Fyodor Lukyanov joins Groong to discuss how Moscow reads a fast-shifting global landscape, from the U.S. raid in Venezuela and maritime seizures at sea, to Trump’s Greenland rhetoric, the stalled endgame in Ukraine, the likelihood of a renewed Israel-Iran war, and how TRIPP and “unblocking” disputes in Armenia’s south fit into Russia’s regional priorities.
Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed: Hello and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. We are joined by Fyodor Lukyanov, editor in chief of Russia in Global Affairs and one of the leading voices in Russian foreign policy analysis.
Hovik: Before we begin, folks, a quick note to our listeners. A lot of you will be watching us, but not be subscribed. So just very quickly, if you’re watching this on YouTube, make sure you’re subscribed and make sure you hit the bell icon so you can get notified when we publish new episodes. And if you value the work we do and want to support us further, visit podcasts.Groong.org.
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Hovik: All right, let’s get to the show.
Asbed: Mr. Lukyanov, happy new year and welcome back to the Groong podcast.
Lukyanov: Happy New Year. I’m very happy to be this year with you again.
Hovik: Yeah, this is our second podcast of the year, so we’re glad to have it with you. And to our Russian friends, whoever celebrates Christmas, that was a day ago, and two days ago was Armenian Christmas, so to all those who celebrate.
Asbed: Okay, well, let’s hit our topics because on January 3rd, President Donald Trump tried to make Venezuela great again, and US forces invaded Caracas, forcefully abducting Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife to face charges in New York. The UN Secretary General said the action was constituting a dangerous precedent while China and Russia slammed the US. US scholars and also House Senate Democrats called the US action wildly illegal. And the reactions from Western countries were split, but many leaders welcomed Maduro’s removal while distancing themselves from the methods used.
Regardless of anything that is being said here, what stood out for me about this episode is not so much the condemnations, but the fact that nobody can do or is willing to do anything about it. So Maduro was friendly with Russia beyond the statements of support, dismay, shock, concern. What’s Russia’s perspective on this?
Lukyanov: of course it was absolutely shocking news to all i think whatever people thought about maduro and they were yes he he was considered as almost an ally or or a very close partner some people believed that Venezuela was not worth making a stake at it but anyway so that that was an absolute shock and of course You know, there is not a very big news when Americans intervene somewhere, especially in Latin America. That’s historically almost a normal situation. Not recently, but it was many, many times. But of course, President Trump is an extremely interesting person.
And if it would be a traditional operation of regime change, that would be condemned, but okay, we did see it before. But this way was, of course, absolutely confusing to everybody. Go or come, take the president, and leave. And basically the regime remained in place.
Okay, now obviously very much constrained, but still. And I would say that many people in Russia, including, I guess, the leadership, are really they don’t know exactly how to interpret this. And on the one hand, the first shock was that now Americans demonstrated the 100%, 200% brutality and reliance on the force only. And the statement by Stephen Miller on CNN was listened here to when he said that guys forget about all international niceties.
This is only force and strength and power which matters. But at the same time, after a short consideration, you can see that actually Donald Trump likes big shows and it’s a very spectacular move, but actually he and his administration are extremely afraid of being dragged in, in anything. And of course, they try to avoid any involvement when they can count an insignificant response. So in case of Venezuela, it was almost, yes, a very, very brilliant operation, of course, but certainly it was pre-agreed and it was some kind of people inside and so on.
Again, Trump, as before, he leaves many people confused or at least without a clear understanding of his intentions. From my point of view, Trump operated in a very traditional way for him. And this is exactly to make as much effect, as much noise as possible. But in fact, it’s very calculated.
And as it was in Iran, for example, in June last year. Another event which provoked a lot of discussions here in Russia, of course, was the seizure of this tanker a couple of days ago. Two of them, I think, overnight. Two of them.
But, you know, the first reaction was pretty angry and very critical. But then when you start to try to understand what happened, to whom those tankers belonged, why one of those tankers suddenly obtained the Russian flag, even not the flag to raise, but just to imitate. And of course, then the simple and clear picture starts to collapse.
Asbed: I see. That’s an interesting aspect. I hadn’t really dug into the event enough to know that those flags may or may not have been, or rather those ships may or may not have been real Russian ones, but just the flag was raised.
Lukyanov: It is a very strange story because the flag was, yes, officially this ship has been registered in Russia, but very recently, during already when the U.S. forces followed this ship. And then they sent message to Moscow or to Russian authorities, and they were registered actually bypassing the procedure. Why somebody did it, very difficult to understand. My guess is that behind this story, there is some very much private interest, nothing to do with the Russian state interest.
Anyway, what I want to say is that The moment you see something happening from the United States, from the Trump administration, and you immediately jump to conclusions, but then after a short while, you understand that that conclusion was probably wrong, and it should be reconsidered again and again. So that’s the new way.
Asbed: That’s a very interesting aspect that I really was not aware of. So we’ll watch for those news a little further down. Russia and China have had expanding trade and energy relations with countries in South America. But the U.S. is starting to treat the American contents as its exclusive zone of interest and influence.
What does Russia… say about this? Does it simply concede that the United States can do anything it wants in the Western Hemisphere because it has declared that it is its own space? Is there any kind of a parallel to this aspect of feeling of ownership of the Western Hemisphere with Russia’s feeling of ownership maybe of Ukraine and the periphery of the old Soviet Union?
Lukyanov: There are some people here who would love to interpret those events in this way. I don’t think it’s the case, fortunately or unfortunately, I don’t know. Because yes, indeed, the statements we hear from the Trump administration, not only in the context of Venezuela, but also before in December when this national election Security strategy has been published. And there, there is a clear statement that Monroe Doctrine, which is based on the sphere of influence approach, is the, so to say, leading idea for the Trump administration and so on.
Of course, it sounds for many conservatively thinking Russians as an invitation. So we have this and then you should define others, Russia, China, maybe India, I don’t know. which spheres you have. But in fact, it’s not the case because, of course, the American strategic thinkers, even those who support the Trumpian approach, they don’t mean, of course, that United States will totally withdraw from the rest of the world.
And certainly it will be reconsideration of many approaches, but it does not mean that Trump or any American president would leave the Middle East or Southern Caucasus or Eurasia or Europe. different approach, maybe a redistribution of resources allocated, but at the end of the day, American administration never will say that this is ours and the rest you take it. No, and in this regard, I think we should not have any illusions, and maybe it’s even good, because if the world will go to this system of clear-cut spheres of influence, It might be beneficial for a while, but after that, I’m not sure.
Asbed: Well, of course, Venezuela is not the only place that Trump is trying to make great again. He’s also trying to make Greenland great again. I’m sure you’ve followed the ramping rhetoric on why the United States absolutely needs Greenland for its national security. is now having a little bit of a row with Denmark and the EU and France has chimed in. Is Russia concerned about such statements or are you all having a great laugh in Moscow watching these exchanges?
Lukyanov: Russia is certainly not concerned because at the end of the day, United States is a dominating power in that area anyway. Belongs Greenland to Denmark or not, it doesn’t matter. It’s fact of life. And, of course, the United States is, under any circumstances, the biggest vis-a-vis of Russia in Arctic.
There are two biggest powers there. As far as this very strange story is concerned, of course, it’s ironic because for me, I’m initially many, many decades ago, I was trained specialist in Scandinavian affairs. I spoke Swedish and I spent a lot of time in Scandinavia. I love these countries.
And for me, it’s, of course, extremely strange to listen to all this debate because I know very well and all of us know that if Americans need something concrete in Greenland and if they ask the Danish government to give it, they will give everything. New bases, concessions, I don’t know, the mines, whatever. Why does Trump need to insist on basically annexation? That’s a very strange idea, but probably it’s really this new post-liberal globalization approach when powers or leaders like Trump, those who want the past come back, the great again and so on.
They try to reassure that territory matters because in the global age, age of globalization, all of us believe that territory actually doesn’t matter that much anymore. It doesn’t make much difference our country’s neighbors or not neighbors. They can communicate anyway with the contemporary means and so on. But now we are back to the classics, to the basics, that territory matters and the neighboring area, that’s the most important.
You need to control it. And the deeper control, the better. And that’s what Trump is doing. As for Russian reaction, I think still people don’t believe that it’s possible that Trump will by force take Greenland, but who knows?
Asbed: Yeah. Yeah. I actually don’t believe that it’s a national security need. I’m sure that there are a lot of natural resources buried under all that ice that’s starting to begin to get exposed.
And, um, the oligarchs here in America want access to it. Sure.
Hovik: So we kind of, the fighting in Ukraine, hits year four, now Russia has a momentum and Ukraine is burning through both men and, Many analysts believe that Ukraine at this rate can go for maybe a year more. I’m not sure. And Europe just has doubled down, pledging another 90 billion to Ukraine. And two days ago, at the coalition of the ruling meeting, We all witnessed Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law standing and smiling with EU bureaucrats who pledged to send troops to Ukraine in the case of a peace deal, despite multiple times Russia’s reiteration of its red lines that no NATO in Ukraine.
It was surreal because All these EU leaders were proclaiming that everyone is like 90 percent close to a peace deal. So, you know, leads me to question whether the Russian red lines have changed. But let me just also add some more. Trump made an interesting pivot.
You know, he backed away from believing that Putin’s residence in Novgorod was attacked. In fact, such an attack would undoubtedly be supported by the U.S. CIA. But basically he said, you know, I’m disappointed in Putin.
And also, you know, we didn’t attack or the Ukraine didn’t attack his residents. So that is mixed messaging. And at least one question, I think, who is trying to end this war? if anyone, and who is trying to manage it into its next phase. So with that intro, Mr.
Lukyanov, why is this war still going on and how do you see its resolution?
Lukyanov: First of all, those mixed messages, mixed messaging, it’s not at all new. So we hear this and we follow this for a year now, almost a year. Since the very beginning, when Donald Trump called Vladimir Putin in February, and then the whole process started, we saw probably four… four turns of this spiral with approximately the same trajectory. Beginning of very promising talks, expectations, raising hopes, Then something happens, and once again.
Even with such heights and culminations as the meeting in Anchorage, but anyway. I think that the changing… view of trump he changes his views and on the details and this what you mentioned to be very frank is a very strange story with this attack on the Putin residence so i don’t know who who said what and why Anyway, tactically, Trump is changing. You can remember them a couple of months ago. He suddenly said that, oh, I’m disappointed.
Russia is a paper tiger. Ukraine will be able to restore its borders of 1991. And everybody was shocked. Then he withdrew those statements after two days.
And so that’s Trump style. Strategically, I think he is still committed to the idea that he will force both sides into some kind of agreement. He tries to change targets. And actually, since from my point of view, I might be wrong, but it looks like this from the outside.
For Trump, it doesn’t matter what will be the end game. He doesn’t care who will win, basically. For him, it’s important to stop it. And he tries to find leverage to put pressure on both sides.
But the bigger pressure is being put on site, which he believes is easier to force to some conclusion. And he tried with Russia, he tried with Ukraine. Both sides, I must say, both sides are very difficult for him. And I think he was really surprised, especially about the Ukrainian stubbornness and firmness.
But of course, Americans have more leverage on Ukraine, objectively, because Ukraine is very much dependent on the West and the American intelligence and so on. But again, he tries to mix. He tries to put pressure on Russia as well. Yesterday, Senator Graham said that Trump, allegedly, give the green light to this legislation in the US Congress, which would give Trump much more leverage to impose sanctions on all clients of Russia and so on.
I will not be very much surprised if he will introduce sanctions against Russia soon. as he did a couple of months ago. But again, at the end of the day, at least so far, he concluded each time that Russia is impossible to change. So Russia is continuing keeping the same while Ukraine at least is trying to slightly change its position. So I think that we will go into the same circle once again, at least once, maybe more.
I still believe that 2026 might be the year when this war will be ended. It will be ended, of course, in case Ukraine and supporters of Ukraine in Europe will understand that continuation of the process will only worsen conditions for Ukraine. We see it now, but pretty slow, slowly. And then probably they will be forced to change position.
But at this point, it looks like everything is back to the battlefield, only this.
Hovik: It’s interesting. You mentioned what Trump believes he can do. Does Trump believe that he is fully in control of the United States? And also, does the president of Russia believe that Trump can deliver on what he’s negotiating?
And also, at the same time, does President Putin even believe that Trump is negotiating in good faith?
Lukyanov: Of course, I cannot be sure what President Putin thinks. I guess that, first of all, yes, he believes that Trump is negotiating in a good faith. It does not mean that he trusts everything Trump is saying or doing, but he believes and he said it many times publicly that Trump really wants this conflict to be over. Whether Trump can deliver, that’s the question, because regardless what Putin believes or not believes, we see that Trump is more or less in control or in full control of the system in the United States, at least until the midterm elections.
But at the same time, we see that Trump cannot impose conditions on Europeans and Ukrainians, even despite the fact that both of them, especially Ukrainians, are very much dependent on the United States. But despite this, the capacity, the might of the United States is limited. And I think it’s quite an interesting phenomenon, so putting aside the particular story about this war. But in general, we see on the one hand that the United States is able to do things which no one else can do. like in Venezuela and others.
But at the same time, more and more at different occasions, we see that the power of the United States is huge, but it’s limited. A very clear example is China, and the whole tariff story, tariff attempts to put pressure actually ended up in something completely different. And another part of this is Ukraine, because with all its might, with all its range of leverage, Trump cannot force Ukraine to accept what he probably would like them to accept, what Putin is proposing.
Hovik: Right.
Asbed: Okay, let’s turn our attention southward to Iran. Since the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025, Tehran has moved fast to close its defense gaps that the strikes exposed. It has pushed deeper defense coordination with Russia and China, and it has worked to rebuild air defenses and restock missiles, preparing for what many analysts describe as a likely second round. Netanyahu has raised the idea of renewed strikes in 2026 directly with Trump.
He was talking to him, I think, I can’t remember if it was before the new year or after the new year. He was here in Washington, D.C. Yeah. And essentially, Trump has signaled that he could back new attacks if Iran rebuilds its ballistic missile or nuclear programs.
Iran’s foreign minister says Iran does not want war, but it’s ready to defend itself if it is attacked. And Iran’s president in December said that Iran is in a full scale war, actually. In previous discussions with you, you have indicated, just like other analysts, that you were surprised how unprepared Iran was to face Israeli attacks. So at this point, is a second Israeli attack inevitable on Iran?
And do you think that Iran is going to be ready or is ready this time?
Lukyanov: First of all, yes, indeed, I was surprised that Iran was pretty badly prepared for the war. But having said that, we must admit that the main goal of attackers has been achieved. Iranian state, Iranian regime survived. Iranian state and Iranian regime managed to deliver significant blow to Israel, significant.
And I think that despite all statements from the Israeli side that it was a fantastic victory. And so I guess that they learned a couple of lessons and they understood that it was more complicated than probably they expected. So in this regard, I think, first of all, Iran demonstrated a higher degree of resilience, despite all weaknesses inside, which are obvious, but demonstrated a higher degree of resilience than people could expect. Secondly, of course, Iran learned a couple of lessons after that.
And I think that they, yes, as you said, they made the big efforts to close those gaps. And that means, from my point of view, again, I haven’t been to Iran since quite a while, but I think that they are much more not only prepared for something coming, but also they know how to play this game of bluffing, because now I think both sides are bluffing. Netanyahu is bluffing as well, because whatever they say, whatever Israel is stating, and of course Israel demonstrated a lot of significant achievements in the last year, but still their capacity is limited as well. It’s not endless.
So I think that now this dancing around hypothetical war, which actually none side wants to start, will continue. What is probably more important, especially at this stage when we see a lot of protests and even partial riots in Iran against the economic hardship and partially against the regime, That’s an all good attempt to undermine Iran from the inside, not through the military operation, but through other means. Again, I don’t know what is happening there. You can listen to Israeli and Western commentators who say almost that Iran is on the brink of collapsing.
You can listen to Iranian people. For example, my counterparts whom I know, they say, yes, it’s a difficult situation, but of course don’t believe what they say. It’s absolutely not that bad and so on. I think that we might suggest that actually Iran is resilient enough to survive another wave of social unrest because of economic problems.
But, of course, the general situation is not improving there. And so I guess that the next stages in this controversy will be not so much about the military pressure. And you’re right that both Russia and China contributed… something, at least after that war, to strengthen, to re-strengthen Iranian defense capacity. But neither China nor Russia can improve the internal situation in Iran, because it’s something else.
And I guess that that will be the main field for confrontation. And it’s not a big surprise that what happened in Venezuela immediately has been used by Iranian opponents to say, look, we need to find creative ways to undermine this regime. And I guess that Israel and Israeli security services, they, of course, will work hard to find those ways without direct military attack.
Asbed: Actually, the level of infiltration by the Mossad was something that we talked about. And I was referring to with Iran being somewhat not ready to withstand the attacks. But I think they’ve dealt with a significant amount of that issue. That was, by the way, that conversation was right after Iran. the June War.
And that was episode 477. For our listeners, if you want to go check it out, it’s podcasts.Groong.org/477. Basically, you can check out our conversation with Mr. Lukyanov.
But that brings me to another question, because at that conversation, you said that Russia You know, Iran is a very important ally, but Russia might not get involved militarily. And you indicated Russia’s interests in the region are very diversified. Does that calculus change at all in light of Venezuela? I’m kind of trying to understand at what point it becomes important enough for Russia to get involved or at least to try and stop one of its allies or partners from being attacked.
Lukyanov: As we discussed already at that occasion Russian capacity to to do something to operate is of course limited by the Ukrainian war and as long as this conflict continues Russia will not be deeply involved in any other major stories strategic or even tactically maybe tactically but but also in a limited to the limited scope in general I think that we in Russia are moving pretty slowly and with a lot of internal hesitations But we are moving towards a new evaluation of the whole area, of the whole Eurasian area, of the neighborhoods, all of them.
Because whatever people think about the past, the Soviet Union, the post-Soviet period when Russia was the ultimate dominance in the area, but this period is over. So this year, we will mark 35 years since Soviet Union collapsed. And that’s enough. time to, so to say, say farewell to the previous perception and to formulate something new. And those attempts already started, both on the intellectual level, among experts like myself, and even on the official level.
I cannot say what the conclusion will be, but the late motive of all those discussions is, of course, the realization that Russian resources are limited. We need to choose priorities. And among priorities, we need to make a hierarchy, which is more important, which is less important. And in this regard, I think that this year and maybe a couple of years after, at the backdrop of enormous changes everywhere, we will see the gradual shift of Russian approaches.
In general, so here I don’t mean any region particularly, but in general, the process has started and it will lead to some conclusions. When it comes to Iran, and then probably for you, it’s the most important is the whole region with Armenia included. Southern Caucasus and so on. I think that the prioritization of this region will remain on the very high level.
Because putting aside a lot of emotions, which we inherited from the past, putting aside some ideological views or… I don’t know how to call it, but of course, the objectively, the transportation routes from the north to the south, Under any circumstance, whoever will be in place in Armenia, in Iran, in Azerbaijan, in India, but this is something which will define a lot for Russia in the 21st century. And that’s why I believe that Russia will, step by step, become much more flexible and pragmatic vis-a-vis all those partners.
Asbed: I am simply concerned that as long as, for example, the EU can funnel money into keeping Ukraine fighting, that means they can paralyze Russia into that one theater and keep Russia inert in the other theaters. Well, in my opinion, things only get worse over time. We have seen, for example, the C5 plus one agreements that were made in Washington about two months ago, I think, where Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian countries signed many agreements with the United States about natural resources, minerals and such. And of course, there are agreements with Russia as well.
But as NATO starts infiltrating into Central Asia, that’s probably not a very good thing for Russia.
Lukyanov: Yeah, that’s for sure. But at the same time, we should be a little bit more calm. And here, I used to say it here as well all the time. Because yes, indeed, the C5 plus one or other formats with the participation of Americans or this corridor Trump route.
Right. Yeah, and so on. For peace and prosperity, of course. Peace and prosperity, of course, yeah.
Hovik: Don’t forget international.
Lukyanov: You know, if we start to dig in, then of course a lot of it, not everything, but a lot of it is just PR. Uzbekistan promised to invest billions of dollars in the U.S. economy.
Asbed: It did. It was like 115 billion or something like that.
Lukyanov: Uzbekistan will invest in the United States. I asked a friend of mine who is quite an important person in Tashkent, why do you do it? He said, oh, come on. That’s for many, many decades.
Something will happen. Of course, we have no money. We will not do it. But they need, Trump needs this sign to show that, look.
So what I mean is that not everything which is being proclaimed, be it C5 plus one or Armenian-Azerbaijan-US, not everything will be implemented, to put it in mind.
Hovik: Let’s come back to the TRIPP. We’re talking about transportation corridors. We talked in June, and since that time, for our listeners, the U.S. role has, at least on paper and in media, expanded in the South Caucasus. In August, Pashinyan and Aliyev were at the White House, and they…
It initialed what was presented as a peace framework that is yet to be signed. There are many preconditions for it to be signed yet. But at the same time, Pashinyan endorsed a US-Armenia project branded TRIPP. Trump route for international peace and prosperity.
Azerbaijan continues to describe this as a Zangezur corridor. And frankly, I believe we should call a spade a spade. And to me, that is, you know, when you look at the principles behind it, it seems to be identical to what the Azeris and the Turks want. But this concept overlaps with the transport provisions of 0.9 of the November 2020 ceasefire statement that Pashinyan signed with Aliyev and Mr.
Putin. Russian officials, including President Putin, Deputy Minister Overchuk, have recently reiterated that Moscow views those 2020 commitments as still in force and expects to be involved in any unblocking of routes in Armenia’s south. We should mention that Russian railways has a concession and operates in the south in Armenia, and that will be important in our discussion a little bit later. But to be honest, this came a little bit as a surprise to me because until now, it seemed that Russians had backed away from the November 9 crisis. 2020 statement because everything else in that statement didn’t materialize.
So what are the Russian expectations when it comes to unblocking the east-west communications or what is called the middle corridor, you know, TRIPP and so forth? What does Russia expect to do in this formula?
Lukyanov: You know, I think that the main priority for Russia, which I mentioned earlier, is that the transport capacities unifying the northern part of Eurasia with the southern part of Eurasia would be developed.
And actually, for Russia, almost any option is fine. so the okay Russia might play bigger or smaller role but just geographically geostrategically Russia occupies the place which makes it almost impossible to to bypass to the our territory and our capabilities so when it comes to this peace and prosperity stuff again i think that many people here actually expect this project to to be slow not to develop too fast and of course we see that the attention of the American leadership is That’s quite a short span, so they cannot focus too long. Trump, for sure, but following him, also the apparatus.
Of course, there are strategic interests which will be pursued by the deep state or whatever the state structures in the United States. But anyway, Trump is hyperactive. The White House with him is hyperactive, and they cannot, so to say, follow and push all projects at the same time. And we see that priorities are changing.
Why Russia reminds this paper, this memorandum, this document, which, as you rightly said, is almost irrelevant in many other points, I think simply because it’s important to remind that Russia is there and there are interests which remain. And if now everybody is fascinated with something else, it does not mean that the previous ideas and agreements totally disappeared. And it might happen that the current fascination can go away and suddenly some other instruments will be demanded. In general, I think, again, maybe I’m not that deep in this issue, but I think that…
Of course, Russia understands very well, and that’s what Asbed asked in the previous question, that Russia is so much occupied with Ukraine, and things are going, whatever we do, but there are a lot of processes and trends around. And that’s correct. That’s absolutely correct.
But at the same time, the dynamics in the Southern Caucasus, including, by the way, the approaches by Azerbaijan, And despite attempts on the Russian side, and Putin in particular personally, to overcome this crisis of last year, which started, or rather, which got visible because of this plane crash, But it didn’t work so well, because we see that the rhetorics of Baku didn’t change much. Yes, it’s slightly better now, but in fact, nothing changed. And if so, then we see that the Azerbaijani leadership, they actually are extremely self-confident, to put it in a polite way.
And this self-confidence might be displayed not only vis-a-vis Russia, but by the way, vis-a-vis Turkey as well. Paradoxically, but we can imagine that relationship is not that easy either between those two leaders. To make a long story short, I think that, yes, indeed, it’s not a good situation that Russia is tied by something else. But some processes are not linear.
They might go in circles. And with this peace and prosperity stuff, I would imagine that it would be possible as well.
Hovik: You mentioned north-south communication several times. We know that Azerbaijan is the primary route for north-south, especially rail communication. I think that Armenia has been viewed in the past as a secondary backup route, and you also mentioned the current strain in Russian and Azerbaijani relations. Are you concerned that the TRIPP would be used as a means to further blockade, not actually open communications, but further blockade north or constrict north and south communication, especially where Armenia is concerned.
And is that, you know, you mentioned that Russia is okay with any sort of almost any format, but we see that Azerbaijan, I mean, there are a lot of questions that remain to be answered, right? You know, if Azerbaijan has exclusive unimpeded access through this corridor, I mean, how is north-south traffic prioritized if it’s at Azerbaijan’s will to dictate the communication on this corridor?
Lukyanov: Yes, indeed. We live in a new world where, according to President Trump and many other speakers, in particular from the United States, each country, each leader does what it or he can. And that’s it. If you can, do it.
If you can’t, shut up. And yes, unfortunately, it’s not unique. So we remember periods in history when it worked exactly in this way. But when it comes to the contemporary world and when it comes to such thing as communications, be it information or logistics or whatever, it’s not ninth century.
It’s not Monroe Doctrine world. And whatever Russia, Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia are trying to push, maybe believing that it corresponds to their national interests, at the end of the day, everything will fail because in general, it’s a complex system, interconnected system. you cannot block others from participating expecting that only you will exert dividends it will not work it will not work with the countries like Azerbaijan or turkey it will not work even with the united states i’m pretty sure that’s the difference between post-globalized world and pre-globalized world. Because pre-globalized world was much more state-centric.
And now, yes, indeed, and what we hear from Trump and even from Russia, from Moscow, from Putin, that’s again the rhetoric that state matters and the states as the structural units of the international system are back, which is correct. But those states are different and the environment is different. So the post-globalization is not globalization anymore, liberal globalization, but it’s not the pre-globalized world either. So sorry for this very vague description, but what I mean is that whatever Azerbaijan is trying to do or any other potential members of this cooperation, at the end of the day, no one will succeed without others.
Hovik: Yeah. OK, in 2025, Pashinyan’s government has imprisoned many opposition leaders, as well as influential businessmen not aligned with their ruling party. For example, Samvel Karapetyan, who holds Russian citizenship in addition to his Armenian citizenship, who owns or used to own the electric networks of Armenia, which has been nationalized or taken away from him. Pashinyan is also escalating his campaign against the Armenian church.
In Armenia, anyone in the opposition, anyone in the church is classified as a Russian asset, Russian puppet, Russian agent. And in fact, Armenia went to the EU recently to request assistance from the EU, from Kaja Kallas, of all people, to help Armenia like it did in Moldova and help Armenia fight against, what was it, malign influences and hybrid warfare. So anyway, the parliamentary elections are in June. It’s very interesting because many in Armenia are asking this question, why doesn’t, for instance, the Russian church, even at the church level, why doesn’t the Russian church support the Armenian church?
But I was thinking about that, and I said, okay, well, if it did, then they would say, aha, so the church is an agent of the Russian, is controlled by Russia. But in reality, involvement from Russia has been very hands-off I mean Russia has been completely not involved so far in armenian internal politics does the outcome of the elections in June 2026 matter for Russia and what is Russia Is Russia okay to see, for instance, another Moldova scenario being unrolled in Armenia right now?
Lukyanov: First of all, I don’t think that any scenario of another country can be repeated somewhere else. So we can find some similarities, but in general, there is a very different situation in Moldova and Armenia. With all due respect to Moldova, I think that Armenia is a little bit sounder state than Moldova. As for Russian indifference or what looks like indifference, you know, I don’t know.
I’m not involved in this. I don’t know whether there are any agents or actors who participate in some activities inside the Armenian political life, but I can say one thing. If we look at the whole period after collapse of the Soviet Union, almost 35 years now. To be frank, to be honest, can we find any successful example of Russia intervening in other countries’ domestic situation and achieving goals which it wanted?
No, because there were, during all those years, there were regime change or there were changes, shifts, political shifts in particular countries, which were in favor of Russia. For example, Yushchenko in Ukraine was replaced by Yanukovich, or Gamsakhurdia was replaced by Shevardnadze or somebody else. Even Aliyev, Geydar Aliyev. Heydar Aliyev came after Elchibey, which was, of course, much better for all in that situation.
But none of those cases was… because of Russian interference. That was a development in countries. Yes, we had a couple of examples when Russia tried to influence elections in other countries. In Ukraine, it was 2004, if you remember the Orange Revolution, Putin openly supported Yanukovich and lost.
Maybe the only case when Russian position played a role was Belarus 2020, when Putin clearly said that in case of overthrown of Lukashenko, Russia would intervene militarily. He just said he didn’t do anything. And that was enough to calm down situation there. But that is unique case.
In all other cases, Russia didn’t intervene or if it did it would be better not to do so that’s my deep deep conviction that it’s not our way to operate unfortunately we are not Kaja Kallas we are not brits British not Americans we we were not um we we don’t master those skills Coming back to Armenian situation, of course, for Russia, it’s important. I don’t think that Prime Minister Pashinyan enjoys a lot of love and trust in Russian corridors because of his… changing rhetorics depending on the situation he speaks. He says one kind of things in Moscow or St. Petersburg.
He says completely opposite things in Brussels or in Washington or wherever. But the question is, has Russia enough leverage to support forces, which probably would be seen as more convenient. I’m not sure, unfortunately. I know that in Armenia, many people have this idea that if only Russia wanted, then Pashinyan would be overthrown.
I’m afraid that’s an illusion. Sorry to say it, but… And of course, it depends on the scale of… If we talk about Moldovan scenario, Moldovan scenario was very remarkable because all manipulations were made to achieve a very particular result. and supported by Europe, of course, because that result was in interest of the European Union.
To what scale this election will be rigged in the same way in Armenia as in Moldova last year, I don’t know. It’s up to you to judge whether it’s possible or not. But of course, depending on the scale of this alleged manipulations, I think the position of Russia might alter.
Hovik: Now, for instance, one of the anticipated activities that people are talking about is a potential banning of political parties in Armenia and banning of the participation of Salvat Karapetian, who currently is enjoying high, you know, So, you know, what tools does Russia have in terms of, you know, or could Russia do anything if that happens? Like if the Armenian government alleges that anyone in the Armenian opposition, like the most, the biggest parties are Russian agents and therefore bans them simply from participation. I mean, it doesn’t seem like Russia…
So-called democracy promotion has been a tool set of Russian foreign policy explicitly, but what would be the Russian response to that kind of an event?
Lukyanov: Frankly, I don’t know. Yes, democracy promotion is not a fashionable thing at all anymore. Not just in Russia, but everywhere.
Asbed: Well, at least the hypocrisy level is a lot less, because what happens in the name of democracy between Europe and the United States is… It’s a different scale from where we see from Russia.
Lukyanov: Absolutely, absolutely. I think that, of course, Russia has leverage, but the question is, the traditional means to stop trade, to stop or to higher gas prices, which we saw before in case of Ukraine, in case of Moldova, by the way, not recently, but before. Did it work? Maybe to some extent, yes, but it was the way to punish actually not the ruling group, but people in respective countries.
As I understand, it’s not about too much sentimentality and sentiments, but it’s a very clear understanding that to use those means and through this to basically undermine trust of Armenian people to Russia would not be the great idea. I don’t know, maybe some… brilliant minds here would finally arrive to this. But as I know for now, it’s not the option which is being discussed. And as for what you asked about, the election which would be rigged, frankly, that’s now almost a new normal.
To be honest.
Asbed: Yeah. I mean, if we look at the rhetoric and the money that is flowing from the EU into the Armenian election system to “prevent foreign influence”, that is the new normal, I think. Yeah. Mr.
Lukyanov, let’s wrap it up there for today. Thank you so much for sharing your insights with us. And we look forward to more conversations in 2026.
Lukyanov: Always a big pleasure.
Hovik: This was a great, great discussion, Mr. Lukyanov. Thank you.
Asbed: That’s our show today. This episode was recorded on January 8th, 2026. We’ve been talking with Mr. Fyodor Lukyanov, who is the chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, a Russian think tank providing expertise in the foreign policy field.
He is also editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, a platform for publication in English and Russian of research in political science and international relations. Mr. Lukyanov is also director of research at the Valdai Discussion Club.
Hovik: Folks, thank you for sticking with us for the show. I hope you found it as interesting as we did, especially as a listener. And before we go, I do have one small request. Hundreds of you listen to us on platforms like Spotify and Apple Podcasts.
If you’re one of them, then please take a moment to subscribe. to our show on those platforms, even YouTube, because we have many listeners on YouTube and viewers who simply will watch this program but not subscribe. But please don’t forget to do that. That’s a great measure of help to us and a way for us to increase our reach and push our episodes to more people and allow us to grow on all of these platforms.
Asbed: Podcasts are great, Hovik. I mean, a lot of people have been moving to video podcasts. I mean, that’s been the big thing in 2025. And you see platforms like YouTube growing, but we do have a stable base on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.
Most people don’t really think about it, but you can take us on your drive, your commute in the morning from work to home, from home to work, and you can just listen to us. You won’t be missing anything if you’re just watching us talk. So do that. We would love to have you download our shows on your Apple Podcasts or on Spotify.
I’m Asbed Bedrossian in Los Angeles.
Hovik: And I’m Hovik Manucharyan in Yerevan.
Asbed: We’ll talk to you soon, folks.