In this episode of Conversations on Groong, we speak with Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, to analyze the geopolitical fallout from Israel’s surprise military campaign against Iran, known as Operation Rising Lion. We explore how the attacks may sabotage U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, shift Russia’s strategic calculus, and destabilize the South Caucasus—particularly Armenia’s Syunik province. We also examine the implications for Russia-Iran relations, the Zangezur corridor, and Azerbaijan’s military posture. Finally, we discuss Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb, recent Russian rhetoric labeling Ukraine a terrorist state, and whether Moscow is preparing to escalate its war effort.
Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed: Welcome to Conversations on Groong. On Friday, June 13, Israel launched a massive military operation against Iran, dubbed Operation Rising Lion. The attacks involved airstrikes and suicide drones, many of them reportedly guided by operatives already inside Iran. Shocking.
Targets included nuclear enrichment facilities, military installations, and the assassination of top Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists. Now, this marks a serious escalation in the shadow war between Iran and Israel with potential consequences far beyond the region. To help us understand what this means for the Middle East and for the broader international order, we will soon be joined by Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs and one of the leading voices in Russian foreign policy analysis.
Hovik: A quick note to our listeners before we begin, before Mr. Lukyanov joins us. If you value the work that we do and want to support it, visit podcasts.groong.org / donate. You’ll find links to Patreon and Buy Me A Coffee.
And every contribution helps us keep the show going. And if supporting us financially isn’t an option, you can still help us by liking, sharing and commenting. That kind of support also goes a long way. Thanks for being with us.
Now let’s go to the show.
Asbed: Mr. Lukyanov, welcome back to the Groong podcast.
Lukyanov: Hello, and thank you very much for inviting me again.
Asbed: Glad to have you on board. Yeah. Mr. Lukyanov, I was reviewing our previous conversation, which was back in February.
And one question we didn’t have an answer for was whether Trump was going to attend the Victory Day parade in Moscow. Well, sad to say that didn’t happen.
Lukyanov: It didn’t happen. Actually, I don’t believe that anybody expected that to happen. Anyway, the level of, how to say it, polite gestures around this anniversary, and even later on, recently, just two days ago, Putin congratulated Trump’s to his birthday, and that was exactly the day of the parade in D.C., and they all again reminded each other the role Russia and the United States played during the Second World War. So Trump understands that this topic, this issue is, so to say, useful in conversations with Russians.
Asbed: Yeah. We were hoping to instigate peace, but it didn’t happen.
Lukyanov: No, it didn’t happen.
Hovik: Well, let’s talk about, unfortunately, more serious issues. Mr. Lukyanov, Israel says that its assault on Iran using multidimensional methods, fighter jets and so forth, is just the beginning and could last for weeks, if not more. The stated goal to neutralize or delay, at least, what Israel claims are Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
And back in January, Iran and Russia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership, as has been much talked about. It’s not a formal military alliance, but it’s hard to believe Moscow is indifferent to a major attack on one of its closest partners. And in fact, I believe after the attack, Putin and Trump had a phone conversation. And according to Trump’s tweet or truth on Truth Social, Putin… relayed the importance of stopping the Israeli aggression against Iran.
And according to Trump, he said, well, you should stop the aggression in Ukraine. I’m paraphrasing, but I think I got the spirit of that conversation, or at least how Trump explains it. What is the view from Moscow on the Israeli attacks against Iran?
Lukyanov: Yeah, first of all, yes, you’re absolutely right. Moscow cannot remain indifferent. Iran is not an ally, as you rightly mentioned, but cooperation between Russia and Iran got much closer in the recent couple of years. And based on the similarity of situations, Iran has been… hit by sanctions, severe sanctions since 1970s.
Russia now has surpassed Iran in the scale, in the amount of sanctions introduced against Iran. against Moscow, but we are more or less on the same page with attempts of unfriendly countries, as it’s officially called here, to isolate and to blockade our countries. yes the treaty which has been signed and just recently ratified by parliaments and i think it was signed today just today on sunday by the chairman the speaker of the iranian parliament is about cooperation but is not about military assistance so the formula in This document is pretty accurate, and countries do not oblige to defend the other part, the partner, in case of military aggression, but there is an obligation not to side with any aggressor, be it against Russia or against Iran.
You know, the feeling, what people here feel about what is happening, those feelings are very mixed. Because on the one hand, yes, indeed, the level of brutality demonstrated by Israel is… impressive even for Russians. We used to operate pretty severe in some cases, but compared to Israel, it’s nothing. That’s number one, point number one.
And frankly, there are people here, I wouldn’t say there are many of them, and it’s certainly not officials, but there are people here who say that, look at Israel, we need to do the same against Ukraine. We need to behave in the same way. And there are, of course, sympathies with Iran, not because Iran is a partner state, but also because Iran is now a victim of such a clear aggression.
At the same time, looking at what is happening, many people here, including specialists, are pretty surprised by the level of unpreparedness of Iran, because the hypothetical operation has been discussed since quite a while, and many people expected something to come. I spoke to some specialists both here in Russia and in Israel in recent months, and many people said that something is coming.
It seems that Iran didn’t believe that, and it seems that Iran was very badly coordinated, and the very fact that Israel managed to eliminate almost the whole military leadership in one wave of strikes, That’s, of course, not a good sign, especially given the fact that Israel is operating exactly in the way as it did against Hezbollah or Hamas. And it had to be at least learned by other enemies and opponents of Israel. So it looks like Iran is in a pretty bad situation now. About diplomacy, yes, I think that Putin is… behind the scene, is trying to communicate with several leaders, including Iran, including US, including Israel.
But to be very frank, I’m afraid in this particular situation, as we see it now, there is no ground for negotiations at all, at least for a while. Israel is very much committed to at least weaken Iran to the point when Iran is totally unable to harm, to deliver any harm to Israel. And I’m afraid that the ambitions of Mr. Netanyahu will grow quite geometrically.
And he is starting to talk about regime change, about to help Iranian people to be liberated from this corrupted ayatollahs and so on. And I’m afraid that the final goal will be just this, just to destroy Iranian statehood as it did exist for previous couple of decades.
Hovik: Mr. Lukyanov, it’s interesting that you mentioned about Netanyahu’s ambitions. Some say that was the plan all along, regime change. So I wanted to get your thoughts on that.
And also, beyond Israel and Iran, this attack, at least it will have the effect of… weakening Eurasian integration if Iran is disintegrated or regime change happens. It seems to be that Iran is a vital link between Russia and China. Do you think that this attack also had broader geopolitical goals and Can the Russian response go further than just diplomacy at this point? Many are criticizing Russian response to be too diplomatic.
Lukyanov: Yeah, I know that many people in Iran are unhappy with the what they see as lack of Russian commitment. As far as the Eurasian integration is concerned, yes and no. Of course, if Iran will be severely weakened or even destroyed in the current form, that will deliver a certain blow to several initiatives taken on the Eurasian space. Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Iran is a member of BRICS.
Iran joined BRICS last year, and so on. At the same time, you mentioned Iran as a link between Russia and China.
No, I wouldn’t agree with that. uh Iran is an important partner for both countries but Russia and china do not need any links between themselves so Iran is an important place and is very important country and potentially very strong country but eurasian process was rather about central asia china uh Russia and in this regard i think it will not be harmed massively as far as Russian image is concerned you know in Iran people used to be suspicious from the beginning that Russia was inclined to improve ties with Iran because of conflict with the west And some people told, even I had some such conversations, that Iranians said, yes, we know the moment when Americans will invite you to discussion, you will abandon us.
I don’t think it is that terrible. It will not happen. But Russia will not get involved in this militarily. because actually Russian interest in the region is pretty diversified. Iran has been an important partner in Syria, but Syrian case is dismissed, doesn’t exist anymore in the previous forum.
And in general, we see such profound moves changes in the whole area that unfortunately i’m afraid that it will be impossible to preserve what we had before and now this is much more important to try to understand what kind of configuration might emerge there in maybe months or a couple of years to come
Hovik: And we’re recording this on Sunday, June 15th, the date when the nuclear talks were supposed to resume in Oman. But we know what happened and the talks are now called off. Now… The timing of the attacks raises serious questions about the US.
Trump publicly at least appeared to gloat that his team knew about the operation in advance. According to Axios, some sources say that Trump even gave Israel the green light for this attack. And, you know, there is this report in 2009, Brookings report, which passed to Persia, which seems to be almost like a prescription of what to do with Iran, especially a chapter five of that report, which says, leave it to Bibi. implying to goad Iran into negotiations but then let Netanyahu eventually attack Iran because of the negotiations would be conducted in bad faith and then the attack would commence.
So do you believe that Israel indeed sabotaged the U.S.-Iran nuclear talks or Is it also in the U.S. interest to at least some part of the U.S. deep state what exactly happened right now?
Lukyanov: Yeah, that’s an interesting question. We don’t know, of course. The interest of the U.S. is not clear, so it’s not holistic, so it’s quite diversified.
When it comes to Trump personally and his… so to say, inner circle, the coalition of those who are closest to Trump and who support America First agenda, I don’t believe it is to any extent in their interest, because Trump and the United States risk to get involved in another very complicated, bloody and long-term, long-lasting war in the middle east so even if Iran will be easily or difficultly destroyed by Israel the scale of changes which it will generate might create much bigger seismic effect and in this regard the whole incentive of trump to end endless wars and to be back to American workers interest might be simply derailed in this regard i don’t believe that trump played played this role which you indicated that he just helped Netanyahu and Israel to distort Iranian attention.
But on the other hand, of course, we know that another very important part of Trump and coalition are those who are staunchly pro-Israel, and those evangelicals in the united states who for their reasons are big friends of israel and his policy until now has been pretty clear very much supportive to israel so in this regard i think he is a little bit uh this distracted at this point if it will end up soon If Israel will manage to really achieve important goals, then Trump might present it as another success, as he used to do. But if not, I don’t know what will happen.
And of course, Trump suffers serious setback on many fronts, actually, at this point. We see many of his election statements are still a work in progress, to put it very mildly. So at the end of the day, I agree with those from Trumpian entourage, and partly I spoke with these people just days ago at a meeting in Istanbul. They are very unhappy about this because they believe that this America First agenda will not survive in case outside forces, this time Israel, maybe next time somebody else, next time Europe probably in the Ukrainian case. will manage to get America involved in such conflicts.
Hovik: We’d definitely love to discuss Istanbul a little bit more in detail. You know, I just want to mention that ever since Trump’s election and, you know, the dialogue that he opened with Putin, Russian media and politicians spoke positively about Trump. And in fact, a recent Levada poll shows that Russians no longer see the U.S. as the enemy, most Russians at least. Given what just happened, You already said the answer, but I’d like to ask it again.
Given what just happened, can Russia really trust Trump to negotiate in good faith, especially when much of Washington, as you said, including many in his own party, still treat Russia as the enemy?
Lukyanov: You know, first of all, we have a very special leader in Russia. And when it comes to trust, I don’t think that’s the notion which can be easily applied to him. His professional background and his experience as a Russian president, his experience in negotiations with the West starting from the year 2000 when he came, all those factors, they rather make him suspicious and not very much trustful to any counterparts. Having said that, I think that in case of Trump, he managed to establish pretty strong connection to him.
Strong connection doesn’t mean full trust. but it means that they understand each other more or less. At least I don’t know what about Trump, he’s a pretty, special guy with other skills. But in case of Putin, I think he is more or less sure that he understands Trump correctly. Not just what he says, but what he means, how he behaves, the logic of his behavior.
To some extent, he understands him better than many Americans. And that means that what you what you ask about whether this Iranian unfortunate experience might undermine Putin’s perception of Trump. No, I don’t think so. I don’t think so.
And I think that at the end of the day, this is a very much personal eye to eye, eyes to eyes. And they, this relationship might go wrong, but it will be not because any of leaders will try to cheat each other. It will because they finally will understand that limits are pretty strict on maneuvering for both sides and there is no much much place for common decision it’s not we are not yet there but when it comes to to trust i i would dare to say that there is a higher degree of trust between those guys than than usually between putin and other leaders
Asbed: Mr. Lukyanov, I want to drill a little bit deeper in something you said earlier when you said that Russia would not get militarily involved in this situation between Iran and Israel. Because as you know, back in January, there was a strategic partnership that was signed between Iran and Russia. And it became very clear that it was not a military alliance.
It, of course, included serious military and technical cooperation. But the question that’s in my mind is if Israel is going to succeed in weakening or even dismantling Iran, What would that mean for Russian strategy on its southern flanks? How far is Moscow willing to go militarily, politically, diplomatically to support Iran and push back against this kind of international violence?
Lukyanov: You know, Russia has one priority now and I’m afraid for quite a while ahead of us. And this priority is called Ukraine. As long as Ukrainian conflict continues, as long as Russian army is fighting very heavy battles to extend control and Russian economy is working to support those moves, Frankly, I don’t believe that any of other issues in international affairs might become equally important. More than that, resources of Russia, I would not say that Russia is overstretched, not yet at least.
But there is not an abundance of capacities which can be directed to other issues beyond Ukraine. So in this regard, what Russia can do and would be ready to do to support Iran certainly not military actions it’s out of question technical and military assistance in some form I think yes as Iran did earlier stages of Ukrainian war diplomacy which might be requested by Iran in case situation will get worse for them. or maybe even get better, but Iran would like to stop the military operation to try to stabilize situation. In this regard, I think Russia is better situated than anybody else because Putin has a good relationship with Iran.
Iranian leaders, both of them, and with Netanyahu, it’s still very workable relationship. They disagree almost on everything, but since quite a long time, they understand each other very well with Netanyahu. And that means that I cannot exclude that it might be requested pretty soon. In case this war will become an attrition war, the prolonged attrition war to try to undermine Iran, I think Russia might be willing to support Iran a little bit more in terms of economic support and technical military support.
Again, not a direct military involvement.
Asbed: So before the Iran-Russia treaty was made public, Many speculated it might include a clear military alliance. And just yesterday, Alexander Dugin made a bombshell claim on his Telegram channel that Russia offered exactly that. But Tehran backed off, hoping to reach some kind of a deal with the West instead. That’s what he said.
How much truth is there to this? And could the agreement have gone further militarily? And was it Iran that chose to hold back?
Lukyanov: Professor Dugin knows probably more than me, frankly. I have no information about the preparation of this treaty, but based on how I feel and how I understand Russian position and Iranian position, I doubt very much that something like this could be included in the earlier draft. Russia and Iran, as we mentioned at the beginning of our conversation, two countries with a lot of different relationships, countries very interested in each other, but never before. During different periods of our relationship, including periods when Iran was… under big pressure, or Russia was under big pressure.
Never before we could get this feeling that it might be that close that a military alliance might be reached. Even in Syria, when Russia and Iran fought side by side, actually, to support Assad regime, as long as it did exist, but especially the first stage when it was a decisive period after 2015. But interest never coincided. Russia had the one set up of priorities and goals in Syria, Iran completely different ones.
And I don’t think that our relationship ever reached the point when sides would conclude that they might need this kind of close binding military lines. And Professor Dugin is right by saying that Iran has always hoped to diplomatically outplay the West. And it was once, it happened once, so to say, the so-called nuclear deal conducted by Obama administration was actually a big success. And it was a big success for Iranian diplomacy as well.
And Russia was, by the way, extremely helpful and instrumental in facilitating that agreement. I think that Iran hoped to repeat the same trick again, especially given the fact that Biden administration seemed to be totally disinterested, but Trump administration, which destroyed the previous deal, at least they sent messages that they would be eager to find some kind of solution. I guess that Iranians overestimated their skills and they underestimated the nature of Trump administration. So they believed that they could continue with this for the same while as they did in 2014, 15, 16.
But this time it’s different and the whole atmosphere is different and Trump is different than Obama. So in this regard, coming back to the suggestion that Iran might reject Russian offer for a military alliance, I doubt that Russia offered military alliance. But in case Russia would do it, I wouldn’t be surprised if Iran would try to avoid that kind of direct link.
Hovik: Well, we do want to talk about Ukraine, but before we do, I want to quickly touch upon South Caucasus, Armenia. After 2020, as you know, there are gray clouds over not just Nagorno-Karabakh or Artsakh, as we say, but Armenia even itself, like one of the regions, the southern region of Armenia remains constantly under threat. And the Turkish and Azerbaijani plans for a corridor through southern Armenia. Part of their, you know, many say would be part of their pan-Turanic vision, have been blocked largely because of Iran’s tough stance on that issue.
At least that’s the most popular belief. And Iran actually held military exercises. It repositioned many of its troops to the northern border and has been constantly talking about the red line of Armenia’s territorial integrity. So if Israel’s attacks weaken or distract Iran, that red line could falter and Armenia could lose Syunik, cutting off Iran from Russia and Europe, leaving Russia isolated in the Persian Gulf, except possibly through Azerbaijan and Turkey, And it would be beholden to those two countries for any access to the Persian Gulf.
How concerned is Russia about this possible development and the so-called “Zangezur corridor”? There are also some analysts who suggest that having this east-west corridor through Armenia, even if at the cost of Armenia’s sovereignty, could align with Russia’s interests. I don’t know how true that is, but I would like your thoughts on that as well.
Lukyanov: first of all i don’t think that this uh part of geopolitical game plays equally a big role in Russian calculation as some people in in the middle east or in the south south caucasus region subscribe to Russia so it’s of course quite an important element but I just refer to my previous answer about Ukraine and everything connected to that. I’m not sure that at this point the Zangezur corridor and this north-south idea overshadows anything else.
Secondly, yes, I think everybody now awaits what will happen with Iran because you’re right that a profound shift in Iranian policy in case of regime change, if it’s possible or not, I don’t know, might change the whole equation because, yes, Iran did play quite an important role. claiming that the Zangezur corridor and all plans to build roads to the south are NATO and Israeli plot and it should be stopped at the same time to your direct question whether Russia would be interested in partitioning of Armenia or reducing of Armenia certainly not so Russia we might subscribe any cynical thinking to any politician, of course, but I never witnessed any signs of such thinking in Russia.
There’s another question that Given the pretty complicated relationship between Russia and Armenia these days, complicated, I mean that they are pretty unclear. Maybe it’s better now than it was, say, three months ago. after Lavrov’s visit and so but it’s still unclear what is going on the policy of prime minister Pashinyan is pretty difficult to understand now by the way more and more Russian Watchers follow this fantastic story in Armenia about struggle between Prime Minister and the Armenian Church, which is, from my point of view, pretty unique. It’s like Europe during the Reformation period 500 years ago, something like this.
So it’s really pretty complicated to decipher what is happening. But I think that relationship now is more stable than it was a couple of months ago or half a year ago. how to call it elegantly, complicated relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan.
It was a moment maybe a year or year and a half ago when some people expected Russia to just shift from Armenia to Azerbaijan given the crisis in relationship with Armenia, but life showed that it’s not possible because Azerbaijan has his own agenda and they pursue it very clearly. so at the end of the day i think that Russia of course will will try to apply diplomatic and political measures not to uh allow no Russia cannot afford another big war uh in southern caucasus Russia is highly disinterested in such scenario in case it still will happen that will put Russia in a very complicated position because on the one hand again The current relationship with Armenia cannot be described as an alliance de facto, but the jury is still there.
So it will be a significant challenge to Russian diplomacy and Russian decision-making.
Hovik: Right, right. I was going to ask about, you know, there are two elements of the de jure relationship. You know, there is a… A 1997 treaty on mutual assistance and a separate strategic alliance document.
But as you say, if the de facto, the Armenian leadership is continuing to sort of move away from Russia’s orbit, I would not personally see how Russia can move. get involved.
But in case things change, I mean, because to be honest, like Pashinyan’s popularity is very low in Armenia, especially, I mean, it was already low, but his attacks on the Armenian church, I think, are still like, you know, if not, you know, not just shockingly, shocking but also i think will degrade his popularity even more but if there is a change in leadership in armenia and i’m thinking with the best possible circumstance right like a a leader that is more aligned with Russia comes to power or at least one that doesn’t have any uh fantasies about the the eu or the west coming to armenia but is uh strongly based on real politic What can Russia do?
What is Russia willing to do to stop Armenia from being taken over? Because, as you said, Russia’s number one priority is Ukraine.
Lukyanov: First of all, probably it’s not very fair for me to speculate about hypothetical change, political change in Armenia. It’s not my business, it’s not Russia’s business. If we theoretically imagine next election, which would produce another persons in power, those who will change rhetoric or those who will change conceptual approaches. One thing is pretty clear that we see that economic relationship between Russia and Armenia is very strong and is getting stronger.
We can find different explanations because of sanctions, because of different factors which are created by outside impetuses, but anyway.
And Russia, as I guess a lot of people responsible for economic development in Armenia, are by far not interested to destroy it or to disrupt this kind of relationship. both sides are interested to develop political transformation in case it will happen i don’t believe that any leader of armenia in the future would probably like to come back to the format of the past i mean this strategic alliance with Russia which builds which creates the framework for for armenian foreign policy not because of Russia not because of armenia but because for me as a national life is moving towards a different format it’s not about firm and permanent alliances even nato from my point of view is not for for is not forever will not be forever it will be change of all kind of relationships and the flexibility uh might become the main value for any country What happens, by the way, now between Israel and Iran or many other processes, the Ukrainian situation, from my point of view, confirms this idea that the previous belief in firm, stable alliances, NATO-like alliances, is not the form which will develop in the future.
So more flexibility, less binding relationship with some red lines which should be preserved by both sides commitments not for any case but for some very very important cases i think that might be the the the good solution on the Russian side i i don’t think that it would be wise for any Russian government or leader in the future to try to demand from neighboring countries to firmly choose either or either us or somebody else it’s not the trend which we see worldwide but of course to find this kind of balance balanced relationship without uh provoking any of important partners it’s difficult i understand it’s very especially for countries in between it’s very difficult but uh unfortunately uh the case of Ukraine shows that an attempt in today’s world an attempt to say bye bye to one important partner and uh we go completely to another important partner we see how it ends
Asbed: Azerbaijan recently inked an agreement with Pakistan to purchase 40 JF-17 fighters. And many observers think that such a large number for the Azerbaijani Air Force is a little overkill, especially if it’s going to be aimed at Armenia. So some analysts think actually it’s not against Armenia that they’re getting all these things. Azerbaijan is also currently engaged in military exercises jointly with Turkey in Nakhichevan.
What do you make of the constant state of military exercise on the part of Turkey and Azerbaijan on the borders of Southern Armenia?
Lukyanov: No, I think it’s quite easily to read and to understand. Azerbaijan and Turkey are interested to keep everybody on alert all the time. It does not mean necessarily that any kind of military action is being prepared. But to demonstrate that this situation, the whole potential conflict there might include military component I think that that’s a very clear political message I’m not a big specialist on military exercises and I cannot identify what particular scenario they play but so far I think that that’s much more about about demonstrating that in case of anything, we are ready to act.
And of course, the whole development around Iran, which increases the level of dangers, the general level of dangers in the region, that stimulates that kind of behavior.
Hovik: In late May, Ukraine launched Operation SpiderWeb striking deep inside Russian territory. Targets included Russia’s strategic bombers, part of its nuclear triad, as well as bridges and trains. Some of the attacks caused civilian casualties, and Putin vowed to make Ukraine pay. Afterwards, Russia’s rhetoric shifted sharply.
Officials began labeling Ukraine’s actions as terrorism. Some analysts now warn that this would change the rules of engagement for Russia, with Moscow possibly targeting Ukrainian leaders it holds responsible. Notably, Russian officials stopped short of blaming the US, which is interesting in the context of what we previously discussed, but This doesn’t change the fact that Washington is still Ukraine’s main military and possibly financial backer. Instead, figures like Foreign Minister Lavrov pointed the finger at the UK for this operation.
And Trump said that, at least I believe Trump said that he was not aware that this was going to happen. Who was really behind these air base attacks and why does the Kremlin seem to be letting the U.S. off the hook? And also from there, you can also talk about maybe you said you were just in Istanbul. So there were some negotiations there.
We’d love to hear your thoughts on that as well.
Lukyanov: In Istanbul, it was a very informal talk with a couple of American experts. It’s not that frequent case nowadays. It was just interesting to exchange some views about what is happening.
But this is not the level of decision making. uh as for uh spider web operation of course no one knows what who was exactly behind this uk is our favorite enemy so this is an old Russian tradition to see uk behind any hostile geopolitical or intelligence moves partially it’s based on history because starting from 90th century Russian and British empires were biggest enemies this so-called great game in around central Asia and partially caucasus and this British suspiciousness about Russian plans towards India which were non-existing uh anyway uh this is an old tradition and i i cannot exclude that consultants or instructors or whoever from the uk or from the us uh participated in that having said that i think we should need underestimate the direct enemy Ukraine, it might be bad for us, but Ukraine demonstrated that they have quite a good capacity to organize pretty sophisticated acts of sabotage and terrorism.
So in this regard, of course, what happened with these strategic bombers, that should be very much… wake up call for people in Russia who are in charge of defending military facilities such an important military facilities i hope that all conclusions will be made as you mentioned the rhetoric which changed yes it it changed but to be frank uh we heard it before as well because it’s not the first time when the Ukraine uh per se or Ukraine with support of somebody organized uh very big actions last year’s in invasion in the Kursk region was a very big deal here and each time people expected to see some spiraling escalation from the Russian side actually what we know about mr Putin’s political style and if i may call it political culture strategic culture he is not in hurry to respond it’s absolutely not his style he is extremely patient he prefers to wait and see and then to to respond in in a way which he believes is is is uh relevant So it means that I guess that the real response is still to come.
But at the same time, I don’t expect that the nature of this conflict will change because of what Ukrainians did, despite the fact that, of course, it was a very, very exceptional move to attack five of sites for Russian strategic bombers connected to the nuclear arms. That’s something. But you know the difference between a Russian tactic and Ukrainian tactic? Ukrainians love to make very big decisions. moves and promote it very widely to show how successful they are.
Experience from three and a half years of war rather shows that neither of those moves changed the logic of the fight. It was a very, very big PR show, but not profound shift in military activities. on the Russian side Russia is not that skillful or avoids to to make a big show out of successes but Russia step by step continues to push Ukrainians further and further into their territory and i guess that this is the main stake on the side of president Putin he believes that at the end of the day whatever they do and whatever damage they they will be able to deliver to Russian particular branches.
At the end of the day, in this attrition war, Russia will win. And, of course, the fact that United States was not blamed, I don’t know. On the one side, probably the Americans were not involved. Why not?
Again, as I said, I trust that Ukrainians can do something themselves. Secondly, of course, it was not in the interest of President Trump, because I wouldn’t say he is very much on the Russian side in this conflict, but his idea is to get rid of it. And, of course, the more such moves, the more such actions, the less probability that it will end up soon. So in this regard, what Trump said immediately after this attack, on the one hand, he was impressed by the technical level.
On the other hand, he said it was a very, very dangerous move because now Russians have the right to dismiss everything and to destroy everything. So at the end, to wrap up this answer, I don’t think that the nature of the conflict will be changed because of that.
Asbed: Mr. Lukyanov, in light of your conversations in Istanbul with American colleagues and all of the demonstrations and protests you have watched, including the military parade, the so-called military parade in Washington, do you have any impressions you want to share of what you think maybe Americans are experiencing under Trump after, what is it, like 150 days or whatever?
Lukyanov: It was not that long conversation. We couldn’t cover everything. But those colleagues with whom we discussed, they are rather on the side of Trump. At least they support his agenda with disengaging from endless wars and be back to American domestic needs.
Asbed: You’re referring to the America First policy?
Lukyanov: America First policy, not the most radical part of it, but experts from think tanks which support this idea. And what I got from this conversation, they were, by the way, all of them were pretty unhappy about what is happening between Iran and Israel, not because they support Iran, but because they believe that it might bring Trump back to this agenda, and Trump will have no chance but to drag in into the conflict on the Israeli side, which would undermine a lot of his concept that the United States basically does need to be there. And that was their concern.
But otherwise, I think the These people around Trump, they still believe that despite some setbacks, he will be able to move forward on the most principled things, like America First ideas.
Asbed: Well, I can tell you that a number of social media postings that I’ve seen were deeply disappointed with the parade in Washington, D.C., because they said, well, we’ve seen parades in Moscow, and this was nothing like that. So I guess Russians know how to do military parades a little bit better than the Americans.
Lukyanov: That’s correct. That’s correct. But Trump, that was just his first parade. Maybe next 10 parades will be much better.
Asbed: Yeah, that was a birthday parade.
Hovik: Maybe he’ll invite some consultants from Russia or North Korea to arrange the parades better. Just kidding.
Lukyanov: Excellent advice. Next year, he will turn 80. That should be a real parade.
Asbed: There we go. Well, of course, next year, it’s 250th anniversary of birthday of the country.
Lukyanov: Oh, yes, absolutely.
Asbed: So that’ll be a big one. Mr. Lukyanov, thank you for sharing your insights with us. I appreciate the time you’re spending here.
Lukyanov: Thank you very much. Thank you.
Asbed: We will talk soon.
Hovik: Bye-bye.
Asbed: Okay. Well, that was our show today. The episode was recorded on June 15, 2025. Happy Father’s Day to all the listening fathers of our show.
We’ve been talking with Mr. Fyodor Lukyanov, who is the chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. This is a Russian think tank providing expertise on the foreign policy field. He is also editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, a platform for publication in English and Russian of research in political science and international relations.
Mr. Lukyanov is also the director of research at the Valdai Discussion Club.
Hovik: Before we say goodbye, I have one last request from you all. Hundreds of you listen to us on platforms like Spotify and Apple Podcasts. If you’re one of them, please take a moment to make sure that you’re subscribed to the show. And if you’re not, consider downloading those apps and subscribing to us as a gesture of help.
Subscribing helps push our episodes to more people and allows us to grow on those platforms, which we really, really, really want to do. And if you’re using Apple Podcasts, whether on your iPhone, iPad, or Mac, you can also help by leaving a rating and writing a short review for us. It doesn’t have to be long. Just a few words can go a long way in helping new listeners find us.
The same for Spotify. There is a way to leave reviews on Spotify as well. I think you click on the three dots next to the show, then tap rate show, and then you can give us a quick rating. We really, really appreciate your support, and please help us keep the show going and growing.
Asbed: Yeah. Thank you. I’m Asbed Bedrossian in Los Angeles. And I’m Hovik Manucharyan.
Still in Los Angeles.
Hovik: Almost. I have two weeks left and I’m dying to get back to Armenia. But yes, that is my situation right now.
Asbed: It’s always fun to schedule when we are 12 hours apart or 11 hours apart. Please find us on social media and follow us everywhere you get your Armenian news. All of our links are in the show notes. And also, I just want to mention that that very interesting paper from Brookings Institute that Hovik mentioned in the show, we’re going to put the link in the show as well.
It’s a little bit shocking when you go through that document. It’s actually 170 pages. But if you just look at the chapters, it almost looks like a blow by blow of what is going on today. In international affairs, Israel and Iran, etc, etc.
Quite shocking. We’ll talk to you soon.
Hovik: Thanks for listening. Have a good day.
Asbed: Bye-bye.