Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed: Hello, everyone, and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. Sorry about my voice. I’m still sick, but you are not going to get sick of this show. We are going to be talking about Russia in global affairs today.
And for that, we have with us Mr. Fyodor Lukyanov, one of Russia’s foremost political analysts. And as a matter of fact, he is editor-in-chief of the influential journal Russia in Global Affairs. Mr.
Fyodor Lukyanov, welcome to the show.
Fyodor: Thank you very much. Hello.
Hovik: Hello, Mr. Lukyanov.
Asbed: So we have a couple of trivia questions for you to start the show. First, who said, “God bless the people of Russia and Ukraine” only a couple of days ago?
Fyodor: President Trump.
Asbed: That’s correct. Ding, ding, ding, ding. And number two, and we actually do not know the answer to this one: Will President Putin invite President Trump to the Victory Day parades in Moscow?
Fyodor: I guess yes. I’m not sure he will come, but certainly he will be invited.
Hovik: So, you know, as the trivia questions hinted at, after talking about peace through strength for weeks, today it feels a little bit different, as if there’s a disturbance in the ether. And Trump and his administration have made on Thursday a set of choreographed statements and maneuvers that… we think represent a significant departure from previously stated positions. First, at a NATO meeting, Peter Hegseth, the defense secretary, delivered the following key, what I would term as concessions, to Russian previous demands in terms of the war in Ukraine.
Number one, he said that returning to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective. And he also said that NATO membership for Ukraine is not realistic in a negotiated solution. I mean, that to us seems to be the number one reason why this war started in the first place. However, in that speech, Hegseth did say that the U.S. envisions non-NATO peacekeeping troops composed of European and non-European nations to be employed in Ukraine.
And on the same day, of course, President Trump had a long meeting with President Putin for 90 minutes, I believe. And then he called Zelensky to let him know how it went. So certainly during that discussion, we think that Russian red lines would have been affirmed. You know, we wanted to know, what does a Trump-Putin phone call mean?
Is this the beginning of the end of the war in Ukraine, in your opinion?
Fyodor: Oh that’s that’s still an issue where we need to speculate more than we can say. Definitely even after all events you described we don’t know exactly what will follow but of course what is happening that is… this is a big change compared to what we had for several years before maybe several decades even you mentioned the notion “concessions to Russian demands”, I would actually frame it differently if I understand Mr. Trump and his entourage correctly, their world view and their setup of priorities they change the whole approach to what is important for the United States: what is less important, what is totally not interesting.
And I think that in this picture, which is absolutely very, very different from the picture of many US presidents prior to Trump, Ukraine doesn’t mean much for the United States, and this is probably the the biggest change compared to the Biden administration, because the Biden administration and many people… sympathetic with Biden and liberal ideas, as they were formulated in previous decades they… saw Ukrainian war as a big struggle between democracy and autocracy, And the stake in this struggle, as it was perceived by many people in the West until recently, the stake was international order, liberal world order, or as Americans prefer to call it recently, “rules-based order.” And in this logic, yes, Ukraine was just a particular case. where Russia, again I repeat in this logic, Russia tried to change, to destroy this liberal world order, while the West made efforts to keep it and to strengthen.
We can debate if you want whether it was correct or not, why this picture emerged years or even decades ago. But what is important at this point, Trump doesn’t see it in this light at all. For him, this kind of struggle doesn’t exist. Democracy, autocracy, values, non-values, traditionalism, something else, it doesn’t matter.
He sees interests of the United States to be, probably to be the hegemon in the world, but in a completely different understanding. Not the country which is trying to formulate and to impose certain rules on everybody and then rule the whole globe. But this primacy and hegemony in Trump’s view is that the United States can achieve whatever it wants, if it wants something. Not to formulate, not to rule the world, but just to fulfill concrete interests, economical, political, whatever, cultural, any.
And that means that you have a very clear setup of priorities, which interest, which national interests are vital, which are less vital and so on. And in his understanding, Ukraine is not vital, not vital. So it’s not anything which deserves such attention, such money, such political turmoil, military efforts and so on.
Hovik: Sorry, doesn’t the whole discussion go beyond Ukraine, the future of NATO, the future of American engagement by extension in Europe and so forth?
Fyodor: That was before Trump, exactly. That’s what I said. Because the international liberal order was based on NATO supremacy worldwide, or at least in the whole transatlantic and maybe Eurasian sphere. the role of the United States abroad and so on and so forth. It’s not what Trump thinks, because it seems that for him NATO is not that important either because NATO is an obsolete instrument from the Cold War and the American is now… is something else because the current agenda is is not… about Europe it’s not about…
Atlantic ocean it’s about Pacific, it’s about China, it’s about probably as we see… northern hemisphere and arctic and so on. So to make a long story short for Trump Ukraine is a burden. Ukraine and this conflict with Russia is something which he inherited from the Biden agenda which he dismisses completely. The whole agenda.
And that means that he believes that it’s time to just put an end to that, to get rid of it because it’s not important and then go to real priorities like China and so on. And if we frame it in this way, I come back to your word concessions. It’s not a concession at all. If you get rid of something which we don’t need, it’s not a concession, it’s just a relief.
Hovik: We’ll definitely go back to that issue of Trump’s essentially reorientation in terms of priorities. But what is Russia’s position in all of this? When the special military operation started, President Putin said that the two main goals were denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine. Is that still the case?
And what does that mean in reality, especially in today’s context?
Fyodor: Those two slogans, which, to be frank, were not clearly understood by people even here, even in Russia, and after the first period of usage, those slogans were, so to say, put aside, actually, especially the denazification. Because for public opinion, it was not clear what propaganda did mean. If we try to interpret those two terms, that was actually very easy. Denazification did mean the classical regime change in American style. and the demilitarization clearly a serious weakening of military capacity of the country which was seen, and is still seen, as a hostile.
So that was it. Whether those goals remain, yes, I would say so.
But of course, compared to what we had at the beginning of this operation, almost exactly three years ago, the whole situation has changed profoundly. and the initial aims were part of discussion or the core of discussion in in March, February, late February and March 2022, the so-called Istanbul agreements or Istanbul process and then yes the key element was actually not about Ukraine per se but it was about European security security arrangements in Europe because… the key reason why Russia launched this operation and Putin decided to go that that far, was that the years and years and years before that Russian claims that NATO enlargement into, expansion, should not should not continue and it should be stopped because Russia perceived it as a threat, as an encirclement and so on.
All those claims were flatly ignored, simply flatly ignored by anybody, because people in the United States, and people in Europe they assumed that Russia as a country which lost the cold war had no right and no point to claim something like that. And since it continued and the Ukrainian situation was seen by many people here, not only by Putin or by military hoax, but by many pretty… moderate people here as a very troublesome development. So that ended with this gesture, actually.
And of course, again, it’s very important to understand for people in the United States, or wherever our audience is, that the composition of Ukraine, the country, was not the key element at the beginning. The key element was about this European situation. We can discuss hours long where was it correct or not, but the rationale was about this and that’s why Istanbul agreement did not touch the territorial issue, it did touch only these issues about regime parameters of military capacity, neutral status, and the political system in Ukraine.
Since that, and we know that those negotiations failed for reasons which we probably will learn someday, since that everything changed and unfortunately the territorial issue, the issue about future of Ukraine as a state, became quite an important part of everything. And now we have this complicated situation, which President Trump believes he can easily address, that we have all those two problems combined. The security issue for Europe is still there, and it’s still, I would dare to argue, that this is still the main one.
But it’s complicated by the territorial situation and by gains Russia made in… two and a half years, and of course and here Trump is absolutely realistic as, many of his team people, Russia will not give up and will not give back those territories, so now we have combination of those two issues and since the territorial issue was added to the initial composition, then the terrible cloud of historical, cultural, religious, and all those aspects came to the issue, to the problem, which, again, initially was purely geopolitical. And now we need to address all of them.
Hovik: Right.
Asbed: So what is the prevailing view in Moscow? Do you think that under Trump, the U.S. is ready to understand Russia’s legitimate security concerns?
Hovik: And let me just add that people like to forget that it was President Trump who himself began arming aggressively Ukraine. And we know that even before that, the Obama administration, they had this big reset button with the incorrectly translated word in Russian. So is there a sympathy towards Trump and that he is able to come to terms with Russian concerns?
Fyodor: you know it’s a pretty ironic situation there’s a big sympathy with Trump as a person as a personage because he is funny he is really he he’s so much different than all those bastards whom we um knew from the establishment whom we knew for for so many decades And who actually contributed, at least contributed very much to this deadlock we have today, that of course Trump with his disregard to protocols and hypocrisy, he looks very warm to many people here.
And I think the well-known sympathy between Putin and Trump, and I think it’s true that they feel quite good about each other, it’s based not on the similarity of political views or something like intellectual closeness, but this is exactly what I said, that Putin hates hypocrisy. and he believes that hypocrisy which European and this which international but especially European diplomacy is based on is… is terrible, it’s awful, Trump… the same, he hates it, and he disregards it, and that’s why he can speak… with each other and I think he probably, they probably understand each other Having said that, I don’t believe that it’s a very easy way to communicate, because we know that Mr.
Putin, especially now, since he got a bit older, he’s very keen to inject and introduce this historical and cultural element in any political debate. which sometimes is very much legitimate, because it’s important to remember history, no doubt about that. But when we deal with a person like Donald Trump, you can be absolutely 100% sure that he will never get what you say in this way.
If Putin will try to explain to him, as he did with Obama and with Tucker Carlson and with many others, to explain the history or genesis of Ukrainian and Russian nations starting from approximately 8th or 9th century, Tucker Carlson had no choice but to listen to that for 45 minutes. But in the case of Trump, it does make sense, because he will simply lose attention after 10 minutes, and then that’s it.
Hovik: I think it should be translated to real estate terminology.
Fyodor: Yeah, and I’m not sure it was in 10 minutes. Maybe, yes. And by the way, if rumors are correct that people involved on the Russian side in the preparation for negotiations with Trump, some of them are business people. I think that’s a very right decision because it’s much better than to send a diplomat to Trump.
But anyway, it’s very difficult to expect that Donald Trump will get into details of how all this… happened and why how it did evolve but at the same time what is… what is positive is that Trump is very much result-oriented, he he thinks as a business person and he thinks probably in some notions like EPI and so something like this, and he wants to have a quick result, which all other people say is impossible. But he is very insistent, and who knows? Maybe in this particular case, it will work for a very simple reason, because all previous efforts failed. So maybe this will work.
Hovik: Very quickly, because we do want to talk about BRICS and also our region. But Annalena Baerbock said that the EU should be involved in any discussion about Ukraine. And also, EU is adamant that the Ukraine should be involved in any discussion about Ukraine. But in response to a reporter who said, do you view Ukraine as an equal member? of this peace process, Trump said essentially like, hmm, that’s an interesting question, which says a lot by itself.
Asbed: And did not answer the question.
Hovik: Does our response also apply to the EU role in this resolution of this conflict?
Fyodor: I think this response applies to the EU role even more than to the Ukrainian role. Because in case of Ukraine, whatever you think about Ukraine, and I can imagine what Trump thinks, Trump believes that if we pay everything, they should do what we say. That’s exactly how a business person should think and consider this situation. So Ukraine is not… should not be a subject of this negotiation, but Ukraine is of course inevitably is part of it because it’s about Ukraine at the end of the day.
As for the European Union it’s a different case, why should European Union be there? What is their contribution? What do they have? Do they have any idea how to solve it?
Do they have money to replace United States? Do they have… ammunition and weapons to supply Ukraine? and to replace the United States? No, and then of course the question is so why should those guys be there, either as they say openly now and Vice President Vance and Secretary Rubio, and Secretary Hegseth, they say approximately the same to Europeans. If you want to be at the table, then take the burden.
If you take the burden, okay, great. Then we leave. and Europeans and especially I think after this week’s Munich Security Conference, with the absolutely devastating speech of Vice President Vance, they really don’t know what to do, what to wish in this particular collision because to wish strategic autonomy, as president Macron likes to float and to discuss, OK great, now you are strategically autonomous, go ahead. But that’s not what Ukraine… Europe wants.
To want to be part of the U.S. team, great then pay. it’s very simple answer from Washington and so i’m afraid that… in case of European Union… and even NATO, since we know approximately what Trump thinks about NATO… Europe is not… well positioned to play a significant role in this process, yeah.
Asbed: Mr. Lukyanov, I want to go back to the way you were saying that Trump behaves a little bit, because that was also part of your recent article in Russia in Global Affairs, titled “Why Global Powers Can’t Agree on a New World Order.” You argued that Trump is not the type who envisions large sweeping treaties that change the world for decades at a time, like the Yalta Conference, for example. He’s transactional and looks for shorter gains for himself, and then he also looks for something for the other party so that they can clinch a deal, right? And we know that Trump is very concerned about the rise of BRICS.
And he has gone so far as to threaten 100% tariff on all the countries in BRICS if, and we are quoting, “they play games with the dollar.” And he said this, as a matter of fact, on Thursday and in his social media post, he said that “the power of the dollar” was discussed with President Putin. So let’s try to understand. Trump wants Russia to abandon BRICS and maybe come back to the G8, but does Russia want to do that? And what is the perspective of Russia’s policies regarding the use of the dollar for essentially a world currency?
Hovik: And maybe if I should add, the big elephant in this room is China, of course, and Russia, we know that has formed a bond over these last few years with China. Is Russia willing to bargain any of that relationship away? And are Chinese also concerned on their side?
Fyodor: Okay, let’s start with the G7, G8, because it was a very… Actually, very expected suggestion from President Trump or somebody in the United States who has in mind to improve relationship with Russia. People believe that Russia and Putin personally in particular will be extremely pleased if he will be invited back to the club. because he was once part of this club, and this club is utterly exclusive, and then he was kicked off, and then we invite him back, and then a big reconciliation will happen. I think it’s a wrong logic.
Putin was maybe pleased to be part of G8. I cannot exclude that. But this phenomenon is a set G8, and G8, I would remind you, did exist between 1998 when Russia was for the first time president Yeltsin at that time was invited to G7 summit in Birmingham in Britain, until 2014 when Russia was expelled from G8 because of… Crimea and the support of Ukrainian insurgency So that was a very unique historical period.
We have to understand it. That was a period when Russia on its side, and the West on its side considered that Russia in one or another form should become part of the political West. Political West, not economic, political West. From the beginning for Russia especially in 1990s when when the process started for Russia it was an enormous, it was a dream that the totally devastated country after collapse of the Soviet Union after collapse of the international status which Soviet Union had, so suddenly to become, to be back to this, the most exclusive, the most important table.
And of course it was considered as an enormous success to be invited. but on the western side it was not the same, but it was also an idea that of course Russia doesn’t meet any criteria to be part of this highly developed democracies club, but it’s better to have Russia here to be, so to say, to exert patronage and to be sure that Russia will not do something wrong. So probably it was an idea which could be discussed at that time. But afterwards, during 2000s and especially beginning of 2010s, it became clear that Russia cannot be part of the political West, simply cannot, for many reasons.
Asbed: And I think maybe we’ll have another show about that topic specifically.
Fyodor: Yeah, absolutely. It’s very interesting. It’s very interesting issue. anyway… at the point at the moment when Russia was expelled, it was absolutely clear that both sides felt totally wrong to have this body. And now when President Trump coins this idea again, he probably means that the goal of integrating Russia into political West should be reinstated.
Whether he’s sincere or not, I don’t know, maybe it’s just the first thing which came on his mind but it’s certainly not what Russia now can consider as an option, because we have experience it didn’t bring anything positive actually, except initial feeling of a prestige in an initial. Later on it turned differently And that’s one reason. Another reason, which is from my point of view, more important. It’s not the same body as it was when Russia was invited 25 years ago.
Because G7, this is a club of Western countries. Fair enough. Very good. But this club is just part of international community and the part which is still extremely powerful and very influential, but this influence is shrinking, not increasing, is shrinking.
And that means that if you don’t belong there because you’re different, and if you see that this club is not increasing its significance, why should you want to join? That’s number one. Number two about BRICS. You know, BRICS is a very strange creature.
What is BRICS? No one can formulate clearly. Is it an alliance? By far not.
Never. Is it a grouping of like-minded countries? No. Is it a community?
Maybe, but what is the criteria which unifies those those very very different members? Again it’s difficult to find it, because before extension of BRICS before this decision to enlarge which was taken 2023 in in Johannesburg That was more or less okay. I could formulate for myself why those five countries are members of BRICS. Since Ethiopia or who else?
Iran and Argentina was invited. Argentina, thanks God, refused.
Asbed: Egypt, I think.
Fyodor: Egypt, yeah. But since that, especially Ethiopia, with all due respect, but this is a country which has nothing comparable in terms of capacity, in terms of potential to China or India or even South Africa. So since that, I think we have just one criteria, but that’s the key issue. And that brings us to your third question about dollar.
This is a community, or rather a milieu, rather an environment, which has one aim, to create a space in international affairs, which is not against the West. Because inside BRICS today, BRICS and BRICS Partners, BRICS Plus, whatever you name it, there is only two countries which have severe conflicts with the West. That’s Russia and Iran. All others, they don’t want to have conflict with the West.
They want to engage with the West and cooperate and so on. So it cannot be anti-Western. Russia cannot turn BRICS into something anti-Western. But what would unify those countries?
There is a wish to create a space which is not against the West, but without the West, which is… which can create instruments and the infrastructure to work, to live, to work, to cooperate without the United States, without Western…
Asbed: As alternatives, you mean.
Fyodor: As alternative, which is not against, but is another option. And here we come to dollar. Here we come to dollar, because whatever Trump is saying, and by the way, that’s another discussion, because I think it’s a… deep contradiction in what he’s saying. On the one hand, he wants to profoundly reduce the deficit, the deficit of US, the state debt of the United States… which is partially because of United States being… emittant of the reserve currency.
It’s the global currency and then you have advantages because of that but you also have disadvantages, like this for example. But at the same time, he says he will punish all countries which would like to think about something else than dollar. So it’s a contradiction in his view. But why those countries, including Russia, think now seriously about how to replace dollar? because dollar has been heavily abused by the United States in political purposes.
A reserve currency is great, and no one doubts that dollar is an excellent reserve currency. It’s extremely comfortable for everybody to work through dollar, as long as it’s not used as a political or even military means. But now it is.
And the Biden administration and the previous Obama administration, they used it so frequently, especially the last period during the war in Ukraine, that now countries which are not so far, not yet targets of the US punishment, but they also understand that if they do something which Americans will believe incorrect they might become objects for this pressure and of course countries start to think about how to bypass dollar. It’s very difficult, I don’t believe that we can expect that BRICS will succeed soon. But if this work will continue at the end of the day, it will be a completely different international system. I mean, in the finance.
Hovik: Okay, well, Mr. Lukyanov, you’re on a show with two Armenians. So I think it’s time to come to our region and discuss the local troubles. You know, the Russo-Armenian relations have a very long and interconnected history.
But let’s just start from the point where… You know, it went seriously wrong, I think. The 2018 so-called “Velvet Revolution” and its aftermath since taking power Nikol Pashinyan has led Armenia into multiple crises, including the 2020 war over Artsakh, Nagorno-Karabakh, and, of course, the betrayal of Karabakh Armenians in 2022. So, you know, more recently he has dabbed in even Armenian genocide denial.
I say that as a survivor or a grandchild of survivors, and it just brings me, it’s reprehensible to me to even think about an Armenian doing that. Now, Pashinyan is risking Armenia’s security and economy in a dubious bid to join the EU. Russian officials, in fact, have warned that closer EU relations mean de facto withdrawal from the Eurasian Economic Union, or the EAEU. which jeopardizes the significant economic benefit that Armenia has. So, I mean, if you follow our podcast, for those listening, we always have trouble making sense of all this, even as Armenians.
But is Pashinyan, in your opinion, swimming against the current? And given that the EU itself is in crisis, does he really believe that the EU will help save Armenia, even if economically?
Asbed: “Save.”
Hovik: Forget about militarily. Yeah, “save,” in quotes.
Fyodor: You know, first of all, as a Russian expert, it’s not my business to discuss the president and the prime minister of another country. And in this regard, I… will try to be more analytical and more theoretical maybe. Because I really believe that this American way to teach lessons to other governments is not the best way to be. The Russian as well, we do it sometimes.
So I would start with your last point. I think the most striking controversy, the most striking paradox in the line Prime Minister Pashinyan is pursuing, is his belief that European Union and European integration might serve as an alternative to whatever, to something else. Two reasons why I think it’s strange. First, unfortunately we see, all of us see the Ukrainian experience, which is, from my point of view, absolutely tragic for both Russia and Ukraine.
Totally devastating and unnecessary, but you certainly remember how it started 12 years ago. It started with a discussion about the European Union, not NATO, not denazification, it was about European Union And at that time, the European Union just stated, and that was, I think it was at that time, Mr. Barroso, chairman, president of the European Commission, who said to Russians, it’s not your business what we are discussing between us, between EU and Ukraine. And that was the kickstart of everything else, the end game we see today.
Of course, I would not argue that any closeness with the EU for any country would end up in such a disaster as Ukraine, because in Ukrainian case, we have so many other aspects of this situation. But after what we saw in those 12, 10, 12 years, I think many countries… concluded that it’s not the best way to try. Even at that time, and I would remind all of us that European Union 12 or 15 years ago was, of course, much stronger than the European Union today. But even at that time, it was, as we see, probably not the best solution to try to replace a relationship with Russia with a relationship with the European Union.
But especially now, since the European Union is in such a difficult internal situation that I personally believe that the European integration, as we knew it for decades, will never come back. I don’t believe so far that the European Union will disintegrate, but it will be something completely different in five years from now.
Very much different organization. and prime minister Pashinyan operates as if nothing happened in recent several years, as if there is still a choice to be part of Russia-centric sphere or to be part of Brussels-centric or European union Euro-Atlantic, and so on, so from my point of view it’s not extremely wise to try again the same path which brought other nations like Ukraine to the brinkmanship, to the complete disaster, especially … in the current situation. In fact…
Hovik: Yeah, I would just say, I don’t think even in 2012, 2013 or 2014, there was a choice, because it was the EU who was strictly saying that EAEU and the European Union are mutually exclusive, I believe. Yeah, absolutely.
Asbed: And I actually would love to understand why that is the case. You and I were discussing, Hovik, before the show, if Turkey, which is a NATO ally, would like to also be a member of BRICS, and that’s not an incompatible thing, then why is it impossible for a country to be a member of the EU and also the Eurasian Economic Union?
Fyodor: No, I think actually that’s a very good question. And it was put before as well. And at that time, I guess it was actually doable in case the European Union would demonstrate the flexibility, but the European Union approach has always been very, very strict and very harsh, that there is one integration which is real. This is European integration.
All other integrations in this area, the huge area of Eurasia, that other integrations are fake. That’s it. And if you start with… If you try to launch something with this starting point, then probably you arrive to something bad.
But there is another thing, and that brings us to a broader… issue of Armenia and the relationship between Armenia and other countries… okay let’s assume, let’s imagine that the European integration is an option, but it is an option, it would be an option for countries in Europe in the European field in the European sphere. So now let us let us take Serbia. We know how complicated relationship between Serbia and the European Union and NATO is, but in case something will change on both sides then Serbia can easily become part of the European Union and smoothly go into this field, this space.
When we look at Armenia and the Southern Caucuses at launch, we immediately notice that European integration sphere is far away. Very far away, and the only Europe, or OK the only West which is close to Armenia, this is Turkey, and then I come listening to Prime Minister Pashinyan with his extremely interesting ideas about what he’s saying, the “real Armenia”, the imagined Armenia, the past which should be cut.
Hovik: Historic Armenia.
Fyodor: Historic Armenia, yeah. When I listen to this, then I think maybe in his view, he believes that Armenians should cut all this historical experience, the past, forget about it. And then why not become a partner state to Turkey? Turkey is a huge country, is a very significant economy, in trouble now, but potentially a very, very strong, strong gravitation center.
Fine. But then my question is, and I cannot answer because I’m not Armenian, I have not lived there. Is Armenian population ready to accept this kind of change of mind? If yes, and sometimes I believe that it might be the case, because we don’t see a significant resistance to what Prime Minister Pashinyan is doing.
If the Armenian people is ready to accept this future and this idea, That’s the sovereign choice of the nation.
Asbed: Well, I’m going to say that there is significant resistance, but we don’t particularly hear it because there are a lot of other things which I don’t think we can get into in this show, really. Media control, NGOs, blah, blah, blah.
Hovik: And of course, I should also mention there are polls that indicate that this is an issue that people believe in and are not ready to give up. But as Asbed said, I think there’s a huge apathy and… People have withdrawn completely from politics.
Asbed: I’d like to say perceived apathy because if you look at our circles and everything, there’s a lot of passion there, but it’s not coming up to the surface to make a regime change or anything. But Mr. Lukyanov, Armenians see, you’re talking about how we see things in current affairs even, but we see these things through the lens of a very long history, mostly of essentially a war of attrition on our demography, on our numbers, from the 1915 Genocide, to the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh.
And now our fears are centered around the southern province of Syunik, which the Azerbaijanis want to take by force. because they call it the “Zangezur Corridor”, which they want to connect to Turkey directly with that one. Of course, that is not just a piece of land for us. That is historical. It’s key to our national identity.
We have Christian monasteries from the ninth century before there were any of these people around. We have Russians and Armenians have mutual history here because the Armenian Meliks helped the Russian Tsar, Peter the Great in his early campaigns in the Caucasus, et cetera. This area is obviously for all of the empires in the region, very, very important for connectivity.
Let me just say, Iran for its part, has reacted with considerable alarm to the concept of the “Zangezur Corridor” that Turkey and Azerbaijan are pushing, and they refer to it as “NATO’s Turan Corridor.” However, while they have defined clear red lines around Syunik and the border between Iran and Armenia, the position of Russia seems a lot less clear. about this. And that is a major concern for us. And that is something that Pashinyan has used, as if it were proof that Russia is willing to negotiate Armenian territories away, that they do not care about this region. Or even help give it to the Turks.
So Armenians have become concerned about Russia’s passivity and we’d like to ask, essentially, Let’s ask directly: would Russia ever tolerate a scenario in which Azerbaijan would take direct control of Syunik through military force? Or is Syunik a red line for Moscow as well?
Fyodor: I’m not the best person to discuss those extremely complicated issues. I agree that this is a crossroad of so many interests of all empires, former, current and future empires in this area. All, they collide in this small piece of communication lines. Let me try to put it in this way.
What happens in recent years, starting from the first Karabakh war?
Asbed: In the early 90s?
Fyodor: No, no, I mean, early 90s, that’s clear that that was product of disintegration and then collapse of the Soviet Union. Yes. But I mean, the recent period, the war… September 2020, October 2020.
And continuation in 22, was it 22 or 23?
Asbed: 23. Right. That was part of a larger process,
Fyodor: which is not very pleasant for Russia, but which was probably historically inevitable. Change of configuration, which we inherited from the collapse of the Soviet Union. And in several years, a couple of decades, actually, after the collapse of the, official collapse of the Soviet Union, we lived in a space, in a configuration which was defined by the presence of the former unified state.
Hovik: Inertia of the former, I guess.
Fyodor: Exactly. And interestingly, no one dared actually to significantly challenge the administrative borders drawn inside the Soviet Union. even if you remember 2008, when after war with Georgia, Russia recognized Abkhazi and South Ossetia, that was interesting that Russia recognized them but did not change borders because the borders were as they were drawn in the Soviet Union, yeah for very arbitrary, but still… and of course it could not last forever and it started to erode maybe in 2010s.
Crimea first, this regime change in Kyiv and then Crimean crisis what was actually first act when the formal administrative borders of the Soviet Union were changed by force, not exactly by big military force, but by push, by force. And then during this period between 2014 till 2020-22, it was a period of quite rapid deconstruction of the whole world. Idea about this former configuration… and that was accompanied with the significant political changes inside the countries and Armenia was not an exemption.
This for me, for example… the so-called “velvet revolution” in Armenia 2018 that was a beginning of very significant political framing of the former Soviet space, because after that we saw similar events in Moldova, in Belarus, failed but very powerful, in Ukraine by the way when Zelensky came, that was a there is an earthquake like this change of the whole generation and so on and so on, and That led to the step-by-step erosion of Russian influence as well, because Russian influence was very much connected to this Soviet and early post-Soviet situation.
Of course, again, I’m not qualified to discuss issues whether Russia could do more or less during 2020 and so on. I think probably Russian diplomacy could make bigger effort before this war. But at the same time, we can remember that both Azerbaijan and Armenia leaders were not, how to say it elegantly, not very keen to make compromises during many attempts Russia made in the 2000s and even 2010s to find the political solution. But at the end of the day, the whole situation started to be, started to simplify, started to simplify to the much more basic settings like nationalism.
And in this game, and we see it now continuing, not in the Southern Caucasus, but worldwide. Look at Trump. And… Azerbaijan was much more successful in that, and much more efficient because Azerbaijan probably had this aim for many, many years and prepared, we must admit, prepared very good for this operation.
At that point, when it happened, I don’t believe that Russia had a chance to change anything. It was too late. Whether it was possible to change something before and to push parts to some some agreements or maybe to strengthen military potential of parts, to increase deterrence that’s another discussion probably yes, but… at the moment of war, 2020… The shape of Armenia, unfortunately, was so much weaker than the shape of Azerbaijan that it was more or less done because of that.
Asbed: There is that, but there are also, we know of the history of the Karabakh War and the multiple occasions when President Putin actually made possible to stop the war and Pashinyan did not take those opportunities. So the outcome is the outcome. We don’t need to litigate the war right now.
Hovik: But I think I must come back to the question that Asbed posed, which is, Does Russia have a stake in this game? So if we realize that it’s up to, let’s say, individual states and maybe Pashinyan is doing something, a deal with the Turks that many Armenians don’t agree with, but… Let’s say there is a new, more nationalist and more strong Armenian government that is against these changes. Does Russia, in essence, care which way things go?
Whether the Turks are connected together with this corridor that is, in a sense, extraterritorial? And if not, how strategic is it? Is it number two after Ukraine, or is it number 10 in the list of important issues for Russia?
Fyodor: it’s certainly not number two, I don’t know which number it is, but certainly not number two. It’s an important issue because however the Ukrainian collision will end it will not solve for everything. It will be hopefully a precondition for much better understanding between Russia and the West, not necessarily friendship or something like this but better understanding and more cautious approach to each other but of course the issue which is connected to this corridor, and the corridors in this area they are extremely important.
For years, decades maybe, centuries to come because this is a new configuration of international routes And in this regard, yes, of course, it’s very important for Russia. But to be frank with you, I think the Russian position in general, not vis-a-vis this particular Zangezur or Syunik issue, the Russian approach to all corridors in Eurasia is: the more corridors, the better. Because putting aside ambitions and prestige and so, Russia is an indispensable part of any corridor, even if this corridor is bypassing Russia.
But Russia, the landmass is so much important that you, in one or another way, you arrive to the necessity to work with Russia. And in this regard, I think that countries directly involved, like in this case, Armenia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkey, they have bigger stakes than Russia has. Of course, Russia would prefer not to see any military collision there, and Russia would prefer not to see any annexation of Armenian territory or anybody else’s territory. You see that relationship with Azerbaijan is, how to put it, mildly, not ideal.
At this point, just now, we have another severe misunderstanding, or misunderstandings on many issues. Some of them are unfortunately due to this very unpleasant and tragic situation with the flight, but not only. So Azerbaijan is using momentum to, so to say, to demonstrate that with this country you cannot play games.
Hovik: In fact, I should add to that, sorry for interrupting, but, you know, Azerbaijani media claims southern Azerbaijan, Armenia has become western Azerbaijan for them, and more recently we’re reading about northern Azerbaijan, and they’re referring to Derbent in Dagestan, for those who don’t know. So, yes, and I guess, you know, is this bellicosity from Azerbaijan a concern for Russia?
Fyodor: I think any wish by any neighbor to reimagine geography is a concern for Russia. No doubt about that. And again, coming back to the bigger issue, we see that this is unfortunately the international trend nowadays. If Mr.
Trump over and over again says that Canada should be… 51st state of the United States. And the more he repeats that, the more people got used to that.
Hovik: Yes, normalized.
Fyodor: Normalized, exactly. And I’m afraid that this is a trend that not necessarily formal change of borders, but change of… real sovereignty and real power, on the ground that might become a very normal thing, so that’s true and here we arrive to the situation which is connected to two circumstances, one circumstance is of course… Ukraine because i would not tell any secret to you that as long as Ukrainian campaign continues a Russian capacity to do anything else is limited We saw it in Syria, we see it somewhere else, we see it in Southern Caucasus.
That’s fact of life, that Russia is totally focused on this issue, which is seen as absolute priority. And also the outcome of this conflict is seen as a very important thing for Russia, because based on this outcome, other countries will evaluate Russia. Higher or lower, that’s one thing, another thing is that…
Russia of course is interested to have balanced relationships everywhere including southern caucasus and this is, it will be quite a fine equilibrium under any circumstances whatever will happen and that means that of course this more and more complicated situation around some Armenian territories coincides with what we discussed some minutes ago that the Armenian leadership is using Russian factor in probably domestic for domestic purposes or purposes of relationship with the West, and of course in this situation when Armenia, Armenian government, the prime minister, repeatedly blame Russia for everything basically, then, of course, this balance will be pretty shaky.
Having said that, I think you know it better than me, but I’m not following developments in that region on a daily basis, but I have a feeling that the current posturing of Armenian government today is slightly different than, say, half a year ago. and we see more of realism in at least, in what Armenian authorities are doing maybe there is an inertia of saying things, and another inertia, and this is of course very… from my point of view it’s ironic to just now, in this very severe situation and especially with the background of Trump arrival, to sign, or to launch this formal procedure to join the European Union in the Armenian Parliament.
It looks like an attempt to continue a project which has gone per se.
Asbed: Yeah, me being in the United States and being in this political environment, to me, what Pashinyan is doing with the anti-Russian posturing and everything is more of the cultural war that he is using to sell certain politics that he wants to advance. That’s how I look at it. And so we were all surprised when he called President Putin, actually, just… what was it, two, three weeks ago and discussed some things. And you’re right, there is a difference in six months ago and today.
As we wind down, Mr. Lukyanov, I wanted to ask, let’s say, one final question. Of the three South Caucasus countries, Georgia now seems to have the most pragmatic approach to Russia and the West. And Georgia is very important to us.
It connects us to Russia. It connects us to Europe, basically. How is Tbilisi’s shift viewed in Moscow? Where do the prospects of rapprochement between Moscow and Tbilisi stand?
Because we certainly have an interest in the Abkhaz Railway, let’s say.
Fyodor: Yeah, the Georgian case is extremely interesting. Really, now we see that it’s more or less stable development and probably will not change soon. But at the beginning, I could not believe that the Georgian government… was able to be that resistant, to be that resilient to any pressure from the West Georgia is a tiny country with a lot of problems, and of course I would easily understand if they would give up. But they didn’t.
And I think it’s another very interesting and telling illustration of what is happening worldwide. Because I think Mr. Ivanishvili understood, or maybe he just felt, having an intuition, that the West is… not as before anymore, that the West is in trouble, and the West will not be able to do… enjoy doing Georgia the same as it used to do in Ukraine or in Moldova and other countries, so to say who tried to oppose some kind of narrative, so.
And I think that Georgian government which is trying actually which is trying to just avoid unnecessary collisions not to confront anybody but to avoid collisions which could destroy Georgia, like Ukraine, like Moldova which is in the mess, so they really understood one very important thing, and I think for Armenia it might be an interesting lesson to at least to consider.
Asbed: Yeah, as a matter of fact, I was going to finish with that, If you thought Georgia offers a good pattern for Armenian leadership to follow, or if you see that the current trend, as you said, different from six months ago, is exactly in that pattern of following, let’s say, Kobakhidze’s and Ivanishvili’s direction.
Fyodor: You know, the trend is, to put it very briefly, the trend is that neighbors matter, Mostly neighbors, if you… shape your policy that you have, not necessarily excellent but workable relationship with your neighbors, then it’s fine then… you can feel safe. Georgia was pressured by United States under Biden, by European Union but those powers are far away. Turkey, Iran, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, all of them accepted what happened in Georgia and said, fine, we are not in favor, we are not against, we just accept that it’s your affair. And that was enough to actually, to guarantee more or less stable development.
I think that is a lesson for many. And why I think it might be important for Armenia to consider at this just today, because Mr. Pashinyan has different idea, it looks like at least he has an idea that if you have important friends far away, then they will come and help you or even protect you, and you can have bad or not workable relationship with neighbors. I’m afraid in today’s world it’s totally wrong.
Hovik: Okay, well, that’s a good point to end our discussion. Thank you for your generosity and time, Mr. Lukyanov, and we hope that this will not be your last time on Groong.
Fyodor: Thank you.
Asbed: Thank you very much.
Fyodor: Bye-bye.
Asbed: Bye-bye. That’s our show today. It was recorded on February 14, 2025. We’ve been talking with Mr.
Fyodor Lukyanov, who is the chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, a Russian think tank providing expertise on foreign policy field. He is also the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, which is a platform for publication in English and Russian, of research and political science and international relations. Mr. Lukyanov is also the Director of Research at the Valdai Discussion Club, and he is the person who interviews Mr.
Putin every year. For more information on the participants in this show, you can check our episode show notes, which is going to be at podcasts.groong.org / episode-number. I’m Asbed Bedrossian.
Hovik: And I’m Hovik Manucharyan. Please find us on social media. Follow us everywhere you get your Armenian news. The links are in the show notes.
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