Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed: Hello everyone, and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. Well, countries better know how to swim, because geopolitics doesn’t wait for anyone. Trump 2.0 and his neocon posse are in the White House. Europe is ramping up defense spending.
And the UK and Ukraine signed a 100-year strategic agreement. Well, Russia and Iran have also signed a comprehensive strategic agreement, and wars are still raging or itching to rage and the self-appointed peacemaker and unifier starts making calls from the White House.
Hovik: What does this all mean? Well, we’re in for an exciting conversation today. Professors Glenn Diesen of the University of Southeast Norway and Professor Armand Grigorian of Lehigh University are here to discuss the incoming multipolar world order and where we stand today. But first, we wanted to thank you for listening to us and continuing to support us.
We’ve had a number of generous donations, and we really, from the bottom of our hearts, thank you. And if you want to support us, if you haven’t yet, you can do that through Patreon or buy me a coffee. podcasts.groong.org / donate is where you can learn more about that. And please consider becoming a sustaining member or maybe just want to do a one-time contribution. Thank you very much.
Asbed: Yeah, but not everybody can do that. And we understand that. But even if you can’t do it, you can help us. You can comment, you can like, and share our shows.
You can follow us on YouTube and Substack and everywhere you can find us because that helps us a lot. Your participation gives activity to our channels and makes it more visible and more recommendable by the platforms. Okay, well, thank you. And let’s get on with our show.
Professors, welcome to the show.
Arman: Thank you for having us.
Glenn: Thank you.
Hovik: Welcome, Professor Diesen, Professor Grigoryan, If you don’t mind, let’s take stock of some of the major conflicts in the world going on today. And I would like to begin by the truly shocking statements coming out of Washington. Of course, it is an ungrateful task to ask you to interpret and predict what will happen in Gaza, let alone Trump’s statements about it. But we must discuss this, given the importance of it and given the current events.
In short, Trump is proposing the complete depopulation of Gaza from its native indigenous Palestinians and has expressed his intention, or the U.S. intention, essentially to commit the U.S. to, and I’m going to use his own words, to take over and own it, it being Gaza, which according to him at least means leveling the entire Gaza Strip or whatever is left of it, cleaning it of unexploded ordinance, and then essentially developing it from scratch. I believe he used the words the Riviera of the Middle East somewhere in there, but no specifics on who will populate this Riviera, and he just said people of the area or people of the world.
And he also said that, I think, you know, why would Palestinians want to come back even? So this plan, according to UN officials, is strictly prohibited and amounts to Ethnic Cleansing. But also, Trump’s statements imply that Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the Middle East will support it. In fact, Trump said that they will not say no, and I’m quoting him.
Let’s begin, maybe whoever wants to go first, but I would like to get your take on these recent developments and what is the strategic plan for the Trump administration in significantly, it seems like, committing the US to the Middle East in this way?
Arman: I can take a first crack if you don’t mind. So on the issue of whether these countries that Hovik mentioned will go along with it, I actually am under the impression that not only these countries will not go along with it, there is no evidence that any of these countries have given consent to it. There is no evidence that if these countries’ leaderships give consent to it, their societies will swallow such a decision. especially if you think about what might happen in Egypt and Jordan.
Saudi Arabia probably is a more complicated case, but it’s not difficult to imagine what will happen in Jordan and Egypt if their leaderships give consent to such a plan. But not only we don’t have evidence of these countries having given consent to Trump’s idea, now we see evidence that domestically there is no consent to it. There is bipartisan opposition to it, according to an article in The Guardian. It’s rare for anything having to do with Israel to have such bipartisan opposition, but this has gone far enough for even Lindsey Graham to say something critical about it.
And moreover, it seems like he didn’t even discuss the idea with his aides, with his closest aides. This is also from an article about The Guardian. One other thing I should mention is that some members of his administration, the White House spokesperson, and the Secretary of State in particular, have been essentially walking back on this statement, even though Trump seems to have doubled down again, making some statement today.
So I don’t think this has been discussed and agreed upon with anybody other than the Israeli leadership, other than Netanyahu, who seemed to be very happy about such a solution because this would commit the United States to an actual tangible presence there. And of course, everybody understands who will repopulate Gaza if the ethnic cleansing succeeds in this kind of an American-Israeli project. Or at least who won’t. Yeah, or at least who won’t.
You’re right. So I don’t think there is any evidence of others going along with this or being okay with this.
Glenn: no I very much agree, I think this is false, this idea that the neighboring countries gave their consent and many people agreed I don’t think they probably knew about it even and that he would say such a thing surely this would have been leaked and as you also correct the point out I think even if the leaders in the region would cynically accept such a proposition it would not be accepted by the population but I would have to add I’m not even sure if Trump would be serious because it tends to be, sometimes he drives a very hard position and you can extend the same logic, you know, does he really plan to conquer Greenland does he really plan to conquer the Panama Canal or by threatening to do so these leaders of this country are pretty much bowing, willing to give him anything he wants as long as he doesn’t do it.
I mean is he planning to get concessions from the Palestinians or threatening to just cleanse every single Palestinian from the region? I don’t really know, I think we should take Trump very serious but I’m not sure if he’s improvising or if this is part of… some great scheme… because he but um… But because I think some of the big bluster as well that comes from him is part of a retrenchment because he wants to be a strong leader, something that brings back strength to the US. But at the same time, you see there’s a bit of a retrenchment going on.
He said he wants to end forever wars. He wants to end the position in Europe. So I guess it could be a possibility that he talks a very big game and throws his weight around while… Yeah, not to seem weak, but again, with Trump, everything kind of becomes speculations because he puts on such a show.
But of course, I could be wrong. He could be serious that the U.S…. but I don’t see how it’s actually possible. How can you… But even if this is possible, expelling every single Palestinian, making it American territory, then this would effectively amount to a merger between the U.S. and Israel.
Because the whole idea is they kick out the Palestinians, America gets the land. Well, now the security interest of Israel and the U.S. will be bound forever. So if it is real, it would definitely make sure that America doesn’t drift away from Israel. So I think it’s worth taking serious.
But again, I’m not sure if Trump actually intends to go all the way or if it’s just a maximalist bargaining position.
Hovik: So my question was, discounting the minor fact about crimes against humanities, is there any cynical worldview where the U.S. move would actually be beneficial, like this move would be beneficial for the U.S., like if the U.S. establishes a base, for instance, in Gaza?
Glenn: Well, it could be. I think Joe Biden said once in the 80s that we should support Israel no matter what. We’re not doing them a favorites for our own benefit. And he made this more or less a quote to us.
If there wasn’t, Israel would have to invent one, because this is a way of projecting power into the region. And it could be. I think Trump is a bit worried about relying too much on external partners, that this allows America to get squeezed, which is why they’re going to have bases in Greenland, but he wants to own it. He wants to have a greater control over Panama Canal, and he might want to have actual US territory in the Middle East.
Again, the fact that he would even propose this uh to cleanse an entire population and take their land is… it’s gonna alienate so many of American allies especially in the region but even beyond, and infuriate all his adversaries so I’m not i don’t see that there can be a great strategy behind this to be honest Or he just might be trying to take his lessons from the business world to come in with guns blazing and do this maximalist position and hope to extract benefits. But of course, this doesn’t translate well into politics where he’s going to anger a lot of people.
Arman: If I may add a comment to that, I think, you know, first of all, I’m not sure I agree with the view that Biden, when he made that statement about if Israel didn’t exist, would have to invent one. is truly reflective of American strategic interests. That’s a very particularistic view of American interests, and I believe quite a few people in the American national security establishment or in American academia with a realist bend probably would not agree with that. Secondly, even if the United States had some interest in projecting power, in the Middle East, in having strong alliances and being welcomed in the region.
Purely from a cynical strategic perspective, I think the best way to achieve that would be to dump Israel and to build relationships in the Middle East. I mean, what is the source of hostility toward the United States in the Middle East? Probably it’s not only its relationship with Israel, but I think most reasonable people would agree that the United States, the kind of unconditional support of the United States for Israel is one of the most important reasons why the United States has enemies in the Middle East in the first place.
Glenn: No, this coincides very well with what John Mearsheimer argues as well, that Israel has become a real drain on the United States. It’s not in its strategic interest anymore, which is why they need a lobby to counteract what is effectively… U.S. interest. But it is interesting that a huge shift this year is occurring in the U.S.
And again, it’s not that Tucker Carlson represents everyone, but the likes of him, who is now suddenly saying, why are we, you know, we should put America first, why are we putting Israel first? And so there is some change in mood, I think. So things could happen, but… I don’t know.
Trump confuses me, because he also posted recently a video by Jeffrey Sachs where he blamed Netanyahu for all of America’s war of the past 20 years, and now he’s going to cleanse Palestine, or at least Gaza, for the Israelis. I mean, he’s a bit all over the place. I’m not sure if he’s just speaking to both audiences.
It might just be he was also trying to save Netanyahu a bit, because Israel has not done well in this war. and Netanyahu’s position has been weakened so you know maybe he can come home now as a victory as he got America to suggest they would cleanse Gaza so it it could be so something was gained from this war but it might not I can’t see this actually going anywhere I can’t see even if this was part of an actual evil plan to implement how how would you even do this it’s… I have a hard time believing he’s serious, but again, I hope I’m not wrong.
Asbed: Right next door to Israel, there’s Syria, where the former wanted terrorist and now the de-facto ruler is Ahmad al-Sharaa. He was known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani a couple of months ago. And he made the first official visit to Turkey just a couple of weeks ago. And as was widely expected, Turkey and Syria have now signed a military alliance that allows Turkey to establish military bases in Syria.
It’s been nearly two months since the war sort of subsided in Syria, and the Turkish-backed HTS forces, they’re in power right now. At least publicly, most Western governments are no longer looking for al-Sharaa as in – there’s no price on his head anymore. Professor Diesen, has Turkey been able to consolidate its dramatic coup in Syria? And do you think it’s bitten off too much?
Or what’s the current situation for them over there?
Glenn: I’m probably not the best person to ask, I think I have a hard time getting a clear overview over what’s happening in Syria or maybe this is a problem for most, but I don’t even think the HTS seizing power has fully consolidated either, but… they might have overplayed their hand I just there’s too many actors now I think who could turn on each other because I think a lot of this unholy alliance between the turks between the different jihadist groups, the United States, Israel, a lot of this was premised on an anti-Assad alliance now that Assad is gone it’s… yeah it just looks like they can quickly turn on each other that is the U.S. and Turks are supporting opposing groups I think the Turks will probably go after the Kurds which the Americans aren’t happy about…
I think HTS and Julani, so far they’re doing what they can to keep the peace and friendship with Israel. But I think they’re going to get too close to each other as well. And overall, I think it’s going to be difficult for Turkey to handle this. But obviously, they’re not happy about, I don’t think they’re happy about Israel’s intrusion.
And obviously, Turkey wants to consolidate its power. But, yeah, I think it’s within Turkey, they’re not there yet. No, sorry, within Syria, they’re not there yet. And the main challenge, I guess, will be with many of the neighbors as well as ethnic groups.
Asbed: Professor Grigoryan, what are the risks for Turkey in Syria? And also, how might this affect other projects that they may have, for example, in the South Caucasus?
Arman: I’m not sure about it affecting their projects in the South Caucasus, but I agree with Professor Diesen on Turkey possibly having beaten more than it can chew. And actually, it would be true for any country, not just Turkey. Syria is a very, very complicated place. As somebody who has studied divided societies, it’s a divided society par excellence.
And whether we like it or not, The sort of government that Syria had under Assad is probably the only type of government that can keep order in a society like that. And with its collapse, we are going to have a lengthy period of very violent contestation and very tense contestation. which occasionally will turn into violent conflicts. You have multiple identities there, the Turkomans, the Sunnis, the Alawites, the Druze, the Christians. And they have, you know, there is very little that they share by way of political sympathies and preferences.
There is very little they share by way of their external allies. Again, as Professor Diesen pointed out, just on the issue of the Kurds. You know, Americans are trying to assume the role of the protector of the Kurds in Syria, but I don’t think they’re doing a good enough job. But whatever it is, it’s constantly a source of tension between the United States and Turkey.
Earlier, Israel’s flirting with Iraqi Kurds had been a very serious source of tension between Israel and Turkey. And now it’s not clear how their interests coincide or clash in Syria. And I’ve even seen some reports and blog posts and interviews in Israel about the possibility of a direct military confrontation between Israel and Turkey in Syria. And last but not least, we get scattered reports about this new government’s mistreatment of the Alawites and the Christians, and I fear it’s going to get worse.
And what kind of consequences it will have for regional stability also remains to be seen, given how Iran is involved with these populations. And also, I think if they push too far, against certain groups in Syria, that may be a problem for Russian interests there as well. So it’s a giant mess in Syria and we’re at the beginning of it, not at the end.
Hovik: Moving from the Middle East to Ukraine, Trump has made a campaign promise to end the war in Ukraine quickly. However, just like Gaza, we’re getting mixed signals. Trump essentially threatened Russia with additional sanctions, taxes, and tariffs if Russia doesn’t negotiate with Ukraine to end the war. Trump has demanded that Ukraine provide its rare earth resources as security collateral. and the UK came in, swooped in, and signed a 100-year strategic deal with Ukraine, which also includes military cooperation.
So it isn’t quite clear, at least to us, you know, Asbed and I, I’ll speak for both of us, how the Ukraine conflict will be resolved quickly and at that. So what does the road to ending the ugly war in Ukraine look like? Each of you, maybe, if you have your own thoughts on this. Since Professor Diesen is a more renowned expert on Ukraine than I am, I’m going to defer to him for the first take, and then I’ll add whatever he misses.
Glenn: Well, in terms of the UK 100-year deal, I think that’s a lot of nonsense. And I think in the UK, it’s recognized as such as, well, they don’t have the money for it. Also, it doesn’t make much sense with Trump as well. He first spoke about a deal in 24 hours, then the scale back to 100, and then the first six months.
So, but it is a bit concerning that they haven’t started diplomatic relationship yet with the Russians. I’m not sure if this… is a negotiation stance that nobody wants to make the first contact. At least the Russians have made the point that the Americans cut relations. It’s up to them to take the first step.
I’m not sure Trump being a bargaining man, if this is an actual consideration. But he does send some mixed signals. On one hand, he recognized that the war started because of NATO expansion.
He blamed Biden for this, but then suggested that there’s a room for compromise he keeps being very critical of Zelensky and Ukraine so it looks like he was ready to let this one go, he suggests he will pass it on to the Europeans, but of course then he starts with this you know big bluster again, he’s threatening sanctions even though there’s not that much the Americans can sanction anymore also he’s worried that more sanctions would actually push Russia further to China and also his comments this you know the Russian economy is struggling…
I mean the war is not good but it’s not struggling and also the comments that the Russia had suffered a million soldiers dead, I mean If you then add injuries on top, which would be like two, three times, it would end up with three to four million casualties. This makes just, I never heard any analysts even be close to a million.
This is usually put around 90 to 100 at most, but no, so it’s all a very, crazy talk but uh so I’m not sure if it’s uh it’s the same thing if he’s planning on retrenching a bit, pulling back, in order not to look weak on Russia he has to, you know, may make very aggressive rhetoric or if it’s just improvising, of course, and just shooting from the hips.
It’s very hard to read the man but overall For the Russians the only piece they would accept is what they refer well what can be referred to as Istanbul plus, so again in February or beginning of 2022 the main deal they had was Ukraine would restore its neutrality and Russia would pull its troops out. After three years of war the deal is still Ukraine has to be neutral, but plus accept territorial concessions from other territories Ukraine lost in the war So also, of course, they want some regime change. They want Zelensky and Bandera people gone. But yeah, I tend to believe that the Russians would accept some territorial swaps.
So they don’t have to necessarily take all the territory. Because they claimed a lot of territory they don’t even hold. So there’s a lot of possibilities. But what’s interesting with Trump’s claim or wanting to get the rare earth minerals in return for help is a lot of this, the majority is actually in Donbas.
And as the Ukrainian army recognized only a week or two ago that Russia actually controls almost half or more than half of Ukraine’s natural resource now. So they already regained everything they lost in the war. The Russian that is. So if Trump wants those minerals, a lot of them are now under Russian control so he would have to push them back and you know he can bluster all he wants, but it’s not that many more weapons America can send anyways, if there had been huge storages sitting away and Biden would have emptied them already so…
Arman: OK so… it’s very difficult to make predictions about Trump’s policy for a couple of reasons One reason is that Trump, as we have already kind of been talking about that also in the context of what he’s doing in the Middle East, is not a person with very deep and consistent convictions. I think if political schizophrenia is a legitimate concept in political science, it should be applied to Trump, and Trump’s worldview, where he says something and it’s exact opposite in the span of five minutes with equal conviction. So it really is difficult to make sense of what the man wants.
Sometimes the example of him advocating advocating ethnic cleansing of Palestinians a couple of days after he had approvingly reposted Jeffrey Sachs’ video where Sachs is calling Netanyahu a son of a bitch and arguing that all of America’s wars were essentially manipulated and instigated by Netanyahu. I mean, what is one to make of a man’s philosophy if he’s capable of doing that? And the same goes with Ukraine, as correctly was pointed out.
You know, he was talking about peace, he was blaming the war on Ukraine, on NATO expansion, on the US policy, on Biden, and he was talking about how he would just get along with Russia, Russia is not the enemy, etc., etc. And shortly after assuming the presidency, he started talking about stiffening the sanctions and sending arms and, you know, making aggressive statements. So it’s really difficult to see where he stands. Partly, again, maybe a matter of his character.
Partly it may be his lack of knowledge about international relations. just responding to the direction of the wind as he sees it. But there is something else which makes predictions about Trump’s behavior difficult. And that is the fact that as powerful as the American presidency is, you know, the president’s policies can be easily sabotaged. If not easily, then they can be sabotaged.
They can be There can be all sorts of obstacles put in front of him. And especially in recent years, we’ve learned a lot about the power of the deep state, about this permanent government, which is impervious to political changes and which has stable interests.
Ho Arman vik: And it’s not just that the deep state.
Arman: and that part of the American government. It’s also the coalition of certain interests, which is not particularly interested in a peaceful, tranquil world and which is not interested in settling things with Russia. And again, they’re not even hiding it. I mean, I remember at the beginning of the war in Ukraine, an open meeting of major weapons manufacturers where they were talking about how their share prices are going up and they couldn’t even conceal their happiness.
And we all know how powerful these people are in Washington, in the Congress, and how connected they are to the deep state and to media. By the way, I have a book recommendation for your viewers. Glenn Diesen’s book on the Think Tank racket, deals with that question.
Hovik: Which we are going to record a separate interview with Professor Decent right after this one about the book. So it’s good to plug it. So just if you see two Glenn Diesen interviews on our channel, it’s not a mistake. It’s not the same one.
So make sure to watch it.
Arman: Okay, so and the other problem is that even if we put all of this, this is the third problem, which I see. Even if we put this aside, again, if you look at the security studies literature, how sometimes your war aims change with the change on the battlefield. But unfortunately, sometimes the war aims change more slowly, especially on the losing side than the situation on the battlefield.
Now imagine what would happen politically to Trump, if Trump accepted the Russian conditions, which would be accepting the demand for Ukrainian neutrality and all these territorial concessions. essentially recognizing the annexation of the four oblasts and Crimea. I mean, this would be a serious crisis for Trump domestically, and it would be a serious crisis in America’s relations with the European countries. A lot of European governments would become destabilized if this were to happen. So that is also an obstacle.
I don’t think they have prepared their societies for such an outcome. And I don’t know what they’re thinking, by the way, because what looks like happening in Ukraine is that the Russian advances are accelerating. And it seems like neither Ukraine nor its allies have any good options left militarily. So they are just buying time by sacrificing more and more of the Ukrainian youth without really a strategy.
It’s just really difficult for them to bite the bullet and start preparing their societies for an unpleasant peace in Ukraine.
Hovik: Professor Diesen, earlier when I asked you the question about UK’s 100-year partnership, you said it’s not very serious. But I’m really interested in the role of the EU post-Ukraine war and UK as well, and whether the interests of the UK, the islands and mainland Europe, if there’s any convergence between the two and just how do you see, how do you see Europe after what happens? I mean, which we all seem to agree is going towards the Russian victory.
Glenn: Well, I think the Europeans will become a major loser in this war after Ukraine, of course. But I think for the United States, it’s quite convenient. They can always pull back. It’s not their continent.
Indeed, they are pulling back. That’s what Trump’s suggesting, that Europe will have to do the heavy lifting. So it’s not America’s problem. But on the wider front, I think they made some big miscalculation.
Of course, when they jumped into this, I think they thought they were going to have an easy victory. That is, they could defeat Russia on battlefield. It was backwards. Its economy could be crushed.
It could be isolated, the international system. But the defeat of Ukraine has huge implications for Europe, because it signals also that the United States, especially if there is a peace agreement, would have to make some peace with Russia. And yeah, this means that it would be easier for the Americans to pull out as well, as opposed to if it was… as a frozen conflict.
So I think this is the main concern for the Europeans that the Americans are leaving Europe, they would like to focus on other areas than primarily Asia and I don’t think there’s much again I make also point I don’t think there’s any political imagination in Europe to consider anything else and I think this has also been a big shock for the Europeans because after the Cold War What made them so optimistic was they thought it was going to be the end of history thesis.
I know it’s too often cited, but they thought really that under the collective or political West, there was going to be a collective hegemony based on these liberal democratic values. We would transcend the power politics of the past. So not only would the collective West be a hegemon, but it would be a benign and, you know, playing this key role in world history. And now suddenly we have this multipolar system emerging.
The Americans are shifting their priorities. The Americans will demand much more from the Europeans. They will be able to offer much less.
And I think it’s also problematic for the Europeans that after all these centuries of being an object, sorry, a subject in international history, affairs that are now becoming an object, to notice that they’re being moved around by the United States and… yeah again I think it was always already obvious with Biden but it’s more so under Trump so… no I always make the point for the Europeans what the what the most of the world is doing in the multipolar world is to diversify their economic connectivity so avoid excessive dependence on any one state or region. This is what most of the world is doing.
The Europeans, I think, to hold on to the unipolar moment, they’re just doubling down, willing to sever ties with not just Russia, but now increasingly China, making them too dependent on the United States, which gives the US an ability to convert all the security dependence into, well, economic loyalty, political loyalty. So now Yeah, you see the Europeans willing to buy. Biden blows up North Stream. Germans give Biden a medal.
Trump says he wants to take Greenland. And the EU is pretty much saying, let’s not anger him. So we can have a common security. I mean, it’s a lot of spinelessness here and purging or cannibalizing the European industries.
Asbed: Or maybe they’re hoping that he’ll be gone in four years.
Glenn: Yeah, but I think it’s a wider trend. Trump is Trump. He’s very unique. But overall, the world is shifting.
And it’s under a unipolar system, having this collective hegemony where Europe would be the junior partner is one thing. But I think in a multipolar system, The Europeans have less of a role to play and they can’t even be a pole of power anymore. So anyways, my point is, with the collapse, with the loss of Ukraine, I think this will only accelerate that trend, which is EU and Europe that is drifting into irrelevance.
And I’m sure if we had an honest discussion about it within the EU, they would recognize that perhaps from the 90s, this idea that we would redivide the continent, remilitarize the dividing lines, that this was a recipe for Europe’s becoming vassals, not greatness.
Asbed: So I was actually going to ask you a question, but I think you’ve partially answered it. I was going to ask, why is the end of the war in Ukraine special in the post-Soviet world more than, for example, the war on terror, Afghanistan, et cetera, these things, which didn’t necessarily usher us into a new multipolar world. But this one, it seems like a lot of countries right now are just kind of standing back and waiting. There’s going to be a change in the way the world works.
Is it because Ukraine is in Europe or is there another reason why it’s so special?
Glenn: Well, I think it’s worth taking a step back looking what NATO expansion actually represented because after the Cold War, we often forget that the main agreements were signed with the Russians and everyone else were based like the Charter powers for a new Europe. All of this was based on the idea of indivisible security. So traditional insecurity, the way you do is you recognize that there’s a security competition. That is, you have many centers of power.
So when one state increases security at the expense of another, they will respond and then everyone loses security. So usually security is pursued by mitigating the security competition. Now, when Russia was weak in the 90s, NATO decided, we don’t need to create a Europe with the Russians. We’ll just have a Europe based on hegemony.
That is, NATO dominates. And as those who perform NATO expansion, those who are against NATO expansion in the US political leadership, they all kind of agree the same logic. The sentiment is it doesn’t matter if Russia doesn’t like it. What can they do?
We will be all powerful. So we don’t have to take into consideration Russia’s security concerns. But now, of course, with Ukraine, which was a result of this hegemonic peace we’re pursuing in Europe, Russia said this is the final red line, they respond. And by actually winning the war, I think it marks the end of this, because NATO expansion was the manifestation of this hegemonic peace.
That’s why I thought it was remarkable about a week ago, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio goes out and says, well, unipolarity, it was never, it’s not natural. It was always going to end. We’re back in multipolarity. I mean, this is so huge.
This is, again, I’m not sure if Trump agrees. So, again, it’s very confusing administration, I think, by design. Yeah. Yeah, so I think this is why Ukraine is so important.
The war was a symptom of a breakdown of the European security architecture and it further intensified this push towards multipolarity. The war on terror was just the hegemon fighting small to medium sized countries. This is something bigger, I think.
Asbed: Professor Grigoryan, your thoughts?
Arman: There are a couple of factors that we should take into account when we think about why Ukraine is so special. So first of all, the problems with the unipolar order did not emerge with Ukraine. As you point out, the earlier failures of the United States in Iraq, in the failure to pacify Afghanistan, they were really indicative of something not being right in the US national security policy, the decision making being very flawed and not being able to calculate the outcomes properly, not having an exit strategy. The fact that in 2003, they also had to deal with German and French opposition to their policy was a very interesting event.
But I think actually the watershed event, which I think the turning point in this,
Hovik: or the start of the period of the end of the end of the Cold War, if that makes any sense,
Arman: was 2008 in Georgia. the Russo-Georgian War. What had happened up to that point? Up to that point, the United States had done a lot of things, which the Russians found unpalatable, which Russians found unacceptable, which they thought infringed on their interests, beginning from the decision to expand NATO and the attack on Yugoslavia, the attack on Iraq, etc., the withdrawal from the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, You name it. Every single time that the United States did something that had consequences, negative consequences for Russian interests, Russians growled but didn’t do anything.
And the Russians didn’t, you know, Russians failing to do anything kind of undermined their credibility and the United States could continue with this policy of ignoring Russia. Simply because they assume that the Russians are more interested in maintaining cordial relationships or good relationships with the United States, and they can’t afford to confront the United States. Moreover, it’s kind of a corollary of this argument that the U.S. hegemony was very cheap. for the US. I mean, they really didn’t have to pay enormous costs for their hegemony.
It came very cheap. And at some point in the 2000s, it started becoming more and more expensive. And the reason I think 2008 was a watershed moment was for two reasons. First, the Russians, for the first time, beat back.
You know, up to that point, they were barking and not biting. And this was the first time that they really hit back and they carried out a threat. Right. And all of a sudden, responding to the Russians or coercing the Russians became expensive and dangerous and risky.
And what happened was, if up to that point, it was the Russians that looked like a paper tiger, in 2008, it was the United States that looked like a paper tiger. And there were several other episodes with the annexation of Crimea, with the Russian intervention in Syria. So you had the Russians already flexing their muscles and defending their interests and not playing ball with the United States, and the United States. failing to coerce Russia as they have been throughout the 90s and early 2000s.
Ukraine in 2022, the Russian demand for an explicit guarantee for Ukrainian neutrality was something that was going to be not just a particular agreement, but it was going to be inconsistent with the logic of American hegemony as such. It was going to put a certain kind of limit to American dominance, which by its very design, the American national security state could not accept, given what they had settled on since the wolf of its doctrine in 1991. So they refused and the Russians invaded. And then I think the United States essentially decided that this is the place for a showdown.
I mean, this process has to be arrested and Russians need to be taught a lesson. And they have done something which is quite consequential. I mean, Georgia was also consequential, but not to the degree… that Ukraine was given its implications for European security, etc., etc. And they convinced themselves, again, this is also quite interesting, maybe a subject for a different podcast, but the quality of American decision-making really has declined.
I mean, the calculations they made about the Russians’ ability to fight this war and what consequences it will have for the Russian economy, how the sanctions will affect the Russian economy. All of these calculations proved to be extremely faulty. And now I think it is inevitable, you look at it, and also the war itself has solidified this picture of China and Russia cooperating Not only China and Russia cooperating, a lot of mid-range countries being emboldened by Russia and China standing up to the United States and Europe and kind of drifting toward them in the form of BRICS.
Hovik: I know you want to discuss that separately.
Arman: But all of these things together make Ukraine a particularly important case. And this is why I think Ukraine is kind of the watershed moment for the end of the unipolar world.
Hovik: Well, let’s move on because you mentioned BRICS. And there are a lot of speculations on how these alliances, whether loosely formed, loosely bound, or tightly bound, and whether it’s military or just economic, how they will you know, be put into place in the coming years. But we want to take into account two major alliances. One is NATO.
What will be the fate of NATO? I would really love to know that. And the other is BRICS, which is on an upward path. So the question essentially is, since the war in Ukraine, you know, China and Russia have formed closer alliance.
And specifically regarding China and Russia, is this a marriage of convenience or is there a real affinity between them in the new multipolarity? Do you see them sticking together in the new multipolarity or do you see them as their own so-called poles? Professor Diesen, maybe we can start with you.
Glenn: Yeah, well I think… the Chinese question as well as BRICS is important, also related to the former question about Ukraine. What makes it different I very much agree with professor Grigoryan that… this was a key difference keep in mind if from the perspective of NATO being this hegemonic vehicle to create a hegemonic system, it is again not to cite Biden too much, but there’s a great clip of him at Atlantic council in 97 where he says, yeah, the Russians are very upset about us expanding NATO. They said they might go to China. And I tell them, what are you going to do?
Really go ahead. Go to Iran as well if that doesn’t work. And everyone’s laughing. But this was the main sentiment.
It doesn’t matter what we do to them. They have nowhere else to go. We’re the only game in town. And indeed, when NATO began to bomb Yugoslavia in 1999, The Russians, this is when they started to think this unipolar order is going to be the end of us.
We have to pursue multipolarity. So they started to speak about a trilateral deal, something with the Chinese and Indians. But that was way too premature. Neither the Indians or the Chinese had the capabilities or the preparedness to challenge anything that was US-led.
But I think a lot of this changed, especially since the global financial crisis. This is when the Chinese began to think that they had outgrown the US-led international economic system. And again, this is why it was quite important by 2014, when the Western countries supported the coup in Ukraine, This was about the same time as the year before the Chinese had launched their Belt and Road Initiative. In 2015, they launched this China 2025, which is missions to have technological leadership in this new industrial revolution.
They began to develop their own development bank like Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. So all of this began to transition out of the US-led international economic system and I think with this the Russians had finally their alternative yes they were kept being pushed out of Europe and from 2014 this is when at least I set the date that they abandoned this idea or goal of a common Europe or greater European home whatever common European home sorry and instead began to focus on what they consider to be greater Eurasia. So I do think that the multi-polar Eurasia has a has a bit of a future to it, because…
I remember actually wrote a book on it back in 2016 it was called the “Russia’s Geoeconomic Strategy for Greater Eurasia” and I was making that prediction that the Russian Chinese they’re going to probably go for a de-dollarization they’re going to do all they’re doing now and I remember i was told back then no no no, they’re… It’s a marriage of convenience. They will fight over Central Asia. But I think the fact that they’re accepting multipolarity is something that is easier to align interests.
Because we often condemn the Russians for having a sphere of influence. But I think it’s more accurate to say they have a sphere of interest, which means… they don’t demand exclusive influence in their own neighborhood but when you’re operating on their doorstep you have to take into account their interests, and the Chinese do this when they go into Central Asia, unlike the Europeans and Americans are trying to decouple the region from Russia, the Chinese attempt to harmonize interest and accommodate the Russians simply because of self-interest.
I think Russia has become the most important partner of China simply for the connectivity across Eurasia so… So I don’t think it has to be disrupted. I think what could create tensions is that China is much more economically at least powerful than Russia. And if Russia becomes too dependent on China in this asymmetrical interdependence, then they will become a bit uncomfortable what this means for their political autonomy.
But this can be overcome by having some strategic autonomy in key industries, as well as if they diversify their economic connectivity. And so far, the Indians haven’t really opposed this. When the Russians align themselves a bit towards India or any other countries, they don’t display any hegemonic ambition. In other words, saying all roads have to go only to China.
I don’t see any conflicts, at least in the foreseeable future, but again, the future will always change. So…
Arman: Can I add a couple of observations? First of all, marriages of convenience are nothing to sneeze at, and according to some data, arranged marriages are more stable than marriages by love. So I don’t know if the analogy works for international relations, but I think one can probably make a case. So indeed, if it’s convenient and the Chinese-Russian alliance is very convenient, I think there is no reason to believe that it’s going to become inconvenient anytime soon.
And as long as they jointly feel that their interests are being infringed upon by the West, as long as they feel like the United States and its Western European allies have hegemonic ambitions, and in the case of China also they have to worry about about the participation of Australia, Japan, South Korea, in some kind of an anti-Chinese coalition. So the alliance and the close relationship with Russia is going to be very valuable. Now, there is a lot of talk about the natural conflicts between two giant countries like China and Russia, which cannot be avoided.
It may be true, but again, I think they have to make important trade-offs and it’s easy to see what their priorities are. And as long as they are in this geopolitical environment, I think… all these other latent conflicts between Russia and China should be easily managed. Now, having said that, as somebody who has certain realist proclivities, I also cannot rule out the possibility that if and when the Western hegemony has completely declined, And the Russians and the Chinese don’t have to worry about a common threat, a common adversary, be it militarily or economically. They are going to start worrying about each other.
The conflicts that exist between them, the natural conflicts that exist between them. may start becoming more important. What happened between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Second World War, right? So that is always a possibility. But I think in the visible future, in the foreseeable future, counting on Russia and China having serious conflicts, or this Russian-Chinese rapprochement petering out, I don’t think that’s correct.
One last point about this. The Russians actually, since the 80s and early 90s, preferred integration with the Western institutions. I mean, this idea of a common European home, and they made all sorts of efforts to be integrated into the West, to become part of the West, and they were rebuffed. And there is no sign on the horizon that that attitude toward Russia is going to change, even if we agree that part of it now is of Russia’s doing, it doesn’t matter, right?
So in the foreseeable future, the relations between Russia and the West are unlikely to improve so dramatically that they will give up on their close ties to Russia, to China, I’m sorry.
Asbed: Okay. So India, China, Russia, these are founding members of BRICS, which is a loosely federated, let’s say, alliance of economies in the world. Some of their goals involve reducing reliance on dollar-denominated trade, countering the West’s power to… impose sanctions on any countries. How do you see BRICS transforming the emerging multipolar world?
And what specific economic and political advantages does it offer to its members? Arman?
Arman: Well, I think this is related to something I said a little while ago, which is in the mid-90s, in the early 90s, mid-90s, a lot of the countries that are striving to become members of BRICS would not even contemplate such a move, would not even contemplate the creation of such an organization. because they would know what consequences it would have in terms of alienating the West or triggering some economic reaction from the West or political reaction from the West.
I think that fear has subsided simultaneously with these countries feeling… that the Washington consensus and this neoliberal globalization consensus that governed international political economy under Western hegemony for a very long time, since the 80s, since the 90s, I think a lot of these countries feel that their interests are not being taken into account sufficiently. that this is an international economic system that disproportionately benefits the West and sometimes harms their interests. And they don’t fear doing something about that.
And I think it’s one of the main reasons for the impetus to create such an organization or to join such an organization. and a lot of the economic decisions are precisely the consequence of this feeling that the existing status quo, international economic status quo, is not fair and doesn’t meet their interests. I think there is also a political dimension to it. It doesn’t amount to an alliance by any stretch of the imagination, but I think as a political bloc, It is quite significant and it allows them to coordinate certain political actions and certain political attitudes and steps. So I think this is important in that respect as well.
Hovik: And one thing is really interesting and indicative about the changing world and
Arman: what BRICS signifies. So you mentioned earlier briefly the fact that even Turkey is striving to become a member of that. a NATO member trying to become a member of another political club that was not very friendly to the United States or the West during the Cold War. That’s really unimaginable. But it shows how the kind of coherence that the Western alliance structure had during the during the Cold War and in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War is not there anymore.
And the second aspect of it is also like a lot of countries would fear to build such close ties with Iran, with a country like Iran, which is seen Well, it’s one of the members, card-carrying members of the axis of evil, right? And, you know, a couple decades ago, even China and Russia would think twice to cozy up to Iran to the degree that they have now, but they don’t fear it anymore. and countries like Iran are happy to join BRICS.
And the final thing is even countries like India and China, which are traditional adversaries and have very obvious disputes and conflicts with each other, even they manage to cooperate. under the auspices of this organization, which also is interesting and shows how you have a certain clarification of this division,
Hovik: at least on economic issues between the West and the West.
Asbed: Professor Diesen?
Glenn: Yeah, no, I very much agree with this. But one can add that the reason why so many countries are gravitating towards BRICS is simply the demand, because the former is disappearing. I often make the point that very stable liberal economic systems formed under a hegemon like the Brits in the 19th century or American in the 20th was very much premised on the idea that could act as a benign hegemon. That is, if you have sufficiently concentration of economic power, it’s always in the interest, for example, of the US to have a very open system, which builds on trust, because as long as people trust it, they will have an open system.
They will have free markets, which means that American industries and techs, because they usually have tech leadership, there will be high quality, low cost, which can then out-compete other countries with higher cost and lower quality. So free trades and benefits. It’s also a good idea to have reliable transportation corridors for trade, because especially if you’re the one controlling them, And, of course, if you trust the system, then you also use the American banks, the currency. So it’s a good system.
You have all the incentives to develop trust. Now, what you see with the declining hegemon is more of a willingness to use all of these administrative powers over the international economy to prevent the rise of rivals, to punish them. And this is what you see for the United States. It’s not anymore pretending that sanctions against China is aimed at because of human rights.
They’re very openly saying, we can’t compete. Let’s see how we can sabotage. And same with Russia. They grew too powerful.
Let’s cut off their energy.
Let’s try to weaken them either through war, or with this economic measures but anyways I I think that because of this the rest of the world’s watching this uh disruption of supply chains by going after China uh seizing the sovereign funds of Russia threatening secondary sanctions this is not a good economic system it doesn’t really create any trust and especially with Trump now as well he well I think he he tries to build this politics on being unpredictable so uh so you know in economics you want predictability so you want alternatives in such a system when the economic hegemon is no longer reliable and i think that’s why the bricks is attractive exactly because it is decentralized it was just replacing an American with a Chinese then both could use it but the fact that bricks is used to economic coercion but given that bricks is very decentralized in many ways it’s It allows for countries exactly to diversify.
That’s the beauty of BRICS. It’s not to integrate under a Chinese hegemon. It’s to be able to diversify. And this is what Turkey or any other country want.
They don’t want to join a Chinese club or… It would be excluded to an American club. They want to have good connections with all centers of power. So in this respect, it could be wrong to compare NATO and BRICS because NATO is an alliance that is country A and B against country C.
If you look at BRICS, the Indians aren’t anti-American. They just don’t want to have to have Washington’s approval if they wanted to trade with China. And this is why I also thought it was fascinating when BRICS expanded, because you can bring in, you know, the United Arab Emirates and Iran, you can have in Egypt and Ethiopia. These are not allies against third countries.
They’re deeply suspicious of each other. So it’s seen as a way to, yeah, it has a multipolar format and doesn’t use this aligned system of divide and rule. So I think this is what is appealing to most countries. So again, it’s a huge demand for BRICS.
Asbed: Yeah, it seems to me like in the 20th century, we had military poles, basically. Let’s call it the Warsaw Pact and NATO. And now we’re going towards more of a West or Western financial economic system against BRICS, the rest of the world, which is also an economic alliance. But I want to ask you about this issue.
BRICS and how much value it has provided in the 12 to 15 years that it has existed because it has a New Development Bank, I think. I’m not sure what projects exist under it. And China has its Belt and Road and there’s INSTC for India. Within the context of BRICS, do these things compete with each other?
And do you see these in the long run coming together to form a greater infrastructure for BRICS members?
Glenn: Yeah, I think, well, they don’t have a clear plan moving forward, but I think most countries actually prefer this loose format because if we try to go down like an EU path, I heard some people suggest parliaments and all that, then I think a lot would be turned a bit away from it.
So yeah it’s also I think to a large extent about the harmonizing this interest because uh you know countries will still have competing interests but this is what was fascinating with how the Chinese and Russians were solving their economic differences because if you look at central Asia the Chinese they have the belt and road initiative in which their influence economic influence growing great, and that Russians wants to institutionalize some more political influence through the Eurasian Economic Union and they you know how do you prevent them from clashing well then you see the belt and road initiative uh harmonizing a bit with the eurasian economic union under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, so I think this is kind of the model that the BRICS is going for.
Arman: If I may add a word, I think what also is interesting about BRICS is its openness and its relatively… How should I describe this? Relatively… Well, yeah, I guess it’s open nature in the sense that you can have multiple types of economic relationships which does not… preclude you from membership in the BRICS.
And the reason I’m bringing this up is to compare it to the conditionalities of EU membership, for example, right? And not only these conditionalities to begin with are quite stiff and hard to match, but it is also an exclusive club. Yeah, that’s the word I was looking for. So the BRICS does not define itself as an exclusive club where if you’re a member of that club, you can’t be a member of anything else.
So, for example, you can be a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and you can be a member of BRICS and nobody is going to tell you you can’t do both. But you can’t be a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union at the same time. If you remember the negotiations that Ukraine and Armenia were engaged in with the EU, this was one of the most important issues. So, the Ukrainians and Armenians were trying to convince the Europeans that perhaps there could be a way to maintain their relations with Russia and their membership in the Eurasian Economic Union while they were going to become part of this process of association.
It was called association negotiations. And they were told in no uncertain terms that you have to make a very sharp and hard choice. I think that’s, as far as I know, that’s not the case for BRICS.
Glenn: But that’s also why it’s attractive, because when you’re in NATO, the Americans will tell you, either with us or… you’re inside or outside, with us or against. But in BRICS, there’s no such thing. If Turkey would want to join the BRICS, the Americans will tell them no, but BRICS isn’t going to tell them you have to leave NATO.
And I think this is… yeah what arman is uh yeah very good to point out that is this flexibility that it doesn’t have an alliance structure because even the chinese they’re very explicit they don’t want to be a part of an alliance uh so they they conceptualize it as something else so uh yeah sustainable economic infrastructure
Hovik: If I just may add one more question, and I know we’re running low on time, but as an Armenian, what is important, I think what is topical for us is whether Turkey could eventually leave NATO. And I don’t know which one is more dangerous for Armenia, a Turkey outside of NATO or a Turkey inside of NATO, but because in both cases, Turkey seems to be able to extract its interests. And, you know, we see NATO, for instance, compromising, NATO countries compromising a lot on issues in the caucus in the favor of Turkey and Azerbaijan. But how difficult is it to crack NATO and how do you see that developing in any case?
Arman: So, first of all, I don’t think it would be good for Armenia, for Turkey to leave NATO. because then the alternative security structure that Turkey is going to become a member of or build a relationship with is going to be Russia-centered in all likelihood. And any bargaining, any rapprochement, which already has happened, by the way, any rapprochement between these countries, Any attempt by the Russians to entice Turkey to leave NATO and to build closer relations with them is going to involve some concessions and some horse trading with Turkey. And among other things, Armenia’s interests may be bargained away.
So I actually made this argument in 2010 when there was the first major spat between NATO and the United States after the Mavi Marmara incident. And a lot of my fellow Armenians were so happy about the seeming break in the relations between Turkey and the United States. And I’m like, I’m not happy about this. I’m scared of this.
So that’s number one. Number two, I think part of the reason why Armenia’s interests have not been properly considered in a lot of these geopolitical games, the responsibility for it squarely lies with the current Armenian government. They have made all sorts of terrible calculations. First, before the war, assuming that extraordinarily hardline position, which was justified neither by the distribution of power, nor by the diplomatic environment, with their main ally telling them that the status quo cannot be sustained and they cannot underwrite a policy that sustains the status quo created by the ceasefire of 1994 indefinitely.
The Armenian government essentially told everybody to go to hell. And I think they even believed that they could win that war for reasons that are completely mysterious to me, given the fact that even the Armenian Armed Forces General Staff had issued a very pessimistic report two months before the war. And you might think that they would have sobered up after the war, after the catastrophe of 2020, but now they seem to have embarked on a new grandiose project, which is making Armenia part of the West and bolting out of the Russian orbit and the Russian sphere of influence.
And I think the war in Ukraine was a true disaster for Armenia for many reasons, including the the geopolitical uncertainty that resulted from that war and gave the countries in the region, including Armenia, all sorts of bad incentives. And the Armenian government, some part of the Armenian elite, I should say, they have been thinking about this policy as the optimal one, on the one hand, because the Russians are too busy to punish us, on the other hand, because the Russians are too busy to help us in case we’re subjected to any pressure from Azerbaijan and Turkey. So Russians have become less and less relevant, if not irrelevant altogether.
So we have no choice but to turn to the West. which I think is an absolutely suicidal policy. And I think they bear a major responsibility for what’s happening there. And it’s not simply other geopolitical actors not taking Armenia’s interests into account. So this is actually our interest for the next question.
Hovik: Maybe Professor Diesen would also have…
Asbed: I was actually going to ask Dr. Diesen to sound off on that.
Hovik: Especially, like, I’m really interested on the NATO part. Like, how easy… Because reading your book, I was just terrified at how much influence, Professor Diesen, that all these think tanks, the military industrial complex, has over NATO policies. So, you know, I just can’t comprehend how all these powers would allow someone like Turkey to leave NATO.
Just your thoughts on how that could happen or how difficult or easy that even is.
Glenn: Well, I think the wider problem for NATO is that its whole approach to security, again, the hegemonic piece that this has fallen apart. I think the whole premise of expanding NATO was that we will have security. We don’t have to take into consideration anyone else because we’ll be so powerful. Now that this is falling apart, a lot of the logic behind NATO is gone.
Now it suddenly looks like a military bloc with the main purpose is to deal with the security concerns that derives from its own existence. And so a lot of this, especially in Ukraine, I think several of Eastern European countries, I’m thinking that primarily Hungary, Slovakia, they wanted to join. They didn’t want to leave, but they thought they were joining a defensive campaign. alliance which could deter. And now it’s an alliance which is taking them to war with Russia.
They see not just security concerns, they see economic problems from this as their energy gets cut off, the other Europeans don’t stand up for them. At some point, I think the Germans will also begin to put some questions whether or not this has been good. So, no, I think it’s hard to say. Because on one hand, this concern about Russia solidifying some unity as an external threat.
On the other hand, I think NATO has… it will have been shown to be in such a failure, that in terms of triggering war, failing to lose and the whole again hegemonic system not working, so I think as yeah governments around especially Europe fail to live up to well defending basic national interest they’re well this is what we see now a growing crisis of political legitimacy.
There’s a lot of European governments on shaky grounds not just European, there’s a reason why people voted for Trump, they they didn’t have much… it was crisis of legitimacy in the Biden white house as well so people are looking for radical alternatives and again Trump could end this whole thing. I don’t think he would, but the whole equation, keep in mind that the we always had this partnership where the Americans paid for security in return they got political influence in Europe.
The europeans always wanted a little bit autonomy, the Americans already always wanted Europeans to pay a little bit more but now you see all of this thrown out the window now , America They demand more loyalty and they have less finance or funding for Europe. So I think something’s going to crack at some point. But again, I realized I could be wrong on this as well because there’s a lot of money and political will behind keeping NATO.
Asbed: Yeah, but you mentioned Czechoslovakia. We have the Baltics. We have Armenia, Azerbaijan, all these countries. we’re going to have all these small interstitial states in a multipolar world. And we were recently talking to Professor Pascal Lottaz of Neutrality Studies, who also believes strongly that these small countries in a situation like this better, their best bet is to stay neutral.
So how should they behave to survive the current world hurricane, let’s say?
Glenn: Well, I think there’s a benefit in terms of an economic block that is like the European Union, but not the way it’s working now with a whip instead of a carrot. But there’s a general interest. I mean, this is the same as the Asian Economic Union. If you’re between Europe and China, it’s better to seek collective bargaining power.
And I think the small countries in Europe benefit from the same. The problem is as a security block or military alliance, It will always be dependent on some tensions with your neighbor. And again, this is the worst thing for alliances, when peace breaks out and the whole logic for maintaining it goes away. So I think…
I think moving towards a neutral posture would be much better. But I actually do believe, as I said, that some form of collective bargaining in the economic sphere is quite helpful. I just think the European Union has failed to deliver at the moment.
Asbed: Do you see the European Union actually staying together in the new world or is it going to splinter into a bunch of regional states like France and Germany being the same as Turkey, for example, or can it collectively stay together with a 450 million population and an economy that’s the size of China essentially?
Glenn: it could stay together, but I think the glory days are behind it and the ability to deliver, um, proper tangible benefits for its member states, I think is also weakened, but, uh, it’s, uh, Yeah, no, I think it will be more dysfunctional if it’s able to stick together. But it’s done too many mistakes, I think. But again, this is part of the problem of the EU. They can, when you have a regional integration is a good way is to distinguish between functionalist and the federalist.
The functionalist will integrate where it makes sense for governance, security, and economy. The federalist will integration seeks to centralize power as a goal on its own to emulate state structures if you will and I think this is what the Europeans have done by a lot of decentralization of power has gone against economic logic as well as governance so i think with BRICS, for me, was an important moment when the EU brought out the whip and wanted to punish Britain, as opposed to, yeah allow it to go its own way. So… No, I think the EU will have its economic crisis and then most likely something will break.
But again, it could hold back together, but it’s not going to be able to deliver many goods anymore, I think, for its member states.
Arman: If I may add a couple of things, both to this question and to the previous one about neutrality. So I think what is going to be quite important for the coherence and stability of the European Union is what’s happening domestically in a lot of the European countries, namely the very visible turn to populism and the very visible the very visible reality that the current status quo, the socioeconomic status quo, the political status quo, the issues with immigration, etc., etc., that they have stopped being manageable within the old system, within the old political assumptions. So there is tremendous pressure.
I mean, who would have thought that a political party like AFD would even remotely have a chance in German politics 10, 15 years ago, right? So this is important. It’s going to have very important implications. for the European Union. And Brexit was not just some kind of a strange British spasm.
I think it’s a representative example of a larger trend that exists elsewhere in Europe. As far as the issue of neutrality is concerned for these small states, So, first of all, I think some countries, well, probably they want to be neutral and they could be neutral. It’s the right thing. But sometimes they are under tremendous pressure not to be neutral and to join… to join some kind of a coalition.
Recently, I was watching a very interesting interview by a Swiss diplomat. I had no idea that this is the case, but the Swiss neutrality has been quite significantly curtailed in recent years under American pressure. And so neutrality is not simply the free choice of particular countries, especially if they are small countries. They can come under pressure to join some kind of a coalition.
So that’s number one. Number two, it’s interesting what happened in Georgia in recent months. We know that Georgia was under similar pressure. Even though no explicit guarantee was being given to Georgia, Georgia was being essentially prodded to pursue a policy of confrontation with Russia. and build stronger and closer ties with the West without the explicit guarantees.
And we know what happened with the elections and the Western reaction. And the West essentially took its mask off in Georgia as it had done earlier in Romania and in Slovakia, etc., etc. Now, as far as Armenia is concerned, I think I would prefer for Armenia to be neutral. and to settle its problems with all of its neighbors and all the great powers, to have good relations both with the West and Russia. But I don’t think in the near future that’s something that is feasible for Armenia.
You can’t have a policy of neutrality. You can’t avoid being in some kind of a wider security architecture if you have unresolved problems with your neighbors and if you’re much weaker than your neighbors. Then you’re simply a target for coercion and nobody’s going to protect you. So I don’t think Armenia can afford that.
But at the same time, I think the, I already spoke about this, the illusions that many people have in Armenia that they can switch the current security architecture without a problem and they can get something better if they reorient the country to the West, I think it’s extraordinarily dangerous as well as completely unrealistic.
Asbed: All right. Thank you very much, professors, Professor Grigoryan, Professor Diesen. We’re going to leave it there for today and we will talk again.
Hovik: This interview went by very quickly. We had so many other topics, but I guess that just means we have to have you back on our show again.
Arman: With pleasure.
Asbed: Thank you. All right. Well, that’s our show today. And this episode was recorded on February 6, 2025.
We have been talking with Dr. Glenn Diesen, who is a professor at the University of Southeast Norway and associate editor at Russia in Global Affairs. He’s also editor at Political Economy, Russian Foreign Policy and Eurasian Integration.
Hovik: And we’re also talking with Dr. Arman Grigoryan, who is an associate professor of international relations at Lehigh University. His research has appeared in various international security and political science journals and reviews. For more on our guests, you can always go to podcasts.groong.org / episode-number and, read up more on their bio on our website.
Asbed: Thank you for listening, everyone. I’m Asbed Bedrosian.
Hovik: And I’m Hovik Manucharyan. And we’ll talk to you soon. Don’t forget to comment on our videos. Thank you.