Summary
In this episode, Christine Arakelian and Col. Douglas MacGregor join the hosts to analyze U.S. foreign policy moves from Gaza to the South Caucasus. They discuss Israel’s ongoing campaign in Gaza, the recent U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, and the likely resumption of hostilities. The conversation examines the Trump–Pashinyan–Aliyev White House summit, the strategic “Trump Corridor” across Armenia, and its impact on Russia, Iran, and India. The guests explore India–Armenia relations, U.S. economic vulnerabilities, and the challenges of sustaining a long-term American role in the region. They also assess the risks and potential outcomes of the upcoming Trump–Putin summit in Alaska, and the Armenian government’s handling of sovereignty, diaspora relations, and political prisoners.
Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Hovik: Hello, everyone, and welcome to this episode of Conversations on Groong. We’ll shortly have with us Ms. Christine Arakelian and Colonel Douglas MacGregor, and we’ll discuss U.S. involvement in Gaza, Iran, and most recently, Armenia and the South Caucasus.
Asbed: Ms. Christine Arakelian is a Fulbright scholar and lawyer with expertise in international global law and finance, and she has worked in the CIA’s, the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of General Counsel.
Hovik: And Colonel Douglas MacGregor is a retired colonel in the United States Army, former government official, author, consultant, and political commentator.
Asbed: But folks, before we go on with our show, I just wanna thank everyone for following us. We really appreciate the trust that you have put in us to bring you consistent fact-based analysis of Armenian news. We also want to earn your support in addition to your trust. We have a goal for ourselves to reach a sustaining membership of about $1,000 a month so that we can find the support we need to produce our shows on a more consistent and frequent basis.
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Yeah, that’s right. Five years into it. We started, the first show was July 12, I think, of 2020. All right.
Without further ado, on with the show. Col. Douglas MacGregor, Ms. Christine Arakelian, welcome to the Groong Podcast.
Arakelian: Thank you.
MacGregor: Happy to be here.
Hovik: Hello, hello.
Asbed: Great to have you on board.
Hovik: Okay, let’s begin this discussion. We wanted to talk about Gaza because when Donald Trump was re-elected in 2024, the promise was that America would stop engaging in forever wars. We’ll talk more about forever wars later, but on this specific forever war, It’s a full on genocide and mainstream media still is trying to skirt about it. Only a few popular outlets are like Breaking Points and even Al Jazeera talk about it.
The Iran war took a lot of attention from Gaza, but Israel’s war of ethnic cleansing is in full swing with U.S. support, of course. So why is the U.S. involved in this horror and what’s in it for us? What is the end game in Gaza? Well, first,
MacGregor: it’s important to keep in mind that it is a tradition of American democracy that very few promises made during elections are ever honored. So I don’t think it’s unique to Donald Trump, although he is preeminently a salesman. And if you’ve ever bought a used car, then you know what it’s like to deal with a salesman. You know, it’s presented to you as a rocket ship that will take you anywhere, everywhere and attract all the attractive women that you know.
And of course, the used car never does that. But nevertheless, he sells the used car. So that’s part of it. Why are we involved in Gaza?
I think that word has to be summed up by the state of Israel. keeping in mind that Israel is inextricably intertwined with international finance, particularly the banks in the city of London and in New York City. And as a result, the Israel lobby over many years, thanks to an enormous amount of cash at their disposal, contributed largely by Jewish financial oligarchs in the United States, is able to buy Congress. And I think they’ve also bought the White House. If it were not for all that money, I doubt seriously very many people would know where Gaza is.
Hovik: In fact, we saw pictures of many of them. The Congress is in recess, but many of them were in Israel taking pictures with Netanyahu.
MacGregor: I think that’s pilgrimage to the wall that you’re talking about, right? Yeah, I have never made that pilgrimage, and I think it’s an absolute precondition right now if you want to continue to be subsidized for re-election to do that.
Asbed: Colonel, what’s our endgame in Gaza?
MacGregor: It’s whatever Israel wants, and I think that Israel is defining it as the complete elimination of Palestinians from Israel. Not simply Gaza, but also the West Bank. Gaza is simply the beginning of a horrific operation that is planned to extend to the West Bank, leaving the entire state of Israel as a purely Jewish state.
Asbed: Christine, what’s your take on this crisis?
Arakelian: So look, I mean, I think it’s pretty clear that the Israeli lobby wields considerable influence within the United States. I don’t think this is a big secret, okay? And this administration, for better or for worse, is extraordinarily transactional. You can see that in what just happened in Armenia.
It is a transactional administration. And that means that basically money wins, principle loses. It’s pretty clear that Israel is pursuing a greater Israel project. This has been on the agenda for some period of time.
And there’s implications really for the whole region. But it’s quite clear as well that Israel intends on being the sole hegemon in the region in which other countries can perhaps participate from a position of Israeli and American largesse. But there’s no plan for the Middle East currently in terms of states living harmoniously as equals. That is just not on the agenda for the Middle East at the moment.
And I think that that’s quite intentional. So I think overall, those are the objectives. It’s about money and power, like most things. And the U.S. has, for better or for worse, linked itself to those two objectives in the greater Middle East.
I mean, we can cloak things with words like peace and whatnot. It’s not to say that I’m critical of everything the U.S. has done in the region, but I think it’s very clear that those are the two overriding objectives at the moment, as well as domestic constituencies, some of whom are more important than others.
Asbed: And has the U.S. actually agreed to all of the dispossession, the ethnic cleansing, the genocide that’s going on? Essentially, we’re funding it, we’re supporting it?
Arakelian: I don’t see any disagreement. I mean, other than a few words, I mean, look, at the end of the day, actions speak louder than words. We were told at the outset of the administration that this great ceasefire had been brokered. I think that was largely for PR, so basically the administration could walk in And claim a success.
That agreement lasted, what, like six weeks, seven weeks. It was quickly repudiated. So, you know, the thing is, is that, you know, this this is now the backdrop for the administration in the region moving forward. Any agreement that’s reached is within a matter of weeks or months tweaked, repudiated, taken off the table. at the sole initiative of certain parties.
This has put U.S. prestige basically in the crossfire, because at the end of the day, is the U.S. going to be a neutral arbiter looking for larger regional objectives, or are they going to put the thumb on the scale vis-a-vis certain parties over others? I think we know where we are at the moment, but at the end of the day, I don’t think that’s going to yield the result that the United States hopes for in terms of its overall power and influence in the region.
MacGregor: By the way, before we go on, if I could just add something to Christine, because she’s imparted a regional focus to this original question about Gaza, which I think is accurate. It’s a mistake to view what’s happening inside Israel as in isolation from or divorced from everything else happening in the region. The Israelis, and I pointed to the banking interests in London and New York City. And now, unfortunately, from a U.S. perspective, what Washington thinks its interest has to also include the impact on Iran, Russia, as well as the Turks.
And the entire region is in a state of turmoil right now by design. The whole design behind the destruction of Syria was to leave Syria in a state where it could be dominated by two principal parties. You could say three because we too have a hand in it, but it’s really Israeli and Turkish with American backing. And we’ve decided for whatever reason to back this Turkish-Israeli hegemony, at least temporarily.
That’s why I always like to make the point that the arrangements between the Turks and the Israelis right now is very similar to the Nazi Soviet pact. It’s a matter of convenience. It doesn’t necessarily mean that the two groups are in love with each other. Far from it.
But they happen to have goals and objectives that coincide. We’ve decided to underwrite those because we have also decided that we want to continue to encircle Russia, put pressure on Russia and ultimately destroy Russia, as well as putting pressure on dividing and destroying Iran. Now, I don’t think these are American objectives. In fact, I’m going to let you move forward to the tenets of the agreement.
I think this is really all about the interests of the Israelis and their fellow travelers in Washington, New York City, and London in the larger region. with absolutely no concern whatsoever for the impact on the people that live in the region they simply want to bring down Russia they want to bring down Iran why well they see Iran as being the repository of all this oil and gas now their efforts to bring down Russia thus far have failed So I think they’re willing to sort of take a temporary step backwards. But they’re going to double down now on Iran without question.
And they have aligned themselves as a result with both Turkey and Israel, who both seem to think that they will benefit from the destruction of Iran.
Asbed: Yeah. As a matter of fact, the crisis that escalated and stole the media limelight from Gaza was Iran’s nuclear program. I don’t want to re-litigate everything because it’s been very well covered. Israel attacked Iran.
Iran retaliated. Then the U.S. got involved again, sent a squadron of B-2 bombers, struck nuclear sites. And 12 days later, the story was done. What happened there?
And is this conflict over, supposedly?
MacGregor: No, I don’t think it’s over at all. In fact, Christine and I have talked about that often. Do you want to pick it up there, Christine, and talk about why we think we’re going to see a resumption of this conflict?
Arakelian: I think it’s incredibly obvious we’re going to see a resumption of the conflict. Although it is perhaps reported in a quiet manner, the fact of the matter is Israel needed a ceasefire for their own domestic constituencies. They simply did not have the domestic support to continue with the war as it was being conducted. And moreover, they were very low on munitions.
And the U.S. in turn was low in terms of supplies, being capable of supplying the Israelis. So by definition, they needed to pause. So it’s very obvious is basically Israel is cycling through Gaza and and Iran with talk of pauses and ceasefires and humanitarian initiatives taking place. But it’s all basically, it’s a two-step dance, so to speak.
We’re just going through the same cycle again and again. And so you think you’re reaching some sort of, you know, detente or ceasefire with Iran and it’s not going to continue. They just cycle to Gaza, run that a couple months, turn back to Iran. It’s very clear It’s very clear that Israel has full intent on resuming hostilities towards Iran.
And in fact, I think the agreement reached between Trump, Aliyev, and Pashinyan, in many ways, facilitates that. The silent partner in the Armenian deal, Trump, Pashinyan, and Aliyev, is Israel. Let’s just put it on the table. That’s the way it is.
There’s no question that there’s going to be a resumption of hostilities. It’s very clear that nothing has really stopped Israel’s hegemonic intents in the region, even… even the UK, France, Australia, Canada, and I’m told New Zealand, basically saying that they’re gonna recognize a Palestinian state in September. The United States has isolated itself diplomatically in terms of its unilateral support for Israel at this point in time. Now, I’m not to say that the United States should not have Israel as an ally.
I’m not suggesting that, but I’m just suggesting that we have more at stake than that. We have our own global reputation and as a trusted partner in the region, as someone who can actually broker peace in a good faith way. And fundamentally that is at stake as well as the goodwill of hundreds of millions of Arabs, okay, who have long memories. You know, the U.S. has a short memory, but people in that region have a very, very long memory.
And the U.S. is creating precedents that fundamentally will have a very difficult time distancing itself from in the future.
Hovik: Let me ask each of you, maybe starting with Colonel MacGregor, we know that Russia and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership shortly, like at the beginning of this year. And that is a very important, I would say, support for the INSTIC, the International North-South Trade Corridor, which is also a very critical foundation for BRICS and the upcoming multipolar world. So, you know, Trump said that he’s going to break up bricks. Are we seeing some of that happening right now?
For instance, this summit coming up in Alaska. And of course, we’re getting warmer to this Pashinyan Aliyev thing. I think that also is related. But Colonel MacGregor, do you believe that if the Iran conflict goes into a more complex phase, can Russia afford to remain a distant observer this time?
And will Trump try to split Iran and Russia up?
MacGregor: You’ve asked three questions. The answer to the first one is that I don’t know all the details of that particular pact that was signed, the strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. And there may be some secret protocols that were agreed. that we just don’t know about. But I think it’s part and parcel of the one belt, one road, the larger BRICS operation.
All of those things are inextricably intertwined with relations between Russia and Iran.
Iran is a very critical partner in that whole process. so i think the answer to the other two questions is under those circumstances i do not think the russians will stand by and allow us or anybody else to pulverize Iran out of existence now having said that i think the Israelis got an education they grossly underestimated the Iranians they would be very mistaken to do so again in the near future because the Iranian air defenses which are almost entirely now in the hands of the Russians in terms of helping them build them effectively and strengthen them and integrate them, are now much more formidable than the air defenses that were previously there.
And I think this brings us back to the first part of this whole discussion, which is you cannot view this corridor business between the Turks on one side and ultimately, you know, Azerbaijan on the other. in isolation from what Israel wants. Israel wants a platform for attack based in Azerbaijan. It’s very important to Israel. It likes the fact that the Kurds who are allied with them are at least as anti-Iranian as they are anti-Turkish.
I’m talking about the Kurds in Syria. So this is part of a longer corridor. If I were going to rename the whole thing as the Trump disaster zone, I would start down with the Druze, work my way up through the Kurds, right up to the Turkish border, where you have this sort of de facto independent Syrian Kurdish state.
And then I would look at the Julani state, which is essentially ISIS dressed up in a suit. and that is obedient to the orders largely of uh turkey but it also responds to mi6 and mossad even more than it responds to us and then finally you you reach you know azerbaijan that little enclave that then links through the corridor up to uh azerbaijan now what is that designed to do We’re encircling Iran. We’re encircling Russia. We’re splitting Iran away from Russia. And we are also interrupting the desire to have this one belt, one road that runs from the Indian Ocean all the way up through the Caucasus and potentially into Eastern Europe.
So all of this is somehow or another combined and linked. Is this part of a grand strategy? I think it is, but it’s a grand strategy that was developed largely in Israel, secondarily in New York City and London. It’s not Donald Trump’s grand strategy.
Donald Trump loves optics. Donald Trump likes to be photographed smiling ear to ear and being congratulated by everyone.
He loves having things named after himself. that’s really what donald trump is about in this particular setting now the bad news is and this is very bad news in my judgment for us i’m talking about the Americans he’s committed to the use of American military power in that corridor he’s moved in and said we will now supplant the russians who were previously expected to help staff and run that corridor with Americans Again, now this is music to the ears of everyone in Israel, New York City, and London, but to the average American who doesn’t really appreciate what that means, it’s very dangerous. because we are overstretched as it is.
If you want to go back and look at this phrase, imperial overstretch, we’ve long since surpassed it. We’re beyond imperial overstretch, and we’re on the verge of bankruptcy. Remember, having failed to sell our debt effectively to very many people in the world, this is the bond market, we’ve now turned to T-bills. We’re trying to sell our debt in a space of four, six, eight weeks.
And we’re having trouble selling them. Of course. So the real question is, if you can’t do this, the whole system in the United States of debt financed power, debt financed consumption, debt financed living, standards of living, prosperity, all of that falls apart. Well, then all of a sudden you wake up and you say, I’m sorry, but I can’t afford to maintain those troops in your corridor.
I’m sorry, but I can’t afford to maintain all the troops that are sitting in Poland. I mean, have we ever seen this happen before? Yes, it happened in 1947 when the British empire fell apart. It fell apart because the debt to GDP ratio was 240% and the British simply said, we can’t afford to stay in India.
So this thing India was what we fought or they thought they fought World War II and World War I to protect. Stop and consider that. That’s where their focus was. What are we protecting? other than just Israel.
We’re protecting a larger financial empire that is bound up with those banking systems that I mentioned earlier. It’s bound up with access to critical oil and gas reserves. It’s bound up with containing bricks, which is represented primarily by Russia, China, now increasingly India, Saudi Arabia, all these other countries. So We’re on very thin ice.
We’re making promises that over the long term, I don’t think we can honor. A friend of mine said it very well to me last night. He said, what is our staying power? I don’t think we have much staying power.
We have the appearance of power. but do we have the real foundations for it? I don’t think we do.
Asbed: Yeah, I always wonder about that as well, because we have a national debt that is, what, 125% of our GDP. And even though most finance people will say, oh, that’s completely okay for a growing economy, I’m still worried about how far we can stretch.
MacGregor: When your growth depends very heavily on spending by the United States government, federal spending, then that’s not full growth.
Asbed: Yeah.
MacGregor: And we don’t really know how much federal spending contributes to GDP. People tell me, well, it’s about 30%. But I’ve got people telling me it’s much closer to 50%. You know, all these statistics are misleading.
Everything is a function of how you manipulate the data. That’s why people don’t even want to hear about GDP anymore when you bring that up. If you’re living in Minnesota on a farm and you’re struggling to survive and it looks bad, or you’re living next to a factory in Granite, Illinois that used to operate and now produces nothing, GDP doesn’t mean a damn thing anymore.
Asbed: Right. Well, if you don’t trust these data right now, wait until the BLS has got it a little more. Ms. Arakelian, this upcoming Trump-Putin summit that’s coming up in Alaska, how is it going to go down between the two of them, especially when, for example, this summit that happened or this meeting that happened in the Oval Office last week, Pashinyan, Aliyev, and Trump signed an agreement which seems diametrically opposed to the summit trilateral agreement between Putin and Trump and Pashinyan back in November 2020.
Hovik: You mean Putin, Aliyev and Pashinyan?
Asbed: Did I just get my trio wrong? Yes. Putin, Aliyev and Pashinyan. Sorry.
So basically the trilateral ceasefire agreement that was signed back then versus the one that’s right now, where it seems like Armenia and Azerbaijan have promised the same thing to the two superpowers opposing each other.
Hovik: And also it happened on the tariff Armageddon Day. So was that a coincidence?
Arakelian: So that I can’t comment on, but it’s okay. Let me address some of the stuff Doug was speaking to, because I think that will frame out what’s going to take place now in Alaska. So I say this frequently to people. It’s easy to know what you don’t want.
It’s hard to know what you do want. So let’s take a look at this in the context of the caucuses. Okay. So you want to separate Russia and Iran.
That’s pretty… That’s a pretty simple strategy, right? And the U.S. is well along to doing that. But for that corridor to have real value for the United States from a geostrategic perspective, it’s not going to be a proxy for Azerbaijan, Turkey on the one hand, and Israel on the other hand.
What it’s actually going to be is going to be a U.S. corridor that cements our relationship with India, okay? And note that I said India and not Modi, because one of the weaknesses of this administration is candidly the obsessive focus on individuals and leaders versus countries and interest. Before the Armenians and the Americans get all excited on the next agreement, let’s just recall that Pashinyan has an election. Okay, there’s an election coming up in Armenia in 2026.
And if the US doesn’t, reach out to other political parties, and this becomes the Pashinyan deal, it lives, dies with Pashinyan. It’s the same thing. I don’t care if it’s called TRIP or I don’t care what it’s called, but if at the end of the day, the agreement doesn’t extend beyond Trump and cement US interests in the region, It’s not going to accomplish anything long-term. And we’re not even close there.
Candidly, I think the State Department has a very shaky relationship with the Armenian diaspora, as well as the Armenian government, that forebodes very poorly for the US and Armenia moving forward. It’s not going to be cemented with evangelical or evangelical proxies in the United States. Anybody who thinks that we can power up a 100-year agreement for the United States and the South Caucasus without the support of diaspora is foolish. OK, short sighted.
But my point is, is that the US has not thought deeply about what US interests are for that corridor. And a big part of that is going to be India. And guess what? Our relations with India at the moment are extraordinarily poor.
OK, if anything, India feels like a two by four at the back of the head. We can look at tariffs. We can look at a relationship between Trump and Modi that has deteriorated significantly. Now, in terms of the upcoming meeting in Alaska, what I would say is this.
I think that meeting is going to be crucial for Trump coming out of the meeting with Aliyev and Pashinyan. Now, why is that? Well, because the Russians still have interest in Syunik. My understanding is they run the railroad.
Asbed: They do. Yeah.
Arakelian: Right. So how’s that going to work? That, of course, got glossed over. But there’s another component as well, which is Syunik is unlocked for Turkey and Azerbaijan, but is Nakhichevan unlocked for Armenians and Armenian railroads that need to go through that region?
Because that’s going to be up to the Turks and Azeris, whereas their access through Syunik is brokered by the Americans.
Asbed: As far as I know, there’s nothing about this in the agreement.
Arakelian: Correct. There is absolutely nothing about it in the agreement. And so part of that is going to be dealing with Russia’s interest in the railroad in Syunik, because people are not actually thinking deeply about what this entails. Russia has economic interest in the region.
And by the way, that’s not including their presence in Gyumri. Last time I checked, they’re still in Gyumri. By the way, the Chinese are still building the port in Georgia. So we’re late to the game, candidly, in the South Caucasus, irrespective of the CIA head, et cetera, and other people from the U.S. government going out.
And candidly, part of it is the lack of strategic focus of the Armenian government. One day, Pashinyan’s like the most pro-Western guy ever. The next day, his wife is heading to China studying Mandarin. And they’re talking about SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Which is it? Will the real Pashinyan please stand up? I’m wondering if anybody in the US government has the balls basically to call Pashinyan out, because they should. They should call Pashinyan out for basically two-timing the United States with China and Sko.
They should call Pashinyan out for arresting Armenian bishops. OK, so Trump has some pretty significant things to accomplish at this upcoming meeting with Putin that relate to the agreement with Armenia and Azerbaijan. OK, that will set the stage for whether that’s successful or not. That’s in addition to what needs to take place in terms of Ukraine.
But candidly, we have no hand to play in Ukraine. That was obvious months ago. My opinion, if Trump had to do it again, he should have stuck to his guns and basically pulled the plug on Zelensky first, ripped the Band-Aid off. He’s not ripped the bandaid off, which is why we’re at the point we’re at right now, which is nowhere.
OK, supposed to have peace in Gaza. We have no peace. We have no peace in Ukraine. Even the Indians are reportedly furious about Trump taking credit for some so-called peace deal or peace initiative brokered by the U.S. with respect to India and Pakistan.
They’re furious. Anyway.
Asbed: Miss Arkelian, I wanted to keep some of the topics about Armenia for a little bit later, because I know we have a very limited time with Colonel MacGregor. But I think that there is one topic which both of you could address. Let’s start with how important is India to Armenia and how important is Armenia to India? And maybe we can take that on a more global scale with the Cardinal after your comments.
Arakelian: So look, India is hugely important to Armenia. Because remember, the U.S. is thousands of miles away. India is not. At least we don’t have that geographic distance.
India at the moment, how to say, India is encircled. India is encircled with India. Turkish and Chinese interest, and the Russians are considerably weakened. They desperately need a land corridor that complements IMEC, which is the India-Middle East-European corridor.
By the way, I know people don’t want to acknowledge this publicly, but IMEC is going nowhere. OK, what should happen is effectively that the Armenia, the Zangezur corridor, the trip corridor, should in fact be a keystone component of a rethought U.S. plan for the region of which Armenia plays a key role. Now, I’m not suggesting that the Armenian government can broker this. They cannot.
OK, somebody sensible in the U.S. government should be doing it. Whether they can, it remains to be seen. But and conversely, Armenia is very central to India because Armenia is not aligned with Pakistan. OK, Pakistan has done a heck of a job of basically trying to stem Indian interest and the subcontinent and the surrounding regions.
Pakistan has done a deal with China. I would say the relationship between India and China is a, how to say, Notwithstanding the trade, there’s a great deal of geopolitical rivalry and tension. And fundamentally, that is why Armenia is important to India. This is in addition to their military sales to Armenia, which I think they’d like to see develop into an important component of their overall economy. assuming that that continues.
One of the interesting things with the deal done is that, of course, Azerbaijan is now buying U.S. weapons. Where’s Armenia at the table? That was also glossed over.
Hovik: All this under the auspices of peace. But Colonel MacGregor, I want to ask a related question. So with all these corridors going on, there’s obvious needs. Even if you consider China’s needs, they do have East-West communication need. um and i don’t know what a u.s company is going to do when there is more tension between the u.s and china and they’re managing this corridor so what do you believe is the solution to reconcile all of these uh transportation corridor needs that does not result in a world war three you know um what how do you satisfy all the parties
MacGregor: Well, two things. Let me answer that question first, but then I want to go back to the potential for something to happen or nothing to happen in Alaska. I think the answer to your question is for the United States to play the kind of role it should play, given the fact that Americans live in the Western Hemisphere and everybody else you describe lives in Eurasia in the Eastern Hemisphere. Now, what do I mean by that?
We have no sense of what our interests are. You’ve asked a very critical question. What about the commercial interests of U.S. companies? Well, if you’re frank and honest and open about that, we have an interest in doing business with everyone.
And instead of doing business with everyone on the assumption that somehow or another, if we do that, it would be bad for us and help China, help Russia, help the One Belt, One Road initiative, we’ve decided to launch tariff wars. And our launching plan has been scattered. We’ve simply punished everybody within range without thinking carefully about the consequences. So what are we doing now?
Well, we’re trying to step back. We’re trying to recoil from what we set out to do to begin with, because we’re finding that the tariffs aren’t helping us in the least. They’re actually quite damaging. i don’t know how that’s going to go but i think if you said what are America’s core interests our core interests are not to destroy Iran not to harm china not to undermine or subvert Russia not to create greater Israel to subjugate the entire moslem world to Israeli dominance to capture and dominate oil and gas fields in the Middle East so that they can profit in London and New York City.
I think our interest is in simply doing business with everybody, being no one’s enemy. But that’s, again, a minority opinion. But it’s one that I’ve held throughout most of my life. The first question I ask always is, how does it help us to fight X, whoever that is?
Are we benefiting from making new enemies? Are we benefiting from harming anyone? We have an unfortunate habit in this country of cheering every time there’s a bombing somewhere. Stupid people, stupid Americans think, oh, there’s evidence for our greatness and our dominance.
We’re bombing people. Then you try to grab somebody said, you know, we’re bombing people that have no air defenses. We’re bombing people with practically no armed forces. How does this help us?
How does this make us great? And they sort of look at you, really? They have no idea what they’re doing. The press, the media has become the sort of purveyor of things.
They write the narrative before it happens. They tell you what the outcome should be before you even know where you’re going. So you’ve got these other forces in charge. Now, that’s the first thing.
So my answer, frankly, is we should not be involved in that corridor at all. We should try to do business with everybody who is. We should encourage everybody to find a way through it. But that’s not what we’re doing.
We’re taking sides. And that goes back to Israel. Do you really think that we would give a damn who went through that corridor, who owned or policed that corridor, if it were not for Israel and now our desire to harm Russia and Iran? I don’t think so.
I don’t think we’d be there. All right. So now what happens in Alaska? And I think we have to understand something.
President Trump wants Alaska to produce what you saw with Aliyev and Pashinyan. That’s what he wants. He wants to stand there, hold up a document, smile ear to ear. You know, this is my great moment.
He’s into the optics. He wants a quote unquote win. A win to him is, well, the American people saw it. It’s great.
Then we get on the plane and fly home and the hell with it. I’m serious. You know, so we signed it. Well, you know, Mr.
President, you said, oh, don’t worry about that. Doesn’t matter. I’m afraid that’s where we are.
Asbed: It was telling that in the agreement that was signed, there was an endorsement by Aliyev and Pashinyan for a Nobel Prize for Trump.
MacGregor: Oh, of course.
Asbed: If that doesn’t say it all, I don’t know what does.
MacGregor: Yeah, I mean, somebody asked me about that, and I tried to tell them, you know, Obama got the Nobel Peace Prize. First, because he’s not white, and secondly, because he got elected. Well, that’s a hell of a foundation for a Nobel Prize Prize, right?
Hovik: Yeah. Christine, maybe I can ask you first, but I also want to actually ask you both. What are the risks from the Alaska summit or meeting? What happens if things don’t go as rosy as Trump wants?
MacGregor: Well, you want to speak, Christine? I’ll give you a shot because I’ve been bloviating for a while.
Arakelian: Oh, please, go ahead. Take it.
MacGregor: Okay. I think the greatest risk is, frankly, to Trump that he will look ridiculous, that he will walk away with nothing because he doesn’t have a grasp of what’s really going on. If you listen to him, he is being fed the same lies that you can read in the Western media. Oh, the Russians are weak.
The Russians are not strong. They have lost millions of people. This is a catastrophe, on and on and on. That’s all nonsense.
It’s actually the opposite. What is being said about Russia is true for this catastrophe called Ukraine, led by this man Zelensky and this crew. So the danger for him is that he gets nothing. He’s got nothing to really offer.
And then he doesn’t do anything. What he should do if he can’t get an agreement is that he should come out and say, look, I’ve done all that I can do. It’s not going to work. And so I have made the decision at this moment to essentially distance ourselves from Ukraine.
It is up to the Ukrainians and the Europeans to come to a resolution of this crisis. So I am withdrawing all U.S. military and civilian personnel from Ukraine. I am immediately suspending all military aid to Ukraine. I’m pulling out.
This is no longer something that we are obligated to solve. This is a matter for the Europeans. Thank you very much. Goodbye.
That’s what he ought to do. Now, one thing he could do on the side is at least tell President Putin, look, we’d like to come to some sort of arrangement on nuclear weapons. We recognize that we were hasty in abandoning the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty, the INF. We’ve been hasty on a number of other issues.
We want to get back to business on that. You know, I know that we sent nuclear weapons to England in what appeared to be a not too subtle threat aimed at Russia. I’m prepared to pull those out. I want to come to some sort of arrangement there.
Let me know what you’re prepared to do. Let’s have some meetings on the subject. Of course, that won’t produce an immediate agreement. That’s going to take months.
Trump has no patience whatsoever. He’s the microwave president. He wants to stick it in the microwave, time it for 30 seconds. Out comes the agreement and the photo opportunity.
But that would make sense. But as far as the rest of it is concerned, I can’t conceive of any reason why at this particular stage, Putin, number one, would believe anything we said. It’s very important to understand that. We accuse him of lying all the time.
He’s never lied about a damn thing. He’s always stuck to his guns. He’s told us exactly what he wants, exactly what Russia desires. We have refused to recognize the legitimate national security interests of Russia.
And that’s wrong. Okay. The second thing is, I think the Russians also understand that they can’t depend upon any signed agreement. Let us say we sign up for the Austrian state treaty model for rump Ukraine, whatever that turns out to be.
How’s it going to be enforced? Who’s going to live up to it? You see, when they signed that treaty with Austria in 1955, president Eisenhower absolutely guaranteed that he would support that treaty and he committed us to it and we withdrew everything and we stayed north of the austrian border inside germany and we did that consistently throughout the entire cold war but that was eisenhower Eisenhower had a lot of credibility. They believed Eisenhower.
They had every reason to believe him because they dealt with him during the Second World War. There’s no reason for the Russians to trust anything we say. So I think the best that President Trump can do is hold this meeting, come out and say we both gained a better understanding of each other’s position, and we agreed to press forward with a resumption of discussions about how to moderate the nuclear matter, how to restrain it. how to work it, but I am now convinced that the only way forward is for the Europeans and the Ukrainian government to reach some sort of resolution with Russia.
Let me tell you, if you did that, people in London and Paris and Berlin would have a heart attack because they’re not prepared for that. Everything they’re doing is designed to drag us in. That’s what everything is about. What do you think this corridor is about?
To drag us in. Even further in.
Asbed: Yes. All the way to Central Asia.
MacGregor: That is Israel. Well, we’re already there trying to subvert the Russians. But Israel is trying to figure out a way to keep us permanently mired in a swamp that we can never drain. That’s the bottom line.
And I don’t see Donald Trump recognizing that, but that would be the smart move and simply say, we can’t fix it. We can’t solve it. We’ve done all that we can. It’s really up to the Europeans.
Thank you. I’m withdrawing our forces. Boy, I tell you what, that would end things quickly in Ukraine.
Arakelian: So let me just say, I do think there is a good reason for the US to be involved in the corridor, but it’s not the reasons that have been articulated. And I’ll explain my thinking on this. US companies have a huge disadvantage globally. Fundamentally, we cannot compete on scale and price.
This is why the Chinese electric car makers are whooping our ass globally. OK, it’s why, because fundamentally, US economic and foreign policy has been around preserving profit margin for US companies. We’re going to pick and choose which countries you’re going to trade with to ensure that profit margins are high. The problem is, is that that does not lead to long term economic innovation. which is why our prices are high on drugs and whatnot.
We basically coddled a bunch of US companies that are effectively now tethered to the US government. And everything this administration does demonstrates that all the top tier companies are effectively tethered to the US government. What people don’t understand is when you take the debt of the US government, You better add Boeing and a whole bunch of other companies debt to your balance sheet, because that’s actually who’s on the balance sheet of the United States government. So what actually needs to take place with this corridor is they need to start creating economies of scale for U.S. companies.
It’s not about U.S. companies basically running the core. If they go ahead and do that, I’ll tell you straight up, this thing is going to be a colossal disaster. Armenia needs scale. Eurasian Economic Union has done absolutely nothing for Armenia.
Let’s just be clear. I don’t care what historic ties there are between Russia and Armenia. Eurasian Economic Union has been a disaster. Now, the funny thing is, is Pashinyan for the past couple of years has been supporting the Eurasian Economic Union, all the while distancing himself from CSTO.
Again, he’s a bit of a schizophrenic when it comes to his policies. But what the U.S. actually needs to do is create scale through that corridor. They need to create harmonized markets.
Asbed: What kind of policies would promote that?
Arakelian: Well, the type of policies that need to happen are effectively a U.S. version of BRICS. They need like an EU. You need to harmonize things. By the way, this was the raison d’être of the GCC.
The GCC is negotiating larger trade pacts with countries. OK, China has undertaken it. UK has undertaken it. The secretary general, the GCC, was in Washington, D.C. a number of months ago.
I happened to be invited to a smaller session in which various people could pose questions. The GCC was practically begging the Biden administration to take a multilateral approach to trade in the region. The U.S. government has refused. That’s all on the US.
MacGregor: I think Christine is 100% correct. But unfortunately, Christine is setting the bar too high for the government and the private sector. Christine’s right in that too many of our firms have increasingly become what I would call state-sponsored enterprises. They are so dependent upon government subsidies and special favors and regulatory loopholes and so forth that they cannot do business in a way that they should.
And the government itself feels that they are prisoners of these big, big corporations. I mean, that’s the problem with the big five in defense. You know, it’s the old adage of if you owe the bank $100, that’s your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that’s the bank’s problem.
And see, that’s where we are at this point. We’re owned by all the wrong people. So I don’t think what Christine is saying could possibly happen right now. It should.
I agree 100%, but I don’t see it. And that’s why my solution is get the hell out, because we don’t know what we’re doing. And we don’t care about the people that live in the region. Nobody shows up and says, well, wait a minute, before we do this, what’s the impact on the Armenians?
What’s the impact on the Azeris? All we care about is the Israelis want us to do this. This helps us to encircle Iran. It helps us to undermine and harm Russia.
The hell with, you know, whatever else happens right now. We don’t care what the Turks do. You know, we haven’t even mentioned Georgia. And the Georgians, you know, they have an interest in all of this, too, that nobody bothers to bring up.
Georgia is a link for Armenia to Russia. Georgia also has another issue. They have territory that the Turks and Anatolia have said they want. That never comes up for discussion.
Asbed: We’re talking about Ajaria?
MacGregor: Yes. You know, listen, let’s wake up and smell the coffee. This is too complex for us. I mean, they already think they own it.
I mean, it’s not that they want it. They already think they own it. But it’s too complex for us. But it’s something that the Russians and the Iranians are familiar with.
And India, who lives not really that far away, has interests in Iran as well as in Russia. All of these things make sense for them. It doesn’t make sense for us. We just don’t know what we’re doing.
Now, the last thing on this event, I’ve been thinking that perhaps the real solution is to have a summit in Antarctica where Zelensky and Pashinyan and Aliyev can go meet and have their own independent summit. Antarctica is the perfect place.
Asbed: Not Alaska. That’s right.
Hovik: I will second.
Asbed: So all of these concerns that you are bringing up are the reason why we’ve actually asked a couple of analysts whether they think that this is some kind of a so-called peace treaty that’s going on, or is it a prelude to an upcoming war? From an Armenian perspective, and I think Azerbaijan should also share these concerns, my fear is that the region may turn into a new Afghanistan or even a Vietnam.
MacGregor: Well, look at Syria. Look at Syria. What has happened to Syria? That’s what you’re looking at.
And we’ve helped to create that catastrophe because we work closely with Israel to make it happen. And to a lesser extent with the Turks. I mean, you never have anybody that stands up and says, well, who stood up ISIS? What was ISIS originally designed to do?
Well, it was stood up in large part by very wealthy Arabs, peninsular Arabs in the Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, as well as by Erdogan. And Erdogan provided the intelligence. Erdogan provided access to oil and the oil markets. Now Erdogan wanted them to attack and destroy the Shiites in Iraq.
Nobody ever brings that up. Then we come in to rescue the situation in Iraq and we worked closely with the Shiites. This man, Soleimani, that we were so anxious to murder was instrumental as an ally. He helped to liberate Christian villages and towns and districts from ISIS.
We worked with the man. He delivered to a large extent back in 2007, 2008, the support and the cooperation of the Shiites in Iraq with us so that we could stand around and pretend that we had had some success there. My point is, we don’t know what we’re doing. We’re just taking orders from foreign powers, foreign influence.
And that influence right now is largely Israeli.
Arakelian: And Turkish.
MacGregor: Yeah, and to a lesser extent, Turkish. I think the Israelis are more clever. That’s my position.
Asbed: Yeah, we’ll see who wins because they’re going to have their own confrontation in Syria eventually.
MacGregor: Inevitably. Absolutely. I think it will have to come to that. And The other thing is Putin has the backing of the Russian population on a scale that I don’t think anybody’s ever seen before.
I mean, he’s got over 85, 84, 85 percent absolutely ironclad support. The Russians are furious. They would just as soon march to the Polish border. Because their attitude is, why should we agree to anything less and then reckon with the inevitability of another war that breaks out in Western Ukraine?
And I think they have a point. I don’t think we can, you know, criticize that. What are we talking about in the Caucasus? Is this a temporary truce for the Armenians so that everybody in Yerevan can go back to the cafes and enjoy themselves and think they’re secure?
I don’t think so. I… I think you need to really re-examine your assumptions about this damn thing.
Asbed: Yeah. I wanted to get your opinion on why the Russians remained inert during the Karabakh War in 2020, and then again in 2023.
MacGregor: Well, first of all, in 2020, I just don’t know. I mean, frankly speaking, I haven’t looked at that carefully. I have talked to some people that are familiar with what happened in 2023, and there was a certain amount of frustration in Moscow with the Armenians. I mean, I think they grew tired of the situation.
They didn’t feel the Armenians were doing enough for themselves.
Hovik: Also, Asbed, I think that it’s a little bit unfair to say that they remained inert in 2020 because they did provide the peacekeepers that eventually stopped at least, you know, the complete annihilation of Artsakh at the time. But maybe they could have done more. But… Sorry, I just had to say that.
MacGregor: I don’t know. I mean, I haven’t looked at 2020 at all, but I have looked a little bit into 2023 and I’ve asked those questions and I got this sort of… you know, comment back that, well, we’re a little tired of the Armenians. You know, they could do more for themselves. And I’ll leave the rest of that to Christine, who’s ultimately intimate with the whole thing in ways that I am not.
But I can tell you that the Russians still, at least based upon my limited experience, feel affection for the Armenians and their situation. It would be a mistake to assume otherwise. But they’re not feeling any affection for the American presence in Yerevan.
Arakelian: Well, I think another mistake that the US is making at the moment, candidly, is they’re not taking strong measures to release the Armenian bishops and Karapetyan. This is a huge mistake.
Hovik: In fact, there was a report, I don’t know how prominent this media source is, BizSec, but apparently the issue of Samvel Karapetyan was discussed by the Trump cabinet prior to Pashinyan’s meeting. And in fact, the story, there was this discussion between Pashinyan and Trump at that meeting where Trump said, you want your 23 Christians back. He was referring to the hostages that are currently in Baku. And Pashinyan, like, he…
He grew pale like we got the sense that he was not expecting that discussion. So I honestly think and Armenian media presents it now as if Pashinyan wanted those media wanted those.
Arakelian: His media says that this is where I think some of the diaspora criticism of the U.S. is unfair. Let me give you an example. And I shared this with a few people over the weekend. So in 2022, the Armenian Central Bank sold a 65% interest in the Armenian Stock Exchange to the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
That is the sole stock exchange through which Armenian companies can raise capital in Armenia proper. Now, I said to myself at the time, wow, why would you sell a 65% interest in your stock exchange? You don’t want to run, you don’t want to have an Armenian run your stock exchange, but they didn’t. So the reason I mentioned this is that a lot of people are saying, well, Armenia is ceding its sovereignty.
Okay, where were you in 2022? The Armenian government has struck a bunch of deals. I think candidly, a lot of them are not even disclosed to the public. Okay, they’re not public, in which effectively it has ceded its sovereignty in a lot of different ways.
Okay, this is an Armenian government that has refused to assert its sovereignty in many different ways. They’re kicking the can down the road. But guess what? The Armenians are going to need to work cooperatively with the Americans.
They’re not going to be able to just say, OK, this is not your problem. Can you cut me my check? That’s not really the way it’s going to work. The U.S. needs a cooperative, engaged partner who has a light bulb on.
OK, not your handpicked sort of cronies. There has to be basically a widespread agreement that this is a good thing. So my point is, is that, you know, Pashinyan has ceded sovereignty. And I think a lot of the criticisms of the agreement are not on the shoulders of the United States.
They’re really on the shoulders of Pashinyan. He could have made the issue of the prisoners a key issue, and he failed to do so. And it’s because of some pressure, okay, and at least some people in the administration who realized, look, there’s a larger context. That’s why the issue got raised with Pashinyan there.
And yes, I think he gasped One of the best things that Trump could do, candidly, is get Ruben Vardanian out. Because one of the things that Trump needs to ensure is that the Abraham Accords, which is the larger framework he wants for the region, remains a US initiative versus an Israeli co-opted initiative. OK, because what’s coming next is basically Azerbaijan and the Abraham Accords and a tripartite agreement between the U.S., Azerbaijan and Israel, because that’s in fact what the U.S. I’m sorry, what Israel was pushing for before this summit in Washington, D.C.
OK, if that happens, effectively, Trump has lost control of the narrative of the Abraham Accords and it becomes an Israeli tool and device in the region and controlled by them versus a U.S. initiative in which there’s broader participation and cooperation between differing states. Ultimately, it should be a U.S. initiative. It should not be controlled by any foreign country or co-opted by them.
MacGregor: By the way, the Europeans have echoed some of Christine’s views, particularly in connection with Trump’s latest discussions with von der Leyen about the EU and the EU’s economic interests. If you go back and look at the agreement that Trump reached with the European Union in his discussions with von der Leyen, she effectively gave everything away. She effectively just said, we’ll be your vassals in exchange for which we expect you to do what we want you to do in Eastern Europe. Effectively, that’s what it was all about.
The Europeans are very unhappy now. You know, this is the problem when you sort of self-vassalize, when you sort of turn yourself into someone else’s vassal.
Asbed: I can’t see this lasting.
MacGregor: No, none of it can last because we don’t have the staying power. That’s the thing I keep trying to get people to understand. We don’t. We are not the nation of 1991.
We don’t have the military power. We don’t have the economic strength. You know, if you look at something like the Depression, During the depression, we made a lot of mistakes. We were no better off in 1938, 39, and we were when it began.
We pursued all the wrong policies, but we had something going for us. We defaulted twice. We call it restructuring the debt in 34 and 36. Now, why were we able to do that?
We had the largest manufacturing base in the world. We had the largest skilled labor force in the world. We had infinite natural resources. People said, well, look, the Americans are having trouble.
They’re not doing very well, but they’ll come out of this. They’re worth the risk. Meanwhile, we demanded repayment for the war debt from World War I from Britain and France and everybody else in gold. And so gold was pouring into the US Treasury.
What have we got now? We are no longer the largest manufacturing base. China is the largest manufacturing base. We’re not even close.
Our skilled labor force, when we examine the potential to build a factory that could produce the very, very exotic, complex microchips that now the world depends upon from Taiwan, the owner of the factory privately told us, you don’t have the human capital to do the job. Our education has fallen apart. Our skills are simply not there. And you put all of that together and ask yourselves, why would you ever, sitting in the Caucasus, make yourself so seriously dependent upon the United States or in Europe or anywhere else?
I don’t think I would. And I keep trying to tell people, I love my country. Don’t get me wrong. I want my country to be successful.
What I’m trying to tell you is that we want you to be successful too. And you’re on the wrong path. And that takes us back to where do you want to go in the Caucasus? And you’re in a tough position.
You only have a few options. India clearly is one. Russia is the other. And so is Iran.
Now, once you move beyond that, what are we going to do for you?
Asbed: Those are words of wisdom. Quick timeout. We are at one hour and I want to be respectful of everyone’s time. I’m on my way out, but I appreciate it.
MacGregor: Thanks for inviting me.
Asbed: Thank you for coming. We really, really appreciate it. All right. We’re going to leave it there for today.
Thank you so much, Ms. Arakelian, for joining us today and also for arranging for Colonel MacGregor to join us.
Arakelian: My pleasure.
Asbed: We really appreciate that and we look forward to having you again.
Arakelian: Thank you. Thank you so much.
Asbed: Take care. Thank you, Ms.
Hovik: Arakelian.
Arakelian: Be well.
Asbed: That’s our show today, folks. The episode was recorded on August 11, 2025. We’ve been talking with Ms. Christine Arakelian, who is a Fulbright scholar and lawyer with expertise in international global law and finance, mergers and acquisitions, and corporate strategy.
She has worked for the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of General Counsel and has advised the Republic of Armenia as an ECORDS fellow. Ms. Arakelion consults globally on matters pertaining to national security, technology, cybersecurity, healthcare, law, and finance. We also had Colonel Douglas MacGregor.
I’m not sure how much of an introduction he needs. He’s famous. You can search for him and you’ll find him, but he is a retired colonel in the United States Army. He’s a former government official, author, consultant, political commentator, defense and foreign policy analyst, and a former advisor to the U.S.
Secretary of Defense.
Hovik: Thank you for listening, everyone. Just one last request. Our campaign to get more traction on Spotify and Apple Podcasts is still ongoing. So if you’re not on those platforms, please get on them.
Follow us there and give us a rating and a comment to help boost us. And also let us know how we’re doing. We would really appreciate your support.
Asbed: Yes. And for my favorite platform, Substack, we’ve actually more than tripled our membership since we started it, I think, a few months ago. So thank you for doing that. But we want lots of numbers.
When we look at the people whose opinions are getting out there, they have tens of thousands of people following their channels. We have… I can’t remember the number, hundreds, let’s say. So please join our Substack channel also.
There’s going to be more and more material eventually. I’m Asbed Bedrossian and I’m in Los Angeles.
Hovik: And I’m Hovik Manucharyan. I’m in Gavar, Armenia. Thank you for listening. Talk to you soon.