the election mood. First, again, as we know, as we were just talking about in the first half of this podcast, the Iran war was a major concern to many Armenians. Many people were following the news very closely about what was going on with Iran, actually, as a matter of fact. But then over time, the election actually became the bigger story.
Now, really, the election has actually been on most people’s minds for several months now already. I mean, that’s just a fact. I mean, that’s just how it’s been here. But what is most interesting is that the vibe I get, and again, I mean, this is just my impression, this just living here.
The vibe I get is that Pashinyan’s standing in the society is collapsing. It’s decreasing. It’s not as strong as it once was. And it reminds me quite a bit of late stage Saakashvili.
So when Saakashvili was on the road to losing the election in Georgia in 2012, Just everything he did, even to try and help himself, just made the situation worse. It just made his popularity worse. So we’ve seen many different things over these past few months since the summer. It’s actually a good measurement because in the summer, the idea was that the TRIPP that Pashinyan was supposedly inaugurating with Trump and Aliyev in Washington, D.C., that that was going to be billed as, look, I’m actually making progress toward a deal with Azerbaijan.
There’s going to be peace and all this and that. But the evidence indicates that this TRIPP has not been well received by the Armenian public, and moreover, The other thing is it’s certainly not boosted Pashinyan, because the idea was that it would act as something that would actually boost him in the polls, that that was going to be a decisive thing that was actually going to ensure his reelection, that I’m the candidate making the peace. And it did not actually become that decisive element to ensure his reelection as easily as he thought. The other issue was his campaign against the church, his persecution of the church.
Now, the church in Armenia, as has been shown by poll after poll after poll after poll, the church is the most trusted institution in the country. and its leadership, if we’re looking at Mikayel Srbazan, for example, or Bagrat Srbazan, or any of these leaders, or the Catholicos himself, Garegin II, that they enjoy immense trust with the Armenian public. The institution of the church enjoys immense trust with the Armenian public. It’s a beloved institution. I mean, just see, we’re in Easter weekend here in Yerevan, You can see that very plainly.
Just look at the mass attendance. Look at the attendance of the church. And when people go to Badarak, it’s like last Sunday was Palm Sunday. And there was another controversy there, too, by the way, as we know, that Pashinyan and his security detail were trying to push themselves in.
People didn’t like this much. But the notable thing there was not only the resentment against Pashinyan, and also there’s this case now with the, you know, the Minasyan case, we’re actually following that quite closely in Armenia, but also the fact that that church, St. Anna’s Church, was packed, tells you a lot about the society. And so his campaign against the church failed.
It did not attract the kind of popular support he wanted it to. And there are many, many different things like this that are just like accumulating over and over and over. Then you have these incidents like, you know, him handing out these pins on the Yedovan Metro. And as we saw.
And the rejections.
Hovik: But OK, let me give you the devil’s argument. Let me give you the devil’s advocate argument, because I would say in 2021. the Armenian society was much more right after you know losing the war Armenian society had legitimately more reason to be upset at Pashinyan and we saw how the elections happened the opposition didn’t accept the results initially But, you know, how can we talk? I’m just wondering whether we are fooling ourselves by giving too much credence that the elections will be democratic and free and fair, given that all these years Pashinyan has been arresting the opposition left and right. I mean, it’s not even just before.
Like, even if Pashinyan says, OK, I’m going to let all the opposition loose right now, he has achieved a lot in terms of suppressing them. In terms of Council of Europe, we’re number three after Turkey and after Azerbaijan in terms of numbers of imprisoned journalists. Most of the opposition, I mean, all branches of the opposition have at least one prominent member who is in jail. Okay, maybe the mood is, you know, against Pashinyan, but how will it result in removal of Pashinyan during the elections if the elections aren’t free and fair?
Pietro: That’s a big question. That’s a question many people are asking. There is even fear, Hovig, unfortunately, despite Pashinyan’s statements that democracy is our brand, there is even fear that the election might not even happen. There’s even some people were even thinking, would he even cancel the whole election?
Let alone, I mean, in addition, of course, to also the fears that, you know, Mr. Putin expressed to Pashinyan in Moscow, that, you know, that would you bar the opposition from participating in the election? And there are serious concerns about that. And Pashinyan, I have no doubt, is going to rig the election or attempt to rig the election.
But if there is enough opposition to him in the society, then it’s going to be very difficult to rig the election convincingly. Because at some point, if there’s so much opposition to him, and if he’s going through administrative resources, doing whatever he can, at some point, he’s only going to be able to rig enough. He might not succeed in this endeavor, is what I’m trying to say.
Hovik: So the goal is essentially increasing the turnout so much that it would expose Pashinyan’s rigging very easily.
Pietro: But again, there’s also the threat, like I said, that even with this, the other fear is, would he even allow the elections to take place? Would he just cancel the election?
Hovik: He passed a law that allowed him to not recognize the results of the election if there is a state of emergency. There are so many laws that have been changed over the last few years to allow Pashinyan all sorts of loopholes in terms of
Pietro: Absolutely.
Hovik: You know, banning political parties, even outright canceling the results of the election if there’s a state of war. So, yes, you’re right that there’s a, you know, there are a lot of questions.
Pietro: And also, Hovik, look over to his partner in populism, Mr. Trump. who has spoken openly about maybe I would cancel the midterm elections in the United States. So Pashinyan, he could get some ideas from that. That’s also the other fear.
But we’ll see what happens. And we’ll see where the opposition is after this election. We’ll see what the situation is like after this election. But what I feel right now in the society is the hostility toward Pashinyan is increasing.
Um, and again, like I was mentioning all these incidents, you know, it’s like a snowball effect, one thing after another thing, after another thing. I mean, one weekend you have, um, literally it’s, it’s like almost every weekend there’s an issue. So like one weekend he’s fighting with one weekend is he goes out to the countryside. Right.
And he goes, uh, I believe it was an art shot as a matter of fact, you know, where he actually was meeting, uh, with people and he goes to a, a grocery store to buy some fruits and And you have the man in the store saying, doors, doors, don’t, you know, out, you know, I don’t want you, don’t enter my store, that kind of a thing. And then the next thing you know, Pashinyan then is trying to sell these, you know, kind of pins of peace. And you see the reaction from the woman from Artsakh and actually…
He, in the end, Pashinyan himself made it a worse situation by actually fighting with a woman and insult, and really insulting the Artsakhsis, calling them runaways and fugitives and all this. And then finally, you know, his, I don’t even understand what the logic of this was, last week, he shows up in St. Anna’s church and literally muscles his way in while people are trying to celebrate, you know, the Badarak, they’re trying to celebrate the service.
Hovik: On Palm Sunday.
Pietro: on palm sunday and he’s just like pushing his way in with the security detail you know there’s there’s you know these fights with the teenage boy um i mean the video
Hovik: evidence clearly shows his security guard punching the teenage The teenager in the face. And it was amazing because Pashinyan is justifying that as if they’re doing their duty. At first, that footage of the security guard punching the boy was not even released. And you could just see a scuffle.
But I can’t believe how after all of that, how after the real images were released, somehow he still is able to justify the actions of his thugs.
Pietro: And that’s at a church. That’s at a church, Hovick.
Hovik: That’s in a church, a place of God. But we have to move on, Pietro. So I’m going to ask you a few more questions about the political landscape and we have to end. But there are two major pieces of news that I was able to gleam from the last weeks or maybe last week regarding the opposition and what the opposition is doing.
Number one is that the Republican Party of Armenia has announced that they will not be participating in these elections, at least directly. I don’t know whether indirectly they will endorse someone else. They haven’t made that clear. I think they’re going to have a Congress soon for the party.
And the other thing which was surprising to me is strong Armenia, Narek Karapetyan, who is currently the leader, announced that they will run as a coalition, not as a party, but as a coalition with two smaller parties. Unfortunately, you know, with me following news in Armenia for the last, you know, 20 years, He mentioned the names of two parties that I had never heard of, to be honest. New Era Party and I Am Armenia Party. But the immediate result of that is that if Strong Armenia runs as an alliance rather than a single party, then the threshold for them to get into parliament is 8% and not 4%.
So those are the few things that are on my mind. But can you Can you talk about the electoral landscape as it is formulating right now and anything you want to call out or any issues that you want to talk about specifically?
Pietro: Well, I think it’s going to be very interesting to see how this all shakes out. I can see a scenario. I can’t speak to the exact calculus that strong Armenia had in terms of why they want to run as a bloc and not as a political party. Maybe it’s maybe to include more forces under their wing or something like this.
I can’t say specifically. But I will say that this is going to be a very interesting election. And I can see a future where there is some sort of a coalition between these different forces with Prosperous Armenia Party and also, you know, Armenia Alliance, Robert Kocharyan’s party. Actually, this is what the authorities are afraid of.
I mean, this is what Pashinyan’s government is even afraid of, that there will be some kind of alliance between these parties. Pietro,
Asbed: what do you make specifically,
Pietro: you know,
Asbed: what do you make specifically of Serge Sargsyan and the Patil Unem party staying out?
Pietro: Well, I think there are two factors behind this. Number one, it wasn’t a surprise because we’ve been speculating for months where they’ve got to even participate in the election. And always we were coming to the conclusion, if you’re watching Armenian politics very closely, always we were coming to the conclusion that most likely no or that we’re hearing through the grapevine, no, it’s not going to actually happen. And in the end, it didn’t happen.
Also, you have to think it is widely believed in Armenia that the Wings of Unity Party that is to say Armin Tatoyan’s party, is indirectly supported by the forces of, you know, the Republican Party and Serge Sargsyan. So there is this idea that would that support then, that would go to, typically go to Serge and the Republican Party, would that be redirected toward Tatoyan? Yeah. So and again, I mean, this is this is just what this is what just what is being said on the Armenian streets.
You know, this is this is the kind of the talking points.
Asbed: So you think it’s more of a strategy on their part rather than lack of popularity and they’re giving up?
Pietro: I think it’s a strategy. I think it’s actually a strategy. And also, I think that, too, even with this issue of the bloc, you know, the threshold being 8%. I mean, also Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance is running as a bloc, right?
Yes. And I think actually they will, my belief is, this is my personal belief, they will clear that 8% threshold. Because they’re doing some very good political moves right now. They’re doing some outreach to the population.
They’re holding, you know, talks and everything like that. It’s actually getting some attention right now. Not everybody would go along with this because there are many people who don’t like, you know, the former presidents or whatever. But still, it is it’s actually generating some energy, especially in this context where there’s more anger and more disillusionment with passion.
Asbed: So far, the strong Armenia party has focused its criticism of the government on the economy. Do you think security issues are an important part of what the opposition should raise during this election cycle?
Pietro: I think absolutely. I mean, and also what the opposition should do really is I think the economy is also very important. The socioeconomic question is extremely important for Armenia, the fate of Armenia. And I think that what needs to be done is to tie that with security because it is a security issue.
Because how can you have an adequate defense or strong defense of regions if, you know, there are no job opportunities, if young people are leaving, right? I was just talking to a friend the other day from Gyumri who was telling me that, you know, he went back there to see his family and he was coming back and he was telling me, you know, Gyumri is dying. that all the young people are leaving Gyumri. And this is in a time when everybody’s talking about supposedly the development of Gyumri, that it’s coming back and all this and that. So you need strong regions.
You need regions where there are economic opportunities, where there’s economic mobility. And that is part of the whole picture of defense. It’s very difficult to defend a place that the population is decreasing. and there are no opportunities. you need to emphasize that, that there is a connection between, the social question in Armenia and the national security question. Same thing we can also say about Artsakh, because when we talk about Artsakh and the refugees, Those resources, think about the resources used by the state for this whole situation, the strain on the state with this refugee problem that’s faced with from ARSOC.
So there’s a lot that actually you can connect between national security issues and the social question in Armenia, in my point of view. Has the opposition done that adequately? That’s a question I think that would be worth discussing. Yeah.
Hovik: I think it deserves its own podcast because I think point by point on every issue, we need to go into details on how the opposition can differentiate itself, especially when being at a disadvantage from all these foreign supporters that are lining up to support Pashinyan. We’ll have to bring in the politicians.
Pietro: I want to just say this one more thing. That’s actually the main concern with the opposition. In Armenia, when you talk to them, that actually there’s a big concern that Pashinyan would be given a green light to, you know, maybe cancel the election or something like this, prevent opposition parties from taking part with the support of, you know, external players. That would the external players enable a rigging of the elections? and enable a kind of a further de-democratization of the country.
That’s what I think the main concern is, actually, when you talk to people. They think that if this was a free, completely free election, Pashinyom would lose hands down. But there’s a serious concern that external forces are going to, they would help actually try and manipulate this election.
Hovik: Yeah. Pietro, this was a really interesting discussion. I want to thank you again for joining us today. Thank you, Hobie.
Thank you, Pietro.
Pietro: Thank you, too. And I loved it. By the way, I loved your lapel pins you had on, very, very sporty. Thank you so much for this.
Yes. And especially I love that.
Asbed: Thank you, Pietro. Thank you, Pietro.
Pietro: Thank you, husband. Thank you, Hobie. And happy Easter.
Asbed: Thank you. Happy Easter. Okay, well, that was our show. Always a fun show with Pietro.
You never know where we will go. The episode was recorded on April 3rd, 2026. Dr. Pietro Shakarian is a historian of Russia and the Soviet Union and a lecturer in history at the American University of Armenia in Yerevan.
He was previously a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Historical Research at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, Russia. He is the author of the book Anastas Mikoyan, an Armenian reformer in Khrushchev’s Kremlin. And I think it was middle of last year that it came out and we did a podcast.
I don’t remember the episode, but you can search for it on our channel.
Hovik: Yeah. Pietro has been receiving wide acclaim for his book and his particular angle of coverage. So definitely an interesting episode to check out.
Asbed: Go to podcasts.groong.org. Check out the shows, all the shows, and you can find Pietro’s show right there. I think it was around the August timeframe, if I’m not wrong.
Hovik: Yeah, you can just Google it, Pietro Shakarian Groong.
Asbed: That’s right. It does come up at this point.
Hovik: That will probably be easier than browsing the show, but our website is cool, you know, so just do that anyway.
Asbed: Hey, they get to see all of the shows that we have done. And optionally, you can also support us by clicking on the donate button, podcasts.groong.org/donate and become a sustaining member. See what I did there?
Hovik: That was Asbed’s ulterior motive. And if you don’t have the funds, it’s okay. You can like, comment, and share. Any support you provide will be appreciated.
But at the minimum, folks, just provide a like if you think that this was interesting and it was worth your time watching, which I’m hoping that if you’re still watching, then it was.
Asbed: That’s right. I’m Asbed Bedrossian in Los Angeles.
Hovik: And I’m Hovik Manucharyan, normally in Yerevan, but yeah, not right now. So please find us everywhere on social media.
Asbed: We’ll talk to you soon. Bye-bye.