Warning: This is a rush transcript generated automatically and may contain errors.
Asbed: Has the Iran War killed the TRIPP, the Trump route? The April 24 commemorations of the Armenian Genocide by the Pashinyan regime: Commemoration or denial? The EPC, the Armenia-EU Summit, the Yerevan Dialogue. Is Armenia really busy or is Civil Contract really busy campaigning on taxpayer drums?
Hello everyone. These and other topics we will tackle for the Armenian News Network Groong Weekend Review for April 26, 2026 with Arthur G. Martirosyan who is a specialist in international conflict management with CM Partners.
Hovik: And folks, as April 24th was last week, we will be talking about that. But on behalf of Asbed and I, I would like to say that we stand in solidarity with Armenians around the world who are seeking justice for the Armenian genocide. So at Groong, we remember and we demand.
Asbed: Justice, justice, justice.
Hovik: On with the show.
Asbed: Hello, Arthur. Welcome back to the Groong Podcast.
Arthur: Hello. Thank you for having me. Hi, thank you. Pleasure is mine.
Thank you.
Asbed: All right. Well, with Trump extending the Iran ceasefire, let’s take a slightly different angle talking about the Iranian war. On April 22nd, Steve Witkoff said at a University of Miami conference that Donald Trump ended 37 years of Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in just six weeks, claiming Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev are “good friends” now, alongside agreements that were tied to the TRIPP, which is the Trump route, as you know. You know, whether the friendship is real is secondary.
For Aliyev, the priority is the Zangezur Corridor, also known as the Trump Route. Without it, there’s no real normalization with Armenia, and as a result, no progress with Turkey. Most analysts that we have spoken to across the Armenian, Russian, Iranian, American circles say that Iran has actually weathered the war at this point. And some argue that it’s even strengthened its positions.
What are your thoughts about the current status of the TRIPP project? Because this project was a subject of warnings from Iran. Essentially, it’s a red line for Iranian foreign policy.
Arthur: Well, it’s early to say how and when the This cycle of confrontation between the U.S., Israel, and Iran is going to end, but it’s obvious to me that the two sides, Israel and United States, haven’t achieved the goals that they had set in the beginning of this campaign, of this cycle. It’s now a war of attrition. where the direct impact on the U.S. is coming through the oil prices and inflation, obviously. For Iran, while Trump evaluates the cost of 500 million a day, I think it’s exaggerated. It’s also suffering economically from the current Hormuz trade blockade and the very aggressive American posture vis-a-vis trade with Iran.
How this is going to end, thoroughly to say, who’s going to blink first? I’m sure that there is some kind of miscalculation on the U.S. side, because being transactional, Trump always looks at the economic losses as the most important driver in policy making and decision making. And they are running into a civilization that holds some other values as more important than just the calculation of immediate economic losses. So who’s going to prevail in this tug of war?
Too early to say, but when it comes to TRIPP, it’s obvious that it cannot be accelerated much to the chagrin of Aliyev at this point, because it all is pinned now on the outcome of this cycle of confrontation. But we can also look into the future in scenario types. Let’s imagine that Iran prevails in this confrontation. Then it’s obvious that TRIPP becomes obviously not only unnecessary, but Impractical.
Right. Let’s imagine the other development. I mean, as a scenario, I’m not saying it’s the one that I wish to see. I’m saying it’s possible.
And the probability is hard to calculate at this point. But let’s assume that Israel and the United States achieve their goal. For Israel, I think the ultimate goal is not just regime changes they were talking about, but maybe some kind of dismantling of Iran as a state in itself. A very risky scenario, but not an impossible one.
Everything is possible. The question then will be what would it mean for TRIPP? It will mean that the region will be in chaos and TRIPP won’t be practical either. So no matter how we look at it and kind of future, I don’t see it becoming of importance for the players.
That’s one of the reasons why the Turkish side now is pushing for reopening the border with Armenia, hoping that that can invigorate the middle corridor. kind of rushing to connect and even presenting it as an alternative to Hormuz. There was an article in Financial Times a couple of days ago. That’s obvious, but that’s where the Turkey-Azerbaijan interest clashed somewhat, because for Aliev, it’s not so much the time, but what he gets, and he still insists that he needs the Zangezur Corridor as the package for the settlement on his terms.
Corridor is just one element in that package, because he also wants to secure potential return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia, the so-called Western Azerbaijan. He wants to completely finish any even historical claims to Artsakh by Armenians. That’s why they continue to run very active policies with the Vatican.
So the idea is that if they destroy all newly built churches in Azerbaijan, claiming that they were built by the occupiers, the ancient churches can be recodified as Albanian churches, and they can even establish the Albanian church recognized by Vatican in Azerbaijan, and that essentially will be their way of saying that Armenians have no place to return now. It was Albanian, it was occupied by Armenia, but no more. So that’s his strategy. I mean, that’s, we’re talking, we’re looking at TRIPP as the main element of that strategy, but it’s only a part of it.
And right now it’s hanging. I mean, it’s not, It’s obvious to me how and when they’re going to start even the logistical and construction operations to activate it.
Hovik: We talk a lot about, of course, being Armenian, we talk a lot about Armenia and Azerbaijan confrontation, but when you’re talking about scenarios, I believe you have roots in Georgia and I believe you may be there right now. Correct me if I’m wrong, but how are the Georgians… Okay, great. So how are the Georgians perceiving these scenarios?
And, you know, for Armenians, I think it’s another important component is the north-south communication. Do you think that the likelihood of a railway between Armenia and Russia through Georgia would increase if this Iran conflict, you know, depending on how this Iran conflict settles?
Arthur: Well, conversations about renewing the operations of the Abkhaz part of the railroad, which was obviously operational in the Soviet days, and then after the conflict in Abkhaz and especially after recognition of Abkhazia by Russia. These conversations have been going nowhere, but in recent couple of months of the rekindling of those conversations and speculations that it may be in the interest of the Georgian side indeed to reopen that railroad and to start working on reopening. Whether they’re going to do that or not, it’s too early to say because it’s a very sensitive issue politically for Georgians.
For some time among Georgian political elites, there was the sense that there should be no cooperation with the Abkhazians as long as they are recognized by Russia, and only pressure on the Abkhaz side through the Western allies can produce some movement in the direction needed by the Georgian side, and that is reintegration of Abkhazia. But time has passed, and it’s obvious that that strategy hasn’t worked.
So one other The other counter-strategy to that has been re-engaging with the Abkhaz as much as possible, kind of putting aside the issue of the Abkhaz recognition by Russia for now and creating new So that line has been held by a minority. Whether that’s going to change now But at this point, too early to say that immediately, depending on how the war ends in Iran, the Georgian elites are going to be able to refocus, group and do something that long term maybe is a more sound strategy, engaging rather than isolating, because isolation leads them to develop even stronger ties with Russia and new dependencies that never even existed before.
So now we’ll see what happens.
Asbed: Arthur, what I heard you say essentially about the Trump route is that given both of the scenarios where Iran survives and Iran could have problems. The Trump route will be somewhat deprecated. Given the fact that you said that Turkey is still pushing for opening the border, What are the prospects for peace, this peace that Pashinyan is promising for the South Caucasus? Does this also indicate that Armenian-Turkish relations and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations are starting to show some kind of a gap in that Turkey wants to normalize these relations regardless of the outcome of the Iranian war, while Azerbaijan may or may not?
Arthur: Well, Turkey certainly, as all other players in the region, have their own interests, and they are kind of in a precarious situation. Many analysts have been comparing this to a Turkish diplomacy of World War II, where they managed to stay neutral avoid the mistakes made by the Turkish diplomacy in World War I when they sided with the camp and that camp ended up defeated. So World War II behavior is kind of a model that is projected now onto this situation.
So Turkey wants to stay as much as it can neutral, understanding that A scenario where Iran is defeated and dismembered is even more dangerous for Turkey than Iran prevailing in this conflict, let me put it this way. Although that also has its own implications for the Turkish interest in this rivalry with Iran in the region in many different parts of Turkey. So, for Turkey, the main interest is to make sure that they stay out of getting involved on one of the sides and then The scenario miscalculation and the scenario that they were hoping to be with the winners turns out that they were with the losers.
So that’s their strategy right now, as far as I can tell. Azerbaijan goes. Azerbaijan has been much closer to Israel in its operations, and right now they’re kind of holding a little bit back. We’re not also trying to follow the Turkish strategy of not I’m not getting too much involved in this one.
But when it comes to reopening and the middle corridor, obviously for Turkey the time is of essence. Again, presenting it as an alternative relative to Hormuz as a solution for the problem for China and for many other players. I think that’s where Turkey is trying to gain more credit in this game for itself. Will the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey therefore be strained?
I don’t think so. I don’t think one issue will be that much important because there are so many other interests where they not only seeing eye to an eye but really have the same strategy essentially when it comes to Caucasus Central Asia and even as we could see very recently when it comes to dealing with with Russia via Ukraine, right? So that’s something that will be an issue for the next couple of years. I don’t think that’s going to be resolved by having some paper signed Islamabad, because no matter what they decide right now, the most important threats or perception of threats is not going to disappear.
All players in this game have their own historical perceptions of where the threat comes to them and therefore they act on those perceptions rather than on what can be declared by Witkoff or Trump as another success in bringing peace. So, and the same goes to Pashinyan. So, whenever he says that he has brought peace, it’s a hollow sound because, you know, to build peace and to talk about historical precedence of Germany, France, I mean, very far-fetched parallels. You really need two to tango because France and Germany under American protection after World War II We’re able to forge that cooperation.
In our case, it’s all very volatile and the weak side and Pashinyan thinks that by being weak and doing everything that other and other players demand from him, he’s going to achieve peace. That’s not even an illusion. That’s lunacy. Because other sides are going to only increase the list of demands.
And they’re going to, especially Azerbaijan, as I said, has a program that cannot be implemented by anything other than Armenia almost fully capitulating.
Asbed: Yeah. Well, Pashinyan thinks that Armenia is Luxembourg. Arthur, we’re in the midst of a second ceasefire in the Iran war by Trump. Of course, I think Trump is reloading and Iran is confident that it can survive the war.
But because Trump has pulled out of the Islamabad talks, now Iran has sent their foreign minister to, first of all, Islamabad for continued talks. And today, actually, I think he is in St. Petersburg to meet with Vladimir Putin. What do you expect from these talks through Russia?
Hovik: And I believe just one, because the stories I’ve read is that actually it was Iran that pulled out of the Islamabad talks, not Trump. But I wanted to get Arthur’s thoughts on that as well.
Asbed: Yeah, here in the US I’m reading that the Trump administration.
Arthur: It’s a very interesting situation. There’s a lot of one-upmanship going on. Especially players who like zero-sum games. They want to keep this reputation of a powerful player. here, that the other side has to follow you.
Both sides claim that they are victorious out of this, right? So who goes? Who attends? Who doesn’t attend?
Who calls first? All these things become, all of a sudden, very important, because they are not so much negotiating interest. They are, at this point, into face-saving. I think a week ago there was an article in the New York Times you’ve probably been following that Trump’s declarations made through social media were really harming the negotiations.
Why? Because he was saying things It’s true or not true, but they were leaving no space for face saving for Iranians internally. It was almost like they were about to do everything that he was demanding. Obviously, the Iranian side cannot accept that.
But even if they had agreed to some point, on some points, it was impossible for them to continue if the structure of the process was such where the other side can claim things that are not happening. I’m surprised that it didn’t happen. Going back to this shallow diplomacy by Archie and now taking him to St. Petersburg, it’s obvious that one of the sticking points in the negotiations is the fate of the enriched uranium, which is by some according to some experts, around 500 kilos a half a ton, which could allow Iranians to develop at least up to 12 ballistic missiles carrying those as a kind of nuclear weapons now.
It’s also somewhat mind-boggling that for so long the United States has been talking about the danger of Iran having enriched uranium, and that at the point where they have 60 to 80 percent enriched uranium, it’s a matter of a couple of weeks to create a nuclear capability. military capability. Have they done that? Have they not done that? That’s the uncertainty that is going to be in place for some time now.
It would be strange if they are not doing anything in that direction, but it would also contradict the earlier statement and FEDFA that they don’t want to develop nuclear weapons. Anyway, this is the sticking point, and even in the previous negotiations rounds, the Russian role primarily was in that Russia was agreeing to take the enriched uranium from Iran and that way resolve this issue.
And although Moscow has been proposing that same thing over and over, Trump was adamant that it is the United States that needs now to take that uranium, obviously either not trusting Moscow or both him and Israel not trusting that that deal would be held, right? And Iran would not keep some of that enriched uranium still in Iran without any other observers just between Russia and Iran.
But Moscow, I think, following statements of Lavrov and other Russian diplomats, I could say that for For Russia, that is still a viable option, and they certainly are going to continue to insist that they are ready to provide those services to put an end to this. Matt, I don’t think that uranium is The only question that needs to be resolved to put an end to this confrontation. There are other issues too. Does Moscow get more of a say in how it can help resolve some of the issues? issues between the sides, other than the fate of the enriched uranium?
Probably yes, because this has to do now with southern Lebanon, as we can see. It has to do with Yemen, and the Russian diplomacy will try to carve some levers where they can do something there to gain Some deals with Americans and maybe Israelis too in other areas of their interest, especially when it comes to sanctions, dealing with Europeans and whatnot.
Hovik: Mr Martirosyan, so April 24th happened in Armenia last week. It was the 111th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, essentially a decades-long series of events that culminated in 1915, but obviously it was not singularly happening on that year and it resulted in the death of 1.5 million Armenians and the removal of Armenians from much of their historic homeland, especially whatever is called Turkey today. Many Armenians also see the ethnic cleansing in Artsakh as a continuation of those policies. Now, watching the reaction from around the world, Vladimir Putin’s statement this year was pretty strong, it used the word genocide accurately.
And as usual Donald Trump again avoided that term which has legal connotation and prefer to use the term which Armenians also use but it refers to the specific events in 1915 only and not the 20 years that preceded that In New York Zohran Mamdani to me was a big surprise he issued a statement that used a genocide and also tied it to Artsakh and this is a big shift and I would say surprisingly good from the era of Eric Adams in New York whose tenure was overshadowed by corruption that included gifts from Turkish government or Turkish related individuals related to Turkish government and Trump of course the Trump Justice Department basically closed that case they withdrew the charges The Turkish government reacted very sternly to Mamdani’s response but so far Mamdani has not removed his or deleted his statement unlike JD Vance.
In Armenia Nikol Pashinyan framed the commemoration as a Narrower State Centered Identity Whatever That Means He Urged Armenians To Drop Any Demands Related To The Genocide And Warning Against Armenia Demanding Justice Even A Home And Also Specifically He Warned Armenians Against Demanding A Homeland Beyond The Borders Of Present-Day Armenia Or At Least Armenia That He Is Promulgating Because His Armenia That Yellow Pin It does not include Artsakh. I don’t know what else it doesn’t include. So what is your take on the events of April 24th this year, the commemoration events? And also, let me pose this devil’s advocate argument.
Isn’t Pashinyan right to say that we need to de-emphasize the issue of genocide? After 111 years, why bring it up, especially politically? And even worse, isn’t now bringing that up a security threat for Armenia?
Arthur: Well, I mean, I have a very short answer to that question, and that is The truth and justice cannot be security threats. On the contrary, once you drop your insistence on the truth, historical truth, and you drop your insistence that there be justice, you open the gate for more injustices. And that’s what Mamdani correctly outlined. And what’s obvious to all of us, If the crime goes unpunished, if there is no justice about one event, what prevents others to continue to do the same thing if they can get away with it?
In Pashinyan’s world, things are turned upside down. He’s claiming things that deal with the future, obviously, and that’s why it’s very difficult to dispute, right? If I’m telling you that it’s going to be safer if we do this, we won’t know, because it has to do with future, we won’t know if it’s really so or not until something terrible happens. He was saying that it was safer for Artsakh Armenians, even at the moment when already his Foreign Affairs Minister was saying that it was not safe, that there was ethnic cleansing in Artsakh.
He was saying, no, there is no violence and there is no pressure on Armenians to leave, when we knew that it was already happening. When it comes to memory, that’s a very important part of any identity. Nobody is calling for—I mean, look at what happened in Hungarian elections. Very few are talking about what is TISZA party.
Why TISZA? Because that’s an important river after the Trianon Treaty, after World War I, Hungary lost territories and the river that was going through bigger Hungary before that war is now going through five different countries and Hungarians ended up living in many neighboring countries. So that’s memory. Does that memory mean that the new prime minister of Hungary, Magyar, is calling to necessarily by force take those territories?
No. He says this is what happened, right? And that requires some respect and recognition. And that’s what Europeans have been doing in the case of Hungarians.
Why it should be any different in the case of Armenians? Why we should not remember that at some points these were Armenian territories or territories populated by Armenians Armenian culture thriving in those territories or at least present in those territories and why there should be a silence when the Armenian cultural presence is destroyed in broad daylight So what Aliyev did was an immediate consequence of what Pashinyan has been saying. Because if you are saying that history can be forgotten, that you can be closing some pages, yes, then we’re going to destroy your churches and we’ll claim that all ancient ones were Albanians, as I said.
That’s it. That will be him closing the page, not us saying beside the truth, historical truth, and demand for justice. The most important, the sancta sanctorum, the sacred right, human right to have property, right? The right that cannot be denied by the entire Western civilization is based on that right.
That right has been trampled in Artsakh. Their property has been taken away in broad daylight, right? I mean, it doesn’t matter. I mean, we can talk whether that’s an Armenian citizen of Republic of Armenia, not a citizen.
It doesn’t matter. The person had property. That property has been taken away. And there is kind of deafening silence from Europeans.
I didn’t hear them condemn the destruction of the church in Stepanakert. Did any one of them say anything about it? Well, destroying Buddhist cultural monuments is a crime that everybody can talk about. Destroying an Armenian church in the broad daylight in Stepanakert is not a crime.
It is a crime. I didn’t hear anything from the Vatican. We should stay by justice and we should stay by the truth. Again, I mean, people are trying to overly politicize some of this stuff and say if you’re standing by the truth and justice, it means that you want immediately lands to be Return to Armenia and whatnot.
I’m separating those issues from how we’re going to negotiate with Turks over what would be a just settlement of these issues. That’s different from recognizing that this is the truth and the justice has to be delivered. Some kind of repair needs to happen here.
Hovik: You can’t have reconciliation without any recognition of the truth.
Arthur: Right. I’ve been, for a long time, I’ve been standing by my own very simple formula, which is three Rs, right? So recognition is going to be followed by some repair and then reconciliation, whereas Pashinyan somehow believes that he can reconcile without repair and without recognition. Well, recognition can be rendered by just laying flowers and saying that you remember.
What you remember, it doesn’t matter. People died, that’s what I remember. And that’s exactly what the Turkish side has been after, right? Because if you look at what Ivan Erdogan in his statement had said, many people in the Ottoman Empire died of different origin, died in the Ottoman Empire during World War I.
Yes, Turks died, Armenians died. It’s almost like saying Jews died, Germans died in World War II, right? But who did it? How did it happen?
It doesn’t matter. So that’s kind of putting You’re putting a varnish on the crime, right? So you’re trying to put layers of varnish by the false humanism, as if you are so much about the loss of human life that you want to forget what exactly happened and how these children, how these women, how these elderly people were killed. The how part is not important.
Hovik: Arthur so on April 23rd as is customary every year a torch procession or torchlight procession was held in Yerevan and like previous years oh you were there okay And like previous years, the youth demonstratively burned the flag of the Republic of Turkey. This raised a ruckus on social media, especially with the Turks. Pashinyan, of course, condemned it, and his accolades condemned it. Deputy Chairman of the Turkish Motherland Party published a photo of himself in Armenia’s Republic Square.
Doing the hand siren representing the grey wolves. I don’t think anyone condemned this. But the loudest protest came from Azerbaijan who called it incitement of ethnic hatred and demanded that the perpetrators of the Turkish flag burning be punished and even more he said that it should have been prevented by the Armenian government.
The Azerbaijani MFA, of course, left out any mention of Aliyev wiping his boots with the Armenian Artsakh Flag Or the complete destruction of yet another major church in Stepanakert, which you mentioned Of course, the Azerbaijani MFA also left out the statement from Erdogan that Armenians are remnants of the sword So what are your thoughts on this burning of the flag? Is it political speech? Is it appropriate in the current circumstances? Or should it be viewed in the context of Pashinyan’s capitulative policies and actually denialist policies and people’s rejection of those policies?
Arthur: Well, I personally don’t believe that burning any flag or anything that is an important attribute of another country is something that we need. I mean, emotionally I can understand, but I don’t think that’s the right thing to do anyway. Whether condemning or saying that that should not be happening, I mean, things like that have happened in the U.S. There were Americans burning American flag.
I mean, but the consequences depended on the state where it happened, depended on the legislation. Now, when it comes to Pashinyan, it’s obvious that he has to condemn it so that He can find some space to continue talking to Aliyev and Erdogan. I mean, that’s obvious to me. But I personally think that it’s too politicized, too—even, I would say, unnecessary—topic that models the real discourse, right?
So what are we saying? Are we saying that We hate every Turk now, or we hate the Turkish government that denies the genocide. What is the statement that people who burned the flag wanted to get to the other side or to the world? I mean, what is it that we are trying to say here?
I’d stay out of that. I mean, because for me, I mean, I’ve been long thinking about this issue and, well, this question in my mind, are they responsible? If you’re a Turk, are you responsible for what was done by your predecessors today? And my answer to that, I mean, the closest I’ve gotten is from a German philosopher and a jurist and a writer, Bernhard Schlink. who said, yes, they are if they are denying it.
And no, they are not if they are saying that it did happen. So do all Turks deny that it happened? No, of course not. But do all Turks stand by their flag?
Yes, they do. Do I want to offend those Turks who do not deny? Of course not. I don’t want that.
And I think we need to find a real new ways of communicating, even symbolically communicating, about where we stand on those issues, without necessarily offending anyone, just getting to the point which is about historical truth and justice. That’s what we want. and it does not necessarily need to be done that way. Is the Turkish government that is denying right now culpable? Yes, it is.
But it’s not by burning the flag that I can get this message out to all Turks. That’s where I stand. I mean, and I know that some people may disagree with me, so be it.
I mean, I just don’t believe that by Burning a flag we are getting because the point of any communication is to get the right reaction from the people who you’re targeting with this who do you think and what reaction do you want to get from them if they tell me if they tell me and they I can see that they achieve that reaction maybe I will understand better But it’s mostly an emotional thing where you are trying to satisfy the emotional moment of the people around you, not getting that message out. As to Aliyev talking about it or anybody else talking about it, I don’t even want to make any comments about it.
I don’t want to discuss what Aliyev has to say on the issue.
Hovik: All right. Interesting. Thank you for that feedback. Yes.
I mean, I personally, I think that whether it’s politically correct or not, I think that if you are a democracy, most democracies allow that as a form of protest.
Arthur: Well, let’s talk about democracy. No, no, no. Let me disagree with this here. It has nothing to do with democracy.
It has to do with liberalism. Okay. If we’re talking about freedom of speech, And if that’s an act of freedom of speech, yes, I can understand that. But let’s look at the flip side.
People start burning Armenian flag. What would be our reaction? Obviously unacceptable. Someone comes to Yerevan and shows the sign of the gray wolves.
Unacceptable? Totally unacceptable. But do we need to be become like them in doing that? Of course not.
And freedom, when it comes to freedom of speech, and I truly believe in some of the liberal values, it should not, you know, it ends, my freedom ends where it touches your body, right? I mean, why should I be doing things that are causing discomfort to so many, indiscriminately? Because, as I said, there may be people who stand by the Turkish flag or the Republic of Turkey for whatever reason. At the same time, they recognize the Armenian Genocide.
Why do I want to offend these people? What is the point?
Asbed: Arthur, looking forward to the June elections, the Pashinyan regime has stacked a number of high-profile meetings in Yerevan one month before the election itself. We have the 8th European political community, the EPC summit coming up, the Armenian European Union summit coming up, the Erevan dialogue coming up, and a whole bunch of preparations have started.
The non-commercial business flights over Armenia have been banned, schools have been canceled, there are videos of workers essentially terrorizing Erevan residents with jackhammers in the middle of the night all to make these venues ready for Europeans because Pashinyan is so interested in giving a clean beautiful look of Yerevan for them. Is this all theater basically a show for Pashinyan to set himself up for the elections or is there any substance to this?
Arthur: I think the Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia said we are not naive enough to believe that Armenia will be an EU member by 2028 or even 2030 meaning that after that maybe But I think for me, the issue is not so much the membership itself, how much you correspond to the criteria for that membership, right, on various issues. For me, the fundamental issue is your identity. Are you a European? And if you are European, what’s in that identity that makes you feel similar to them, right?
Do you have these things? Are you really a European? Do you behave like a European when you have to make the choice or when there are tough dilemmas? Do you make the choice that Europeans make knowing their values or you’re not making those choices?
These are more important, more fundamental things for me than all these gatherings, toasting, high-flown talks and whatnot. Obviously, Pashinyan will try to get as much out of these events to show to Armenians who have these aspirations of Europe and European future that he is taking us in that direction, when we all know that he does not, right? There are arrests of dissidents, there are arrests of opponents in the upcoming elections, There are all sorts of things that do not go well with the European. Look, many Europeans were calling Orban an autocrat.
He is an autocrat. But was he an autocrat? Did an autocrat allow fair and pretty much free elections and then was the first one to recognize his defeat? That’s a Democrat.
Yes, he may be illiberal. He may not share the liberal values that are this one, but who said that everyone should be prophesying liberal values and liberal democracy? He’s a Democrat. Do we have Democrats in Yerevan when it comes to Pashinyan?
Of course not, because we’ll see him as a Democrat if he when defeated in election yields power peacefully. And when that happens several times in the country, then we can talk about consolidated democracy. Until then, all of these gatherings, they certainly are going to be, I’m sure, Ursula von der Leyen, Macron, I would not be even surprised if they say a few words in Armenian, And they would say that Armenia has a bright future, European future, and whatnot. But let’s not mix those things with the real challenge.
Do we really believe that we have the same values as Europeans? Do we live by those values? Do we have the institutions that support those values? Those are more important issues to answer than to look about the tactical gains right here.
I’m going to get them all here, and they will tell you that soon you’re all going to get your Schengen visas in your passports, and you will be free to travel to Europe. So that they can go and vote for me during elections. I’m sure that’s what Pashinyan will be trying to get out of them, because for now they are not even saying the date, the time when any negotiations should have as a goal some timing, right? Right now they are not even saying when that’s going to happen.
Well, we’re doing everything to comply. This is going to happen. But when? What are the milestones?
How are we going to see when that happens? And to be honest, I mean, is travel, free travel or even work in Europe, is it the only thing that we want from being Europeans? Or is it really about other values, more important ones? Unfortunately, our population has been indoctrinated to believe that that’s a more important goal than being European.
Even the most pro-European ones, they are not often behaving in tune with the European values.
Hovik: You mentioned several times European values. I think that, to me, there’s big debate if those values as they were originally defined still exist. But Pashinyan continues his rhetoric of peace. We talked a little bit about that, but in the context of this European summit, you know, we recently had a discussion with Philippe Raffi Kalfayan.
It will be published today. This is April 27th. And he mentioned something interesting. He’s from the International Observatory for Democracy in Armenia.
Basically, I think the only independent international observation team there because everyone else is either from OSCE, which, you know, the E being the Europe or the CIS or, you know, so they’ll have some different observers.
But this one has been funded privately and he mentioned something very very stunning to me he said in his discussions with various officials they keep bringing up that Pashinyan I mean this is in the context of monitoring elections but they keep bringing up that Pashinyan is going to be good for peace meaning that you know he will I guess in my opinion I think that that means he will yield to anything to continue the present path now Let me clarify, did Pashinyan really achieve peace? I mean, you talked about it, but, and also, do Europeans really believe Pashinyan’s narratives?
Or are there other motivations, perhaps more cynical ones, at play? And what does this portend for European values, anyway?
Arthur: Well, I mean, when it comes to values, certainly there is a question. I mean, values of which Europe? What time Europe? Are we talking about Europe before the end of the Cold War?
Are we talking about Europe 19th century? Are we talking about Europe Renaissance? What Europe are we talking about? Which values are really the ones that define now.
And obviously, values are not something that is carved in stone, right? There is an evolution, there is change, and certain things have been changing in Europe. Otherwise, we would not You cannot see a major crisis in European politics. When you can see the leadership not really pulling the weight.
They get the vote, but soon their ratings are close to a single digit. It’s the crisis, and that crisis talks about the gap in values in those European countries, too. So the question is, okay, so what does it have to do with us, and do we really have peace finally? As I said, peace comes when there are major players who are interested in keeping that peace, and they are committed to do things to keep that peace.
Number two is when the parties who had the disputed land or whatever the cause of conflict was have really settled the issue. And number three is when there is trust among these parties to cooperate and create new value through cooperation. Let’s start with the third one. We don’t have the third one, no matter how much they’re trying to persuade us that the oil and grain that entered Armenia through Azerbaijan is a sign.
These are early signs of that cooperation. That cooperation is not there because there is fundamentally no trust between the parties. Okay, do we have then issues settled on the dispute? No, we don’t, because Azerbaijan continues to have territorial claims to Armenia.
Azerbaijan continues to insist that the area, much of modern-day Armenia, is Western Azerbaijan. So it’s not settled either. So do we have the major players who have a consensus that they’re going to are committed to keep peace in Armenia? I don’t think we do have a consensus among them.
It’s really a strange moment right now when they are too busy with other things to say that, well, we can go one by one why Trump believes that he has brought peace, why Russians believe that they have brought peace, why Other players are not so much interested in having a conflict rekindled here, but pretty much there is no consensus. So the minute there is going to be an opening when these parties are not going to be interested in committing to peace, and committing to peace means that they may engage even militarily if they see one of the parties violating the peace, that kind of commitment.
If that’s not going to be, well, what’s going to be sustaining peace when the balance of power is not in your favor? Only the scruples of moral scruples for Aliyev that war is a bad thing. Are you serious? Because I remember that in 2018, after his first meeting in Dushanbe, that elevator talk, of Aliyev and Pashinyan.
Pashinyan’s comment was that he saw that Aliyev was very cultured and very constructively disposed, really wanting a peace guy. Really? Reminds me Chamberlain talking about Hitler. So do we have peace?
No, we have Elal right now. And he’s selling that as a long term piece, as 100 year piece or whatever. What’s it based on? No one knows.
Then that piece is not a piece of paper and we do not even have that piece of paper, right? It hasn’t been finalized. But even if we had a piece of paper still without the elements that I mentioned, that piece would be very shaky. So that’s what we have.
But he continues to brainwash Armenians that to gain peace, he needs to continue to make more concessions. And in my book, the more concessions you make, the more the other side is going to demand.
Asbed: Arthur, a couple of weeks ago we were talking with Rant Mikaelian, maybe that was episode 531, and we observed that strong Armenia has good chances of entering the parliament. Hayastan Dashing is right on the borderline. depending on how things turn out. And then Pashinyan seems to be polling around 30 to 40 percent depending on which poll you look at. Are you monitoring the polls related to the elections?
What’s your take on the current state of who makes it into parliament? What happens?
Arthur: Well, I’ve been following some of the sociology in Armenia. I’ve run some surveys myself, and from my experience, the margin of error in Armenian sociological surveys is much larger than typical 3% in any other major services run. Unfortunately, we do not have an independent group that runs such surveys. Typically, they are invited from abroad to do that.
Or we have ones in Armenia that have one way or the other some political bias. And even if they don’t have that bias, it’s very difficult to eliminate something that exists in the Armenian political culture and manifests during these surveys. Armenians tend to answer the question the way they think the interviewer wants to hear it, not always answering the way they really think about the issue. There are different methodologies helping to correct that perception of such outcome, but I don’t think that’s a methodological issue right now.
So when I’m hearing Pashinyan has 40%, I take it with a It’s not really possible that he can have 40%. 30 and below, probably he does. How the other parties are going to fare in this round to the election day depends on how they are going to campaign, how they’re going to build the confidence of the voters that they’re going to really see an alternative to Pashinyan, one. And number two is that no matter who comes to power, it’s not going to be immediately a war, just because Pashinyan says that if you do not elect me, there’s going to be a war. So essentially, Pashinyan says no matter who you vote for, not for me means a war.
That’s also kind of an interesting interpretation.
Asbed: Well, he’s even hinted that if he doesn’t get supermajority, there will be war.
Arthur: Right, right, right. But I don’t think he’s going to get supermajority. votes are going to be distributed. I would not go by the current sociological data because it’s somewhat misleading in terms of the real situation. Because the real situation depends on two factors.
One is the turnout. And when people are asked, are you going to participate in the elections? Yes. Some say yes, they’re going to go, but they don’t go.
And there are some who are not saying they’re going to go, and they go, right? It’s Armenia. And number two is, so turnout is important. The higher the turnout, the worst the situation for Pashinyan and it can get to the worst for him if it gets beyond 75 percent then the other factor that is going to be important is obviously the ability of the opposition to keep the Undecided voters vote for the opposition, not for Pashinyan, and voting for the opposition, not for any political party, because they’re going to inundate that political space with parties that are going to just participate for one or two percent of votes.
It doesn’t matter how many votes they get. The main thing will be to participate and to really pulverize that segment of the undecided voters. So I think March will depend on how they’re going to campaign and how they’re going to get to the voters that you need to go to vote on that day, and you need to vote only for the parties that have a chance of getting to the parliament. And I think the opposition parties will have to come up with some kind of a statement to make it comfortable for any voter to vote for them, where they would say no matter how many votes they get, how many mandates they What are you going to get?
Once in the parliament, they will be forming a coalition to oust Pashinyan from power. Is that doable? Yes, that doable, but then there are so many challenges and even parties that are very close I don’t want to use even the word ideologically, but close programmatically, close what they stand for. They are not able to negotiate and make deals.
And that’s a very sad part of the Armenian and Romanian political reality, unfortunately, because the political field has not matured. Political parties have not matured enough to understand that it’s in their interest to somehow tame their ambitions, personal ambitions, and see the common good as more important than just gaining a couple of votes or seats in the parliament.
Hovik: On that topic, Pains me to talk about this, but we must. Now, it is widely known that Serge Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan did not get along, do not get along. So as the elections approach, that tension has surfaced through public jabs and mutual accusations. We have seen it happen from like sort of ancillary people around both camps, but it has never until now happened directly. between the leadership of both camps.
Even though Serge Sargsyan’s Republican Party is not running, the conflict has moved to the top level. In a recent interview in Russian, Robert Kocharyan, when asked what he might have done differently, said that he might have chosen a different successor as one of his chief mistakes or, you know, I think this is now an open split with participation of the major people who are viewed as the head of the majority of the opposition unfolding right before elections so I want to ask why why why are Robert Kocharyan and Serge Sargsyan so insistent on continuing these attacks and why now, who benefits from this?
And how does this portend for the opposition unity?
Arthur: Well, any polarization and polarization is in the interest of the powers that be. That’s obvious. Why it’s happening right now, I think it’s a question that the leaders need to, of these two political forces need to answer themselves. We cannot talk for them, but it seems to me that there are hurt ambitions and egos on both sides because blaming one side that they were instrumental in bringing Pashinyan to power and then counter blames that it was not them who brought them to power but they are in, as far as I understand, cooperating behind the scenes with Pashinyan and whatnot.
All this distracts the voter from the real issues. And again, it’s not good for mobilizing undecided voters to go and vote in favor of the opposition parties. I think the decision not to participate by Serge Sargsyan’s party was a sound one. But if Kocharyan is going to participate, is he going to be able to make it to the parliament with the 8%, 9%?
Or as his critics from the other camp claim that he’s going to pulverize that vote, not getting enough to get into the parliament? I do not know, but I’d say that why make sure that he does that, pulverizes? So if he’s going to get into the parliament with the 8 or 9%, let him get there. And if he’s not going to become part of that coalition against Pashinyan in the parliament, then that will be the verdict for that entire movement.
Until then, I think they need all to cooperate. That would be my call on all parties that want to think about Armenia’s future without Pashinyan and the path that he has chosen, because that path leads us to nowhere.
Asbed: Arthur, great discussion. Thank you for joining us today. It’s always great to hear your views and your Armenian values.
Arthur: Thank you. Take care. Bye-bye.
Hovik: Thank you.
Asbed: Today is April 27, 2026, and that was our Week in Review. Hovik, any comments to finish up the show?
Hovik: In the interest of time, I think no, just that…
Asbed: Hovik, you were surprised by Arthur’s response on the flag. What were your thoughts on that?
Hovik: No, I wasn’t surprised. I just think that when you take away all other rights and all their dignity from your victims, you should not be surprised that the only weapon that people have, their speech, is relied on more heavily than other parts. You know, so if If the Turkish government did not pursue its denialist policy then maybe a diplomatic solution could prevent people from protesting and burning flags, and the society as well would.
If there was a real chance of reconciliation happening right now society itself would also limit those kinds of behavior but it’s a bottom-up versus top-down approach and I think that as long as Turkey officially continues this policy of genocide, which now is focused on denial of genocide, then such manifestations of protest cannot be excluded. Am I for it? I’m ambivalent.
Asbed: So would you ban it, condone it, condemn it?
Hovik: Of course not. I have posted pictures of Turkish and Azerbaijani flags burning. And I don’t regret it, but because I see emotionally I think most Armenians see that as the only means of making a point right now diplomatically we’re in a capitulated position and we’re being told to forget about it, and you know I’m not preparing to do that. So now look if I was the leader of the country I wouldn’t condone burning the flags probably I would not burn, you know, post the parade to burn a flag in the Republic Square.
But as long as there is denial, I mean, what else can be done?
Asbed: Well, I guess I understand where it comes from. And as I was watching some of the videos and I was seeing that going on, I was also thinking that there is Freedom of Speech and this is political speech and it’s okay. Would I be happy if somebody was burning an Armenian flag in Turkey or showing the gray wolf sign and stuff like that? Absolutely not.
Hovik: But honestly, I’m going to allow them to do that.
Asbed: But am I going to do that? I’m not going to do that because I just… I just don’t think that it helps the dialogue of two people. It just gives governments the means to polarize their people even more.
Hovik: I’m saying about myself, I wouldn’t do it. Why are we introducing false equivalencies in the first place? The gray wolf sign is not the same as burning a flag. Why do we keep repeating this?
And why do we participate in that narrative? The gray wolf sign represents the complete elimination of Armenians. Burning a flag is a political protest. It’s a protest against the country.
Yes, it’s not pleasant, but it’s not the same as promoting hate crimes and promoting the genocide, which is what the gray wolf sign is. So please, let’s not contribute to this narrative, in my opinion.
Asbed: You have to add one more thing to that. that it was a deputy speaker of their parliament who was doing that. So it’s actually considered…
Hovik: I don’t care who it is. I think that should be criminalized.
Asbed: It’s very important who it is because if it’s some Mehmet who’s in the streets of…
Hovik: It’s not a deputy speaker.
Asbed: …versus a government representative, okay? That’s almost like government policy. They should be getting rid of that guy to say that’s not government policy, but they’re not doing that.
Hovik: Yes, but just a clarification, that was not a deputy speaker of their parliament. It was a Deputy Head of a Party. I don’t know how big that party is, but yes, I agree. So I’m strongly in favor that the guy who did that sign should be jailed in Armenia in the worst jail possible.
But that is not the same thing as burning a flag.
Asbed: Okay, I don’t believe he should be jailed, but he should be banned from coming to Armenia again. So that’s as simple as that. Anyway, well, there’s freedom of speech on this podcast. Hovik, we’ve been talking to Arthur G.
Martirosyan. He’s a senior consultant with CM Partners. In 1994, after graduating from Yale, Arthur joined Conflict Management Group with Harvard Negotiations Project and has since worked on conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, the Balkans, Africa, and Latin America. For more information, folks, just go to podcasts.groong.org/episode-number, and you’ll find a lot more links.
Hovik: SUBSCRIBE, LIKE, COMMENT, SHARE, and DONATE if you want. podcasts.groogn.org/donate. We would appreciate greatly any support that you provide and thank you for watching us. I’m Hovik Manucharyan.
Asbed: And I’m Asbed Bedrossian. We’ll talk to you next week. Bye-bye.